

जयराशिभट्टविरचितः

तत्त्वोपप्लवसिंहः

आङ्ग्लानुवादः

वी. एन्. झा

Chinmaya Research Series: 6

Tattvopaplavasimha
of
Jayarāśibhaṭṭa

English Translation

by

V N Jha



Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan
Adi Sankara Nilayam, Veliyanad
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Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa

English Translation: V. N. Jha

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Benediction

The *Tattvopaplavasimha* of Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa is a rare work on skepticism of Indian thought of eighth century A.D. The author has boldly criticized the means of valid knowledge stated by the various systems of Indian philosophy, i.e. Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Buddhist and Jain respectively by declaring the obliteration of all the principles. Although the tradition links it with the Cārvāka systems of thought, its study leads a reader towards a skeptical critique of all major systems of Indian philosophy. It is indeed a unique work depicting Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa as a great dialectician. Also the study of the text helps us understand the Pūrvapakṣa for without the understanding and negation of the Pūrvapakṣa, the Siddhānta cannot be truly established.

Prof. V. N. Jha, a renowned scholar of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa has translated the text into lucid English on the basis of *Bauddhabhārati*, Varanasi edition, 1987. The present book consists of an introduction, detailed analysis, and English translation. All these will be useful to readers. I hope that the publication of the text will stimulate further discussion and research. I am extremely happy that the Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan has brought out such a text on the system of Indian thought for future generations of scholars to edit and translate the text.

We are very grateful to Prof. V.N Jha for his unstinted support for all the research activities at Chinmaya International Foundation and its Shodha Sansthan. May God's grace and Pujya Gurudev's blessings be ever with him.

In Shri Guru Smṛti
Swami Advayananda
President, CIF

Preface

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa most probably flourished in between the later part of the 8th century AD and the earlier part of the 9th century AD (ca. 770-830) in Southern India. He was a philosopher, a skeptic, loosely affiliated to the materialist Cārvāka/Lokāyata school of thought. He is the author of one of the most extraordinary philosophical works in India, the *Tattvopaplavasīmha* (The Lion of the Dissolution of all Categories). Its palm leaf manuscript was discovered in 1926 in a manuscript library at Sanghavina Padano Bhandar, Patan by Sukhlalji Samghavi and Bechardas Dosi. The text was brought to light in 1941 by them and they assigned 8th century AD as the date of the text. This date was slightly modified by Sukhlalji Saṅghavi who placed Jayarāśi's *Tattvopaplavasīmha* between 725 and 825 AD, which, in turn, is accepted by Eli Franco (1987: 12–13). However, in the 'Preface to the second edition' of 1994, the date of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa was modified as 770–830 AD.

Cārvāka, also known as Lokāyata, is a system of Indian philosophy that assumes various forms of philosophical skepticism and religious indifference. It is named after its founder, Cārvāka, the author of the *Bārhaspatya-sūtra* which is not available today except some quotations here and there.

The present text of *Tattvopaplavasīmha* is often regarded as belonging to the Cārvāka school, which would make it the only extant authentic text of that school.

The *Tattvopaplavasīmha* reflects on various epistemological theories offered by various schools of thought. He critically examines a number of definitions of *pramāṇas* (process of knowing) accepted by various Indian schools of thought and proves that none of them are sufficient for establishing knowledge. Inference relies on inductive reasoning which cannot be shown to be universal premises. Testimony requires the reliability of the witness, which must be established by another the *pramāṇa*. Even direct perception cannot be established as true, because it cannot be distinguished from an erroneous cognition. Therefore, Jayarāśi argues that none of the sources of knowledge is valid and hence nothing can be known for certain. Jayarāśi also challenged the āstika establishment's belief in supernatural beings by attacking

their epistemology with different arguments in a Vaitaṇḍika style. One can find free use of epistemological terminology prevalent at the time of Jayarāṣi in this text.

Prof. V. N. Jha, a renowned scholar of Veda, Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā, and the Former Director, Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Pune, has translated this text into lucid English. He has arranged the entire text in a dialogue form and has translated it in such a way that the arguments become clearer and the reading of the translation becomes quite enjoyable. For translating, he has taken the text of Baudhabharati, Varanasi edition, 1987 of Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Rasiklal Parikhji. In this edition, at several places, the Sanskrit text is broken and those sentences do not convey any sense. Hence, Prof. Jha preferred to leave them without translation with a hope, perhaps, that in future a better manuscript of the text may be unearthed.

The present book consists of an introduction and a detailed analysis of the content of the text, over and above, the Sanskrit text in Devanagari along with its roman transliteration and English translation. At the end, an index of all technical terms used in the text has been appended, which, I believe, will be very much useful to the readers. It is a great pleasure for the Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan to bring out this work for readers and scholars of Philosophy. I am very grateful to Prof. Jha for allowing our Shodha Sansthan to publish this work which is of great historical importance. I am thankful to all my colleagues for carrying out all necessary works connected with the publication of this volume. We are very much grateful to Rashtriya Snskrit Sansthan, New Delhi, for the financial assistance, especially to Prof. Radha Vallabha Tripathiji, the Vice-Chancellor, for his kind support and advice. My sincere thanks to Prof. K. G. Paulose, Chairman, CIFSS for his kind support and guidance. At last, I pray Pujya Gurudev and the almighty God for their blessings.

Dilip Kumar Rana
Director, CIFSS

Acknowledgements

Some time back in 2010 Prof. Muraleemadhavan, the former Chairman of the CIFSS, requested me to prepare the English Translation of *Tattopaplavasīṃha* of Jayarāṣi for the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, New Delhi. I readily accepted his request because of my love for Śāstra and translated it. He also suggested that the translation will be published by the CIFSS which happens to be an institution affiliated to the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, New Delhi. I agreed to this also and the same translation is now being published by the CIFSS. I thank Prof. Muraleemadhavan for being instrumental to get this work done by me. Had he not requested me I donot think I would have taken up this work so urgently. I am also thankful Dr. Dilip Kumar Rana, the Director of the CIFSS and Dr. V. Sheeba for showing very keen interest in publishing this work on priority basis. They extended all technical help for the completion of this translation. I thank from the core of my heart the entire team of the Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan, Veliyanad, for preparing the press copy with all necessary improvements and seeing the book through the press.

Special thanks are due to Dr. Sheeba, Mrs. Sarala Suresh and their colleagues for properly typing the orinal text in sanskrit along with its transliteration with diacrtitic marks and for arranging the English tranlation text-wise. I am glad that they have added the sanskrit word-index also at the end of the book. I wish them all happiness and peace in their life.

I would also like to thank Dr. K.G Paulose, the present Chairman of the CIFSS, for his love and respect for Indian knowledge systems.

V N Jha

Introduction

The *Tattvopaplavasim̐ha* is the work written in the style of vitaᅇᅇā.

The Author of the Text

At the end of the book it is written that this work called *Tattvopaplavasim̐ha* is composed by Jayarāᅇi Bhaᅇᅇa. Beyond this nothing is known about the author.

Time of the Author

About the time of the author also nothing is certain. Looking at the internal evidence, we do find reference to Kūmarīla, Prābhākara and Dharmakīrti in this text and so the upper limit may be fixed as 750 AD. Similarly, *Tattvopaplavasim̐ha* along with its author's name Jayarāᅇi is quoted in the Aᅇᅇasāhasrī of Vidyānanda, a Jain scholar of 810 to 875 AD. On this ground Pdt. Shri Sukhalalji Sanghvi thinks that Jayarāᅇi Bhaᅇᅇa might have flourished before 725 AD (Cf. Hindi Introduction of Varanasi Edn.).

History of the Text

The *Tattvopaplavasim̐ha* was published for the first time in the year 1940 in the Gaekwad Oriental Series (No.87). This was edited by Pdt. Shri Sukhalalji Sanghvi and Prof. Rasiklal Parikh. That edition of this work along with the Hindi introduction of Pdt. Shri Sukhalalji Sanghvi was published separately by Swami Dwarakanatha Shastri in the Bauddhabharati Series no. 20 from Varanasi in the year 1987.

Form of the Text

The *Tattvopaplavasim̐ha* may be regarded as a work belonging to the category of vitaᅇᅇ-grantha. In a vitaᅇᅇ-grantha the main aim of the author remains to show how the others' views are wrong and untenable without stating the author's own views. Here too we find that Jayarāᅇi has criticised positions of all the three traditions of Vedic, Jaina and Bauddha philosophy on the concept of pramāᅇa and prameya. In the Vedic traditions too, he has specially engaged the doctrines of Nyāya, Sāᅇkhya, Mīmāᅇsā, Vedānta and Vyākaraᅇa and refuted them. He refers to the Jainas as Digambaras and refutes their stands. Among the Buddhists he takes on Dharmakīrti and his vijñāna-vāda-followers

and refutes their theories. He equally finds it difficult to agree with the language philosopher, Bhartṛhari and ultimately refutes him also.

This simply shows the versatile scholarship of Jayarāsi. He demonstrates equal command on all the systems of Indian Philosophy. Ultimately he demonstrates that no doctrine is logically tenable with regard to concept of pramāṇa (the process of knowing) and prameya (object of a true cognition). What is considered to be Truth can never be established through any definition. Therefore, there is nothing called Truth (tattva) or real as proposed by philosophers of various systems. He takes a pride even in saying that he has excelled even Bṛhaspati, the great teacher of the Cārvāka school of thought so far the creation of doubts is concerned. The Cārvākas seem to have accepted only one pramāṇa called perception and the four mahābhūtas namely, earth, water, fire, and wind. Jayarāsi demolishes this position also. Thus, although one may get an impression initially that Jayarāsi is the follower of the Cārvāka school, one will be disillusioned once one completes the reading of the text carefully. This justifies the name of the text as *Tattvopaplavasīnha* (Lion who ransacks all the believed forms of Truth of any system of thought). He says at the end of this work that something appears to be true only as long as it is not critically examined. In his words :

tad evam upapluteṣu eva tattveṣu avicaritaramaṇīyaḥ sarve vyavahāraghaṭanta eva. tathā

*pākhaṇḍakhaṇḍanābhijñā jñānodadhi-vivardhitāḥ,
Jayaraśerjayantīha vikalpavādījīṣṇavaḥ.*

Application of the Form

This text provides training as how to frame questions in such a way with a number of alternatives (vikalpa) that it becomes difficult for the opponents to take a particular position. Gautama mentions three types of discourse (kathā) in his *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1. They are vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Vāda is a form of a discourse which aims at discovering the truth. Jalpa is that dialogue which involves twisting arguments. Vitaṇḍā, on the other hand, is the form of discourse where the proponent is interested only in showing how the opponents' stand is not tenable and hence wrong without, however, providing any alternative view-point. Gautama defines it as follows :

sva-pratīpakṣa-sthāpanahīno vitaṇḍā (*Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.3) ‘A discourse in which the proponent neither agrees with the view of the opponent nor establishes his own view.’ Jayarāśi’s *Tattvopaplavasīnha* belongs to this category of discourse.

Content of the Text

The plan of work of Jayarāśi seems to be the following :

Since the reality of any thing is claimed on the basis of *pramāṇa*, it is better to challenge the very concepts of *pramāṇa* held by different system of philosophy. Thus when the basis or ground to claim something real or existent is demolished, the reality of those accepted *prameyas* gets automatically refuted.

Jayarāśi has challenged and refuted the general and particular definitions of *pramāṇa* of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Bauddha philosophers. He also refuted the particular definitions of *pramāṇa* as offered by Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya, Bauddha, Paurāṇikas and the Vaiyākaraṇa thinkers. While he refuted the definitions of all the four *pramāṇas* as developed by Gautama, Jayarāśi seems to have refuted the definition of perception of Sāṅkhya, but those of perception and inference of the Buddhists. Jayarāśi discussed all the six *pramāṇas* accepted by the Mīmāṃsā system and pointed out their limitations. The *aitihya* and the *sambhava pramāṇas* of the Paurāṇikas have also been criticised in this text. There is comprehensive criticism of the concept of *vācaka-pada* and *sādhu-pada* as desired by the grammarians.

The following are some of the concepts which Jayarāśi has particularly discussed:

1. *jāti* (universal or generic property)
2. *samavāya* (inherence relation)
3. *ālambana* (object of knowledge)
4. *atathyatā* (falsity)
5. *tathyatā* (validity)
6. *smṛti-pramoṣa* (erasing of remembrance)
7. *sannikarṣa* (sense-organ-object-contact)
8. *viṣayadvaividhya* (classifying objects into two category)

9. kalpanā (imagination)
10. aspaṣṭatā (haziness)
11. santana (series)
12. hetu-phalabhāva (cause-and-effect relationship)
13. ātman (self)
14. kaivalya (pure state without attributes)
15. anekānta (multi-dimentional perspectives)
16. avayavin (whole)
17. bāhyārtha-vilopa (denial of external world)
18. kṣaṇabhaṅga (refutation of the theory of series)
19. nirhetukavināśa (destruction without cause)
20. varṇa (phoneme)
21. pada (morpheme)
22. sphoṭa (conceptual form)
23. apauruṣyatva (non-human agency)

Jayarāśi has very cleverly discussed and refuted these concepts. It is a fact that all systems of Indian Philosophy do not accept all these concepts and while rejecting any of these concepts each system of thought offer a set of arguments. Jayarāśi equipped himself with these sets of arguments for refuting a particular concept and made use of one set of arguments at his convenience. For instance, concepts accepted by the Naiyāyikas, like jāti, samavāya, avayavin and ātman, are not acceptable to the Buddhists and the Buddhists developed a set of arguments to refute them. Jayarāśi adopts these arguments of the Buddhists to refute the Naiyāyikas and vice-a-versa.

English Translation

I have translated the text as it appears in the Varanasi edition. In this text it appears that the editors have followed certain principle of editing. According to which whatever is found in the manuscript has been kept unchanged in the running text and whatever has been added by the editors is kept in the brackets. If the addition is of the nature of correction in the text, the corrected form of the text has been kept

in the first bracket ‘()’. Similarly, if the editors have suggested some missing form of the text, that has been kept in the third bracket ‘[]’, and the broken text or corrupted text which does not convey any sense has been put into the second bracket ‘{ }’. I have not disturbed this policy of the editors.

I have arranged the text in a dialogue-form. While translating the text I have tried to make the translation readable, without, however, losing the content. Wherever I could not make any sense of some text I have put question mark(?) in the brackets. At several places the sanskrit text is broken and so while translating I had to keep it blank.



Abbreviation

जैमि.	-	जैमिनीयसूत्राणि
तत्त्वसं. का.	-	तत्त्वसङ्ग्रहकारिका
न्यायबि.	-	न्यायबिन्दुः
न्यायसू.	-	न्यायसूत्राणि
प्रमाणवा.	-	प्रमाणवार्तिकम्
वैशे.	-	वैशेषिकसूत्राणि
शाबरभा.	-	शाबरभाष्यम्
श्लोकवा.	-	श्लोकवार्तिकम्
सन्मति.	-	सन्मतितर्कः

Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāsibhaṭṭa

भट्टश्रीजयरशिप्रणीतः तत्त्वोपप्लवसिंहः

(Bhaṭṭaśrījayarāśipraṇītaḥ Tattvopaplavasimhaḥ)

Text with English Translation

0.1 ग्रन्थकरणप्रतिज्ञा

Granthakaraṇapratijñā

(Introducing the Text)

Text: 1

1.तां यात मुन.....

.....tām yāta muna.....

Translation: 1

...tām yāta muna(The line is broken, it does not make any sense.)

Text: 2

2. [त]त्त्वोपप्लवसिंह एष विषमो नूनं मया [सृज्यते].....

[ta]ttvopaplavasimha eṣa viṣamo nūnaṁ mayā [sṛjyate].....

Translation: 2

This text called (*Ta*)ttvopaplavasimha which is unique, not similar i.e. extra-ordinary, peculiar is (being composed) by me indeed. ...

Text: 3

नास्ति तत्फलं वा स्वर्गादि।

nāsti tatphalaṁ vā svargādi.

Translation: 3

Or there is no result of that (good, or, bad act) viz. heaven etc. (hell)¹

¹The Cārvākas do not accept either merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa) produced by good act, or, bad act respectively nor heaven and hell produced by merit and demerit respectively.

Text: 4

सत्यं, तावदा(दे)तस्य कर्मणः स भा.....

satyaṁ, tāvadā(de)tasya karmaṇaḥ sa bhā.....

Translation: 4

It is true but by that, of this act

(the sentence is broken and hence does not make full sense).

Text: 5

उक्तं च परमार्थविद्भिरपि-

uktam ca paramārthavidbhirapi-

Translation: 5

Even those who know the Ultimate Reality have said the following:

Text: 6

“लौकिको मार्गोऽनुसर्त्तव्यः अ[ति?]। लोकव्यवहारं प्रति सदृशौ बालपण्डितौ॥”
इत्यादि।

“laukiko mārgo ’nusarttavyaḥ a[ti?]. lokavyavahāraṁ prati sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau.” ityādi.

Translation: 6

“One should follow the mundane, or, ordinary path (a part of the verse is missing). With reference to the mundane behavior, or, inter-action both, a child and a wise man, are alike.” etc.

[2. बृहस्पतेस्तत्त्वचतुष्कोक्तेरपि तत्त्वोपप्लवपरत्वम्।]

[2. brhaspatestattvacatuṣkokterapi tattvopaplavaparativam.]

Text: 7

ननु यद्युपप्लवस्तत्त्वानां किमाया....

nanu yadyupaplavastattvānām kimāyā....

Translation: 7

Well, if realities are unsettled i.e. are not as they are presented by different philosophers (again, the sentence is broken).

Text: 8

“अथातस्तत्त्वं व्याख्यास्यामः”

“athātastattvaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ”

Translation: 8

Question:

“Now, we shall explain the reality.”

Text: 9

“पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुरिति तत्त्वानि तत्समुदाये शरीरेन्द्रियविषये संज्ञा”[] इत्यादि
 “*pr̥thivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣaye samjñā*”[] *ityādi*

Translation: 9

“Earth, water, fire and air are the real entities. The compositions made out of them are called body, sense organ and object.” Are these real entities?²

Text: 10

न, अन्यार्थत्वात्।

na, anyārthatvāt.

Translation: 10

Answer:

No, because they are made for something else.

Text: 11

किमर्थम्?

kimartham?

Translation: 11

Question:

For what?

Text: 12

प्रतिबिम्बनार्थम्।

pratibimbanārtham.

Translation: 12

Answer:

For reflection.

²This list refers to only the material aspect of the world. The Cārvākas do not want to go beyond that. Even time and space are not acceptable because these are not perceived. What to talk of self and mind?

Text: 13

किं पुनस्त्र प्रतिबिम्ब्यते?

kiṃ punaratra pratibimbyate?

Translation: 13

Question:

What is to be reflected upon here?

Text: 14

पृथिव्यादीनि तत्त्वानि लोके प्रसिद्धानि, तान्यपि विचार्यमाणानि न व्यवतिष्ठन्ते किं पुनरन्यानि?

prthivyādīni tattvāni loke prasiddhāni, tānyapi vicāryamāṇāni na vyavatiṣṭhante kiṃ punaranyāni?

Translation: 14

Answer:

The entities such as earth etc. are well known in the mundane world. When we enquire deep into them, even they are cannot be properly characterized. What to talk of other entities?

Text: 15

अथ कथं तानि न सन्ति?

atha katham tāni na santi?

Translation: 15

Question:

How do you say that (they cannot be characterized and hence) they do not exist?³

Text: 16

तदुच्यते-सल्लक्षणनिबन्धनं मानव्यवस्थानम्, माननिबन्धना च मेयस्थितिः, तदभावे तयोः सद्व्यवहारविषयत्वं कथं [स्वयमेव]..... ताम्।

taducyate-sallakṣaṇanibandhanam mānavyavasthānam, mānanibandhanā ca meyasthitih, tadabhāve tayoh sadvyavahāraṣayatvaṃ katham [svayameva]..... tām.

³If the world has an existence, it has to exist independent of its knowledge. Knowledge merely reveals the world. It is said *jñānādhīna vastusattā* 'the existence of an entity is revealed by its true knowledge, or, *mānādhīna meya-siddhiḥ* 'the knowable is to be established by its knowledge.' But that knowledge has to be a true knowledge. But how to determine that a knowledge is true or false? The Cārvākas hold that it cannot be.

Translation: 16

Answer:

Here is our answer. (You will agree that) settlement i.e. existence of a proof (knowledge) is based on its proper definition. And the existence of 'what is to be proved' (object of knowledge) depends upon the proof (knowledge). In the absence of that (the proof), how can (by itself) both, (proof and what is to be proved), be the objects of real reference...

Text: 17

अथ.... न ब..... व्यवहारः क्रियते; तदात्मनि रूपास्तित्वव्यवहारो घटादौ च सुखास्तित्वव्यवहारः प्रवर्त्तयितव्यः।

atha.... na ba..... vyavahārah kriyate; tadātmani rūpāstitvavyavahāro ghaṭādau ca sukhāstitvavyavahārah pravarttayitavyaḥ.

Translation: 17

Reference is made (the sentence is broken); at that time one should make reference to the existence of form in the self and reference of existence of happiness in pot etc.

0.2 न्यायसम्मतस्य प्रत्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा

[1. *nyāyasammataṣya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasya parīkṣā*]

Refutation of the definition of perception as accepted by *Nyāya*

Text: 18

[इ]न्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारिव्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्" (न्यायसू. १।१।४) इति तल्लक्षणम्।

[१. अदुष्टकारकेत्यादिविकल्पचतुष्टयेन अव्यभिचारिपदस्य दूषणोपक्रमः।]

“[i]ndriyārthasannikarṣoṭpannam jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri-vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam” (Nyāyasū.1.1.4) iti tallakṣaṇam.

[1. aduṣṭakāraḥketyādivikalpacatuṣṭayena avyabhicāripadasya dūṣaṇopakramah.]

Translation: 18

The definition of perceptual knowledge as given by *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.4 is “a perceptual knowledge is that which is produced by the contact between the sense organ and its object and which is not verbalized, which is not erroneous, and which is determinate in nature.”

Text: 19

तच्चाव्यभिचा[रि]..... किमदुष्टकारकसन्दोहोत्पाद्यत्वेन, आहोस्विद् बाधारहितत्वेन, प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्येन, अन्यथा वा?

taccāvyabhicā[ri]..... kimaduṣṭakāraḥsandohotpādyatvena, āhosvid bādharahitatvena, pravṛttisāmarthyena, anyathā vā?

Translation: 19

Here we would like to know such knowledge is called “not erroneous”, is it because (a) it is produced by a number of factors free from defects? Or, (b) because it is free from contradiction? Or, (c) because it leads to fruitful interaction with the world? Or, (d) because of anything else?

Text: 20

तद्यद्यदुष्टकारकसन्दोहोत्पाद्यत्वेन अव्यभिचारित्वम्; सैव कारणानामदुष्टता केनावगम्यते? तद्यद्यदुष्टकारकसन्दोहोत्पाद्यत्वेन अव्यभिचारित्वम्; सैव कारणानामदुष्टता केनावगम्यते?

Translation: 20

There, if you say that such knowledge is not erroneous because it is produced by a set of factors which are free from defects, we would like to ask how do you know that those factors are free from defects?

Text: 21

न प्रत्यक्षेण; नयनकुशलादेरतीन्द्रियत्वात्।

na pratyakṣeṇa; nayanakuśalāderatīndriyatvāt.

Translation: 21

You cannot say you know it by perception because the defects (say foreign particles) in the eyes are beyond the range of sense organ.

Text: 22

नाप्यनुमानेन; लिङ्गान्तराऽनवगतेः।

nāpyanumāneṇa; liṅgāntarā'navagateḥ.

Translation: 22

Nor can that be known by inference because, no other ground is known.

Text: 23

ननु इदमेव ज्ञानं लिङ्गं तदुत्थं तस्य विशिष्टतां गमयति;

nanu idameva jñānaṁ liṅgaṁ tadutthaṁ tasya viśiṣṭatām gamayati;

Translation: 23

Well the same perceptual knowledge will be the ground and that will cause the knowledge of its being special i.e. free from defects.

Text: 24

यद्येवमितरेतराश्रयत्वं दुरुत्तरमापनीपद्यते।

yadyevamitaretarāśrayatvaṁ duruttaramāpanīpadyate.

Translation: 24

Answer:

If it is so, it leads to the unavoidable defect of mutual dependency.⁴

- (1) A true perceptual cognition has to be produced by the contact between a sense organ and the object.
- (2) It should not be erroneous.
- (3) It should not be caused by the decoding process of language (avyapadeśya), and
- (4) It should be a determinate cognition, and not a doubtful cognition.

Jayarāśi is going to challenge all these criteria and ultimately he is going to demonstrate that they do not characterize any true cognition.

Text: 25

किञ्च, इन्द्रियाणां गुणदोषाश्रयत्वे तदुत्थे विज्ञाने दोषाशङ्का नातिवर्तते पुंव्यापारो-
त्पादितशब्दविज्ञान इव।

kiñca, indriyāṇāṁ guṇadoṣāśrayatve tadutthe vijñāne doṣāśaṅkā nātivarttate puṁvyāpārotpāditaśabdavijñāna iva.

Translation: 25

Moreover, if the sense organs are accepted as loci of healthiness and defects then, the doubt regarding the defects in the knowledge

⁴The Naiyāyikas provide criteria to decide what can be called a true perceptual cognition. The criteria are:

produced by the sense organ does not override i.e. remains as it is like the verbal understanding from a sentence uttered by a human being.

Text: 26

अथ बाधानुत्पत्त्याऽव्यभिचारित्वं ज्ञायते; बाधानुत्पत्तिर्विज्ञानस्य किं यथार्थगृहीतित्वेन, आहोस्विद् बाधकज्ञानोत्पादककारकवैकल्यादिति सन्दिह्यः?

atha bādhānutpattiyā'vyabhicāritvaṁ jñāyate; bādhānutpattirvijñānasya kiṁ yathārthagrṛhītītvena, āhosvid bādhakajñānotpādakakāra-kavaikalyāditi sandihmah?

Translation: 26

Question:

If you say that the perceptual knowledge which has arisen is not erroneous because there has not arisen any contradiction. In that case our question will be is it the case that there has not arisen the contradiction because the perception has revealed the fact or because all the factors which will produce the contradictory knowledge are not present there? This is our doubt.

Text: 27

दृश्यते हि बाधकज्ञानोत्पादककारकवैकल्याद् बाधानुत्पादः, यथा दूरे मरीचिनिचये जलज्ञाने जाते बाधा न सम्पद्यते, अभ्यासदेशावस्थितस्य कारकोपनिपाते सत्युत्पद्यते। सा चोपजायमाना संवत्सरादिकालविकल्पेन सञ्जायते, कदाचिच्च कारकवैकल्यान्नैव सम्पद्यते। न चैतावता तस्या यथार्थता उपपद्यते।

drśyate hi bādhakajñānotpādakakāra-kavaikalyād bādhānutpādaḥ, yathā dūre marīcinicaye jalajñāne jāte bādhā na sampadyate, abhyāsadeśāvasthitasya kārakopanipāte satyutpadyate. sā copajāyamānā samvatsarādikalāvikalpena sañjāyate, kadācicca kārakavaikalyānnaiva sampadyate. na caitāvatā tasyā yathārthatā upadyate.

Translation: 27

Answer:

As a matter of fact, we do see sometimes because of absence of all factors contributing to the contradictory knowledge, the contradiction does not take place, as for example, in the beam of mirage at a distance, when there arises the knowledge of

water, there is no contradiction arising at that time. But, when there is association of all factors, with the familiar place the contradicted knowledge does arise. And sometimes for the arising of the knowledge of contradiction it takes a year or so and sometimes because of absence of all necessary factors, the contradicted knowledge does not arise at all. But simply because of this i.e. simply because the contradicted knowledge does not arise, it cannot be justified that the perceptual cognition is true.

Text: 28

अपि च, बाधाविरह एव बाधासद्भावावेदकः तदुपलब्धत्वेन तत्सद्भावोपलब्धेः।

api ca, bādhāviraha eva bādhāsadbhāvāvedakaḥ tadupalabdhatvena tatsadbhāvopalabdheḥ.

Translation: 28

Moreover, the absence of contradictory knowledge itself suggest that there is contradiction, because the knowledge of absence of contradiction will cause the knowledge of contradiction.

Text: 29

अन्यच्च, बाधाविरहः किं सर्वपुरुषापेक्षया, आहोस्वित् प्रतिपत्त्रपेक्षया?

anyacca, bādhāvirahaḥ kiṁ sarvapuruṣāpekṣayā, āhosvit pratipattrapekṣayā?

Translation: 29

Still there is another point to be considered. Is it the case that there is absence of contradictory knowledge for everybody? Or, such absence of contradiction is only to that person who has perceived actually?

Text: 30

तद्यदि सर्वपुरुषापेक्षया... तद्विरहोप्य... [स]र्वज्ञाः स्युः।

tadyadi sarvapuruṣāpekṣayā... tadvirahopya... [sa]rvajñāḥ syuḥ.

Translation: 30

If you say, it is with everybody..... (the sentence is broken) then all will become all-knowing.

Text: 31

भवन्तु नाम सर्वे सर्वज्ञाः। को दोषः?

bhavantu nāma sarve sarvajñāḥ. ko doṣaḥ?

Translation: 31

Question:

Let everybody become all-knowing. What is the harm?

Text: 32

असर्वज्ञव्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गः।

asarvajñavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 32

Answer:

In that case we cannot make reference to someone as “not all-knowing”.

Text: 33

अथ प्रतिपत्त्रपेक्षया बाधानुत्पादः-प्रतिपत्तुर्बाधिकं विज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते तेन तदव्यभिचारि;

atha pratipattrapekṣayā bādhānutpādaḥ-pratipatturbādhakam vijñānam notpadyate tena tadavyabhicāri;

Translation: 33

Question:

If you say that not arising of contradiction is only with that person who is perceiving, and therefore since the contradictory knowledge does not arise, and therefore the perceptual knowledge is not erroneous.

Text: 34

तदयुक्तम्; प्रतिपत्तुर्बाधिकज्ञानाऽनुत्पादेऽपि देशान्तरगमन-मरणादिना मणिमरीच्यादि-विपर्ययज्ञानदर्शनात्।

tadayuktam; pratipatturbādhakajñānā'nutpāde'pi deśāntaragamanamaraṇādina maṇimarīcīyādīviparyayañānadarśanāt.

Translation: 34

Answer:

This is also not proper. Because, even if there does not arise the contradictory knowledge to the perceiver, even to that person it

is seen that there arises opposite knowledge, such as knowledge of mirage, when he goes to that place..... (?)

Text: 35

अथवा तद्विपर्ययज्ञानं तथाविधमेवोत्पन्नं स्वप्रभवस्वभावानुप्रवेशेन यद्बाधकविज्ञानो-
त्पादप्रतिबन्धकृत् तद्वशोऽपि तथाभूत एव परेष्टसम्यग्ज्ञानवत्। एवं सति यदुक्तम्- “यत्र
च दुष्टं करणं यत्र च मिथ्येति प्रत्ययः स एव असमीचीनः प्रत्ययः” [शाबरभा. १।१।५]
इत्येतदेवाऽसमीचीनम्।

*athavā tadviparyayaḥ jñānaṁ tathāvidhamevotpannam svaprabhava-
svabhāvānupraveśena yadbādhakavijñānotpādapratibandhakṛt tadva-
śo'pi tathābhūta eva pareṣṭasamyagjñānavat. evaṁ sati yadu-
ktam- “yatra ca duṣṭaṁ karaṇaṁ yatra ca mithyēti pratyayaḥ sa eva
asamīcīnaḥ pratyayaḥ” [Śābarabhā. 1.1.5] ityeta devā'samīcīnam.*

Translation: 35

Or, that erroneous knowledge being produced in that form because of its own nature, obstructs the arising of its contradictory knowledge. Even being affected by that it remains as it is like the true cognition, intended by the opponent. In this context, what Śābarasvāmin has said in his Bhāṣya on *Jaiminī Sūtra* 1.1.5 “where the instrument is defective and where the knowledge is erroneous, such cognition is called a false cognition.” Is also not proper.

Text: 36

अथ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्येन अव्यभिचारितां वेत्सि; प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यं फलेनाऽभिसम्बन्धः,
फलञ्च स्रक्चन्दनवनितोदकादि, तेषु सत्यफलनिष्पत्तेः तेषु फलोपचारः तद्वेदसम्बन्धः
प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यम्। प्रवृत्तिः कायस्था क्रिया तत्सामर्थ्यमव्यभिचारितां गमयति।

*atha pravṛttisāmarthyena avyabhicāritāṁ vetsyi; pravṛttisāmar-
thyam phalenā'bhisambandhaḥ, phalañca sraḥcandanavanitoda-
kādi, teṣu satyaphalanīṣpatteḥ teṣu phalopacāraḥ taddehasamba-
ndhaḥ pravṛttisāmarthyam. pravṛtṭiḥ kāyasthā kriyā tatsāmarthyam
mavyabhicāritāṁ gamayati.*

Translation: 36

If again, you know that the perception is not erroneous on account of its corresponding with the reality, then corresponding to the reality or prompting to fruitful interaction with the world, means

the association with the result and result is garland of flowers, sandal wood paste, women, water, etc. As a matter of fact, the real result is going to be produced in them. And by extension they are treated as result. Therefore, the association of body is in fact, the correspondence with the reality. The inducement is the activity in the body, the capacity of that leads to the knowledge of not being erroneous.

Text: 37

तत्किम् अवगतम्, अनवगतं वा?

tatkim avagatam, anavagataṁ vā?

Translation: 37

Question:

Here we want to ask: whether that capacity causes the knowledge after being known or without being known?

Text: 38

यदि नावगतम्; तद् 'अस्ति' इति कथं वेत्सि? अथाऽवगतम्; तदवगतेरव्यभिचारिता कथमवगम्यत इति पूर्वोक्तमनुसर्त्तव्यम्।

yadi nāvagatam; tad 'asti' iti katham vetsi? atha'avagatam; tadavagateravyabhicāritā kathamavagamyata iti pūrvoktamanusarttavyam.

Translation: 38

Anticipated Clarification:

If you say that it causes the knowledge without being known, then how do you know that it exist. And if you say that it causes the knowledge after being known, how does it lead to knowledge that the perception is not erroneous? Therefore, one will have to follow the same method of enquiry as presented before.

Text: 39

उदकप्राप्त्या पूर्वोत्पन्नोदकविज्ञानस्य अव्यभिचारिता व्यवस्थाप्यते; किं तत्प्रतिभातो-दकप्राप्त्या, आहोस्वित् तज्जातीयोद[क]प्राप्त्या, तद्वंशजजलप्राप्त्या वा?

udakaprāptyā pūrvotpannodakavijñānasya avyabhicāritā vyavasthāpyate; kiṁ tatpratibhātodakaprāptyā, āhosvit tajjātīyoda[ka]prāptyā, tadvaṁśajjalaprāptyā vā?

Translation: 39

Question:

If you say that if water is obtained after the knowledge of water, it is concluded that the knowledge of water which arose before, is not erroneous. There we would like to ask, is it so because one gets the water which was revealed in the knowledge? Or, because one gets water of that genre. Or, because one gets water of the same family?

Text: 40

तद्यदि प्रतिभातोदकप्राप्त्या; तदयुक्तम्; प्रतिभातोदकस्य अवस्थानं नोपपद्यते, झष-
महिषपरिवर्तनाऽभिघातोपजाताऽवयवक्रियान्यायेन प्रत्यस्तमयसम्भवात्।

*tadyadi pratibhātodakaprāptyā; tadayuktam; pratibhātodakasya avasthānaṃ nopapadyate, jhaṣamahiṣaparivartanā'bhighātopajātā'va-
yavakriyānyāyena pratyastamayasambhavāt.*

Translation: 40

Anticipated Clarification:

If you say that because one gets knowledge which was reflected in the perception, it is not proper. Because what appeared in the knowledge, does not exist there. Because it is possible that the water has become extinct through the action in the parts caused by striking of water, by the changing movements of fish, buffalo etc.

Text: 41

अथ तज्जातीयोदकप्राप्त्या, एवं तर्हि असत्योदकज्ञानेऽपि जाते क्वचित्तोयमासादयन्ति
पुमांसः तदप्यवितथं स्यात्।

*atha tajjātīyodakaprāptyā, evaṃ tarhi asatyodakajñāne'pi jāte kvacit
toyamāsādayanti pumāṃsaḥ tadapyavitatham syāt.*

Translation: 41

Again, if you say that the knowledge of water has led to the getting of water belonging to the class of water which was revealed in the knowledge of water (therefore the knowledge of water is not erroneous), then sometimes even if an erroneous knowledge of water arises people get a water in that case that erroneous knowledge will also have to be declared as a true cognition.

Text: 42

अथ तद्देशकालसंलग्नमुदकं न प्रापयति मिथ्याज्ञानम्, सम्यग्ज्ञानं तु तद्देशकालसंलग्नमुदकं प्रापयति तेन तदव्यभिचारीति चेत्;

atha taddeśakālasaṁlagnamudakam na prāpayati mithyājñānam, samyagjñānam tu taddeśakālasaṁlagnamudakam prāpayati tena tadavyabhicārīti cet;

Translation: 42

Clarification:

Well, the erroneous knowledge of water does not lead to getting the water connected with a particular space and particular time. But, a true cognition of water does lead to getting the water connected with a particular space and time and therefore such a true cognition is called not erroneous.

Text: 43

यन्न प्रापयति तद् व्यभिचारि तर्हि मुमूर्षुपदार्थोत्पादितं ज्ञानं चन्द्रार्कग्रहनक्षत्रतारकादि-संवेदनं च व्यभिचारि प्राप्नोति।

yanna prāpayati tad vyabhicāri tarhi mumūrṣupadārthotpāditam jñānam candrārka grahanakṣatratārakādīsamvedanam ca vyabhicāri prāpnoti.

Translation: 43

Reply:

Then it implies that, that knowledge which does not lead to getting the object revealed by it is an erroneous knowledge. In that case, knowledge which is caused by some thing which is about to die or vanish and also the knowledge of moon, sun, planet, constellations and stars etc. will have to be declared as erroneous (because such knowledges do not lead to getting the objects revealed by the respective knowledges).

Text: 44

न च तद्देशकालसंलग्नोदकप्रापकत्वमस्ति, देशस्यापि उदकवद्विनाशसम्भवात्।

na ca taddeśakālasaṁlagnodakaprapakatvamasti, deśasyāpi udakavadvināśasambhavāt.

Translation: 44

(Moreover), it is also not true that what you consider to be a true cognition, leads to getting the water connected with a particular space and particular time, because as water is likely to be destroyed the place also is also likely to be destroyed.

[२. प्रसङ्गात् जातेर्निराकरणम्।]

[2. *prasaṅgāt jāternirākaraṇam.*]

Refutation of Universal

Text: 45

नच जातेः सम्भवोऽस्ति।

naca jāteḥ sambhavo'sti.

Translation: 45

There is no possibility of “universal” or generic property being a real entity.

Text: 46

स एव कथम्?

sa eva katham?

Translation: 46

Question:

How is to so?

Text: 47

कथ्यते- सा उदकव्यक्तिभ्योऽभिन्ना, भिन्ना, भिन्नाऽभिन्ना वेति?

kathyate- sā udakavyaktibhyo'bhinnā, bhinnā, bhinnā'bhinnā veti?

Translation: 47

Answer:

Here is the answer. Let me ask (a) what you call universal or a generic property (say waterness) is it identical with waters? (b) or different from waters? (c) or different-cum-identical with water?

Text: 48

तद्यदि तादात्म्यव्यवस्थिताः तदा इह तासां नानात्वेन तस्यापि (तस्या अपि) नानात्वो-
पपत्तिः, तदेकत्वे च सर्वासामेकतापत्तिः। एकत्वे च निःसामान्यता तादात्म्यविपर्ययो वा।

tadyadi tādātmyavyavasthitāḥ tadā iha tāsāṃ nānātvena tasyāpi (tasyā api) nānātvopapattih, tadekatve ca sarvāsāmekatāpattih. ekatve ca niḥsāmānyatā tādātmyaviparyāso vā.

Translation: 48

If you say, that the universal is identical with the particulars, then since the particulars are many in number, there will arise the contingency of universal being many in numbers (i.e. there will be many waternesses). And if you say that the universal is only one, then there will arise the contingency that all the particulars becoming one. And if the particulars become one it will have no universal. Or, it will result into error of identity.

Text: 49

अथ अर्थान्तरभूता; सा व्यावृत्ताकारा, अनुगताकारा वा?
atha arthāntarabhūtā; sā vyāvṛttākārā, anugatākārā vā?

Translation: 49

Again if you maintain the universal as a distinct entity, then the question arises (a) whether it is of the form of being distinct from the rest? Or (b) whether it is of the form of one of the same form in the consecutive cognitions?

Text: 50

तद्यदि व्यावृत्ताकारा; न तस्याः सामान्यरूपत्वं व्यावृत्तैकस्वभावत्वात् तोयादिवत्।
*tadyadi vyāvṛttākārā; na tasyāḥ sāmānyarūpatvaṃ vyāvṛttaikasva-
bhāvatvāt toyādivat.*

Translation: 50

If you say that it is of the form of being distinct from the rest then that cannot be of the form of universal because of its being of distinct unique character like an individual water.

Text: 51

अथ अनुस्यूतरूपा; तत्किम् आत्मरूपानुस्यूता, पररूपानुस्यूता वा?
atha anusyūtarūpā; tatkim ātmarūpānusyūtā, pararūpānusyūtā vā?

Translation: 51

But if you say that it is of the form of one of the same form. There again the question arises (a) is it of one of the same form identical

with its self or (b) is it of one of the same consecutive form identical with the form of something else.

Text: 52

तद्यद्यात्मरूपानुस्यूता, तदयुक्तम्; आत्मन्यनुगमाऽभावात्।

tadyadyātmarūpānusyūtā, tadayuktam; ātmanyānugamā'bhāvāt.

Translation: 52

If you say it is of one of the same form identical with its self, it is not proper because there is no question of consecutiveness in one and the same thing.

Text: 53

अथ पररूपानुस्यूता; केयं पररूपानुस्यूतता-किं तत्तादात्म्यम्, तत्समवायो वा?

atha pararūpānusyūtā; keyam pararūpānusyūtātā-kim tattādātmyam, tatsamavāyo vā?

Translation: 53

And if you say it is of one of the same consecutive form identical with the form of something else, then we would like to know what is that: is it of one of the same consecutive form identical with the form of something else: (1) Does it mean identity with that? Or (2) does it mean inherence with that?

Text: 54

तद्यदि तादात्म्यम्; सामान्यतद्वतोरभेदप्रसङ्गः।

tadyadi tādātmyam; sāmānyatadvatorabhedaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 54

If you say it is identity with that, then there arises the contingency of universal becoming identical with that which possesses universal, that is particular.

Text: 55

अथ पररूपसमवायः अनुस्यूताकारता; तदयुक्तम्; सामान्याद्भिन्नः समवायः। सामान्यस्य अनुगतं रूपमालोचयितुमारब्धं न ततोऽन्यस्य।

atha pararūpasamavāyaḥ anusyūtākāratā; tadayuktam; sāmānyādbhinnāḥ samavāyaḥ. sāmānyasya anugatam rūpamālocayitumarabdham na tato'nyasya.

Translation: 55

If you say it is inherence with other form, is what is called the form of being known as of one and the same form in the consecutive cognitions, that is not proper, because (for you) inherence is different from universal. We have initiated the discussion on the form of consecutive character of universal and not of anything else.

Text: 56

यदि च उदकजातीयार्थप्राप्त्याऽव्यभिचारिता पूर्वोदितोदकविज्ञानस्य व्यवस्थाप्यते; तदा उदकजातेर्गवादावपि सम्भवोऽस्ति गवादिप्राप्त्याऽव्यभिच(चा)रिता उदकविज्ञानस्य स्यात्।

yadi ca udakajātiyārthaprāptyā'vyabhicāritā pūrvoditodakavijñānasya vyavasthāpyate; tadā udakajātergavādāvapi sambhavo'sti gavādi prāptyā'vyabhica(cā)ritā udakavijñānasya syāt.

Translation: 56

If you say that the knowledge of water is not erroneous because it leads to the obtainment of something similar to water, then the universal of water i.e. wateriness can be found also in cow etc. and so even if one gets cow after getting the knowledge of water, the knowledge of water can be said to be not erroneous.

Text: 57

अथ उदकत्वस्य गवादावभाव इति चेत्;
atha udakatvasya gavādāvabhāva iti cet;

Translation: 57

Clarification:

Well, there is no wateriness in cow etc.

Text: 58

किम् इतरेतराभावः, प्रागभावः, प्रध्वंसाभावः, अत्यन्ताभावो वा?
kim itaretarābhāvaḥ, prāgabhāvaḥ, pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, atyantābhāvo vā?

Translation: 58

Reply:

Here we would like to know what kind of absence is here in the cow.

- (1) Is it a mutual absence (2) Or a pre-absence (3) Or a destruction
(4) Or an absolute absence?

Text: 59

तद्यदीतरेतराभावः; तदा उदकादावपि समानम् उदकत्वस्याऽभावप्रसङ्गः। उदकरूपता न उदकत्वस्य, उदकत्वरूपता च नोदक.....

tadyadītaretarābhāvaḥ; tadā udakādāvapi samānam udakatvasyā'-bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ. udakarūpatā na udakatvasya udakatvarūpatā ca nodaka.....

Translation: 59

If you say it is a mutual absence, then it is common in water also and as a consequence there will be absence of waterness in water too, because neither waterness is of the form of water, nor the water is of the form of waterness.

Text: 60

अथ प्रागभावः; तदा उदकेऽपि उदकस्याभावप्रसङ्गः।

atha prāgabhāvaḥ; tadā udake'pi udakasyābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 60

If you say there is a pre-absence of waterness in the cow, then even in water one can say there is no water.

Text: 61

अथ प्रध्वंसाभावः; तदा उदकेऽपि अभावप्रसङ्गः।

atha pradhvaṁsābhāvaḥ; tadā udake'pi abhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 61

Similarly, if you say there is destruction of waterness in cow, then there is such destruction in water also.

Text: 62

अथ अन्यत्रास्ति;

atha anyatrāsti;

Translation: 62

Clarification:

Well, waterness is found in another water.

Text: 63

नैकत्र प्रत्यस्तमितस्य अन्यत्र सम्भव उपपद्यते।

naikatra pratyastamitasya anyatra sambhava upapadyate.

Translation: 63

Reply:

It cannot be so because if something is destroyed in one place this destruction can be possible elsewhere also.

Text: 64

अथ अत्यन्ताभावः; तदा उदकेऽपि तस्याऽभावप्रसङ्गः।

atha atyantābhāvaḥ; tadā udake'pi tasyā'bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 64

Again if you say that there is absolute absence of wateriness in the cow, then there will arise the contingency of its absence being in water also.

Text: 65

अथ सम्बन्धाभावाद् गवादावुदकत्वाभाव इति चेत्;

atha sambandhābhāvād gavādāvudakatvābhāva iti cet;

Translation: 65

Clarification:

We say that there is no wateriness in cow, because there is no relation of wateriness in the cow.

Text: 66

तत्रापि किम् इतरेतराभावः, प्रध्वंसाभावः, अत्यन्ताभावो वेति पूर्ववद् वक्तव्यम्।

tatrāpi kim itaretarābhāvaḥ, pradhvaṅsābhāvaḥ, atyantābhāvo veti pūrvavad vaktavyam.

Translation: 66

Reply:

There also the same questions arise as before: (1) Is it the case that there is mutual absence of relationship and the cow? (2) Or there is destruction? (3) Or there is absolute absence? And one should satisfactorily answer them.

Text: 67

निमित्तान्तराभावाद् गवादाव(वु)दकत्वाभाव इति चेत्;

nimittāntarābhāvād gavādāva(vu)dakatvābhāva iti cet;

Translation: 67

Clarification:

Since there is absence of any other ground, there is absence of wateriness in the cow.

Text: 68

सोऽत्रापि समानः।

so'atrāpi samānaḥ.

Translation: 68

Reply:

That is common here also.

Text: 69

न च उदकव्यक्तीनां नानात्वमुपपादयितुं पार्यते। उदकम् अनुदकाकाराद् उदकाकारतया व्यावर्त्तते, उदकाकारात्तु कथं व्यावर्त्तते? किम् उदकाकारतया, आहोस्विद् आकारान्तरेण?

na ca udakavyaktīnāṃ nānātvamupapādayitunī pāryate. udakam anudakākārād udakākāratayā vyāvarttate, udakākārāttu kathamī vyāvarttate? kim udakākāratayā, āhosvid ākārāntareṇa?

Translation: 69

Reply:

Moreover, it is not possible to explain how individual waters are made (one can understand that) water is distinguished from non-waters, in the form of water. But how can one form of water be distinguished from another form of water. If it is distinguished then two questions come to our mind (1) Is it being distinguished in the form of water? (2) In the form of something else?

Text: 70

तद्यद्युदकाकारतया व्यावर्त्तते, तदा अन्यासामुदकव्यक्तीनाम् अनुदकाकारता प्राप्नोति रसादेरिव। अथ अनुदकाकारतया उदकाकारान्निवर्त्तते; ततो दहनादेरिव अनुदकत्वप्रसङ्गः।

tadyadyudakākāratayā vyāvarttate, tadā anyāsāmudakavyaktīnām anudakākāratā prāpnoti rasāderiva. atha anudakākāratayā udakākārānnivarttate; tato dahanāderiva anudakatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 70

If you say that it is distinguished in the form of water then the other water individuals become non-water like taste etc. and if one individual water is being distinguished from other water individuals in the form of non-water, then, as fire is non water so also other water individuals will become non-water.

Text: 71

अथ उदकाकाररूपताऽविशेषेऽपि अवान्तरगणिकाकारभेदपरिक्लृप्तिरिति चेत्;
*atha udakākārarūpatā 'viśeṣe'pi avāntaragaṇikākārabhedapariklṛpti-
riti cet;*

Translation: 71

Clarification:

Well, although there is no difference in the forms of water individuals, still one gets the knowledge of difference of the form of other entities like jasmine flower.

Text: 72

सत्यम्, अवान्तरगणिकाकारः तोयतादात्म्यव्यवस्थितः, अतादात्म्यव्यवस्थितो वा?
satyam, avāntaragaṇikākāraḥ toyatādātmyavyavasthitah, atādātmyavyavasthito vā?

Translation: 72

Reply:

What you say is true. But we would like to know (a) whether that form of entity like jasmine flower is decided on the basis of the identity with water? Or (b) whether it is decided on the basis of non-identity with water?

Text: 73

तद्यदि तादात्म्यव्यवस्थितः, तदा उदकाकारतया उदकान्तराद्भिद्यते। एवं चान्यासाम् उदकव्यक्तीनामनुदकरूपता प्राप्नोति, पूर्वोदितमेव दूषणम्।

tadyadi tādātmyavyavasthitah, tadā udakākāratayā udakāntarādbhidhyate. evaṁ cānyāsām udakavyaktīnāmanudakarūpatā prāpnoti, pūrvoditameva dūṣaṇam.

Translation: 73

If you say that it is decided on the basis of identity then it amounts to saying that one water is distinguished from another water as water. In that case, it will amount to saying that other water individuals are not water and in this way, all the defects raised above can also be raised here.

Text: 74

अथातादात्म्यव्यवस्थितः; तर्हि अनुदकत्वं रसादेरिव।

athātādātmyavyavasthitah; tarhi anudakatvaṁ rasāderiva.

Translation: 74

If you say that it is settled on the basis of non-identity, then obviously the other individuals will not be called water as taste is not called water.

Text: 75

अथ उदकत्वव्यावृत्त्या अनुदकाकाराद् व्यावर्त्तते;

atha udakatvavyāvṛtṭyā anudakākārād vyāvarttate;

Translation: 75

Clarification:

Well, by distinguishing in terms of wateriness water is distinguished from non-water.

Text: 76

शृण्वन्तु अमी बाललपितं विपश्चितः! यद्युदकत्वव्यावृत्त्याऽनुदकाद् व्यावर्त्तते तोयम्, उदकत्वञ्च उदकादनुदकाच्च कथं व्यावर्त्तते?

śṛṅvantu amī bālalapitaṁ vipaścitaḥ! yadyudakatvavyāvṛtṭyā 'nudakād vyāvarttate toyam, udakatvañca udakādanudakācca katham vyāvarttate?

Translation: 76

Reply:

Let these so-called intelligent people listen to your tale of children, if you are saying that water is distinguished from non-water by distinguishing wateriness, then we will also how are you going to distinguish from water and non-water.

Text: 77

न जात्यन्तरं व्यावर्त्तकमस्ति। अभ्युपगमे वा अनिष्ठोपप्लवाऽनुबन्धः स्यात्। तस्मात् स्वेनैवरूपेण इतरेतरात्मना व्यावर्त्तते न जात्यादिना व्यावर्त्तते, जात्यादेरव्यावृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्।
na jātyantaram̐ vyāvarttakamasti. abhyupagame vā aniṣṭhopaplavā'-nubandhaḥ syāt. tasmāt svenaivarūpeṇa itaretarātmanā vyāvarttate na jātyādinā vyāvarttate, jātyāderavyāvṛttiprasaṅgāt.

Translation: 77

You do not have any other universal which can distinguish them. And if you accept another universal, you will be caught in the undesired chaos. Therefore, it is better to accept that each individual water is distinguished from others by its own form and not by any entity called universal. Because, in that case there will be a contingency of an impossibility to distinguish universal from the rest.

Text: 78

तस्मात् स्थितमेतत् नोदकव्यक्तीनां नानात्वोपपत्तिः तदनुपपत्तौ नोदकत्वं नाम सामान्य-मस्ति स्वत्ववत्।

tasmāt sthitametat nodakavyaktīmāṃ nānātvopapattiḥ tadanupattau nodakatvaṃ nāma sāmānyamasti svatvavat.

Translation: 78

Thus, we have come to this conclusion that it is not possible to explain the plurality of water individuals and when that cannot be explained we can say that there is nothing called universal such as waterness as you too do not accept individuality as universal.

Text: 79

इतोऽपि न विद्यते सामान्यम्, नित्यस्य सतो विज्ञानजनकत्वायोगात्।

ito'pi na vidyate sāmānyam, nityasya sato vijñānajanakatvāyogāt.

Translation: 79

For the following reason too (we hold that), there is no universal. Because, if a positive entity is eternal it cannot produce knowledge.

Text: 80

तदेव कथम्?

tadeva katham?

Translation: 80

Question:

How do you say so?

Text: 81

व्युत्पाद्यते-विज्ञानजनकावस्थायां यदेव स्वरूप(पं) सामान्यात्मकं शक्तिमच्छक्तिरूपं च कारकान्तरानपेक्षयाऽजनकावस्थायां तदेव रूपम्, अतः पूर्वमपि कार्योत्पादप्रसङ्गः। अनुत्पादे वा प्रागे(गि)व इदानीमपि [न] जनयेत्।

vyutpādyate - vijñānajanakāvasthāyām yadeva svarūpa(pam) sāmānyātmakam śaktimacchaktirūpam ca kārakāntarānapekṣayā'janakāvasthāyām tadeva rūpam, ataḥ pūrvamapi kāryotpādaprasaṅgaḥ. anutpāde vā prāge(gi)va idānīmapi [na] janayet.

Translation: 81

Answer:

Let me explain. At the time of producing the knowledge whatever form, of the nature of universal, possessed of capacity, and of the nature of capacity it had without depending upon any other causal factor the same form it has at the time of not producing knowledge. Therefore, there arises the contingency that it should produce effect viz. its knowledge even before and if it does not produce effect it should not produce even now as before.

Text: 82

अथ कारकान्तरमपेक्ष्य उत्पादयति कार्यम्,

atha kārakāntaramapekṣya utpādayati kāryam,

Translation: 82

Clarification:

Well, it will produce effect taking help of some other causal factor.

Text: 83

किं तेन कारकान्तरेण तस्य क्रियते कारकत्वम्, ज्ञाप्यते वा?

kiṁ tena kārakāntareṇa tasya kriyate kārakatvam, jñāpyate vā?

Translation: 83

Answer:

We would like to know what does other causal factor do to this universal? Do you want to say that the causal factor makes this

universal also a causal factor? Or, do the causal factors reveal universal?

Text: 84

तद् व्यु(तद् यद्यु)त्पाद्यते; सुस्थितं नित्यत्वम्!

tad vyu(tad yadyu)tpādyate; susthitaṁ nityatvam!

Translation: 84

If you say the causal factors convert universal into a causal factor then its nature of being eternal is gone.

Text: 85

उत ज्ञाप्यते; सिद्धं तर्हि कारकत्वम्, तदभावेऽपि विद्यमानस्याऽवद्योतनात्।

uta jñāpyate; siddhaṁ tarhi kārakatvam, tadabhāve'pi vidyamānasyā'vadyotanāt.

Translation: 85

Again if you say that the causal factors reveal universal, then it is proved that the universal itself is a causal factor. Because, even without the causal factor, something existent is being revealed.

Text: 86

भवतु नाम कारकत्वं को दोषः?

bhavatu nāma kārakatvaṁ ko doṣaḥ?

Translation: 86

Question:

Let the universal be a causal factor, what is the harm?

Text: 87

कार्योत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः।

kāryotpattiprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 87

Reply:

There will arise the contingency of its producing the effect.

Text: 88

अथ कारकत्वेऽपि कार्यं न जनयेत्;

atha kārakatve'pi kāryaṁ na janayet;

Translation: 88

Clarification:

(It is not necessary) even if it is a factor, there is no need that it should produce any effect.

Text: 89

अहो राजाज्ञा गरीयसी नैयायिकपशोः! इतोऽपि नास्ति सामान्यम्; तदुपपादकमान-
व्यतिरेकात्।

*aho rājājñā garīyasī nīyāyikapaśoḥ! ito 'pi nāsti sāmānyam; tadupa-
pādakamānavyatīrekāt.*

Translation: 89

Answer:

Oh, what a prevailing order of the king, of the animal logician. Also for the following reason, we think that there is no universal. Because, there is no proof which can explain it.

Text: 90

ननु अस्ति प्रमाणम्- 'अनयोः सादृश्यम्' 'एषां सारूप्यम्' 'तेन सदृशोऽयम्' 'असौ वा तेन सदृशः' इत्यादिज्ञानं सामान्यसत्तावबोधक(कं) अप्रतिपन्नसामान्यस्य नोपपद्यते। अस्ति त्विदं विज्ञानं बाधाविकलं जातितनुव्यवस्थापकम्;

*nanu asti pramāṇam- 'anayoḥ sādṛśyam' 'eṣāṁ sārūpyam' 'tena sadṛśo 'yam' 'asau vā tena sadṛśaḥ' ityādiñānam sāmānyasattā-
vabodhaka(kam) apratipannasāmānyasya nopapadyate. asti tvidam
vijñānam bādāvīkalam jātitanuvyavasthāpakam;*

Translation: 90

Objection:

Well, there is proof for instance there are cognitions like, “there is a similarity between the two,” “these have similar forms,” “it is similar to that,” “that is similar to this,” and the like. These knowledges convey the existence of universal. And unless one accepts universal, these knowledges are not possible. This is a knowledge which is not contradicted and therefore it establishes the form of universal.

Text: 91

तदेतदयुक्तम्; किं निमित्तभूतेन तेन एवंविधं ज्ञानमुत्पाद्यते, कर्मतापन्नेन वा? तद्यदि निमित्तभूतेन उत्पाद्यते; तदा न सामान्यं कल्पनीयम्, असामान्यात्मकमेव निमित्तमित्थ-

म्भूतसामान्यज्ञानोत्पादनाय, अलं सामान्यकल्पनया। अथ कर्मतापन्नेन उत्पाद्यते; तदसत्; नैवाऽवभाति विज्ञाने सामान्यं धूर्तैरविपर्यासितसंविदाम्।

*tadetadayuktam; kiṁ nimittabhūtena tena evaṁvidhaṁ jñānamu-
tpādyate, karmatāpannena vā? tadyadi nimittabhūtena utpādyate;
tadā na sāmānyam kalpanīyam, asāmānyātmakameva nimittami-
tthambhūtasāmānyajñānotpādanāya, alam sāmānyakalpanayā. atha
karmatāpannena utpādyate; tadasat; naivā'vabhāti vijñāne sāmā-
nyam dhūrtairaviparyāsitasanivīdam.*

Translation: 91

Reply:

This is improper. Is it the case that universal is an efficient cause because of which such knowledge is produced? Or is it the case that universal causes knowledge by becoming object of that knowledge? If you say being an efficient cause it produces knowledge, then there is no necessity of postulating any universal. For the production of such knowledge of universal the efficient cause of the nature of non-universal itself, is sufficient. There is no need of postulating any universal. If you say that universal produces knowledge, by becoming the object of that knowledge that is also not true. No universal appears in the knowledge of those who have not been brain-washed by the cunning logicians.

Text: 92

ननु सादृश्यमवभाति;

nanu sādṛśyamavabhāti;

Translation: 92

Objection:

Well, as a matter of fact, similarity does appear in the knowledge.

Text: 93

सत्यम्, अवभाति, नापह्नूयते अपि तु—द्रव्यगुणकर्मात्मकं सत् पाचकादिभेदेषु—यथा एषां पाचकत्वम्, एते पाचकाः, तत्पाचकसदृशोऽयम्, असौ अनेन सदृश इति विशेषादावपि द्रष्टव्यम्।

*satyam, avabhāti, nāpahnūyate api tu-dravyaguṇakarmātmakam
sat pācakādibhedeshuyathā eṣām pācakatvam, ete pācakāḥ, tatpāca-
kasadrśo'yam, asau anena sadṛśa iti viśeṣādāvapi draṣṭavyam.*

Translation: 93

Reply:

It is true. It appears. We are not denying that. But it is of the nature of either substance or quality or action, as we find in different cooks, as we find cookness in them and we say they are cooks or “he is like that cook” or “that cook is like this cook” in the same way such references can be made to particulars also.

Text: 94

अत्रापि सामान्यपरिज्ञप्तिरिति चेत्;
atrāpi sāmānyaparijñaptiriti cet;

Translation: 94

Objection:

In these cases also, there is knowledge of universal.

Text: 95

न; सूत्रव्याघातात् सामान्यविशेषेषु सामान्यविशेषाऽभावात् तत एव ज्ञानम् [वै. सू. ८।१।५]
na; sūtravyāghātāt sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣā'bhāvāt tata eva jñānam [Vai. sū. 8.1.5.],

Translation: 95

Reply:

No, it is not so. If you interpret like that, it will go against the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* 8.1.5 “there is no universal and particular in universal and particular.” Knowledges arise from them directly.

Text: 96

अनिष्ठा च- विशेषेषु सामान्ये परिकल्प्यमाने सति सन्देहः, सति सन्देहे तेषु विशेषान्तरं
परिकल्पनीयम्, पुनः सामान्यम् इत्यनिष्ठा इत्यलम् असद्ग्रहाऽभिनिवेशेन।
aniṣṭhā ca- viśeṣeṣu sāmānye parikalpyamāne sati sandehaḥ, sati sandehe teṣu viśeṣāntaraṁ parikalpanīyam, punaḥ sāmānyam itya- niṣṭhā ityalam asadgrahā'bhiniveśena.

Translation: 96

This is also not desirable. If we postulate universal in particulars there will be doubt. And when there will be doubt, one will have to postulate another particular. Again, in those particulars some

universal and in this way (it will lead to infinite regress) and therefore this is not desirable and hence enough of this unsound insistence!

Text: 97

अथ भिन्नाभिन्ना सामान्यं भवद्भिः प्रतिपाद्यते-आकारभेदेन व्यक्तिभ्य उपलभ्यते इत्यर्थान्तरम्, देशभेदेन तु नैव उपलभ्यते इत्यव्यतिरिक्ते(क्तम्);

atha bhinnābhinnā sāmānyam bhavadbhiḥ pratipādyate-ākārabhedena vyaktibhya upalabhyate ityarthāntaram, deśabhedena tu naiva upalabhyate ityavyatirikte(ktam);

Translation: 97

Objection:

Well, you are explaining universal which is different-cum-identical. You are telling that it is distinct because it is obtained from particulars due to the difference in form. But it is not obtained as distinct on the basis of the difference in space.

Text: 98

तदेतन्महासुभाषितम्,
tadetanmahāsubhāṣitam,

Translation: 98

Reply:

Oh, this is indeed a great and beautiful saying!

Text: 99

न देशभेदेनैव वस्तूनां भेदः अपि तु आकारभेदेनैव भावा भेदमुपयान्ति। यथा च आकारभेदो नास्ति तथाऽनन्तरमेव निवेदितम्।

na deśabhedenaiva vastūnām bhedaḥ api tu ākārabhedenaiva bhāvā bhedamupayānti. yathā ca ākārabhedo nāsti tathā'nantarameva nive-ditam.

Translation: 99

It is not true that things become different only because of the difference in space. But the positive entities are distinguished on the basis of difference in their form. And we have just explained how there is no difference in form.

[३. प्रसङ्गात् समवायस्य निरसनम्।]

[3. prasaṅgāt samavāyasya nirasanam.]

Text: 100

सामान्यं समवायवृत्त्या व्यक्तिषु वर्तते इति। न चासौ विद्यते।

sāmānyam samavāyavṛtṭyā vyaktiṣu varttate iti. na cāsau vidyate.

Translation: 100

Universal (according to you) exists in the individuals by the relation of inherence. But the fact is there is nothing called inherence.

Text: 101

समवायो हि- व्यावृत्तैकस्वभावः, अनुगतैकस्वभावो वा?

samavāyo hi- vyāvṛtṭaikasvabhāvaḥ, anugataikasvabhāvo vā?

Translation: 101

We would like to know (1) whether it is of unique and distinct nature or (2) whether it is consecutively of unique nature.

Text: 102

तद्यदि व्यावृत्तैकस्वभावः, कस्यासौ समवायः, सर्वतो व्यावृत्तेः नीलादिवत्।

tadyadi vyāvṛtṭaikasvabhāvaḥ, kasyāsau samavāyaḥ, sarvato vyāvṛtṭeḥ nīlādivat.

Translation: 102

If you say that it is of unique and distinct nature we would like to know, whose inherence it is, because it is distinguished from everything like a blue object.

Text: 103

अथ अनुगतैकस्वभावः; सामान्यं तर्हि, न समवायः, नित्यस्य सतोऽनेकत्र वृत्तेर्गोत्वादिवत्,
atha anugataikasvabhāvaḥ; sāmānyam tarhi, na samavāyaḥ, nitya-
sya sato 'nekatra vṛtṭer gotvādivat,

Translation: 103

Again if you say it is consecutively of unique nature, then it becomes universal and it is not inherence, because it is a positive entity, it is eternal, and it exists in many individuals like cowness.

Text: 104

उपपादकप्रमाणाभावाच्च।

upapādakapramāṇābhāvācca.

Translation: 104

And also there is no proof which can explain inherence.

Text: 105

ननु प्रत्यक्षबुद्ध्यवसेयोऽसौ;

nanu pratyakṣabuddhyavaseyo'sau;

Translation: 105

Objection:

Well, it can be definitely known by perceptual cognition.

Text: 106

तदयुक्तम्; किं सम्बन्धबुद्ध्याऽध्यवसीयते, आहोस्विद् इहबुद्ध्या, समवायबुद्ध्या वा उच्यते?

tadayuktam; kiṁ sambandhabuddhyā'dhyavasīyate, āhosvid ihabuddhyā, samavāyabuddhyā vā ucyate?

Translation: 106

Reply:

This is not correct. Is it known as a relation, or is it known as the locus or is it known as inherence. What do you want to say?

Text: 107

तद्यदि सम्बन्धबुद्ध्या; कोऽयं सम्बन्धः? किं सम्बन्धजातियुक्तः सम्बन्धः, आहोस्विद् अनेकोपादानजनितः, अनेकाश्रितो वा, सम्बन्धबुद्धिविशेषो वा, सम्बन्धबुद्ध्युत्पादको वा, सम्बद्धा(न्धा)कारो वा?

tadyadi sambandhabuddhyā; ko'yaṁ sambandhaḥ? kiṁ sambandha-jātiyuktaḥ sambandhaḥ, āhosvid anekopādānanjanitaḥ, anekāśrito vā, sambandhabuddhiviśeṣo vā, sambandhabuddhyutpādako vā, sambaddhā(ndhā)kāro vā?

Translation: 107

If you say, it is known as a relation, we would like to know what is that relation? (1) Is it a relation associated with the genre of relation? (2) Or is it known as something caused by many evidence. (3) Or is it known as located in many? (4) Or is it known as a particular knowledge of relation? (5) Or is it known as the generator of knowledge of relation? (6) Or is it known as something which a form is associated?

Text: 108

तद्यदि सम्बन्धजातियुक्तस्ते सम्बन्धः; सोऽनुपपन्नः; समवायाऽसम्बन्धत्वप्रसङ्गः।
tadyadi sambandhajātiyuktaste sambandhaḥ; so 'nupapannah; sama-
vāyā'sambandhatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 108

If you say that your relation is that which is associated with the genre of a relation that is not proper, because it will lead to the contingency of un-related inherence.

Text: 109

अथ अनेकोपादानजनितः सम्बन्धः; तदा कुम्भादेरपि सम्बन्धत्वप्रसङ्गः।
atha anekopādānajanitaḥ sambandhaḥ; tadā kumbhāderapi samban-
ndhatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 109

If you say it is that relation which is caused by many factors, then even a pot will have to be treated as the relation of inherence.

Text: 110

अथ अनेकाश्रितः सम्बन्धः तदा घटजात्यादेः सम्बन्धत्वं प्रसज्यते।
atha anekāśritaḥ sambandhaḥ tadā ghaṭajātyādeḥ sambandhatvaṁ
prasajyate.

Translation: 110

If you say it is a relation which is located in many, then the universal of pot, viz. potness will have to be treated as a relation of inherence.

Text: 111

अथ सम्बन्धबुद्ध्युत्पादकस्ते सम्बन्धः उच्यते; तदा लोचनादेरपि सम्बन्धत्वप्रसङ्गः।
atha sambandhabuddhyutpādakaste sambandhaḥ ucyate; tadā locanā-
derapi sambandhatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 111

If you say that your relation is that which produces the knowledge of relation, then there will arise a contingency of treating eyes etc. as a relation of inherence.

Text: 112

अथ सम्बन्धबुद्ध्यवसेयः सम्बन्धोऽभिधीयते; तदा कौलेयककरिकुमारादिष्वपि सम्बन्ध-
 शब्दव्युत्पादने सम्बन्धत्वप्रसङ्गः।

atha sambandhabuddhyavaseyaḥ sambandho'bhidhīyate; tadā kaule-yakakarikumārādiṣvapi sambandhaśabdavyutpādane sambandhatva-prasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 112

Similarly, if you say that, that is relation of inherence which is definitely known from the knowledge of relation, then when one derives the knowledge of relation from the relational terms like “someone born in a noble family,” “the baby of an elephant” etc. there will arise the contingency of such relations becoming the relation of inherence.

Text: 113

सम्बन्धेतरयोः एकविज्ञानविषयत्वे इतरस्य सम्बन्धरूपता प्राप्ता।

sambandhetarayoh ekavijñānaviṣayatve itarasya sambandharūpatā prāptā.

Translation: 113

If relation and non-relation becomes object of one knowledge, the non-knowledge becomes relation.

Text: 114

अथ सम्बन्धाकारः सम्बन्धः; संयोगाऽभेदप्रसङ्गः।

atha sambandhākāraḥ sambandhaḥ; saṁyogā'bheda-prasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 114

Again if you say that the form of a relation is a relation of inherence, then it will become identical with the relation of contact.

Text: 115

अवान्तरगणिकाकारस्तु यथा न भेदकः तथा पुरस्तादुक्तमेव दूषणम्।

avāntaragaṇikākāraṣtu yathā na bhedakaḥ tathā purastādūktameva dūṣaṇam.

Translation: 115

As the form of another jasmine flower is not the distinguisher, we have already stated it before along with the objections which could be raised in that case.

Text: 116

अथ 'इह तन्तुषु पटः' इति इहबुद्ध्याध्यवसीयते;
atha iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ' iti ihabuddhyādhyavasīyate;

Translation: 116

Objection:

Well, (the knowledge of inherence) is obtained for certain on the basis of the knowledge “there is cloth here in these threads.”

Text: 117

न। इहबुद्धेरधिकरणसंविद्रूपत्वात्। न चास्मिन्ना(न चान्यस्मिन्ना)कारे प्रतीयमाने अन्यत् परिकल्पयितुं न्याय्यम्, अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

na. ihabuddheradhikaraṇasaṁvidrūpatvāt. na cāsminnā(na cānyasminnā)kāre pratīyamāne anyat parikalpayitum nyāyīyam, atiprasaṅgāt.

Translation: 117

Reply:

It is not proper, because, the word here stands for the knowledge of locus. It is not proper to postulate something else, when such a form of locus is revealed in the knowledge. Or else it will lead to undesirable contingencies.

Text: 118

अथ समवायबुद्ध्याऽऽत्मसात्क्रियते;
atha samavāyabuddhyā' tmasātkriyate;

Translation: 118

Objection:

Well, this we had decided on the basis of knowledge of inherence.

Text: 119

सोप्यनुपपन्न एव, समवायबुद्धेरनुपपत्तेः, 'अयं तन्तुः, अयं पटः, अयमनयोः समवायः' इति न जातु जानते जनाः।

sopyanupapanna eva, samavāyabuddheranupapatteḥ, 'ayaṁ tantuḥ, ayaṁ paṭaḥ, ayamanayoḥ samavāyaḥ' iti na jātu jānate janāḥ.

Translation: 119

Reply:

That is also not proper, because, there is nothing called knowledge

of inherence. This is a thread, this is cloth, and here is the relationship of inherence 'between the two' people do not know this.

Text: 120

अथ अनुमानेन अनुमीयते;

atha anumānena anumīyate;

Translation: 120

Objection:

The inherence can be inferred.

Text: 121

द्वे अनुमाने-दृष्टम्, सामान्यतो दृष्टं च।

dve anumāne-dr̥ṣṭam, sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam ca.

Translation: 121

Reply:

You have two forms of inference (1) *dr̥ṣṭa* (2) *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa*.

Text: 122

न दृष्टम्; प्रत्यक्षव्यतिरेकात्।

na dr̥ṣṭam; pratyakṣavyatirekāṭ.

Translation: 122

The first type of inference will not apply here, because inherence is not perceived.

Text: 123

सामान्यतो दृष्टमपि नास्ति; तत्प्रभवकार्याऽनुपलब्धेः।

sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭamapi nāsti; tatprabhavakāryā'nupalabdheḥ.

Translation: 123

The second type of inference will also not apply, because one does not see any effect produced by inherence.

Text: 124

नन्विहबुद्धिरेव समवायज्ञापिका- 'इह तन्तुषु पटः इति प्रत्ययः सम्बन्धनिमित्तः, अबाधित-इहप्रत्ययत्वात्, 'इह कुण्डे दधि' इति प्रत्ययवत्।

nanvīhabuddhireva samavāyajñāpikā-'iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ iti pratyayaḥ sambandhanimittaḥ, abādhita-ihapratyayatvāt, 'iha kuṇḍe dadhi' iti pratyayavat.

Translation: 124

Objection:

Well, the very knowledge “here in the threads there is cloth” will cause the knowledge of inherence by the following inference: (1)The knowledge “here in the threads there is cloth” is caused by a relationship. (2)Because, it is an uncontradicted knowledge “here in the threads there is cloth”. (3)Like the knowledge “here in the pot there is curd”.

Text: 125

किमनेन अनुमीयते-

kimanena anumīyate-

Translation: 125

Reply:

What is being inferred by this inference?:

Text: 126

किं निमित्तमात्रम्, उत सम्बन्धः?

kiṁ nimittamātram, uta sambandhaḥ?

Translation: 126

(a)The very causal factor which cause the inferential cognition of inherence? Or (b) The relation of inherence?

Text: 127

यदि निमित्तमात्रम्, ततः सिद्धसाध्यतया सम्बोधयितव्यः।

yadi nimittamātram, tataḥ siddhasādhayatayā sambodhayitavyaḥ.

Translation: 127

If you say mere causal factor is being inferred then it is required to be satisfied because it is going to cause knowledge of that which is already known.

Text: 128

अथ सम्बन्धः; संयोगः, समवायो वा?

atha sambandhaḥ; saṁyogaḥ, samavāyo vā?

Translation: 128

And if you say that relation is going to be inferred then I ask you, is it (a) contact or (b) inherence?

Text: 129

संयोगानुमाने उपगमहानिः।

saṁyogānumāne upagamahāniḥ.

Translation: 129

If you say that it is a contact which is being inferred it will go against your conclusion.

Text: 130

समवायानुमाने सम्बन्धव्यतिरेकः।

samavāyānumāne sambandhavyatirekaḥ.

Translation: 130

And if you say that inherence is being inferred then there is absence of relationship.

Text: 131

न चान्यस्य सम्बन्धः अन्यस्य गमकत्वम्, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। न जातु देवदत्तनयनकुटसम्बन्धे यज्ञदत्तेन्द्रियं रूपादिकमर्थं करणत्वसाम्यात् प्रकाशयद् दृष्टम्।

na cānyasya sambandhaḥ anyasya gamakatvam, atiprasaṅgāt. na jātu devadattanayanakuṭasambandhe yajñadattendriyaṁ rūpādika-marthaṁ karanatvasāmyāt prakāśayad dṛṣṭam.

Translation: 131

It cannot be the case that the relation is with something else and it causes the knowledge of something else, because, it will lead to undesirable consequences i.e. the defect of over-application. It is never the case that when something is related to the eyes of Devadatta the sense organ of Yajñadatta reveals the object such as color because of the similarity between the sense organ of Devadatta and Yajñadatta. It is never seen like this.

Text: 132

एवं सति सामान्यसमवायविरहे कथं द्रव्यादि व्यवस्था इति चिन्त्यते।

evaṁ sati sāmānyasamavāyavirahe kathaṁ dravyādi vyavasthā iti cintyate.

Translation: 132

Thus, when there is neither universal nor inherence how can one decide or know or settle that something is a substance (i.e. how can there be something called substance.)?

Text: 133

अथ तद्वत् सत्य(अथ तद्वंशज)जलप्राप्त्या अव्यभिचारिता ज्ञायते; तदयुक्तम्; अन्त्यावयविद्रव्याणां जनकत्वव्यतिरेकात्। न च उदकव्यक्तीनां नानात्वमस्ति, यथा च न विद्यते तथा निवेदितं पुरस्तात्।

atha tadvat satya(atha tadvaṁśaja)jalaprāptyā avyabhicāritā jñāyate; tadayuktam; antyāvayavidravyāṅām janakatvavyatirekāt. na ca udakavyaktīnām nānātvamasti, yathā ca na vidyate tathā niveditam purastāt.

Translation: 133

Like that, if you say, since one gets water belonging to the same family of water, the knowledge of water will not be proper, because, the substances in the form of final wholes cannot be the cause of anything (i.e. of any other whole) and there are no other water individuals and that there are no plural individuals of water, has already been explained before.

Text: 134

किञ्च, प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्येन अव्यभिचारिता पूर्वोदितज्ञानस्य ज्ञाप्यते—किं लिङ्गभूतेन, आहो अध्यक्षात्मकेन?

kiñca, pravṛttisāmarthyena avyabhicāritā pūrvoditajñānasya jñāpyate-kiṁ liṅgabhūtena, āho adhyakṣātmakena?

Translation: 134

Moreover, you have said that on the strength of consistent inter-action the knowledge which arose before i.e. the knowledge which prompted the interaction is not erroneous. There questions are (a) is it because that is treated as a ground for inference or (b) is it because it is of the nature of perception?

Text: 135

तद्यदि लिङ्गभूतेन; तदयुक्तम्; तेन साकं सम्बन्धानवगतेः।

tadyadi liṅgabhūtena; tadayuktam; tena sākaṁ sambandhānavagateḥ.

Translation: 135

If you say it causes the knowledge as a ground that is not proper, because, one cannot know the invariable concomitance with that.

Text: 136

अवगतौ वाऽलं प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्येन।

avagatau vā 'lam pravr̥ttisāmarthyena.

Translation: 136

If you say it can be known, then there is no need of capacity of resulting into fruitful interaction.

Text: 137

अथाध्यक्षात्मकेन; तद्युक्तम्; पूर्वोदितप्रत्यस्तमितेन साकं सन्निकर्षाऽभावात्। तद्विषय-
विज्ञानं न प्रत्यक्षफलं निरालम्बनत्वात् केशोण्डुकादिसंवेदनवत्। न विज्ञानस्या-
भावोऽवभाति, न भावः तदभावात्।

athādhyakṣātmakena; tadayuktam; pūrvoditapratyastamitena sākaṁ sannikarṣā'bhāvāt. tadviṣayavijñānaṁ na pratyakṣaphalaṁ nirālambanatvāt keśoṇḍukādīsāṁvedanavat. na vijñānasyābhāvo 'vabhāti, na bhāvaḥ tadabhāvāt.

Translation: 137

If you say it will cause the knowledge being in the form of perception that is also not proper, because, there cannot be any contact with the knowledge which arose before and vanished. The knowledge of that object cannot be the result of perception, because, it will be contentless, like the knowledge of thread-like things which appear in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly open our eyes.

Text: 138

अविद्यमानस्य विषयार्थो वक्तव्यः—किम् आकारार्पकत्वेन वा, महत्त्वादिधर्मोपेतत्वेन वा, सत्तामात्रेण वा, सहोत्पादेन वा? सर्वस्य प्रत्यस्तमितत्वात् कथमसौ विषयः? तद्विषयत्वे केशोण्डुकादिविज्ञानस्येव मिथ्यात्वे बीजमन्वेषणीयम्।

avidyamānasya viṣayārtho vaktavyaḥ—kim ākāraprakatvena vā, mahattvādidharmopetatvena vā, sattāmātreṇa vā, sahotpādena vā? sarvasya pratyastamitatvāt kathamasau viṣayaḥ? tadviṣayatve keśoṇḍukādivijñānasyeva mithyātve bījamaṁveṣaṇīyam.

Translation: 138

There does not appear either absence of knowledge or presence because it does not exist there. You should tell us the meaning

of content which does not exist. (a) Is it content because it offers itself to the knowledge? or (b) Is it content because it is associated with the property viz. “grossness”? or (c) Is it content because of mere existence or (d) Is it content because it arises together? As a matter of fact when all of them have vanished, how can that be called content?

And in spite of that if you say that it is content of knowledge, then like the knowledge of thread-like things which appear in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly open our eyes, that should be considered as erroneous or illusory and in that case one should enquire into the reason for this illusion.

Text: 139

आत्मसत्तामात्रेण मिथ्यात्वे सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वमापद्यते ततः तत्त्वोपप्लवः स्यात्।
ātmasattāmātreṇa mithyātve sarvasya mithyātvamāpadyate tataḥ tattvopaplavah syāt.

Translation: 139

If by mere existence of itself it is considered as illusory, then everything has to be accepted as illusory and thereby one will have to accept that there is nothing called real and everything is a flux.

Text: 140

अथ अन्यथाऽव्यभिचारित्वं गृह्यते-आत्मान्तःकरणसम्बन्धेन उत्पन्नं विज्ञानमव्यभि-
 चारिताविशिष्टं प्रद्योत्यते; तदयुक्तम्; तदव्यभिचारित्वं तद्धर्मो वा, तत्स्वरूपं वा?
atha anyathā'vyabhicāritvaṃ grhyate-ātmāntaḥkaraṇasambandhena utpannam vijñānam avyabhicāritāviśiṣṭam pradyotyate; tadayuktaṃ; tadavyabhicāritvaṃ taddharmo vā, tatsvarūpaṃ vā?

Translation: 140

If you say that there is another way by which one will know that perceptual knowledge is not erroneous viz. when the knowledge produced by the relationship of inner sense organ i.e. mind and the soul is revealed qualified by the property of not being erroneous. This is also not proper, because, this give rise to two questions (a) whether the property of not being erroneous is the property of that knowledge or (b) is it the nature of that knowledge?

Text: 141

तद्यदि तद्धर्मः-स नित्यः, अनित्यो वा?

tadyadi taddharmaḥ-sa nityaḥ, anityo vā?

Translation: 141

If you say that it is property of that knowledge there again the question arises (a) whether that property is permanent? Or (b) whether non-eternal property?

Text: 142

यदि नित्यः, तदा जातिदोषेणापोपोदि(णापोदि)तो वेदितव्यः।

yadi nityaḥ, tadā jātidōṣeṇāpopodi(ṇāpopodi)to veditavyaḥ.

Translation: 142

If you say that it is eternal property then it will be rejected on the basis of the same defect which were raised in connection with the universal.

Text: 143

अथाऽनित्यः-स पूर्वोत्पन्नः, सह, पश्चाद्वा जातः?

athā'nityaḥ-sa pūrvotpannaḥ, saha, paścādvā jātaḥ?

Translation: 143

Again if you say that it is non-eternal, then also one can ask (i) whether it was produced before (ii) whether it is produced simultaneously or (iii) whether it is produced later.

Text: 144

तद्यदि पूर्वोत्पन्नः; तदा कस्यासौ धर्मः? न हि धर्मिणमन्तरेण धर्मो भवितुमर्हति, सर्वतो व्यावृत्तरूपत्वात् कः कस्येति वक्तव्यम्।

tadyadi pūrvotpannaḥ; tadā kasyāsau dharmah? na hi dharmiṇamantareṇa dharmo bhavitumarhati, sarvato vyāvṛttarūpatvāt kaḥ kasyeti vaktavyam.

Translation: 144

If you say it is produced before, then one may ask whose property it is? Because, without a locus no property can exist. When everything is discrete, which is property of what? You should tell.

Text: 145

अथ सहोत्पन्नः; कस्तयोः सम्बन्ध इति वक्तव्यम्।

atha sahotpannaḥ; kastayoh sambandha iti vaktavyam.

Translation: 145

If you say it is produced together then you should state what is the relation between the two?

Text: 146

तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिसमवायसम्बन्धाभावे सति षष्ठ्यर्थो वक्तव्यः 'तस्य अव्यभिचारित्वम्' इति।

tādātmyatadutpattisamavāyasambandhābhāve sati ṣaṣṭhyartha vaktavyaḥ 'tasya avyabhicāritvam' iti.

Translation: 146

If the relationship is not identity or cause-and-effect relationship or inherence then what will be the meaning of the genitive suffix, you should state, because, the expression is “the property of not being erroneous of that”.

Text: 147

अथ पृष्ठोत्पन्नस्तर्हि पूर्वं व्यभिचारिता विज्ञानस्य प्राप्नोति। न च आध्यात्मिकोऽव्यभिचारिरूपो धर्मोस्ति सुखादिव्यतिरिक्तः, तत्प्रतीत्यसम्भवेन स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्।

atha pṛṣṭhotpannastarhi pūrvam vyabhicāritā vijñānasya prāpnoti. na ca ādhyātmiko'avyabhicārirūpo dharmosti sukhādivyatiriktaḥ, tatpratītyasambhavena svayamanabhyupagamāt.

Translation: 147

If you say that it is produced later then it implies that the knowledge was erroneous before. It is not also the case that there is a property viz. the state of not being erroneous in the self other than happiness etc. because, that can never be known and you yourself have not accepted it.

Text: 148

यदि च अव्यभिचारादयो धर्मा अर्थान्तरभूताः अभ्युपगम्यन्ते तैरवच्छिन्नं विज्ञानं सामग्र्या अवस्थापकमुद्बुध्यते; तच्चानुपपन्नम्; प्रत्येकमनेकविशेषणावच्छिन्नविज्ञान-प्रतिपत्तिकालावस्थानायोगात्, ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकयोरभावे कर्तृमात्रप्रबन्धि ज्ञानं स्यात्।

yadi ca avyabhicārādayo dharmā arthāntarabhūtāḥ abhyupagamante tairavacchinnam vijñānam sāmāgryā avasthāpakamudghuṣyate; taccānupapannam; pratyekamanekaviśeṣaṇāvachinna-vijñānapratipattikālāvasthānāyogāt, jñāpyajñāpakayorabhāve karttṛ-mātraprabandhi jñānam syāt.

Translation: 148

If you declare that the properties like not being erroneous are accepted as another type of entities, and therefore the knowledge qualified by those properties will account for the factors which have produced it, this is also not proper, because, each knowledge will not exist up to the awareness of the knowledge qualified by a number of qualifications and where there will be absence of both the revealer and the revealed, the knowledge will be restricted to only the knower.

Text: 149

अथ तत्स्वरूपमव्यभिचारित्वम्-तत्किं स्वसत्तामात्राऽनुरोधेन, अर्थान्तरसत्तानुरोधेन वा? *atha tatsvarūpamavyabhicāritvam-tatkiṁ svasattāmātrā'nurodhena, arthāntarasattānurodhena vā?*

Translation: 149

If you say the very nature of the perceptual knowledge is that it is not erroneous, there the question arises, is it on account of its mere existence? Or is it on account of the existence of another object?

Text: 150

तद्यदि ज्ञानसत्तामात्रतैवाऽव्यभिचारित्वमुच्यते, तदा केशोण्डुकसंविदोऽपि अव्यभिचारिता स्यात्। न च ज्ञानसत्तामात्रानुरोधेन ज्ञानं व्यभिचार्यव्यभिचारि वा उद्गीयते। *tadyadi jñānasattāmātrataivā'vyabhicāritvamucyate, tadā keśoṇḍu-kasānvīdo'pi avyabhicāritā syāt. na ca jñānasattāmātrānurodhena jñānam vyabhicāryavyabhicāri vā udgīyate.*

Translation: 150

If you say the mere existence of the knowledge is what is called the state of not being erroneous, then the knowledge of thread-like things which appear in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly open our eyes, should also be considered as not erroneous. It is not proper to say that some knowledge is erroneous or not erroneous only on the basis of its existence.

Text: 151

अथार्थान्तरसत्तानुरोधेनाव्यभिचारित्वम्-किमनुपकारकाऽर्थान्तरसत्तानुरोधेन,
आहोस्विद् उपकारकाऽर्थान्तरसत्तानुरोधेन?

athārthāntarasattānurodhenāvyabhicāritvam-kim anupakāṛakā'rthāntarasattānurodhena, āhosvid upakāṛakā'rthāntarasattānurodhena?

Translation: 151

If you say that it is not erroneous, because there is existence of another knowledge, there again the question arises (i) is it because of existence of another knowledge which is not involved in the production of the knowledge? Or (ii) is it because of the existence of another knowledge in the production of knowledge?

Text: 152

तद्यदि तावद् अनुपकारकाऽर्थान्तरसत्तानुरोधेन, तदा केशोण्डुक-इन्दुद्वयसंविदोप्यव्य-
भिचारिताप्रसङ्गः।

tadyadi tāvad anupakāṛakā'rthāntarasattānurodhena, tadā keśoṇḍukaindudvayasamvidopyavyabhicāritāprasāṅgaḥ.

Translation: 152

If you say that it is on account of existence of another knowledge, not involved in the production of knowledge, then there will arise the contingency of accepting the knowledge of thread-like things which appear in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly open our eyes and the perception of two moons when you press your eyes in a particular way, as not erroneous.

Text: 153

अथ उपकारकाऽर्थान्तरसत्तानुरोधेन अव्यभिचारिता-किं प्रतीयमानाऽर्थान्तरोपकारक-
सत्तानुरोधेन, तद्विपरीतार्थान्तरोपकारकसत्तानुरोधेन वा?

atha upakāṛakā'rthāntarasattānurodhena avyabhicāritā-kim pratīyamānā'rthāntaropakāṛakasattānurodhena, tadviparītārthāntaropakāṛakasattānurodhena vā?

Translation: 153

If again you say that it is on account of the existence of another object which is involved in the production of knowledge, the knowledge is known as not erroneous, then again the question arises

(i) is it because of the existence which is involved in production of knowledge of something else “being known” or (ii) is it because of the existence which is involved in the production of another knowledge “not being known”.

Text: 154

तद्यदि पूर्वपक्षाभ्युपगमः, तदा अतीताऽनागतानुमानविज्ञानस्य योगिप्रत्यक्षस्य च चोदना-
वचनजनितविज्ञानस्य वाऽव्यभिचारिता न भवेत् तदवगतोपकारकार्थाभावात्।

*tadyadi pūrvapakṣābhyupagamaḥ, tadā atītā'nāgatānumānavijñā-
nasya yogipratyakṣasya ca codanāvacanajanitavijñānasya vā'vyabhi-
cāritā na bhavet tadavagatopakārakārthābhāvāt.*

Translation: 154

If you accept the first alternative, then, the inferential knowledge of the past, inferential knowledge of the future, the perception by the Yogins, or even the knowledge caused by Vedic injunction, cannot be considered as not erroneous, because, there is no object which is known as the helping factor towards that.

Text: 155

भावे वा वितानक्रियालोपप्रसङ्गः। अथ उत्तरो मतः; तदा केशोण्डुक-इन्दु-द्वयसंवि-
दोऽव्यभिचारित्वं प्रसज्यते इत्यसद्गृहीतम्।

*bhāve vā vitānakriyālopaprasaṅgaḥ. atha uttaro mataḥ; tadā keṣoṇḍu-
kaindudvayasamvido'vyabhicāritvaṁ prasajyate ityasadgrhītam.*

Translation: 155

Accepting that, that is there, there will arise the contingency of vanishing all activities. Again if you accept the second alternative, there will arise the contingency of accepting the knowledge of thread-like things which appear in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly open our eyes and the perception of two moons when you press your eyes in a particular way, as not erroneous. Therefore this is not a proper understanding.

Text: 156

किञ्च, तद्विज्ञानम् अव्यभिचार्यवगतं सामग्र्या ज्ञापकम्, अनवगतं वा?

*kiñca, tadvijñānam avyabhicāryavagatam sāmagryā jñāpakam,
anavagatam vā?*

Translation: 156

Moreover, that perceptual knowledge is not erroneous you have said. Is it the case that, that knowledge is not erroneous which is known through a collection of factors or which is not known?

Text: 157

यद्यवगतम्; तस्यावगतिः आत्मसंविद्रूपा वा, ज्ञानान्तरवेद्या वा?

yadyavagatam; tasyāvagatiḥ ātmasaṁvidrūpā vā, jñānāntaravedyā vā?

Translation: 157

If you say that only when it is known, it causes the knowledge, then is that knowledge of knowledge self-illuminating or it is to be known by another knowledge?

Text: 158

तद्यद्यात्मसंवेदनरूपावगतिः; तद्युक्तम्; द्व(स्व)यमनभ्युपगमात्। अभ्युपगमे वा उपगम-
विरोधः।

*tadyadyātmasaṁvedanarūpāvagatiḥ; tadayuktam; dva(sva)yamana-
bhyupagamāt. abhyupagame vā upagamavirodhaḥ.*

Translation: 158

If you say it is self-illuminating and therefore it causes its own knowledge, it is not proper because in your System (in the System of Nyāya) you would not accept any knowledge as self-illuminating. And if you accept there will be contradiction with your doctrine.

Text: 159

अथ ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यं वेत्सि; विज्ञानयोर्भेदे बीजमन्वेष्टव्यम्।

atha jñānāntaravedyam vetsyi; vijñānayorbhede bījamaṁveṣṭavyam.

Translation: 159

If you say that, that perception is not erroneous is known by another knowledge, one will have to enquire the ground to explain the difference between those two knowledges.

Text: 160

ज्ञानमज्ञानाकारात् ज्ञानात्मतया व्यावर्तते ज्ञानान्तरात्तु कथं व्यावर्तते? – किं ज्ञानात्मतया व्यावर्तते आहोस्विद् आकारान्तरेण?

jñānamajñānākārāt jñānātmatayā vyāvarttate jñānāntarāttu katham vyāvarttate?- kiṃ jñānātmatayā vyāvarttate āhosvid ākārāntareṇa?

Translation: 160

Knowledge is distinguished from the form of knowledge as knowledge but how can knowledge be distinguished from another knowledge? Is it distinguished as knowledge? Or, in terms of another form?

Text: 161

तद्यदि ज्ञानात्मतया व्यावर्त्तते; तदा अन्यस्य ज्ञानात्मता निवर्त्तते तोयादेर्यथा।
*tadyadi jñānātmatayā vyāvarttate; tadā anyasya jñānātmatā nivar-
ttate toyāderyathā.*

Translation: 161

If you say it is distinguished as knowledge, then the other (i.e. the non-knowledge i.e. the form or object) is not of the nature of knowledge as water is not knowledge.

Text: 162

अथ आकारान्तरेण; आकारान्तरस्वीकरणे ज्ञानाकारविरहः स्यात्, आकारयोस्तादा-
त्म्याऽयोगात्।

*atha ākārāntareṇa; ākārāntarasvīkaraṇe jñānākāravirahaḥ syāt, ākā-
rayostādātmyā'yogāt.*

Translation: 162

And if you say that it is distinguished on the basis from another form, then if you accept another form, it amounts to saying that there is no form in knowledge, because the two forms cannot be identical and if they are identical that object is only one.

Text: 163

तादात्म्ये वा एकं तद्वस्तु ज्ञातं(नं) अज्ञातं(नं) वा? यदि ज्ञातं(नम्); न तर्हि आकारान्तरेण
व्यावर्त्तते किन्तु ज्ञानात्मतयैव, अन्यस्य अज्ञानात्मकत्वप्रसङ्गः।

*tādātmye vā ekam tadvastu jñātam(nam) ajñātam(nam) vā? yadi
jñātam(nam); na tarhi ākārāntareṇa vyāvarttate kintu jñānātma-
tayaiva, anyasya ajñānātmakatvaprasaṅgaḥ.*

Translation: 163

Is that single object knowledge or non-knowledge? If it is knowledge, then it cannot be distinguished with the help of another form, but only in the form of knowledge. Since, the other will become of the nature of non-knowledge?

Text: 164

अथ अज्ञातं(नं); सिद्धं नः समीहितम्।

atha ajñātam(nam); siddham naḥ samāhitam.

Translation: 164

If again you say that single object is non-knowledge, then what we are intending to prove, is already proved.

Text: 165

अथ ज्ञानत्वं व्यावर्त्तकम्, तत्केन व्यावर्त्तते इति पूर्वोक्तमनुसर्त्तव्यम्।

atha jñānatvaṁ vyāvarttakam, tatkena vyāvarttate iti pūrvokta-manusarttavayam.

Translation: 165

If you say the property of being knowledge is distinguishing factor, here again we would like to know by what it distinguishes? And thus, we will have to follow the same method of raising doubts as shown by us before.

Text: 166

विज्ञानान्तरवेद्यमपि न सम्भवति। अथ न वेद्यते; तदस्तीति कथं पुनर्वेत्सि?

viññānāntaravedyamapi na sambhavati. atha na vedyate; tadastīti katham punarvetsi?

Translation: 166

That the knowledge is not erroneous cannot be known by any other knowledge also. If you say that it is not known, then we will ask you how do you know that it exists.

Text: 167

अनेनैव वर्त्मना सत्येतरविज्ञानयोर्विभागाभावोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः।

anenaiva vartmanā satyetaraviññānayorvibhāgābhāvo 'bhyupagantavyah.

Translation: 167

In this way, we can show there is nothing called a true cognition or a false cognition. This is what you should note.

Text: 168

अतोऽव्यभिचारिपदमपार्थकम्।

ato 'vyabhicāripadamapārthakam.

Translation: 168

And therefore, we say that the term “not erroneous” is meaningless.

[४. प्रकारान्तरेण अव्यभिचारिपदस्य निरासः।]

[4. prakārāntareṇa avyabhicāripadasya nirāsaḥ.]

Text: 169

इतोप्यपार्थकम्—

itopyapārthakam-

Translation: 169

For the following reason also the clause “which is not erroneous” (in the definition of perception as given by Gautama 1.1.4) is purposeless:

Text: 170

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षपदेन अपोदि(हि)तत्वात्।

indriyārthasannikarṣapadena apodi(hi)tatvāt.

Translation: 170

Because, the intended true perception can be excluded from the false perception by the word “contact between sense organ and object”.

Text: 171

नहि केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्य नयनार्थसन्निकर्षोद्भूतिरस्ति।

nahi keśoṇḍukavijñānasya nayanārthasannikarṣodbhūtirasti.

Translation: 171

It is not the case that the perception of the thread-like things which appear in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly open our eyes is produced by the contact between eyes and the object.

Text: 172

नन्वस्ति मरीच्युदकविज्ञानस्य, तदपनोदाय अव्यभिचारिपदम्;

nanvasti marīcyudakavijñānasya, tadapanodāya avyabhicārīpadam;

Translation: 172

Objection:

Well, the clause “which is not erroneous” is required to exclude the perception of water in the mirage.

Text: 173

तन्न; यत उदकं प्रतिभाति, न च तेन सह सम्बन्धोऽस्ति। विद्यमानेन साकं सम्बध्यते नाऽविद्यमानेन। तत्सम्बन्धे वा, न तद्विषयो(ये) मिथ्यात्वमिहोपपद्यते सत्योदकसंवेदनवत्।
tanna; yata udakam pratibhāti, na ca tena saha sambandho'sti. vidyamānena sākaṁ sambadhyate nā'vidyamānena. tatsambandhe vā, na tadviṣayo(ye) mithyātvamihopapadyate satyodakasaṁvedanavat.

Translation: 173

Reply:

It is not true, because, in that knowledge of water, water does appear, but there is no relationship of sense organ with that water. The relationship of the sense organ is possible only with that which exists there and not with that which does not exist there and if you say there is a relationship with water there, then the knowledge of water arising from the mirage, cannot be said to be erroneous like the knowledge of water where there is real water.

Text: 174

ननु यद्यपि प्रतीयमानोदकेन सह सम्बन्धो नास्ति चक्षुषः, तथापाप्या(थाप्या)लम्ब्य मरीचिनिचयेन साकं सम्बन्धोऽस्ति, तस्यैव आलम्बनत्वात् तद्देशं प्रति प्रवृत्तेः, अत एव मिथ्यात्वम्, अन्यदालम्बनम् अन्यच्च प्रतिभाति।

nanu yadyapi pratīyamānodakena saha sambandho nāsti cakṣuṣaḥ, tathāpāpyā(thāpyā)lambya marīcinicayena sākaṁ sambandho'sti, tasyaiva ālambanatvāt taddeśam prati pravṛtṭeḥ, ata eva mithyātvam anyadālambanam anyacca pratibhāti.

Translation: 174

Objection:

Although there is no contact of eyes with the water which has

appeared in the perception of water in the mirage, still, there is relationship with the mirage after getting water as its object. Water alone has to be the object of that knowledge because the person in need of water goes towards that direction of mirage and that is why such knowledge of water is called erroneous, because the basis of that knowledge is different and what appears in the knowledge is different.

[५. प्रसङ्गादालम्बनपदार्थस्य परीक्षणम्]

[5. *prasaṅgādālambanapadārthasya parīkṣaṇam.*]

Text: 175

कोऽयमालम्बनार्थो नाम येनेदमुद्घुष्यते - अन्यदालम्बनं चान्यत् प्रतिभातीति? - किं विज्ञानजनकत्वम्, आकारार्पकत्वम्, विज्ञानाधिकरणत्वम्, विज्ञानावभासितता वा?

ko 'yamālambanārtho nāma yenedamudghuṣyate - anyadālambanam cānyat pratibhātīti? - kim vijñānajanakatvam, ākārārpakatvam, vijñānādhikaraṇatvam, vijñānāvabhāsitatā vā?

Translation: 175

Reply:

Please tell us the meaning of the word ālamhana on the basis of which you are making the statement, on which the perception of water depends is different and what appears in the perception is different. Does it mean (i) “the property of being the producer of that knowledge”? or (ii) does it mean “the property of offering a form in that knowledge”? or (iii) does it mean “being the locus of that knowledge”? or (iv) does it mean “the state of being a revealer of knowledge?”

Text: 176

तद्यदि विज्ञानजनकत्वमालम्बनार्थः; तदा नयनालोकादेरपि आलम्बनत्वं प्रसज्यते।

tadyadi vijñānajanakatvamālambanārthah; tadā nayanālokāderapi ālambanatvaṁ prasajyate.

Translation: 176

If you say that the meaning of the term 'ālamhana' is being the property of being the producer of that knowledge, then eyes, light, etc. should also be called ālamhana.

Text: 177

अथ आकारार्पकत्वमालम्बनत्वम्; तदयुक्तम्, नैयायिकसमयेऽनभ्युपगमात्। यथा च विषयाकारो विज्ञाने न युज्यते तथोपरिष्ठात् प्रतिपादयिष्यामः।

atha ākārārpakatvamāmbanātvam; tadayuktam, nīyāyikasamayeḥ anabhyupagamat. yathā ca viśayākāro vijñāne na yujyate tathopariṣṭāt pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ.

Translation: 177

If you say that the meaning of the term ālambana is being the property of offering a form in that knowledge, that is also not proper, because, such a position is not acceptable in the doctrine of Nyāya. We are going to explain later in what way the form of the content of knowledge, will fit into that perception.

Text: 178

अथ विज्ञानाधिकरणत्वमालम्बनत्वम्, [नः] न मरीचिककरोत्कलितमुदीयते ज्ञानम् अपि तु आत्मसमवेतमात्मानमासादयते।

atha vijñānādhikaraṇātvamāmbanātvam, [na:] na marīcīcakrotkalitamudīyate jñānam api tu ātmasamaveta mātmānamāsādayate.

Translation: 178

If you say that the meaning of the term ālambana is being the locus of that knowledge, it is also not correct, because, it is not the case that knowledge arises by way of blossoming as it were, from the circle of the mirage. But what happens is it obtains its own form in the self through the relationship of inherence.

Text: 179

अथ विज्ञानावभासितता आलम्बनत्वम्; तदा उदकविज्ञाने उदकं प्रतीयते न मरीचयः।

atha vijñānāvabhāsītātā ālambanātvam; tadā udakavijñāne udakam pratīyate na marīcayāḥ.

Translation: 179

If you say that the meaning of the term ālambana is the state of being a revealer of knowledge, then in the knowledge of water, water alone should appear and not the mirage (as it happens later).

Text: 180

अथ उदकाकारतया मरीचय एव प्रतीयन्ते; स उदकाकारो मरीचिभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तोऽव्यतिरिक्तो वा?

atha udakākāratayā marīcaya eva pratīyante; sa udakākāro marīcibhyo vyatirikto'vyatirikto vā?

Translation: 180

If you say that yes, mirage alone appears in that knowledge, in the form of water, then we will ask you whether that form of water is different from mirage or not different.

Text: 181

तद्यद्यव्यतिरिक्तः; स तात्त्विकोऽतात्त्विको वा?

tadyadyavyatiriktaḥ; sa tāttviko'tāttviko vā?

Translation: 181

If you say it is not different, then we will like to know whether it is real or unreal?

Text: 182

यदि तात्त्विकः; कथं तदवगतेर्मिथ्यात्वम्?

yadi tāttvikaḥ; katham tadavagatermīthyātvam?

Translation: 182

If you say it is real, then how the knowledge of it can be unreal?

Text: 183

अथाऽतात्त्विकः; तदा मरीचीनामपि अतात्त्विकत्वं प्रसज्यते।

athā'tāttvikaḥ; tadā marīcīnāmapī atāttvikatvaṁ prasajyate.

Translation: 184

Again if you say it is not real, then the mirage also will become unreal?

Text: 185

अतात्त्विकोदकतादात्म्ये सति तदुदकज्ञानमतथ्यम्। किमुक्तं भवति? मरीचिविज्ञान-मतथ्यम्।

atāttvikodakatādātmye sati tadudakajñānamatathyam. kimuktaṁ bhavati? marīcivijñānamatathyam.

Translation: 184

If the mirage becomes identical with the unreal water, then the knowledge of that water is not real. What does it mean? It means the knowledge of mirage is unreal.

Text: 185

एकस्मिंश्चोदकाकारे प्रतीयमाने केन एतदाख्यातम्-मरीचयः प्रतिभान्ति देवानाम्प्रियस्य!
*ekasmimścodakākāre pratīyamāne kena etadākhyātam-marīcayah
pratibhānti devānāmpriyasya!*

Translation: 185

When it is the case that only one form viz. the form of water appears in the knowledge, then who has told you, Oh fool! that in this knowledge the mirage appears?

Text: 186

अथ अर्थान्तरभूतः; तर्हि न वक्तव्यम् - मरीचय उदकाकारतया प्रतीयन्ते उदकाकारा-
न्तरिता मरीचयः।

*atha arthāntarabhūtaḥ; tarhi na vaktavyam-marīcaya udakākāratayā
pratīyante udakākārāntaritā marīcayah.*

Translation: 186

If you say that the form of water is different from the mirage, then you should not say that the mirage appears in the form of water. It is not the case that the mirage is covered by the form of water.

Text: 187

अथ केशोण्डुकविज्ञाने किमवभाति? किमालम्बते?

atha keṣoṇḍukavijñāne kimavabhāti? kimālbate?

Translation: 187

Objection:

Well, I can also ask you what does appear in the knowledge of thread-like things which appear in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly open our eyes, and what is the ālambana there?

Text: 188

केशोण्डुकस्यैवालम्बनत्वं प्रतीयमानत्वं च तथा उदकस्यैव आलम्बनत्वं प्रतीयमानत्वञ्च,
नालम्बनान्तरं परिकल्प्यम्।

keṣoṇḍukasyaivāḷambanatvaṃ pratīyamānatvaṃ ca tathā udakasyaiva āḷambanatvaṃ pratīyamānatvañca, nāḷambanāntaraṃ parikalpyam.

Translation: 188

Reply:

The same thread-like things are called āḷambana and the same appear in the knowledge. In the same way, in the knowledge of water in the mirage, we think that water alone is āḷambana and water alone appears in the knowledge. You need not postulate any other āḷambana in that case.

Text: 189

न चोदकज्ञानस्य प्रतीयमानोदकाऽन्यालम्ब(न)त्वेन मिथ्यात्वम्, अपि तु अभावात् तात्त्विकत्वेन, अन्यथा केशोण्डुकसंविदोऽपि मिथ्यात्वं न प्राप्नोति, अन्यालम्बनव्यतिरेकात्।

na codakajñānasya pratīyamānodakā'nyāḷamba(na)tvena mithyātvam, api tu abhāvāt tāttvikatvena, anyathā keṣoṇḍukasamvīdo'pi mithyātvam na prāpnoti, anyāḷambanavyatirekāt.

Translation: 189

It is not the case that the knowledge of water in the mirage is called erroneous knowledge because it has an āḷambana which is different from water which appears in the knowledge of water. But, it is called a false knowledge because in reality there is no water. Otherwise, the knowledge of thread-like things also will not be called false because it is not based upon any thing other than what appears in the knowledge.

Text: 190

यदप्युक्तम्-मरीचिदेशं प्रति गमनात् मरीचीनामालम्बनत्वम्; यद्येवं देशस्यापि आलम्बनत्वमनया रीत्या उपपद्यते।

yadapyuktam-marīcīdeśaṃ prati gamanāt marīcīnāmāḷambanatvam; yadyevaṃ deśasyāpi āḷambanatvamanayā rītyā upapadyate.

Translation: 190

You said that the mirage is the āḷambana of this knowledge of water in the mirage, because, after knowing water the person in need

of water goes towards the mirage. If it is so, then in this way it is possible to say that place should also be the ālambana of that knowledge.

Text: 191

न चावभातोदकभिन्नार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वम् उदकविज्ञानस्योपपद्यते, सत्योदकज्ञानेऽदृष्टत्वात्, अन्यथा अनुमेयदहनज्ञानस्यापि इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वमापनीपद्येत आत्ममनःसन्निकर्ष-जत्वात्।

na cāvabhātodakabhinnārthasannikarṣajatvam udakavijñānasyopapadyate, satyodakajñāne’drṣṭavāt, anyathā anumeyadahanajñānasyāpi indriyārthasannikarṣajatvamāpanīpadyeta ātmamanaḥsannikarṣajatvāt.

Translation: 191

It is not possible to justify that the knowledge of water is caused by the contact of the sense organ with something different from water which has appeared in the knowledge of water, because, this is not seen in the knowledge of real water. Otherwise, even the inferential knowledge of fire, can be said to be produced by the contact of sense organ with the object, because, it is in any case it is produced by the contact of soul and the mind.

Text: 192

अथ प्रतीयमानदहनेन सह मनसो नास्ति सम्बन्धः;

atha pratīyamānadahanena saha manaso nāsti sambandhaḥ;

Translation: 192

Objection:

Well, in the case of inferential knowledge of fire, the mind is not connected with the fire, which appears in the inferential knowledge.

Text: 193

तदिहापि प्रतीयमानेन अम्भसा सह नास्ति सम्बन्धः चक्षुषः।

tadihāpi pratīyamānena ambhasā saha nāsti sambandhaḥ cakṣuṣaḥ.

Translation: 193

Reply:

Similarly, here also there is no relationship of the eyes with the water, which appears in the knowledge of water.

Text: 194

तस्मादव्यभिचारिपदं न युक्तम् इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षपदेनापोदितत्वात्।

tasmādavyabhicārīpadam na yuktam indriyārthasannikarṣapadenāpoditativāt.

Translation: 194

Therefore, the clause “which is not erroneous” is not required in the definition of perception, because, the clause the contact between the sense organ and object can exclude erroneous perceptions.

[६. पुनः प्रकारान्तरेण अव्यभिचारिपदस्यापाकरणम्।]

[6. punaḥ prakāraṅtaraṇa avyabhicārīpadasyāpākaraṇam.]

Text: 195

इतोप्यनुपपन्नम्, अपोह्यज्ञानाऽसम्भवात्।

itopyanupapannam, apohyajñānā'sambhavāt.

Translation: 195

Similarly, for the following reason also the clause which is not erroneous is not required, because, there is no knowledge which needs to be excluded.

Text: 196

अथ मरीच्युदकविज्ञानाय(प)निर्नी(नी)षया उपादीयते; तत्कथमपनीयते? अविद्यमानो-
दकविषयत्वात्।

atha marīcyudakavijñānāya(pa)nirnī(nī)ṣayā upādīyate; tatkathamapanīyate? avidyamānodakaviṣayatvāt.

Translation: 196

If you say that this clause is required, in order to exclude the knowledge of water in the mirage, we would like to know, how you are going to exclude it. Is it because this knowledge has water which is not there as its object?

Text: 197

यद्यविद्यमान(नं); कोऽयं विषयार्थः? पूर्वोदितमनुसरणीयम्।

yadyavidyamāna(nam); ko'yaṁ viṣayārthaḥ? pūrvoditamanusaraṇīyam.

Translation: 197

If you say there is no water (then it means there is absence of water) and then the question arises, what should we understand by the word ‘viṣaya’ or ‘content’? All objections raised in such context are to be referred to once again here.

Text: 198

यदि तत्रोदकं प्रतिभाति कथम् अस्ति?

yadi tatrodakam pratibhāti katham asti?

Translation: 198

Objection:

If you say water appears there then how is it, that water is not there?

Text: 199

सत्यम्, प्रतिभाति, किन्तु अतथ्यं प्रतिभाति। अतथ्यता का? – किं प्रतीयमानस्याऽभावः, उत प्रतीयमान एव अभावः?

satyam, pratibhāti, kintu atathyam pratibhāti. atathyatā kā?- kim pratīyamānasyā’bhāvaḥ, uta pratīyamāna eva abhāvaḥ?

Translation: 199

Reply:

True, water appears but what appears is false. Then we would like to know what is this falsity of knowledge? Does it mean (a) absence of what has appeared in the knowledge? Or (b) what has appeared that itself is absence?

Text: 200

तद्यदि प्रतीयमानस्य अभावः—स किं तदैव, आहोस्वित् कालान्तरेण?

tadyadi pratīyamānasya abhāvaḥ-sa kim tadaiva, āhosvit kālāntareṇa?

Translation: 200

If you say “absence of what has appeared”, the next question that arises is that absence at that time only? Or at a later time?

Text: 201

यदि तदैव; स किम्ब(किमव)गतः, अनवगतो वा?

yadi tadaiva; sa kimva(kimava)gataḥ, anavagato vā?

Translation: 201

If you say at that time only, then the question will arise is it known or unknown?

Text: 202

यद्यवगतः; स केनावगम्यते किमुदकविज्ञानेन, ज्ञानान्तरेण वा?

yadyavagataḥ; sa kenāvagamyate kimudakavijñānena, jñānāntareṇa vā?

Translation: 202

If it is known, by what it is known? Is it known by knowledge of water? Or by some other knowledge?

Text: 203

तद्यद्युदकज्ञानेन; तन्न; तस्य उदकविषयत्वात्।

tadyadyudakajñānena; tanna; tasya udakaviṣayatvāt.

Translation: 203

If you say that it is known by knowledge of water, it is not correct, because that has water as its object.

Text: 204

तद्विषयत्वे वा, न तर्हि 'उदकज्ञानं भ्रान्तम्' इत्युपपद्यते अभावविषयस्य परमार्थसत्त्वात्।

tadviṣayatve vā, na tarhi 'udakajñānam bhrāntam' ityupapadyate abhāvaviṣayasya paramārthasattvāt.

Translation: 204

In that case it cannot be said that knowledge of water is false. Since, in that knowledge, water alone is the object, because, the object of absence is a fact.

Text: 205

न च उदकाकारावगाहिनि विज्ञाने तोयविनिवृत्तयोऽवभान्ति अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

na ca udakākārāvagāhīni vijñāne toyavinivṛttayo'vabhānti atiprasaṅgāt.

Translation: 205

It cannot be said that in the knowledge where the form of water is an object, absence of water appears, because, it will lead to unwanted consequence.

Text: 206

अथ ज्ञानान्तरेण; न; ज्ञानयौगपद्यासम्भवात्।

atha jñānāntareṇa; na; jñānayaugapadyāsambhavāt.

Translation: 206

If you say that absence is known by knowledge, this is also not correct, because, no two knowledges can occur simultaneously.

Text: 207

यदि च अभावज्ञानेन अभावव्यवस्था क्रियते भावज्ञानेन च भावव्यवस्था, तदा उदकस्य भावाभावौ एककालौ स्याताम्।

yadi ca abhāvajñānena abhāvavyavasthā kriyate bhāvajñānena ca bhāvavyavasthā, tadā udakasya bhāvābhāvau ekakālau syātām.

Translation: 207

If you are settling absence on the basis of the knowledge of absence and presence by the knowledge of presence, then there will be presence and absence of water at one and the same time.

Text: 208

अथ भावज्ञानं भावव्यवस्थां न करोति अभावज्ञानं च अभावव्यवस्थां करोति। अहो राजाज्ञा नैयायिकपशोः।

atha bhāvajñānam bhāvavyavasthām na karoti abhāvajñānam ca abhāvavyavasthām karoti. aho rājājñā nīyāyikapaśoḥ.

Translation: 208

If you say that the knowledge of presence of an entity does not settle the presence, but the knowledge of absence settles the absence of an entity. What a king's order of the animal called logician!

Text: 209

यदि च भावज्ञानं भावव्यवस्थां न करोति तदा सर्वभावेषु अनाश्वासप्रसङ्गः। तत्प्रसक्तौ अभावस्याप्यनवस्थितिः, तदनवस्थितौ च तत्त्वोपप्लवः स्यात्।

yadi ca bhāvajñānam bhāvavyavasthām na karoti tadā sarvabhāveṣu anāśvāsaprasaṅgaḥ. tatprasaktāu abhāvasyāpyanavasthitih, tadana-vasthitau ca tattvopaplavaḥ syāt.

Translation: 209

If the knowledge of presence does not settle the presence, then there will be uncertainty with regard to all positive entities and if

there is uncertainty, there will absence of settlement of absence also and where there will be no settlement, it will result into certainty regarding the reality itself.

Text: 210

अथाऽनवगतः; सोऽस्तीति कथं पुनर्वेत्सि?

athā'navagataḥ; so'stīti katham punarvetsi?

Translation: 210

If you say that it is not known, then how do you know that it exists?

Text: 211

अथ कालान्तरे; तदा न किञ्चिद् बाध्यते सत्योदकस्यापि कालान्तरेऽभावोपपत्तेः।

atha kālāntare; tadā na kiñcid bādhyate satyodakasyāpi kālāntare'bhāvopapatteḥ.

Translation: 211

If you say that it will be known later, then nothing is contradicted, because, even then; it is possible to explain that there is going to be absence of even real water, sometime later.

Text: 212

अथ प्रतीयमान एव अभावः; कथं तद्विषयज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वमुपपद्यते, प्रतीयमानस्यैव अभावस्योपपत्तेः?

atha pratīyamāna eva abhāvaḥ; katham tadviṣayajñānasya mithyātvamupapadyate, pratīyamānasyaiva abhāvasyopapatteḥ?

Translation: 212

If you say that absence is indeed known, then how the knowledge of that absence can be possible to be false? Because, this absence is that which is known.

Text: 213

न च भावाकारे प्रतीयमाने अभावकल्पना न्याय्या, अतिप्रसङ्गात्, अन्यथा रूपादौ प्रतीयमाने रसादिकल्पना कर्त्तव्या। न च क्रियते, तथेहापि उदकं प्रतीयते।

na ca bhāvākāre pratīyamāne abhāvakalpanā nyāyīyā, atiprasaṅgāt, anyathā rūpādau pratīyamāne rasādikalpanā karttavīyā. na ca kriyate, tathēhāpi udakam pratīyate.

Translation: 213

It is not proper to postulate absence when the positive form is known, because it will lead to over-application, otherwise, when color is known, one should postulate taste, but nobody does so. In the same way, here also, water is known.

Text: 214

ननु प्रतीयते किन्तु अतथ्यम्;
nanu pratīyate kintu atathyam;

Translation: 214

Objection:

It is true that water is known, but it is false.

Text: 215

यद्येवम् उदकप्रपञ्चोऽयं दीर्घोदकं मधुरोदकमिति यथा।
yadyevam udakaprapañco'yaṁ dīrghodakam madhurodakamiti yathā.

Translation: 215

Reply:

If it is so, this is family of water, as we say 'huge water' 'sweet water'.

Text: 216

नन्वत्र सर्वासु अवस्थासु उदकं प्रतीयते तेन तासु अम्भः प्रकल्प्यते।
nanvatra sarvāsu avasthāsu udakam pratīyate tena tāsu ambhaḥ prakalpyate.

Translation: 216

Objection:

Well, here in all conditions or forms, water is known and therefore by that water is postulated in all of them.

Text: 217

यद्येवं तदिहापि अवस्थाद्वयेऽपि उदकं प्रतीयते सत्योदकमसत्योदकं च। सत्योदकज्ञाने सत्योदकमवभाति नाऽसत्योदकमनुदकं वा। तथा असत्योदकज्ञानेऽसत्योदकं प्रतिभाति न सत्योदकमनुदकं वा, स्वविषयपर्यवसायिन्यो हि बुद्धयः॥

yadyevam tadihāpi avasthādvaye'pi udakam pratīyate satyodakamasatyodakam ca. satyodakajñāne satyodakamavabhāti nā'satyoda-

kamanudakaṁ vā. tathā asatyodakajñāne'satyodakaṁ pratibhāti na satyodakamanudakaṁ vā, svaviṣayaparyavasāyīnyo hi buddhayaḥ.

Translation: 217

Reply:

If it is so, then here also in both the states, water is known such as real water and unreal water. In the knowledge of water, real water appears and not unreal water or something which is not water. Similarly, in the knowledge of unreal water, the unreal water appears, not the real water and anything but unreal water, because, the knowledges result into determining their objects.

Text: 218

अथ बाध्यमानत्वेन मिथ्यात्वमिति चेत्;

atha bādhyamānatvena mithyātvamiti cet;

Translation: 218

Objection:

Well, we say some knowledge as false, only because it gets contradicted.

Text: 219

किं बाध्यते-अर्थः, ज्ञानम्, उभयं वा?

kiṁ bādhyate-arthaḥ, jñānam, ubhayaṁ vā?

Translation: 219

Reply:

What is contradicted? Is it the object, or the knowledge or both?

Text: 220

यद्यर्थस्य बाधा; स केन बाध्यते? किं स्वयमेवात्मानं बाधते, आहो अर्थान्तरेण ज्ञानेन वा?
yadyarthasya bādhā; sa kena bādhyate? kiṁ svayamevātmānaṁ bādhatē, āho arthāntareṇa jñānena vā?

Translation: 220

Is it the case that, it contradicts its own form? Or is it contradicted by something else or by knowledge?

Text: 221

यदि स्वयमेवात्मानं बाधते, तदा बाधा तेन क्रियते, ज्ञाप्यते वा?

yadi svayamevātmānaṁ bādhatē, tadā bādhā tena kriyate, jñāpyate vā?

Translation: 221

If you say it is contradicted by itself, then does it mean it performs contradiction or does it mean that it reveals contradiction?

Text: 222

यदि क्रियते; अव्यतिरिक्ता, व्यतिरिक्ता वा?

yadi kriyate; avyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?

Translation: 222

If you say it does cause contradiction, and then question arises is it identical or is it different?

Text: 223

यद्यव्यतिरिक्ता; तदा बाधा क्रियते इति आत्मा अनेनोत्पाद्यते। तच्च न जाघटीति स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात्।

yadyavyatiriktā; tadā bādhā kriyate iti ātmā anenotpādyate. tacca na jāghṭīti svātmani kriyāvirodhāt.

Translation: 223

If you say it is identical, then when you say contradiction is caused, it will mean by this its form is produced. But that does not fit in, because, no action can be directed towards one's own self.

Text: 224

अथ व्यतिरिक्ता क्रियते; तथापि विद्यमानस्य कर्तृत्वं न प्रतीयमानस्याऽपलापः।

atha vyatiriktā kriyate; tathāpi vidyamānasya kartṛtvaṃ na pratīyamānasyā'palāpaḥ.

Translation: 224

If you say that it does something different, even then the agency should be ascribed to that which exists and one should not deny the existence of that which is cognized.

Text: 225

अथ बाधा ज्ञाप्यते; साप्यभिन्ना, भिन्ना वा?

atha bādhā jñāpyate; sāpyabhinnā, bhinnā vā?

Translation: 225

If you say that contradiction is indicated, there also question arises, contradiction is identical or different?

Text: 226

यद्यभिन्ना; तदा बाधा तेन ज्ञाप्यते। किमुक्तं भवति? उदकं ज्ञाप्यते।

yadyabhinnā; tadā bādḥā tena jñāpyate. kimuktam bhavati? udakam jñāpyate.

Translation: 226

If you say that it is identical, then it will mean that the contradiction is indicated by that. What does it amount to? It amounts to saying that water is revealed.

Text: 227

अथ भिन्ना; तदा विद्यमानस्य ज्ञापकत्वं सिद्धं, प्रतीयमानस्य चाऽस्तित्वम्।

atha bhinnā; tadā vidyamānasya jñāpakatvam siddham, pratīyamānasya cā'stitvam.

Translation: 227

If you say that contradiction is different, then it gets established that whatever exists that implies and whatever is cognized exists.

Text: 228

अथ अर्थान्तरेण बाध्यते; तथापि विद्यमानयोर्बाध्यबाधकभावो भूपालयोरिव, न चैकस्य बाध्यबाधकभाव उपपद्यते।

atha arthāntareṇa bādhyate; tathāpi vidyamānayorbādhyabādha-kabhāvo bhūpālayoriva, na caikasya bādhyabādhakabhāva upapadyate.

Translation: 228

Again, if you say that it is contradicted by something else, still, the relationship of contradicting and contradicted, of two existent things will be like the same relation between two kings. It is not proper to say that such relationship of contradicting and contradicted, is there with reference to only one thing.

Text: 229

बाधापि तेन प्रतीयमानस्य—किं क्रियते, ज्ञाप्यते वा?

bādḥāpi tena pratīyamānasya—kim kriyate, jñāpyate vā?

Translation: 229

What is the fact: is the contradiction of that which is cognized is created by that? Or is it indicated?

Text: 230

यदि क्रियते; अव्यतिरिक्ता, व्यतिरिक्ता वा?

yadi kriyate; avyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?

Translation: 230

If you say it is created, the same question may be asked whether is it identical or different?

Text: 231

यद्यव्यतिरिक्ता; तदा अव्यतिरिक्ता बाधा उत्पाद्यते। किमुक्तं भवेत्? उदकमुत्पाद्यते। तदुत्पादने च तत्संविदोऽमिथ्यात्वम्।

yadyavyatiriktā; tadā avyatiriktā bādhā utpādyate. kimuktaṁ bhavet? udakamutpādyate. tadutpādane ca tatsamvido'mithyātvam.

Translation: 231

If you say it is identical, then it will mean identical contradiction is produced. What does it mean? It means water is produced and with reference to production of that, the knowledge of that water cannot be said to be false.

Text: 232

अथ व्यतिरिक्तोत्पाद्यते; तथापि तोयसम्बन्धितयोपलब्धेरम्भस उपपत्तिर्न जातु देवदत्त-स्याऽसत्त्वे तन्नयनव्यवहारसिद्धिः।

atha vyatiriktotpādyate; tathāpi toyasambandhitayopalabdherambhasa upapattirna jātu devadattasyā'sattve tannayanavyavahārasiddhiḥ.

Translation: 232

Again if you say, that it is different and it is produced, still, since it is being known as related with water, it is possible to justify water. It cannot be the case that if Devadatta is not there, the function of his eyes (is there).

Text: 233

अथ ज्ञाप्यते; तदा साऽव्यतिरिक्ता, व्यतिरिक्ता वा?

atha jñāpyate; tadā sā'vyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?

Translation: 233

If you say it is indicated, there also the question arises, whether that contradiction is identical or different.

Text: 234

यद्यव्यतिरिक्ता ज्ञाप्यते; तदा बाधा तेन ज्ञाप्यते। किमुक्तं भवति? उदकं ज्ञाप्यते।
yadyavyatiriktā jñāpyate; tadā bādḥā tena jñāpyate. kimuktam bhavati? udakam jñāpyate.

Translation: 234

If it indicated as identical, then the contradiction is indeed indicated by that. What does it mean? The water is revealed.

Text: 235

अथ व्यतिरिक्ता सती ज्ञाप्यते; तथाप्युदकस्येयं बाधेति अन्यतन्त्रतया प्रतिभासनात् नात्यन्ताभावोपपत्तिः।

atha vyatiriktā satī jñāpyate; tathāpyudakasyeyam bādheti anyatantrtaya pratibhāsanāt nātyantābhāvopapattiḥ.

Translation: 235

If you say that it indicates by being different, still this contradiction is of water and therefore one cannot say that there is absolute absence of water because it appears with the help of something else.

Text: 236

तस्मादर्थान्तरेणापि न बाधोपपत्तिः।
tasmādarthāntareṇāpi na bādhopapattiḥ.

Translation: 236

Therefore, even if it is treated as a different entity, still, contradiction cannot be explained.

Text: 237

अथ ज्ञानेन बाध्यते; किं तद्विषयेण अन्यविषयेण निर्विषयेण वा?
atha jñānena bādhyate; kiṁ tadviṣayeṇa anyaviṣayeṇa nirviṣayeṇa vā?

Translation: 237

If you say that it contradicted by knowledge, there the question arises, is it contradicted by content of knowledge or by the content of some other knowledge or by knowledge without content?

Text: 238

यदि तद्विषयेण; तदा तत् स्वरूपं विधत्ते न तु विपर्यासयति तदाकारपर्यवसितरूपत्वात्।
yadi tadviṣayeṇa; tadā tat svarūpaṁ vidhatte na tu viparyāsayati tadākāraparyavasitarūpatvāt.

Translation: 238

If you say that it is contradicted by the content of that knowledge, then it justifies its form and does not make it otherwise, because, it is of the form which is contributed by the form of that knowledge.

Text: 239

अथ अन्यविषयं बाधकम्; तदपि न युज्यते, यद् यद्विषयं तत्तस्यैव सत्तां विधत्ते नत्वन्यस्य विधायकं प्रतिषेधकं वा। स्वविषयपर्यवसायिन्यो हि बुद्धयः।

atha anyaviṣayaṁ bādhakam; tadapi na yujyate, yad yadvīṣayaṁ tattasyaiva sattāṁ vidhatte natvanyasya vidhāyakaṁ pratiṣedhakaṁ vā. svaviṣayaṁparvavasāyinyo hi buddhayaḥ.

Translation: 239

If you say that object of some other knowledge is the contradicting factor, that also is not proper, because, if X is the object of the knowledge Y, then that X justifies the existence of Y. It cannot be either the justifier or the prohibiter, because, the knowledges result into referring to their own objects.

Text: 240

अथ निर्विषयेण बाध्यते; न किञ्चिद् विदधाति प्रतिषेधति वा निर्विषयत्वादेव।

atha nirviṣayeṇa bādhyate; na kiñcid vidadhāti pratiṣedhati vā nirviṣayatvādeva.

Translation: 240

If you say that it is contradicted by knowledge without content, then it will mean that it neither enjoins anything nor negates anything, because it does not have any content.

Text: 241

अथ ज्ञानं बाध्यते; तस्यापि बाधा का? – किं स्वरूपव्यावृत्तिरूपा, स्वरूपापह्नवरूपा वा, विषयापहारलक्षणा वा?

atha jñānaṁ bādhyate; tasyāpi bādha kā? – kiṁ svarūpavyāvṛttirūpā, svarūpāpahnvarūpā vā, viṣayāpahāralakṣaṇā vā?

Translation: 241

You are saying that knowledge is contradicted, what is that contradiction with reference to that knowledge? Is it of the form of

exclusion of its own form from the rest or is it of the form of denial of its own form or is it of the form of snatching away its content?

Text: 242

तद्यदि स्वरूपव्यावृत्तिरूपा बाधा, तदा सर्वं बाधितं स्यात् विज्ञानस्य विज्ञानान्तरेण निर्व(निव)र्त्यमानत्वात्।

tadyadi svarūpavyāvṛttirūpā bādḥā, tadā sarvaṁ bādhitam syāt vijñānasya vijñānāntareṇa nirva(niva)rtyamānatvāt.

Translation: 242

If you say that it is of nature of exclusion of its own form from the rest and that is what you call contradiction, then everything will become contradicted, because, one knowledge is contradicted by another knowledge.

Text: 243

अथ स्वरूपापह्नवरूपं(पा); तदयुक्तम्; मिथ्योदकविज्ञानस्यापि अनुभूयमानत्वात्।

atha svarūpāpahnavarūpaṁ(pā); tadayuktam; mithyodakavijñānasyāpi anubhūyamānatvāt.

Translation: 243

If you say that it is of the form of denial of its own form, that is not proper, because, even the knowledge of false water is being experienced.

Text: 244

अथ विषयापहारलक्षणा बाधा उच्यते; सापि न युक्ता। यथा च विषयापहारो न शक्यते कर्तुं तथाऽनन्तरमेव निवेदितम्।

atha viṣayāpahāralakṣaṇā bādḥā ucyate; sāpi na yuktā. yathā ca viṣayāpahāro na śakyate karttum tathā'nantarameva niveditam.

Translation: 244

If you say that it is of the form of snatching away its content and that is what is called contradiction, that also is not proper. That it is not possible to snatch away the content, which is being explained later.

Text: 245

यदि न बाध्यते किमित्यसौ अर्थक्रियां न करोति भावः?

yadi na bādhyate kimityasau arthakriyām na karoti bhāvaḥ?

Translation: 245

If you say that it is not contradicted, then does it mean that a positive entity does not perform consistent interaction?

Text: 246

केयम् अर्थक्रिया या तेन न सम्पाद्यते पुंसाम्-किं विज्ञानरूपा, प्रवृत्तिरूपा, प्राप्तिरूपा, सुखदुःखोत्पादभोगरूपा वा?

keyam arthakriyā yā tena na sampādyate puṁsām-kiṁ vijñānarūpā, pravṛttirūpā, prāptirūpā, sukhaduḥkhotpādabhogarūpā vā?

Translation: 246

What is this consistency of behavior which is not brought about to the people by that positive entity? (i) Is it of the form of knowledge? (ii) Is it of the form of action (iii) Is it of the form of getting what was shown by the knowledge? Or (iv) Is it of the form of experience leading to happiness or unhappiness?

Text: 247

तद्यदि विज्ञानलक्षणां न करोति; तदयुक्तम्; विज्ञानलक्षणामर्थक्रियां करोत्येव तोयम्।
tadyadi vijñānalakṣaṇāṁ na karoti; tadayuktam; vijñānalakṣaṇā-marthakriyāṁ karotyeva toyam.

Translation: 247

If you say it does not produce knowledge that is not proper, because, water does produce the consistent behavior in the form of knowledge.

Text: 248

अथ प्रवृत्तिरूपां न करोति; तदयुक्तम्; प्रवृत्तिर्हि पुरुषेच्छानुविधायिनी नार्थस्वरूप-
भावाभावावनुगमयति। पुरुषो हि कामतः प्रवर्तते वा न वा, नह्येतावता तदभावसिद्धिः।
atha pravṛttirūpāṁ na karoti; tadayuktam; pravṛttirhi puruṣecchānuvidhāyinī nārthasvarūpabhāvābhāvanugamayati. puruṣo hi kāmataḥ pravarttate vā na vā, nahyetāvatā tadabhāvasiddhiḥ.

Translation: 248

Again if you say, that it does not produce consistency in the form of action, that also is not proper, because, an activity takes place as per the desire of the person and does not cause the knowledge of either

positive or negative entity. A human being's activity is prompted by desire or not, till today its contrary has not been proved.

Text: 249

अथ प्राप्त्यरूपामर्थक्रियां न करोति तेनाऽसत्त्वम्; तदप्ययुक्तम्; चन्द्रार्कग्रहनक्षत्रतारकादेः प्राप्त्यभावेऽपि सत्त्वसम्भवात्।

atha prāptirūpāmarthakriyām na karoti tenā'sattvam; tadapyayuktam; candrārkaagrahanakṣatratārakādeḥ prāptyabhāve'pi sattvasambhavāt.

Translation: 249

If you say that the positive entity does not produce consistent behavior in the form of obtainment of what has been shown, and therefore it does not exist. It is also not proper, because, in spite of the fact that entities like moon, sun, planet, constellation and stars etc. have not been obtained by anybody and still they exist.

Text: 250

अथ सुखदुःखरूपामर्थक्रियां न करोति—किं दर्शनजं सुखं न करोति आहो देहसम्बन्धजम्? अथा सुखदुःखरूपामर्थक्रियां न करोति—किं दर्शनजं सुखं न करोति आहो देहसम्बन्धजम्?

Translation: 250

If you say it does not produce the consistency in the form of pleasure and pain, there one may ask, does it mean that, it does not produce pleasure produced by seeing the object or produced by relationship with body?

Text: 251

तद्यदि दर्शनजं न करोति; तदयुक्तम्; करोत्येव।

tadyadi darśanajam na karoti; tadayuktam; karotyeva.

Translation: 251

If you say it does not produce pleasure caused by perception, it is not proper, because it does produce pleasure.

Text: 252

अथ देहसम्बन्धजं न करोति; तदा चन्द्रार्कग्रहनक्षत्रादौ व्यभिचारः तेषां देहसम्बन्धज-सुखजनकत्वं नास्ति, अथ च सत्त्वम्। न च अर्थक्रियाऽकर्तृत्वेन वस्तूनामसत्त्वं स्वहेतोरेव विज्ञानजननमात्रस्योत्पत्तेः, सहकारिविरहाद्वा न करोति।

atha dehasambandhajaṃ na karoti; tadā candrārkaḡrahanakṣatrādaḡ vyabhicāraḡ teṣāṃ dehasambandhajasukhajanakatvaṃ nāsti, atha ca sattvaṃ. na ca arthakriyā'kartṛtvena vastūnāmasattvaṃ svahe-toreva vijñānajananaṃātrasyotpatteḡ, sahaḡrivarahādvā na karoti.

Translation: 252

If you say it does not produce pleasure caused by the association with body, and then it will violate the fact in the case of moon, sun, planet, constellations etc. because, they do not produce pleasure being associated with body and in spite of that they exist. It is not the case that things do not exist simply because they do not produce consistent behavior, because, by their own ground they simply facilitate the production of their knowledge or if they are no auxiliary causes they will not produce that.

Text: 253

किञ्च, अर्थक्रियां न करोति-किमेकस्य प्रतिपत्तुः, सर्वप्रतिपत्तुणां वा?

kiñca, arthakriyāṃ na karoti-kimekasya pratipattuh, sarvapratipattṛṇāṃ vā?

Translation: 253

Moreover, you say that a positive entity does not produce fruitful behavior, do you want to say that it does not produce fruitful behavior of some specific person or all persons who know it?

Text: 254

तद्यदि एकस्य प्रतिपत्तुर्थक्रियां न करोति तेनाऽसत्त्वम्; तदा चन्द्रार्कग्रहनक्षत्रतारकादौ व्यभिचारः मुमूर्ष्वर्थे च।

tadyadi ekasya pratipatturarthakriyāṃ na karoti tenā'sattvaṃ; tadā candrārkaḡrahanakṣatratārakādaḡ vyabhicāraḡ mumūrṣvarthe ca.

Translation: 254

If you say that it does not produce fruitful behavior of a specific person who knows it and therefore it does not exist, if it is so, it will violate the fact with regard moon, sun, planet, constellations etc. and also something (like a bubble) which is about to vanish.

Text: 255

अथ सर्वप्रतिपत्तृणामर्थक्रियां न करोति तेनाऽसत्त्वम्; एवं तर्हि सर्वभावानामसत्त्वप्रसङ्गः।
नहि सर्वे भावाः सर्व पुरुषार्थहेतवः।

*atha sarvapratipattṛṇāmarthakriyām na karoti tenā'sattvam; evaṃ
tarhi sarvabhāvānāmasattvaprasaṅgaḥ. nahi sarve bhāvāḥ sarva
puruṣārthahetavaḥ.*

Translation: 255

If you say that it does not produce fruitful behavior of all those who know it and therefore it does not exist, in that case, it will lead to the contingency of non-existence of all positive entities. It is not the case that all positive entities are the cause of desired goals of all human beings.

Text: 256

न च सर्वपुरुषार्थक्रियाविहीनमेतदित्यवगन्तुं पार्यते अर्वाग्विदा।

*na ca sarvapuruṣārthakriyāvihīnametadityavagantum pāryate
arvāgvidā.*

Translation: 256

It is also not possible to know that this is devoid of fruitful action of all human beings by a person who knows before.

Text: 257

तस्मात् स्थितमेतद् अव्यभिचारिपदमनर्थकम्।

tasmāt sthitametad avyabhicāripadamānarthakam.

Translation: 257

Therefore, one can conclude that the clause “not erroneous” is purposeless.

[७. भ्रमस्य स्मृतित्वं स्वीकुर्वतां प्राभाकराणां मतस्य विकल्प्य निरसनम्।]

*[7. bhramasya smṛtitaṃ svīkurvatām prābhākarāṇām matasya
vikalpya nirasanam.]*

Text: 258

अन्ये तु मरीच्युदकविज्ञानस्य स्मृतित्वं प्रतिपद्यन्ते न भ्रान्तिरूपताम्।

*anye tu marīcyudakavijñānasya smṛtitaṃ pratipadyante na
bhrāntirūpatām.*

Translation: 258

Others (Prābhākaras) however believe that the knowledge of water in the mirage which he remembers of water is not an illusion.

Text: 259

तस्य कथं स्मृतित्वं—किमुदकगृहीतित्वेन गृहीतोदकगृहीतित्वेन वा उदकग्रहणानन्तर-
कालभावित्वेन वा निर्विषयत्वेन वा 'यमहमद्राक्षम्' इत्यनेनाऽऽकारेण उपजायमानत्वेन वा?
tasya katham smṛtitvam-kimudakagr̥hītītvena, gr̥hītodakagr̥hītītvena
vā udakagrahaṇānantarakālabhāvitvena vā nirviṣayatvena vā 'yam
ahamadrākṣam' ityanenā'kāreṇa upajāyamānatvena vā?

Translation: 259

There we can ask how is it called remembrance? (a) Is it a remembrance which reveals water or (b) is it a remembrance which reveals water which was known before or (c) is it a remembrance because it occurs after the knowledge of water or (d) is it remembrance having no content or (e) is it a remembrance which arises in the form such as “this is what I saw before”.

Text: 260

तद्यदि उदकगृहीतित्वेन; तदा सर्वोदकविज्ञानानां स्मृतित्वप्रसङ्गः।
tadyadi udakagr̥hītītvena; tadā sarvodayajñānānām smṛtitva-
prasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 260

If it is a remembrance “as knowledge of water” then, all knowledges of water will become remembrance.

Text: 261

अथ गृहीतोदकगृहीतित्वेन स्मृतित्वम्; तदाऽऽद्यस्यापि गृहीतोदकगृहीतित्वे स्मृतित्वं
प्रसज्यते, गृहीतोदकग्राहित्वाविशेषात्।
atha gr̥hītodakagr̥hītītvena smṛtitvam; tadā'dyasyāpi gr̥hītodaka-
gr̥hītīte smṛtitvaṁ prasajyate, gr̥hītodakagrāhitvāviśeṣāt.

Translation: 261

If it is a remembrance which reveals water which was known before, then, if the first knowledge is also the knowledge of water which was known before and so that knowledge also will become remembrance,

because the first knowledge also is equally the revealer of water which was known before.

Text: 262

आद्यस्य गृहीतोदकग्राहित्वं नास्ति;
ādyasya grhītodakagrāhitvaṃ nāsti;

Translation: 262

Clarification:

The first knowledge of water cannot be called the revealer of water which was already known.

Text: 263

तदानीं भिन्नविषयत्वम्, भिन्नविषयत्वे च द्वितीयस्यापि गृहीतग्राहित्वं विहायते।
tadānīm bhinnaviṣayatvam, bhinnaviṣayatve ca dvitīyasyāpi grhīta-
grāhitvaṃ vihāyate.

Translation: 263

Reply:

That means, at that time i.e. at the first time, the object was different, then the second knowledge of water, cannot be said to be revealer of water which was already known (in that case the second knowledge cannot be called remembrance).

Text: 264

अथ एकविषयत्वम्; आयातं तर्हि प्रथमस्यापि गृहीतग्राहित्वम्, अविशिष्टार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वात्, प्रथमोत्तरविज्ञानवत्। यथा एकनीलस्वलक्षणग्राहकयुगपदुत्पन्नानेकविज्ञानात् नीलज्ञान-रूपता न भिद्यते, तथेहापि।

atha ekaviṣayatvam; āyātaṃ tarhi prathamasyāpi grhītagrāhitvam,
aviśiṣṭārthagrhītirūpatvāt, prathamottaravijñānavat. yathā ekanīla-
svalakṣaṇagrāhakayugapadutpannānekavijñānāt nīlajñānarūpatā na
bhidyaṭe, tatthehāpi.

Translation: 264

If you say the object is one and the same, then the first knowledge has to be revealer of that which is already known, because, the first knowledge is the knowledge which reveals an object which was not specific, like the knowledge which followed thereafter as the

form of knowledge of a blue thing, is not distinguished from many knowledges of blue things simultaneously occurring, at the time of the knowledge which reveals one blue thing. The same is the case here.

Text: 265

तथा, धारावाहिविज्ञानानां स्मृतिरूपता प्राप्नोति।

tathā, dhārāvāhivijñānānām smṛtirūpatā prāpnoti.

Translation: 265

Similarly, the perceptions occurring in a sequence, when someone is looking at one and the same thing, will become remembrance.

Text: 266

तथा, प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य च गृहीतग्राहित्वेन स्मृतित्वं प्रसज्यते।

tathā, pratyabhijñānasya ca grhītagrahītvēna smṛtitvaṁ prasajyate.

Translation: 266

In the same way, the knowledge called recollection (which is produced by sense organ and impressions together) will become remembrance.

Text: 267

अथ प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वं न विद्यते;

atha pratyabhijñānasya grhītārthagrahītvam na vidyate;

Translation: 267

Clarification:

Well, in that case it is different and hence it cannot be called recollection.

Text: 268

तदा प्रत्यभिज्ञानत्वं निवर्त्तते, नह्याद्यं दर्शनं 'स एवायम्' इत्युपजायते।

tadā pratyabhijñānatvaṁ nivarttate, nahyādyam darśanam 'sa evāyam' ityupajāyate.

Translation: 268

Reply:

In that case, it cannot be called recollection. It is not the case that the first observation arises in the form viz. "he is the same person".

Text: 269

तथा आनुमानिकमपि विज्ञान(नं) गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वेन स्मृतित्वमापद्यते।
*tathā ānumānikamapi vijñāna(nam) grhītārthagrahītvena smṛti-
 tvamāpadyate.*

Translation: 269

Likewise, the inferential cognition also will become remembrance since it reveals something which was already known.

Text: 270

अथ उदकग्रहणोत्तरकालभावित्वेन स्मृतित्वम्;
atha udakagrahaṇottarakālabhāvitvena smṛtitvam;

Translation: 270

Well, remembrance is that knowledge, which occurs after the knowledge of water.

Text: 271

तदा संस्कारस्य स्मरणरूपता प्राप्नोति, उदकग्रहणोत्तरकालभावित्वेन, रससंवेदनस्य च।
*tadā saṁskārasya smaraṇarūpatā prāpnoti, udakagrahaṇottarakāla-
 bhāvitvena, rasasaṁvedanasya ca.*

Translation: 271

Reply:

Then, the impression “produced by experience” will become remembrance because, impression also occurs only after experience. Also, the experience of taste, will become remembrance.

Text: 272

अथ निर्विषयत्वेन स्मृतिरूपता उच्यते; तदयुक्तम्; पूर्वोदितानुभवावेदितार्थकारावेदकत्वेन उदीयमानायाः कथं निर्विषयत्वम्?
*atha nirviṣayatvena smṛtirūpatā ucyate; tadayuktam; pūrvoditā-
 nubhavāveditārthakārāvedakatvena udīyamānāyāḥ katham nirviṣa-
 yatvam?*

Translation: 272

If you say that the knowledge of water in the mirage is remembrance because it is contentless, it will be improper, because, as this

knowledge has arisen as the revealer of the form of water, prompted by the earlier experience of water, how can this knowledge be called contentless?

Text: 273

अथ पूर्वानुभूतार्थप्रत्यस्तमये सति समानकालार्थाभावान्निर्विषयता; तदा चोदनाजनित-विज्ञानस्य निर्विषयत्वेन स्मृतित्वमापनीपद्यते, कर्त्तव्यतारूपार्थस्य तदाऽभावात्। भावे वा कर्त्तव्यरूपता नोपपद्यते। तदनुपपत्तौ सप्ततन्तुक्रियाया विलोपप्रसङ्गः।

atha pūrvānubhūtārthapratyastamaye sati samānakālārthābhāvānnirviṣayatā; tadā codanājanitavijñānasya nirviṣayatvena smṛtitvamāpanīpadyate, karttavyatārūpārthasya tadā'bhāvāt. bhāve vā karttavyarūpatā nopapadyate. tadanupapattau saptatantukriyāyā vilopaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 273

If you say by contentless what we mean is the absence of object or at the same time when the object is of the earlier experience is no longer there, then, the knowledge caused by an injunction will become contentless and thereby will become remembrance, because, at that time there is no object which is worth-performing. If you say it is there, it cannot be explained how it should be worth-performing and if that cannot be explained then all the activities related to the sacrifice called sapta-tantu will vanish.

Text: 274

यदि च निर्विषयत्वेन स्मृतित्वम्; तदा विद्यमानघट-जात्यादेः स्मरणस्यास्मृतित्वप्रसङ्गः।
yadi ca nirviṣayatvena smṛtitvam; tadā vidyamānaghṭa-jātyādeḥ smaraṇasyāsmṛtitvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 274

If you say that the knowledge is contentless and therefore it is a remembrance, the remembrance of universal like potness which is existent cannot be considered as remembrance.

Text: 275

अथ 'अद्राक्षम्' इत्यनेनाकारेणोपजायमानत्वेन स्मृतित्वम्;
atha 'adrākṣam' ityanenākāreṇopajāyamānatvena smṛtitvam;

Translation: 275

Clarification:

Knowledge which arises in the form viz. "I saw" will be a remembrance.

Text: 276

तदयुक्तम्; 'इहोदकमि'त्यनेनाकारेणोपजायमानायाः कथम् 'अद्राक्षमि'त्येवंरूपतोपपद्यते?
tadayuktam; 'ihodakami'tyanenākāreṇopajāyamānāyāḥ katham 'adrākṣami'ityevamrūpatopapadyate?

Translation: 276

Reply:

It is also not proper, because, when knowledge of water in the mirage has arisen in the form "here there is water", how can it be explained having the form viz. I saw?

Text: 277

अथ विप्रमुषि[त]ता अनया भङ्ग्या उपजायते।
atha vipramuṣi[ta]tā anayā bhāṅgyā upajāyate.

Translation: 277

The erasing of that knowledge can be explained as follows:

[८. प्रसङ्गात् विप्रमोषपरीक्षा।]
[8. prasaṅgāt vipramoṣaparīkṣā.]

Text: 277a

कोऽयं विप्रमोषो नाम? किमनुभवाकारस्वीकरणम्, स्मरणाकारप्रध्वंसो वा, अपूर्वार्थगृहीतित्वं वा, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वं वा, इन्द्रियार्थाऽसन्निकर्षजत्वं वा?
ko'yaṁ vipramoṣo nāma? kimanubhavākārasvīkaraṇam, smaraṇā-kārapradhvaṁso vā, apūrvārthagṛhītitaṁ vā, indriyārthasannikarṣajataṁ vā, indriyārthā'sannikarṣajataṁ vā?

Translation: 277a

If you say, such knowledge arises in the form in which some part is erased; we would like to ask you, what is this erasing? (a) Does it mean acceptance of the form of experience? (b) Does it mean destruction of the form of remembrance? Or (c) Does it mean revealing something new? Or (d) Does it mean the state of being

produced by the contact between the sense organ and object? Or (e) Does it mean the state of not being produced by the contact between the sense organ and object?

Text: 278

तद्यदि अनुभवाकारस्वीकरणम्; तदा स्मृतिरूपता नोपपद्यते।

tadyadi anubhavākārasvīkaraṇam; tadā smṛtirūpatā nopapadyate.

Translation: 278

If you say, does it mean acceptance of the form of experience? Then, that cannot be treated as remembrance.

Text: 279

अथ स्मृतिरूपता; तदाऽनुभवाकारस्वीकरणं नोपपद्यते, स्मृत्यनुभवाकारयोः इतरेतर-परिहारस्थितिलक्षणत्वात्।

atha smṛtirūpatā; tadā' nubhavākārasvīkaraṇam nopapadyate, smṛtya-nubhavākārayoḥ itaretaraparihārasthitilakṣaṇatvāt.

Translation: 279

If you treat it to be a form of remembrance, then you cannot treat it as the form of an experience, because remembrance and experience are mutually exclusive.

Text: 280

अथ स्मरणाकारप्रध्वंसः; तदयुक्तम्; विज्ञानस्य स्वयं स्मृतिवत्त्वेनाभ्युपगमात्। प्रध्वंसो हि अविज्ञानात्मकः कथं स्मृतिरूपतां विधत्ते?

atha smaraṇākārapradhvamsaḥ; tadayuktam; vijñānasya svayam smṛtitvenābhyupagamāt. pradhvamso hi avijñānātmakaḥ katham smṛtirūpatām vidhatte?

Translation: 280

If you say, does it mean destruction of the form of remembrance? That is not correct, because, knowledge by itself is not accepted as remembrance. Destruction is not of the form of knowledge, and so how do you call it a remembrance?

Text: 281

अथ अपूर्वार्थविषयगृ(०र्थगृ)हीतित्वं स्मृतिप्रमोष उच्यते; तदा अत्यन्ताऽननुभूतकनक-पनसादिसंवित्तीनां स्मृतिविप्रमोषत्वम् आपद्यते।

atha apūrvārthaviṣayaagr(rthagr)hātitvaṃ smṛtipramoṣa ucyate; tadā atyantā'nanubhūtakanakapanasādīsamvittīnām smṛtīvipramoṣatvam āpadyate.

Translation: 281

If you say that erasing of remembrance means revealing something new, then the perception of golden jackfruit and the like which is never experienced by anybody, will become erasing of that remembrance.

Text: 282

अथ इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वं स्मृतिविप्रमोष उच्यते; तदा संवित्तीना(नां) स्मृतिविप्रमोष-
त्वप्रसङ्गः।

atha indriyārthasannikarṣajatvaṃ smṛtīvipramoṣa ucyate; tadā samvittīnā(nām) smṛtīvipramoṣatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 282

If you say that, does it mean the state of being produced by the contact between the sense organ and object? Then there will arise the contingency of erasing of remembrance of all perceptions.

Text: 283

अथ इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वं स्मृतिविप्रमोष उच्यते; तदा चोदनाजनितविज्ञानस्य
अनुमानोपमानविज्ञानस्य च स्मृतिविप्रमोषत्वमापद्यते।

atha indriyārthasannikarṣajatvaṃ smṛtīvipramoṣa ucyate; tadā codanājanitavijñānasya anumānopamānavijñānasya ca smṛtīvipramoṣatvamāpadyate.

Translation: 283

If you say that, does it mean the state of not being produced by the contact between the sense organ and object? Then, the knowledge caused by injunction and the inferential knowledge as well as analogical knowledge, will also become the erasing of remembrance.

Text: 284

तस्माद् यथा यथा विचार्यते स्मृतिविप्रमोषः, तथा तथा न्यायं न विषहत इति।

tasmād yathā yathā vicāryate smṛtīvipramoṣaḥ, tathā tathā nyāyaṃ na viṣahata iti.

Translation: 284

Therefore, as we go on analyzing erasing of remembrance, deeper and deeper, it does not withstand logic.

Text: 285

तस्मात् मरीच्युदकविज्ञानस्य न स्मृतिविप्रमोषरूपता अपि तु विपरीतख्यातित्वं सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वं वा।

tasmāt marīcyudakavijñānasya na smṛtivilpramoṣarūpatā api tu viparītakhyātītvaṁ samyagjñānatvaṁ vā.

Translation: 285

Therefore, the knowledge of water in the mirage is not of the form of erasing of remembrance, but either of the form of knowledge of the contrary or the form of a true cognition.

[९. व्यवसायात्मकपदस्य समालोचनम्।]

[9. vyavasāyātmakapadasya samālocanam.]

Text: 286

तथा, व्यवसायात्मकपदमपि नोपादेयमप्रमे(मपने)याभावात्।

tathā, vyavasāyātmakapadamapi nopādeyamaprāme(mapane)yābhāvāt.

Translation: 286

In the same way, the clause “which is of the nature of determinate cognition” is not required in the definition of perception, because, there is nothing which can be excluded by this clause.

Text: 287

ननु स्थाण्वादिकेऽर्थे इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् सामान्यमात्रदर्शनाद्विशेषानुपलब्धौ सन्देहज्ञान-
मुपजायते तदपनीयते; तस्मिन् सन्देहज्ञाने जाते किञ्चित् प्रतिभाति आहो न प्रतिभाति?
*nanu sthāṅvādike'rthe indriyārthasannikarṣāt sāmānyamātra-
darśanāt viśeṣānupalabdhau sandehajñānamupajāyate tadapanīyate;
tasmin sandehajñāne jāte kiñcit pratibhāti āho na pratibhāti?*

Translation: 287

Objection:

Well, when our eyes come in contact with a post, we observe certain common features there and we also do not observe certain specific features and after sometimes, a doubtful knowledge arises. Now the

question is, in that doubtful knowledge whether something appears or does not appear?

Text: 288

तद्यदि प्रतिभाति; स किं धर्मो, धर्मो वा?

tadyadi pratibhāti; sa kiṃ dharmī, dharmo vā?

Translation: 288

Reply:

We would like to know what appears in the knowledge, is it a locus of the properties or the property itself?

Text: 289

तद्यदि धर्मो प्रतिभाति; स तात्त्विकः, अतात्त्विको वा?

tadyadi dharmī pratibhāti; sa tāttvikaḥ, atāttviko vā?

Translation: 289

If you say that the locus appears, then our question is, whether that locus is real or unreal?

Text: 290

यदि तात्त्विकः; नापनेयता तद्विषयविज्ञानस्य।

yadi tāttvikaḥ; nāpaneyatā tadviṣayavijñānasya.

Translation: 290

If you say that it is real, then obviously, the knowledge of that cannot be excluded.

Text: 291

अथ अतात्त्विकः; तदा अव्यभिचारिपदेन अपनीतत्वात् न व्यवसायात्मकपदमुपादेयम्।

atha atāttvikaḥ; tadā avyabhicāripadena apanītatvāt na vyavasāyātmakapadamupādeyam.

Translation: 291

If you say that it is real, then it has already been excluded by the clause “which is not erroneous” and so the clause “which is of the form of determinate cognition” need not be added to that definition.

Text: 292

अथ धर्मः प्रतिभाति; स स्थाणुत्वलक्षणः पुरुषत्वलक्षणः, उभयं वा?

atha dharmah pratibhāti; sa sthāṇutvalakṣaṇaḥ puruṣatvalakṣaṇaḥ, ubhayaṁ vā?

Translation: 292

If you say what appears there is a property, we would like to know, is that property of the form of postness or of the form of manhood or both.

Text: 293

तद्यदि स्थाणुत्वलक्षणो धर्मः प्रतिभाति स तात्त्विकोऽतात्त्विको वा?
tadyadi sthāṇutvalakṣaṇo dharmah pratibhāti sa tāttviko 'tāttviko vā?

Translation: 293

If you say that property which appears there, is of the form of postness, we will again ask you, whether that is real or unreal?

Text: 294

यदि तात्त्विकः; कथं तद्बुद्धेः सन्देहरूपता, तात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वेन सत्योदकसंवेदनवत्?
yadi tāttvikaḥ; katham tadbuddheḥ sandeharūpatā, tāttvikārthagṛhī-tirūpatvena satyodakasamvedanavat?

Translation: 294

If you say it is real, how can that knowledge be doubtful like the perception of real water which reveals the real object?

Text: 295

अथ अतात्त्विकः; तदा अव्यभिचारिपदेन अपोदितत्वात् न व्यवसायात्मकपदमुपादेयम्।
atha atāttvikaḥ; tadā avyabhicāripadena apoditatvāt na vyavasā-yātmakapadamupādeyam.

Translation: 295

If you say it is unreal, then this has been already excluded by the clause “that which is erroneous” and therefore the clause “that which is of the form of a determinate cognition” need not be added in the definition.

Text: 296

अथ पुरुषत्वलक्षणो धर्मः प्रतिभाति; असावपि तात्त्विकोऽतात्त्विको वा?
atha puruṣatvalakṣaṇo dharmah pratibhāti; asāvapi tāttviko 'tāttviko vā?

Translation: 296

If you say that property which appears is of the nature of manhood, the same question can be asked, whether that manness is real or unreal.

Text: 297

यदि तात्त्विकः; कथं तद्बुद्धेः सन्देहरूपता?

yadi tāttvikah; katham tadbuddheḥ sandeharūpatā?

Translation: 297

If you say real, then how can that knowledge be called doubtful?

Text: 298

अथ अतात्त्विकः तदा अव्यभिचारिपदेन अपोदितत्वाद् व्यवसायात्मकपदं न साधीयः।

*atha atāttvikah tadā avyabhicāripadena apoditatvāt vyavasāyātma-
kapadam na sādhyah.*

Translation: 298

If you say unreal, then this has already been excluded by the clause “that which is erroneous” and therefore the presence of the clause which is of nature of determinate cognition cannot be justified.

Text: 299

अथ उभयं प्रतिभाति; तदा उभयोस्तात्त्विकत्वम्, अतात्त्विकत्वं वा,

atha ubhayam pratibhāti; tadā ubhayostāttvikatvam, atāttvikatvaṁ vā,

Translation: 299

If you say, that what appears in the knowledge is of nature of both real and unreal, then, either both are true, or both are false?

Text: 300

अथ एकस्य तात्त्विकत्वम्, अन्यस्यातात्त्विकत्वम्? तद्यदि उभयोस्तात्त्विकत्वम्; तदा तद्विज्ञानस्य तात्त्विकत्वमेव, न सन्देहात्मता।

*atha ekasya tāttvikatvam, anyasyātāttvikatvam? tadyadi ubhayostā-
ttvikatvam; tadā tadvijñānasya tāttvikatvameva, na sandehātmatā.*

Translation: 300

If you say if one is real, and other is unreal, there if both are true, then the knowledge of both will be true and that knowledge cannot be said to be of nature of doubt.

Text: 301

अथ उभावप्यतात्त्विकौ; तदा तद्विज्ञानस्य विपर्ययरूपता, न सन्देहात्मता।

atha ubhāvapyatāttvikau; tadā tadvijñānasya viparyayarūpatā, na sandehātmata.

Translation: 301

If you say both are unreal, then the knowledge of that will be of knowledge of nature of contrary or nature of opposite, but not a doubtful knowledge.

Text: 302

अथ एकस्य तात्त्विकत्वमन्यस्याऽतात्त्विकत्वम्; तदा तदेव ज्ञानं व्यभिचारि तदेवाऽव्यभिचारि अतात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वाद् व्यभिचारि, तात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वादव्यभिचारि।

atha ekasya tāttvikatvamanyasyā'tāttvikatvam; tadā tadeva jñānam vyabhicāri tadevā'vyabhicāri atāttvikārthagrṛhītirūpatvād vyabhicāri, tāttvikārthagrṛhītirūpatvādavyabhicāri.

Translation: 302

If you say one is real, and the other one is unreal, then that very knowledge becomes erroneous and that very knowledge become non-erroneous, since one reveals the unreal object, and therefore is erroneous, and the other reveals the real object and therefore it is not erroneous.

Text: 303

एतेन द्विचन्द्रज्ञानमुद्धाटितम्। तत्र हि द्रव्याकारः प्रतिभाति न गुणाकारः।

etena dvicandrajñānamudghāṭitam. tatra hi dravyākāraḥ pratibhāti na guṇākāraḥ.

Translation: 303

By the same argument, the knowledge of two moons is also explained. In that knowledge what appears is a form of substance and not of the form of quality.

Text: 304

अथ सन्दिग्धार्थाकारप्रतिभासि सन्देहज्ञानमिति चेत्;

atha sandigdghārthākārapratibhāsi sandehajñānamiti cet;

Translation: 304

Clarification:

Well, the knowledge which reveals doubtful form of an object is called a doubtful knowledge.

Text: 305

स सन्दिग्धोऽर्थो विद्यते वा न वा?

sa sandigdho 'rtho vidyate vā na vā?

Translation: 305

Reply:

We would like to know, whether that doubtful knowledge exists or not.

Text: 306

तद्यदि विद्यते; कथं तत्संवेदनस्य सन्देहरूपता अबाधितार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वात् सत्योदक-
संवेदनवत्?

tadyadi vidyate; katham tatsamvedanasya sandeiharūpatā abādhitārthagṛhītirūpatvāt satyodakasamvedanavat?

Translation: 306

If that exists, then how can the knowledge of that would be form of doubt, because, that knowledge, reveals an object which is not contradicted like the perception of real water?

Text: 307

अथ न विद्यते; तदाऽव्यभिचारिपदेन अपोदितत्वाद् व्यवसायात्मकपदमपार्थकम्।

*atha na vidyate; tadā'vyabhicāripadena apoditatvāt vyavasāyātma-
kapadamapārthakam.*

Translation: 307

If you say that it does not exist, then, by the clause “which is not erroneous” itself that has been excluded, and therefore again, the clause “which is of the nature of a determinate cognition” becomes purposeless.

Text: 308

अ[थ न किं]चिदपि प्रतिभाति; न तर्हि तस्य इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षज[त्वम्], भ्रान्तोदक-
विज्ञानवत्। तस्माद् व्यवसायात्मकपदमपि अनुपादेयम्।

a[tha na kiṁ]cidapi pratibhāti; na tarhi tasya indriyārthasannikarṣaja[tvam], bhrāntodakaviḥṅānavat. tasmād vyavasāyātmakapadam api anupādeyam.

Translation: 308

If you say nothing appears in that knowledge, then that cannot be treated as knowledge caused by contact of sense organ and object as in the case of illusion of water. Therefore, the clause “which is of the nature of a definite cognition” is also not required to be added in the definition of perception.

[१०. अव्यपदेश्यपदस्यासाधुत्वे लक्षणसारग्रन्थस्योल्लेखः।]

[10. *avyapadeśyapadasyāsādhutve lakṣaṇasāragranthasyollekhaḥ.*]

Text: 309

अव्यपदेश्यपदञ्च यथा न साधीयः तथा लक्षणसारे द्रष्टव्यम्।

avyapadeśyapadañca yathā na sādhyāḥ tathā lakṣaṇasāre draṣṭavyam.

Translation: 309

We have discussed (in detail) how the clause “that which is not named or verbalized” is not justifiable in the definition of perception. For that one should see the text *Lakṣaṇasāra* (composed by me).

[११. इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नपदस्य समीक्षा।]

[11. *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannapadasya samīkṣā.*]

Text: 310

तथा, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वमपि नोपपद्यते तद्गत्यभावात्। इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षो हि व्यवहितार्थानुपलब्धिलिङ्गो वा, आ[वरणलिङ्गो वा], तदुत्पादितघटादिज्ञानावसेयो वा?

tathā, indriyārthasannikarṣajatvamapi nopapadyate tadgatyabhāvāt. indriyārthasannikarṣo hi vyavahitārthānupalabdhiṅgo vā, ā[varaṇaliṅgo vā], tadutpāditaghaṭādiḥṅānāvaseyo vā?

Translation: 310

Similarly, the clause “which is produced by the contact between the sense organ and object” also is not justified, because, there is no way by which it can be known. Is the contact between the sense organ

and object known on the basis of not arising of the knowledge of a thing at a distance or is it known on the basis of the ground viz. cover or ignorance or is it concluded on the basis of the knowledge of pot etc. produced by that contact.

Text: 311

तद्यदि व्यवहितार्थानुपलब्धिलिङ्गः; तदयुक्तम्; तेन सह सम्बन्धाऽनुपपत्तेः, तदभावेऽप्यनुपलम्भसद्भावदर्शनात्। यदभावेऽपि यस्य सद्भावः स कथं तत्सद्भावावेदकः?

tadyadi vyavahitārthānupalabdhilingaḥ; tadayuktam; tena saha sambandhāḥānupapatteḥ, tadabhāvepyanupalambhasadbhāvadarśanāt. yadabhāve'pi yasya sadbhāvaḥ sa katham tatsadbhāvāvedakaḥ?

Translation: 311

If you say it is known on the basis of not arising of the knowledge of a thing at a distance, it is not proper, because, there is no invariable relationship with that, because, it is observed that even in the absence of that the non-knowledge exist. If X can exist, even without Y, how can Y be the producer of knowledge of existence of X.

Text: 312

अथ आवरणलिङ्गः; तदयुक्तम्; तेन सह सम्मतिग(सङ्ग)तेरभावात्, तदभावेऽपि सद्भावदर्शनात्, तद्भावे वा आवरणानर्थज्य(क्य)म्। तदभावे तद्गतिः कथम्?

atha āvaraṇalingaḥ; tadayuktam; tena saha sammatiga(saṅga)terabhāvāt, tadabhāve'pi sadbhāvadarśanāt, tadbhāve vā āvaraṇānarthajya(kya)m. tadabhāve tadgatiḥ katham?

Translation: 312

If you say it is known on the basis of the ground viz. cover or ignorance, which also is not proper, because, this also does not have a relationship with that contact. Since, even in the absence of that it is observed to exist and if it exists the cover becomes meaningless and if it does not exist, how can it be known?

Text: 313

अथ तद्भवकुम्भादिज्ञानेन अवगम्यते; तदयुक्तम्; तदनवगतौ तदुद्भवत्वस्यानवगतेः। पिशाचपरमाणुमहेश्वरकल्पोऽसौ सन्निकर्षः। कथं तदायत्तता वेद्यते ज्ञाने?

*atha tadbhvakumbhādijñānena avagamyate; tadayuktam; tadana-
vagatau tadudbhavatvasyānavagateḥ. piśācaparamāṇumahēśvara-
kalpo'sau sannikarṣaḥ. katham tadāyattatā vedyate jñāne?*

Translation: 313

If you say it is known by the knowledge which is produced by the contact, it is again improper, because if it is not known, it cannot also be known that the contact has produced the knowledge of pot. That contact between sense organ and object is something like a ghost or an atom or what you say God which is never known. How can it be known that knowledge depends upon that?

Text: 314

कथं च तद् इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षमावेदयति ज्ञानम्—किं विज्ञानाकारतया, आहो कार्या-
कारतया, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्याकारतया वा?

*katham ca tad indriyārthasannikarṣamāvedayati jñānam-kiṁ vijñānā-
kāratayā, āho kāryākāratayā, indriyārthasannikarṣajanyākāratayā vā?*

Translation: 314

We would like to ask: How does that knowledge cause the knowledge between sense organ and object? Is it (i) As knowledge? (ii) As an effect? (iii) As a form produced by the contact produced by sense organ and object?

Text: 314

तद्यदि ज्ञानस्वभावतया; तदयुक्तम्; तदभावेऽपि ज्ञानाकारस्य सम्भव उपमानादिज्ञाने।
*tadyadi jñānasvabhāvatayā; tadayuktam; tadabhāve'pi jñānākārasya
sambhava upamānādijñāne.*

Translation: 314

If you say it causes the knowledge as nature of knowledge, it is not proper, because, even without this there is possibility of a form of knowledge as in the case of analogical knowledge.

Text: 315

अथ कार्यात्मतया गमयति तदप्ययुक्तम्; उपमानानुमानज्ञान—मरीचिनीलजलादौ तस्य
सद्भावोपपत्तेः। यो येन विना भवति स कथं तस्य ज्ञापको नाम? अन्यथा सत्त्वादेरपि
गमकत्वं स्यात्।

atha kāryātmatayā gamayati tadapyayuktam; upamānānumānajñā-namarīcinīlajalādaḥ tasya sadbhāvopapatteḥ. yo yena vinā bhavati sa katham tasya jñāpakā nāma? anyathā sattvāderapi gamakatvam syāt.

Translation: 315

If you say it causes the knowledge in the form of an effect, it is also not proper, because, in the case of analogical knowledge, inferential knowledge, and the knowledge of water in the mirage, also effectness is present. If X comes into being without Y how can Y be called the producer of knowledge of X? Otherwise, mere existence can also become the producer of knowledge.

Text: 316

अथ इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्याकारतया संशू(सू)चयतीति चेत्; असौ इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष-जन्याकारः ज्ञानाकारादव्यतिरिक्तः व्यतिरिक्तो वा? यद्यव्यतिरिक्तः; तदा ज्ञानात्मतामात्रं, नाऽऽकारातिरेकोऽन्योऽस्ति विभाव्यमानोऽनुमानादिज्ञानेषु यथा। आकारान्तरातिरेके वा ज्ञानारूपता हीयते।

atha indriyārthasannikarṣajanyākāratayā saṁśū(sū)cayatīti cet; asau indriyārthasannikarṣajanyākārah jñānākārādavyatiriktaḥ, vyatirikto vā? yadyavyatiriktaḥ; tadā jñānātmamātram, nā"karāti-reko 'nyo 'sti vibhāvya māno 'numānādijñāneṣu yathā. ākārantarāti-reke vā jñānārūpatā hrīyate.

Translation: 316

If you say that it causes the knowledge as a form produced by the contact between the sense organ and object. We would like to know whether that form produced between the contact between the sense organ and object, is identical with the knowledge or different from it. If it is identical, then it is mere knowledge. There is no different form which we can imagine there as in the case of an inferential cognition and the like and if we posit another form it will cease to be knowledge.

Text: 317

अथ व्यतिरिक्तः; तस्यैव तर्हि गमकत्वं न ज्ञानाकारस्य। तस्याप्यगमकत्वं तदवेदनात्।
atha vyatiriktaḥ; tasyaiva tarhi gamakatvam na jñānākārasya. tasyāpyagamakatvam tadavedanāt.

Translation: 317

If you say that the form produced by the contact between the sense organ and object is different from knowledge, then that should cause the knowledge and not the form of knowledge. Even that cannot be called producer of knowledge, because it cannot cause that knowledge.

Text: 318

किञ्च, तदुत्पन्नम् इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाद् विज्ञानं स्वरूपेणावगाहनीयम्, ततो व्याप्तिस्मरणम्, तदनु परामर्शज्ञानम्, ततोऽनुमेयावगतिरिति। न च एतावन्तं कालं विज्ञानं स्थितिपदं बध्नाति, आशुभावित्वेन प्रत्यस्तमितत्वात् ।

*kiñca, tadutpannam indriyārthasannikarṣād vijñānaṁ svarūpeṇā-
va-gāhanīyam, tato vyāptismaraṇam, tadanu parāmarśajñānam,
tato 'numeyāvagatiriti. na ca etāvantam kālam vijñānaṁ sthitipadaṁ
badhnāti, āśubhāvitvena pratyastamitatvāt.*

Translation: 318

Moreover, first of all, that knowledge produced from the contact between the sense organ and object, should be known in its own form. Then, there should be remembrance of invariable concomitance. That will be followed by a confirmatory knowledge and then the inferential knowledge of that contact can arise. The initial knowledge however, cannot continue to exist for such a longer duration, because, as the knowledge comes quickly, it goes quickly.

Text: 319

अथ बुद्ध्यारूढेन धर्मधर्मिन्यायेन परिकल्प्यते अनुमानम्;

atha buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharmīnyāyena parikalpyate anumānam;

Translation: 319

Clarification:

Well, we can postulate a mental process of inference, as we do on the basis of the principle of locus and located.

Text: 320

तदा अवास्तवं प्राप्नोति सुगतानुमानवत्।

tadā avāstavam prāpnoti sugatānumānavat.

Translation: 320

Reply:

Then the whole thing will become unreal like the inference of the Buddhists.

[१२. इन्द्रियजन्यत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षेऽसम्भवप्रकटनम्।]

[12. *indriyajanyatvasya pratyakṣe 'sambhavaprakāṭanam.*]

Text: 321

तथा, इन्द्रियोत्पाद्यत्वमपि नोपपद्यते, इन्द्रियोत्पाद्यत्वातिरेकानवगतेः।

tathā, indriyotpādyatvamapi nopapadyate, indriyotpādyatvātirekānavagateḥ.

Translation: 321

In the same way, even this cannot be justified that perceptual knowledge is produced by the sense-organ, because, we do not know whether the perceptual knowledge is also produced by something other than the sense-organ.

Text: 322

विज्ञानं स्वभावतयैव वेद्यते, नाकारान्तरेण, तज्ज्ञप्तौ वा ज्ञानाकारविरहप्रसङ्गः।

viññānam svabhāvatayaiva vedyate, nākārāntareṇa, tajjñaptau vā jñānākāravirahaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 322

Knowledge is known by its own nature and not by any other form and if it is known by any other form then it will result into losing the form of knowledge.

Text: 323

न च ज्ञानम् इन्द्रियसम्बद्धं दृष्टं, येन तदुपलभ्यमानम् इन्द्रियं गमयति।

na ca jñānam indriyasambaddham dṛṣṭam, yena tadupalabhyamānam indriyam gamayati.

Translation: 323

We have not come across any knowledge connected with the sense organ, had it been so, it would have caused the knowledge of the sense organ in the form of being known.

Text: 324

अथ क्रिया अन्यत्र करणसाध्या दृष्टा। सैव गमिकाऽस्तु यस्याः करणसम्बन्धोऽवगतः।
atha kriyā anyatra karaṇasādhyā dr̥ṣṭā. saiva gamikā'stu yasyāḥ karaṇasambandho'vagataḥ.

Translation: 324

Objection:

Well, we do find action somewhere else i.e. in another locus produced by an instrument, let that action be the causer of the knowledge with which relationship of instrument is understood.

Text: 325

न चान्यस्य सम्बन्धे अन्यस्य गमकत्वं किञ्चित्साम्यादुपपद्यते। न जातु देवदत्तनयननील-
सम्बन्धे सति यज्ञदत्तेन्द्रियं घटादिकमर्थम् असति सम्बन्धे करणत्वसाम्यात् प्रकाशयद् दृष्टम्।
na cānyasya sambandhe anyasya gamakatvaṁ kiñcitsāmyādupapadyate. na jātu devadattanayanānilasambandhe sati yajñadattendriyaṁ ghaṭādīkamārtham asati sambandhe karaṇatvasāmyāt prakāśayad dr̥ṣṭam.

Translation: 325

Reply:

It will not be proper to say that on the basis of some similarity, X has the relationship and Y can cause the knowledge. No one has seen that, if there is a relationship of something blue with the eyes of Devadatta, then the sense organ of Yajñadatta causes the perception of pot etc. even if there is no relationship simply on the basis of similarity of an instrument.

Text: 326

तथा, अर्थजन्याकारोऽपि विज्ञाने अनेनैव प्रकारेण पर्युदस्तो वेदितव्यः।
tathā, arthajanyākāro'pi vijñāne anenaiva prakāreṇa paryudasto veditavyaḥ.

Translation: 326

In the same way, the argument of knowledge having a form produced by the object, should be known as rejected on the basis of this very logic.

[१३. अर्थस्यापि प्रत्यक्षजनकत्वखण्डनम्।]

[13. *arthasyāpi pratyakṣajanakatvakhāṇḍanam.*]

Text: 327

तथा, अर्थोऽपि विज्ञानमुत्पादयति-अनुपजाताऽतिशयः, उपजातातिशयो वा, अव्यति-
रिक्तोपजातातिशयो वा, व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयो वा?

tathā, artho'pi vijñānamutpādayati-anupajātā'tiśayaḥ, upajātātiśayo vā, avyatiriktopajātātiśayo vā, vyatiriktopajātātiśayo vā?

Translation: 327

Similarly, you say that object produces knowledge; there we would like to ask, (i) whether the object produces knowledge without any additional property produced in the object? Or (ii) whether it produces knowledge with something extra property produced in it?

Or (iii) does it produce knowledge with something additional property produced in it and at the same time not being different from it? Or (iv) does it produce cognition with some extra feature produced in it which is different from it?

Text: 328

तद्यति अनुपजातातिशयः करोति; तदा सर्वदा कुर्याद् न वा करणम् अकरणं वा नोपवि-
(प)द्येत तत्स्वरूपानतिवृत्तेः।

tadyati anupajātātiśayaḥ karoti; tadā sarvadā kuryād na vā karaṇam akaraṇam vā nopavi(pa)dyeta tatsvarūpānativṛtṭeḥ.

Translation: 328

If you say, it produces knowledge with something extra property produced in it, then it should always produce knowledge or it cannot be characterized either as an instrument or non-instrument because its nature remains unaffected.

Text: 329

तथा, अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयोऽपि न करोति, अकारकाकारस्यानुगतेः। अननुगतौ वा न
तर्हि तदव्यतिरिक्तोऽतिशयः।

tathā, avyatiriktopajātātiśayo'pi na karoti, akārakākārasyanugateḥ. ananugatau vā na tarhi tadavyatirikto'tiśayaḥ.

Translation: 329

In the same way, it cannot produce knowledge with some additional feature being born in it, which is not different from itself, because, its form of not being a causal factor still continues. If you say it does not continue, then, the additional feature is not different from the object.

Text: 330

अथ व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन जन्यते तथापि नो[पपद्य]ते, अकारकाकारानतिवृत्तेः। अतिवृत्तौ वा आयातं क्षणिकत्वम्।

atha vyatiriktopajātātīśayena janyate tathāpi no[papadya]te, akāra-kākārānativṛtteh. ativr̥ttau vā āyātam kṣaṇikatvam.

Translation: 330

If you say that knowledge is produced by the object, which has additional feature which is born at the same time which is different from itself, even then, it is not justifiable, because, the form of not being a causal factor has not ceased to exist and if you say that it has over-extended the one cannot stop it from becoming momentary.

Text: 331

ततश्च नेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजं विज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षलक्षणम्।

tataśca nendriyārthasannikarṣajam vijñānam pratyakṣalakṣaṇam.

Translation: 331

From all this we conclude that a cognition which is produced by the contact of the sense organ with the object, it cannot be called the definition of a perceptual cognition.

0.3 मीमांसकसम्मतस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा।

[mīmāṃsakasammataśya pramāṇalakṣaṇasya parīkṣā.]

(Refutation of the definition of pramāṇa as accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas)

Text: 332

अन्ये तु अनधिगतार्थगन्तृत्वेन प्रमाणलक्षणमभिदधति। ते त्वयुक्तवादिनो द्रष्टव्याः।

anye tu anadhigatārthagantṛtvena pramāṇalakṣaṇamabhidadhati. te tvayuktavādinō draṣṭavyāḥ.

Translation: 332

Others (Mīmāṃsakas) say that the general definition of pramāṇa is that knowledge which reveals an object, which was not known before. They should be looked upon as such scholars, who do not talk rationally.

Text: 333

कथमयुक्तवादिता तेषामिति चेत्;
kathamayuktavādītā teṣāmīti cet;

Translation: 333

Objection:

How do you say that they do not talk logically?

Text: 334

उच्यते-विभिन्नकारकोत्पादितैकार्थविज्ञानानां यथाव्यवस्थितैकार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वाऽविशेषेऽपि पूर्वोत्पन्नविज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यं नोत्तरस्य इत्यत्र नियामकं वक्तव्यम्।

*ucyate-vibhinnakāra kotpāditaikārthavijñānānām yathāvya vāsthitai-
kā rthagr̥hītirūpatvā'viśeṣe'pi pūrvotpannavijñānasya prāmāṇyam
nottarasya ityatra niyāmakam vaktavyam.*

Translation: 334

Reply:

We say so due to the following: When, the knowledges of an object produced by different causal factors do not show any difference, in their form viz. being the revealer of that single object as it is, they say that the knowledge that has arisen before, is authentic, whereas the knowledge that has arisen later, is not. What should be the deciding factor? They should spell out.

Text: 335

अथ यथाव्यवस्थितार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वाविशेषेऽपि पूर्वोत्पन्नविज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमुपपद्यते न प्रथमोत्तरविज्ञानस्य;

*atha yathāvya vāsthitārthagr̥hītirūpatvāviśeṣe'pi pūrvotpannavijñā-
nasya prāmāṇyamupapadyate na prathamottaravijñānasya;*

Translation: 335

Clarification:

Well, when there is no difference in the form viz. being the revealer

of one and the same object, as it is and still it is proper to hold that the knowledge that was produced before is alone dependable, and not the knowledge that followed the first knowledge.

Text: 336

तदा अनेनैव न्यायेन प्रथमस्याप्यप्रामाण्यं प्रसक्तं गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वाऽविशेषात्। यथा एकनीलस्वलक्षणावभासितयुगपदुत्पन्नानेकनीलविज्ञानानां नीलैकार्थगृहीतिरूपता न भिद्यते, तथा पूर्वापरोत्पन्नविज्ञानानामपि गृहीतार्थगृहीतिरूपता न निवत्स्यति।

tadā anenaiva nyāyena prathamasyāpyaprāmāṇyaṃ prasaktaṃ gṛhītārthagrahītvāḥviśeṣāt। yathā ekanīlasvalakṣaṇāvabhāsītayugapadutpannānekanīlavijñānānāṃ nīlāikārthagṛhītirūpatā na bhidyate, tathā pūrvāparotpannavijñānānāmapi gṛhītārthagṛhītirūpatā na nivartsyati.

Translation: 336

Reply:

Then on the same logic the first logic should also be declared as non-dependable, because, that is also not different from having the nature of being the revealer of the object which was known. As the knowledges of a blue thing simultaneously occurring at the time of the knowledge which reveals one blue thing, do not show difference of their form of being the revealer of the same one blue thing. In the same way, the knowledges occurring the earlier knowledge will not give up their form of being the revealer of something which was known.

Text: 337

अथा(थ) नियतविषयत्वं पूर्वोत्तरविज्ञानयोः-पूर्वोत्पन्नविज्ञानम् अनधिगतार्थाकार-स्वीकरणमुखेन उपादीयते, उत्तरं तु अधिगतार्थाकारविषयमुपजायते।

athā(tha) niyataviṣayatvaṃ pūrvottaravijñānayoh-pūrvotpannavijñānam anadhigatārthākārasvīkaraṇamukhena upādīyate, uttaram tu adhigatārthākāravīṣayamupajāyate.

Translation: 337

Clarification:

Let us accept that the one and the same object appears in the earlier knowledge and also in the subsequent knowledge. In that case, we accept the knowledge which was produced earlier, as having

the form which was not known before. Whereas, the subsequent knowledge, reveals the form which was already known.

Text: 338

यदि गृहीतार्थविषयत्वम्; कथं प्रतिनियतविषयत्वम्? अथ प्रतिनियतविषयत्वम्; कथं गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वम्, नियतविषयत्वगृहीतग्राहित्वयोर्विरोधात्?

yadi grhītārthaviṣayatvam; katham pratiniyataviṣayatvam? atha pratiniyataviṣayatvam; katham grhītārthagrahītvam, niyataviṣayatvagrhītagrahītvayorvirodhāt?

Translation: 338

Reply:

Here, we would like to know if the knowledge is called knowledge in which object is known, then how we can say that each knowledge has the same object? And if each knowledge has the same object, then how can the knowledge be called a revealer of an object which was known? Because, there is a contradiction between the property of being a specific object of knowledge and the property of being a revealer of something which was already known.

Text: 339

यदि च नियतविषयत्वम्; तदा उभयोरपि प्रामाण्यम् अनधिगतार्थगन्तृत्वाऽविशेषात्।

yadi ca niyataviṣayatvam; tadā ubhayorapi prāmāṇyam anadhigatārthagantṛtvā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 339

If it is accepted that knowledges have specific object then both the knowledges should be treated as authentic, because both the knowledges share the characteristics of being the revealer of something which is not known.

Text: 340

अथ एकविषयत्वम्; तदा उभयोरपि प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं वा गृहीतग्राहित्वाऽविशेषात्।

atha ekaviṣayatvam; tadā ubhayorapi prāmāṇyamaprāmāṇyam vā grhītagrahītvā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 340

If you say both the knowledges are of one and the same object, then both the knowledges should be either authentic or non-authentic,

because both share the characteristics of being the revealer of some unknown object.

Text: 341

सोऽयं गडुप्रवेशाक्षितारकविनिर्गमन्यायोपनिपातः श्रुतिलालसानां दुरुत्तरः। नन्वधिगत-
विषयत्वे सत्यपि प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमे स्मृतेरपि प्रामाण्यमनुषज्यते, प्रमाणफलता वा। कोऽत्र
निवारयिता?

*so'yam gaḍupraveśākṣitārakavinirgamanyāyopanipātaḥ śrutilālasā-
nām duruttaraḥ. nanvadhigataviṣayatve satyapi prāmāṅyābhyupa-
game smṛterapi prāmāṅyamanusajyate, pramāṅaphalatā vā. ko'tra
nivārayitā?*

Translation: 341

Objection:

Well, if knowledge reveals something which was already known and in spite of that if it is treated as authentic, then even a remembrance will have to be treated as authentic or it will have to be treated as a result of a dependable knowledge. Who can prevent this unwanted consequence?

Text: 342

स्मृतिरिहोपजायमाना-आद्यानुभवावेदितार्थाकारविषया वा, अन्यविषया वा, निर्विषया वा?
smṛtirihopajāyamānā-ādyānubhavāveditārthākāraṅviṣayā vā, anyaviṣayā vā, nirviṣayā vā?

Translation: 342

Reply:

In that context, we would like to ask whether the remembrance which is caused here, has the same form which was revealed by the first experience or having different object or having no object?

Text: 343

तद्यदि पूर्वोदितानुभवावेदितार्थाकारविषया; तथा तस्याः प्रमाणफलता नैव निवारयितुं
पार्यते गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वाविशेषादित्युक्तम्।

*tadyadi pūrvoditānubhavāveditārthākāraṅviṣayā; tathā tasyāḥ pramā-
ṅaphalatā naiva nivārayitum pāryate grhītārthagrahītvāviśeṣāditi-
tyuktam.*

Translation: 343

There if you say that the remembrance has the same form, which was revealed in the earlier experience, then that should be treated as a result of the authentic knowledge and that cannot be avoided because, the remembrance also shares the same property of being the revealer of the object which was known. Therefore, it is not proper.

Text: 344

एवं च स्मृतिसंज्ञकं सप्तमं प्रमाणं प्रसक्तं मीमांसकानाम्।

evañca smṛtisañjñakam sapṭamaṁ pramāṇam prasaktam mīmāṁsakānām.

Translation: 344

In that case, the Mīmāṁsakas should accept the seventh pramāṇa called remembrance.

Text: 345

अथ पूर्वविज्ञानानवधारितार्थविषया; यद्येवं कथं तस्याः प्रमाणफलत्वमपनेतुं पार्यते? आद्यानुभवस्यै(स्ये)व स्मृतिरूपता च न प्राप्नोति। दृष्टश्रुतार्थविषया हि स्मृतिर्नागृहीतार्थविषया।

atha pūrvaviññānānavadhāritārthaviṣayā; yadyevaṁ katham tasyāḥ pramāṇaphalatvamapanetum pāryate? ādyānubhavasya(i)sye)va smṛtirūpatā ca na prāpnoti. dṛṣṭaśrutārthaviṣayā hi smṛtirnāgrhītārthaviṣayā.

Translation: 345

If you say that the remembrance has its object which is not known by the earlier knowledge, if you say so, how can its property of being the result of a dependable knowledge are removed. One cannot say that the first experience is of the form of a remembrance, because remembrance is that in which either something seen appears as its content or something heard appears as its content and never something which is not known.

Text: 346

अथ निर्विषया इष्यते; तदा न गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वेन स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यम् अपि तु केशोण्डुक-संवेदनवन्निर्विषयत्वेन।

*atha nirviṣayā iṣyate; tadā na gr̥hītārthagrāhitvena smṛteraprā-
māṇyam api tu keśoṇḍukasamvedanavannirviṣayatvena.*

Translation: 346

Now if you say that it is without content, in that case, the remembrance cannot be declared as non-dependable on the ground of its revealing something already known. But, only like a perception of thread-like thing which one sees in the cognition when one returns from the scorching sun in a shade.

Text: 347

अपि च, यदि निर्विषया; तदा गृहीतार्थग्राहिणी कथम्?

api ca, yadi nirviṣayā; tadā gr̥hītārthagrāhiṇī katham?

Translation: 347

Moreover, if you say that it is without content, then how can you call it a revealer of something which was known?

Text: 348

गृहीतार्थग्राहिणीति चेत्;

gr̥hītārthagrāhiṇīti cet;

Translation: 348

Clarification:

By that we mean, revealer of that object which is known.

Text: 349

'निर्विषया' इति न वक्तव्यम्। न च निर्विषया-भातरं पितरं शुश्रूषितवानहम्' सन्ति मे पञ्चभृत्याः' इति पूर्वानुभवावेदितार्थाकारपर्यवसायिन्यो हि स्मृतयः, स्मृतिज्ञानेन पूर्वानुभवावेदितार्थाकारस्य प्रतिभासनात्।

*'nirviṣayā' iti na vaktavyam. na ca nirviṣayā- 'mātaram pitaram śuśrūṣitavānaham' 'santi me pañcabhṛtyāḥ' iti pūrvānubhavāve-
ditārthākāraparyavasāyinyo hi smṛtayah, smṛtijñānena pūrvānubha-
vāveditārthākārasya pratibhāsanāt.*

Translation: 349

Reply:

In that case you should not say it is contentless. As a matter of fact, remembrance cannot be without content. We do have remembrances such as "I had served my father and mother." "I

have five servants” which reflect the forms of the objects, which were experienced before. Knowledge called remembrance always reflects, the form of an object, which was experienced before.

Text: 350

अथ स्मृतिविज्ञानकाले पूर्वप्रबोधविषयीकृतार्थस्य प्रत्यस्तमितत्वान्न तद्विषयत्वम्। एवं च निर्विषयत्वेन स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यं न गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वेन इत्युक्तम्।

atha smṛtiviljñānakāle pūrvaprabodhaviṣayīkṛtārthasya pratyastamitatvānna tadviṣayatvam. evaṃ ca nirviṣayatvena smṛterapramāṇyam na gṛhītārthagrahītvena ityuktam.

Translation: 350

If you say, at the time of the knowledge viz. remembrance the object which was the content of the earlier knowledge is no more, and therefore we say that, that is not the content of remembrance. If it is so, then remembrance is not dependable not because it is contentless, but not on the ground of its being the revealer of that object which was known.

Text: 351

यदि च अवधारितार्थविषयं प्रमाणमप्रमाणमुपपाद्यते तदाऽनुमानज्ञानस्य अप्रामाण्यमापनीपद्येत।

yadi ca avadhāritārthaviṣayaṃ pramāṇamapramāṇamupapādyate tada'numānājñānasya aprāmāṇyamāpanīpadyeta.

Translation: 351

If you say, a dependable knowledge which has a definite object as its content is being presented as not dependable, then an inferential knowledge also will not become dependable.

Text: 352

तदेव कथम्?

tadeva katham?

Translation: 352

How can it be so?

Text: 353

कथ्यते-यदेव अविनाभावसम्बन्धग्रहणकालावधारितमग्नित्वसामान्यं लिङ्गाजहद्वृत्तित्वेन प्रत्यक्षेण तदेव अनुमानादवगच्छति, आहोस्वित् पावकस्वरूपम्, मत्वर्थं वा, लिङ्गव्यापार-

समानकालीनता(लीना)स्तित्वं वा, लिङ्गोपसर्जनत्वं वा, अग्निव्यक्तिपारतन्त्र्यं वा अग्नित्वसामान्यस्य?

kathyate-yadeva avinābhāvasambandhagrahaṇakālāvadhāritamagnitvasāmānyam liṅgājahadvṛttitvena pratyakṣeṇa tadeva anumānā-davagacchati, āhosvit pāvakasvarūpam, matvartham vā, liṅgavyā-pārasamānakālīnatā(līnā)stītvam vā, liṅgopasarjanatvam vā, agni-vyaktipāratantryam vā agnitvasāmānyasya?

Translation: 353

Here, is the answer. At the time of the knowledge of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, whatever was decided such as the class of fire, the same is being known by inference, on the basis of perception of the ground, viz. the smoke through the method of inclusive relationship, is it this or mere the form of fire or the meaning of the possessive suffix or the existence concurrent with the function of the ground or what was indicated by the ground or any dependency on a particular fire individual.

Text: 354

तद्यदि पूर्वावधारितसामान्यविषयमभ्युपेयते; तदा प्रामाण्यं नैव समासादयति गृहीतार्थ-ग्राहित्वेन स्मृतिवदेव। तदप्रामाण्ये नाग्निमत्त्वव्यवस्थोपपत्तिः तदनुपपत्तौ वा अर्थापत्त्या अग्निव्यक्तिसंस्थितिः। ततश्च 'अमुत्राग्निः' 'अग्निरानीयताम्' इति सकललोकव्यवहारविरहः स्यात्।

tadyadi pūrvāvadhāritasāmānyaviṣayamabhyupeyate; tadā prāmā-ṇyam naiva samāsādayati grhītārthagrahītvena smṛtivadeva. tadaprāmāṇye nāgnimattvavyavasthopapattiḥ tadanupapattau vā arthāpattya agnivyaktisamsthitiḥ. tataśca 'amutrāgniḥ' 'agnirānīya-tām' iti sakalalokavyavahāravirahaḥ syāt.

Translation: 354

If you accept that knowledge has having the universal which was decided before, then it cannot be said to be authentic, because like remembrance, it reveals something which was already known and if that becomes unauthentic on the basis of that the subject cannot be concluded as having fire and when that is not explained, there will be existence of individual fire through another way of knowing

viz. arthāpatti and that will result into all human behaviors such as “there is fire there” “please bring fire” etc.

Text: 355

अथ मा भूदेतद्व्यवहारहानिरिति चेत् पूर्वधारितेऽप्यर्थे अनुमानस्या(स्य) प्रामाण्य-
मभ्युपेयते;

*atha mā bhūdetadvyavahārahānirīti cet pūrvāvadhāritepyarthe anu-
mānasyā(sya) prāmāṇyamabhyupeyate;*

Translation: 355

Clarification:

Well, let us not lose such a behavior and we do accept the authenticity of an inferential knowledge which reveals an object which was already known.

Text: 356

तदा अनधिगतार्थगन्तुविशेषणमपार्थकं श्रोत्रियाणामिति।

tadā anadhigatārthagantvīśeṣaṇamapārthakam śrotriyāṇāmīti.

Translation: 356

Reply:

In that case, the clause “that which reveals an object which was not known before” becomes purposeless for the Mīmāṃsakas.

Text: 357

अथ पावकस्वरूपमनुमिमीषे; तत् लिङ्गाजहद्वृत्तित्वेन पूर्वमवधारितं वा, न वा?

atha pāvakasvarūpamanumimīṣe; tat liṅgājahadvṛttitvena pūrvamavdhāritam vā, na vā?

Translation: 357

If you say that you will infer the nature of fire by the inference there the question will arise, will that fire be known before through the relation of invariable concomitance with the ground viz. the smoke or not?

Text: 358

यदि पूर्वोपलब्धम्; अधिगतार्थविषयत्वमायातमनुमानस्य।

yadi pūrvopalabdham; adhigatārthaviṣayatvamāyātamanumānasya.

Translation: 358

If you say the known fire will be inferred, then obviously the content of inferential cognition becomes something which is already known.

Text: 359

अथ न पूर्वोपलब्धम्; अव्यापकोऽग्निः अनुमानान्तर्हि प्रतीयते, तदभ्युपगमे तृणजलादि-
विषयमप्यनुमानं प्रसज्यते।

atha na pūrvopalabdhām; avyāpako'gniḥ anumānāntarhi pratīyate, tadabhyupagame tṛṇajalādiviṣayamapyanumānaṁ prasajyate.

Translation: 359

If you say that such fire that was known before will be inferred, it will mean, in that case, that such fire is being inferred by inference which is not the pervader of ground viz. the smoke and if that is accepted then one can have inferential knowledge of grass, water etc. from the knowledge of smoke (which is absurd).

Text: 360

अथ मत्वर्थोऽनुमीयते स पूर्वावधारितो वा, न वा?

atha matvartho'numīyate sa pūrvāvadhārito vā, na vā?

Translation: 360

If you say a qualified thing (the subject qualified by the thing to be inferred) there again the question arises, whether that is known or not?

Text: 361

यद्यवधारितः कथम् अनधिगतार्थगन्तृविशेषणम् अनुमाने सम्भवति?

yadyavadhāritaḥ katham anadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇam anumāne sambhavati?

Translation: 361

If you say it is known, then how can the qualifying clause “which reveals something which is not known before” will fit into the inferential cognition?

Text: 362

अथ नैवावगतः; तदानीं जलतृणादिविषयमप्यनुमानं प्रसज्येत इत्युक्तम्।

atha naivāvagataḥ; tadānīm jalatṛṇādiviṣayamapyanumānaṁ prasajyeta ityuktam.

Translation: 362

If you say it is not known, then we have already said that from anything there will arise the cognition of water, grass etc. etc.

Text: 363

अथ लिङ्गव्यापारसमानकालीनास्तित्वम् अग्निसामान्यस्य अनुमीयते; तदनुमानव्यापार-
समानकालीनास्तित्वम् अग्नित्वसामान्याद् व्यतिरिक्तम्, अव्यतिरिक्तं वा?

atha liṅgavyāpārasamānakālīnāstitvam agnisāmānyasya anumīyate;
tadanumānavyāpārasamānakālīnāstitvam agnitvasāmānyād vyati-
riktam, avyatiraktam vā?

Translation: 363

If you say through inference, what is inferred is the existence of fire universal occurring at the same time of the function of the ground i.e. the smoke, there we may ask, whether the existence of the universal of fire existing at the time of the function of the ground is different from the universal of fireness or identical.

Text: 364

तद्यदि अव्यतिरिक्तम्; तदानीं पूर्वोपलब्धास्तित्वविषयमेवानुमानम्, कथमनधिगतार्थगन्तु-
विशेषणमपार्थकं न भवेत्?

tadyadi avyatiraktam; tadānīm pūrvopalabdḥāstitvaviṣayamevānumā-
nam, kathamanadhigatārthagantvīṣeṣaṇamapārthakam na bhavet?

Translation: 364

If you say it is identical, then it is the inferential knowledge of the same object viz. the existence which was known before and in that case, how are you going to say that the qualification “which reveals the object which was not known before” is not meaningless?

Text: 365

अथ व्यतिरिक्तम्; तत्किं पूर्वोपलब्धम्, अनुपलब्धं वा?

atha vyatiraktam; tatkiṁ pūrvopalabdham, anupalabdham vā?

Translation: 365

If you say it is different, there also the question will arise, whether it was known before or not known at all.

Text: 366

यदि पूर्वोपलब्धम्; तद्विषयत्वेऽनुमानस्य नाऽनधिगतार्थगन्तुविशेषणमुपपद्यते।

yadi pūrvopalabdham; tadviṣayatve'numānasya nā'nadhigatārthagantrviśeṣaṇamupapadyate.

Translation: 366

If you hold that, it is known before, then to that inferential knowledge the qualification “which does not reveal the object which is known before” will not fit in.

Text: 367

अथ नोपलब्धम्; तत्कथमनुमीयते जलादिकल्पं धूमेन?

atha nopalabdham; tatkatham anumīyate jalādikalpaṁ dhūmena?

Translation: 367

Again if you say it is not known at all, and then the question will arise, how will you infer something like water on the basis of smoke?

Text: 368

अथ लिङ्गोपसर्जनत्वमग्नित्वसामान्यस्य अनुमानात् प्रतीयते;

atha liṅgopasarjanatvamagnitvasāmānyasya anumānāt pratīyate;

Translation: 368

Clarification:

What is inferred by the process of inference is the dependence of the universal of fireness on the ground viz. smoke.

Text: 369

तल्लिङ्गोपसर्जनत्वम् अग्नित्वसामान्याद् भिन्नम्, अभिन्नं वा?

talliṅgopasarjanatvam agnitvasāmānyāḍ bhinnam, abhinnam vā?

Translation: 369

Reply:

Here also the question may be asked, whether that dependency on the ground is different from the universal of fireness or identical?

Text: 370

यद्यभिन्नम्; पूर्वोपलब्धाऽग्नित्वसामान्यविषयमेव अनुमानं कथं प्रामाण्यभाग् भवति?

yadyabhinnam; pūrvopalabdhā'gnitvasāmānyaviṣayameva anumānaṁ katham prāmāṇyabhāg bhavati?

Translation: 370

If you say it is identical, then the inferential knowledge will have the same content viz. the universal called fireness, which was known

before and in that case how such a cognition will be called authentic according to you?

Text: 371

अथ भिन्नम्; तद् अविनाभाविसम्बन्धग्रहणकाले लिङ्गव्यापकत्वेन अवधारितं वा,
atha bhinnam; tad avinābhāvisambandhagrahaṇakāle liṅgavyāpakatvena avadhāritam vā,

Translation: 371

If however, if you say it is different, then at the time of knowledge of invariable concomitance, whether it was known at pervader of the ground or not?

Text: 372

न वा? यद्यवधारितम्; कथमनधिगतार्थविषयमनुमानम्?
na vā? yadyavadhāritam; katham anadhigatārthaviṣayamanumānam?

Translation: 372

If you say it was known, then how can inferential knowledge of something which was not known before?

Text: 373

अथ लिङ्गव्यापकत्वेना[न]वगतम्; तदा तद्विषयत्वेऽनुमानस्य परिकल्प्यमाने
त्रिभुवनावेदकत्वं धूमस्य किन्न परिकल्प्यते, सम्बन्धाभावाऽविशेषात्?
atha liṅgavyāpakatvenā[na]vagatam; tadā tadviṣayatve 'numānasya parikalpyamāne tribhuvanāvedakatvaṁ dhūmasya kinna parikalpyate, sambandhābhāvā'viśeṣāt?

Translation: 373

Again if you say that, it was not known, as the pervader of the ground, then if that is the object of inferential knowledge postulated by you, then why don't you postulate that the knowledge of any probans will cause inferential knowledge of anything in the three worlds (the heaven, the earth, and the pātāla) because there is absence of the relationship of invariable concomitance common in all such cases.

Text: 374

अथ अग्निव्यक्तिपारतन्त्र्यमनुमीयते धूमेन अग्नित्वसामान्यस्य इति चेत्; तत्पारतन्त्र्यम्
अग्नित्वसामान्यस्य धूमव्यापकत्वेन अवधारितं वा, न वा?

atha agnivyaktipāratantryamanumīyate dhūmena agnitvasāmānyasya iti cet; tatpāratantryam agnitvasāmānyasya dhūmavyāpakatvena avadhāritam vā, na vā?

Translation: 374

If you say that dependence of the fire individual is being inferred on the basis of smoke of the universal called fireness, there also the question can be asked, whether the dependency of the universal called fireness, is already known as the pervader of the ground viz. the smoke or not.

Text: 375

यद्यवधारितम्; पुनरपि गृहीतग्राहित्वं नातिवर्ततेऽनुमानम्।
yadyavadhāritam; punarapi grhītagrāhitvam nātivarttate 'numānam.

Translation: 375

If you say it is already known, then again it cannot be avoided that an inferential knowledge is the revealer of something already known.

Text: 376

अथ नावधारितं धूमव्यापकत्वेन पारतन्त्र्यम् अग्निसामान्यस्य इति चेत्; कथमनुमीयते इत्युक्तं पुरस्तात्।

atha nāvadhāritam dhūmavyāpakatvena pāratantryam agnisāmānyasya iti cet; katham anumīyate ityuktam purastāt.

Translation: 376

If you say that the dependency of the universal viz. fireness is not known as the pervader of smoke, then how can it cause the knowledge of fire as it has already said above?

[१. गोत्वादिप्रतिपादकत्वेन गोशब्दादीनामप्रामाण्योद्घाटनम्।]

[1. gotvādipratipādakatvena gośabdādīnāmaprāmāṇyodghāṭanam.]

Text: 377

एतेन पूर्वोपलब्धगोत्वादिप्रतिपादकत्वेन गोशब्दादेरप्रामाण्यमुद्घाटितम्।

etena pūrvopalabdagotvādipratipādakatvena gośabdāderaprāmāṇyamudghāṭitam.

Translation: 377

Through this method of argumentation, it was shown that the word cow is not authentic, because, it causes the knowledge of cowness which was already known.

Text: 378

तदेव कथम्?
tadeva katham?

Translation: 378

Objection:
How is that possible?

Text: 379

कथ्यते—किं सङ्केतग्रहणकालावगतगोत्वार्थवाचकत्वं तद्व्यतिरिक्तार्थवाचकत्वं वा प्रतिपाद्यते गोशब्दस्य?

kathyate-kiṃ saṅketagrahaṇakālāvagatagotvārthavācakatvaṃ tadvyatiriktārthavācakatvaṃ vā pratipādyate gośabdasya?

Translation: 379

Reply: Let me explain. Do you say that the word cow expresses cowness as its meaning which was already known at the time of knowing the relation between the word cow and the meaning of that word or do you say that the word cow expresses its meaning other than that cowness?

Text: 380

तद्यदि सङ्केतग्रहणकालाधिकरणगोत्वस्वरूपावेदकत्वं जेगीयते गोशब्दस्य; तदा विदितार्थकारावेदकत्वेन न मानत्वमासादयति गोशब्दः।

tadyadi saṅketagrahaṇakālādhikaraṇagotvasvarūpāvedakatvaṃ jegīyate gośabdasya; tadā viditārthākārāvedakatvena na mānatvamāsādayati gośabdaḥ.

Translation: 380

If you say that you are narrating the fact that the word cow expresses the nature of cowness existent at the time of the existence of relation between the word cow and its meaning, then the word 'go' does not acquire authenticity, because, it expresses the form of object which was already known.

Text: 381

अथ वेदितार्थाकारावेदकत्वेऽपि प्रामाण्यमावहति; तदा अनधिगतार्थगन्तृविशेषणस्य विषयो वक्तव्यः।

atha veditārthākārāvedakatve 'pi prāmāṇyamāvahati; tadā anadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇasya viṣayo vaktavyaḥ.

Translation: 381

If you say that even if the word 'go' causes the knowledge of the form of object, which was already known, still it is authentic, then, you should tell us what is that which is referred to by the qualification, "which causes the knowledge of that, which was not known before".

Text: 382

अथ तद्व्यतिरिक्तार्थावचकत्वम्; तदानीमसङ्केत(ति)त एवार्थः प्रतीयते गोशब्दात्, ततश्च स्वसिद्धान्तप्रतीतिविरोधो दुर्निवारः।

atha tadvyatiriktārthavācakatvam; tadānīmasaṅketa(ti)ta evārthaḥ pratīyate gośabdāt, tataśca svasiddhāntapratītivirodho durnivāraḥ.

Translation: 382

If you say that the word expresses its meaning, different from that, then it amounts to saying that from the word cow one understands a meaning, with which there is no relation of the word cow and in that case you cannot avoid the contradiction with the understanding of your own doctrine.

Text: 383

अथ गोत्वमेवाऽवगम्यते गोशब्देन इति चेत्; तत्रापि प्रपञ्चितमेव अप्रामाण्यकारण(णं) गृहीतग्राहित्वम्। तदप्रामाण्ये न गोत्वव्यवस्थितिः। तदनवस्थितो नार्थापत्त्याधिकरण-व्यवस्थितिः।

atha gotvamevā'vagamyate gośabdena iti cet; tatrāpi prapañcitateva aprāmāṇyakāraṇa(ṇam) grhītagrahitvam. tadaprāmāṇyena gotvavyavasthitih. tadanavasthito nārthāpattiyādhikaraṇavyavasthitih.

Translation: 383

If you say that one understands cowness from the word cow, there also we have already pointed out how the word cow becomes inauthentic, because it will cause the knowledge of something

which is already known and if the word cow become inauthentic the cowness cannot be established and once that cowness is not established, the section of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Darśana dealing with arthāpatti (pre-supposition or implication) cannot be said to be meaningful.

[२. अर्थापत्तेरधिकरणव्यवस्थित्युपपादकत्वस्य निषेधः।]

[2. arthāpatteradhikaraṇavyavasthityupapādatvasya niṣedhaḥ.]

Text: 384

इतोऽपि नार्थापत्यधिकरणव्यवस्थितिरुपपद्यते-किम् अर्थापत्या पूर्ववधारिताधिकरण-प्रत्यायनं क्रियते, आहोस्वित् अपूर्वाधिकरणप्रत्यायनम्?

ito'pi nārthāpattyadhikaraṇavyavasthityupapadyate-kim arthāpattyā pūrvāvadhāritādhikaraṇapratyāyanan kriyate, āhosvit apūrvādhikaraṇapratyāyanam?

Translation: 384

Also, on the basis of the following ground, the section dealing with the pre-supposition or implication cannot be settled: - Is it the case that, by the process of arthāpatti one creates the understanding of the section which is already known or it causes the knowledge of the section which was not before?

Text: 385

तद्यदि पूर्ववधारिताधिकरणपर्यवसिताऽर्थापत्तिः; तदा प्रतिपादितार्थप्रतिपादकत्वेन न प्रमाणम्।

tadyadi pūrvāvadhāritādhikaraṇaparyavasitā'rthāpattiḥ; tadā pratipādītārthapratipādatkatvena na pramāṇam.

Translation: 385

If you say, that arthāpatti terminates in the section which was known before, then it cannot be said to be authentic process, because, it causes the knowledge of that which is already known.

Text: 386

अथ अदृष्टपिण्डावेदकत्वम्; तदा गोत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या गजवाजिकल्पनापि कार्या।

atha adṛṣṭapiṇḍāvedakatvam; tadā gotvānyathānupapattyā gajavājikalpanāpi kāryā.

Translation: 386

If you say, it causes the knowledge of the individual which was not known before, then if cowness does not fit into that, one may postulate horse or elephant also.

Text: 387

अथ पूर्ववधारितस्य इदानीन्तनमस्तित्वम् अर्थापत्त्याऽवसीयते इति चेत्; तत् इदानीन्तनमस्तित्वं पूर्वधारिताद् व्यतिरिक्तम्, अव्यतिरिक्तं वा?

atha pūrvāvadhāritasya idānīntanamastitvam arthāpattiyā'vasīyate iti cet; tat idānīntanamastitvaṁ pūrvādhāritād vyatiriktam, avyatiriktam vā?

Translation: 387

If you say, the process called arthāpatti helps in concluding the present existence of something which was known before, then question may arise, whether the present existence is different from the existence which was known before or identical?

Text: 388

तद्यद्यव्यतिरिक्तम्; तदा पूर्ववधारितार्थप्रतिपादकत्वेन कथमर्थापत्तेः प्रामाण्यं वेदविदो वदन्ति?

tadyady avyatiriktam; tadā pūrvāvadhāritārthapratipādakatvena katham arthāpatteḥ prāmāṇyam vedavidō vadanti?

Translation: 388

If you say, it is identical then how can the scholars of the Vedas (Mīmāṃsakas) say that arthāpatti is an independent process of knowing because, it causes the knowledge of something, which was already known?

Text: 389

अथ अर्थान्तरम्; कथं गोत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रतीयते? तत्प्रतीत्यभ्युपगमे वा गजवाजि-विषयापि प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् इत्यसकृत् प्रतिपादितम्। एवं च सति यदुक्तम्—

atha arthāntaram; katham gotvānyathānupapattiyā pratīyate? tatpratītyabhyupagame vā gajavājivīṣayāpi pratipattiḥ syāt ityasakṛt pratipāditam. evaṁ ca sati yaduktam—

Translation: 389

If you say, it is different then how is it known by the process of implication without which the knowledge of cowness cannot be

explained and in spite of that you accept that knowledge, why not there should be knowledge of horse, elephant etc. from the word cow? We have repeatedly explained this before.

Text: 390

“इदानीन्तनमस्तित्वं नहि पूर्वधिया गतम्।” [श्लोकवा०४.२३४] इति तद् बालवल्गितम्।
“idānāntanamastitvam nahi pūrvadhīyā gatam.” [ślokavā.4.234] iti tad bālavalgitam.

Translation: 390

In the light of this, when we look at the following statement (of the *Ślokavārttika*, sūtra 4, verse No. 234): “the present existence was not known by the earlier knowledge” is nothing more than a child’s quibbling.

[३. प्रत्यभिज्ञानप्रामाण्यखण्डनस्य सूचनम्।]
[pratyabhijñānaprāmāṇyakhṇḍanasya sūcanam.]

Text: 391

एतेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्यापि प्रामाण्यं प्रत्युक्तं वेदितव्यम्।
etena pratyabhijñānasyāpi prāmāṇyam pratyuktam veditavyam.

Translation: 391

By this very argument, the authenticity of “recollection” is to be noted as rejected.

0.4 ताथागतसम्मतस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा।

[tāthāgatasammatasya pramāṇalakṣaṇasya parīkṣā.]

(Refutation of the definition of pramāṇa as accepted by the Buddhists)

[१. अनधिगतार्थाधिगन्तृत्वेति विशेषणस्यापार्थकत्वप्रदर्शनम्।]
[1. anadhigatārthādhigantrtveti viśeṣaṇasyāpārthakatvapradarśanam.]

Text: 392

तथा, ताथागतानामपि अनधिगतार्थगन्तृविशेषणमपार्थकम् अपोह्यज्ञानासम्भवात्।
tathā, tāthāgatānāmapi anadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇamapārthakam apohyajñānāsambhavāt.

Translation: 392

In the same way, the qualifying clause, “which reveals something which is not known before” in the general definition of *pramāṇa* as offered by the Buddhists, is also purposeless because it is impossible to show something which can be excluded.

Text: 393

नहि पूर्वापरकालभाविनि विज्ञाने एकविषये स्तः, न स्वलक्षणैकविषये, न सामान्यैकविषये, स्वलक्षणस्य अभिन्नैकस्वभावस्य क्रमवृत्त्यनेकविज्ञानजननशक्तिव्यतिरेकात्।

*nahi pūrvāparakālabhāvīni vijñāne ekaviṣaye staḥ, na svalakṣaṇaika-
viṣaye, na sāmānyaikaviṣaye, svalakṣaṇasya abhinnaikasvabhāvasya
kramavṛtṭyanekavijñānananaśaktivyatirekāṭ.*

Translation: 393

It is not the case that two cognitions arising in a sequence (the later being caused by the former) have one and the same object, as their content. It is also not the case that both the knowledges have only *svalakṣaṇa* (a particular free from all characterizations) as their content.

Nor is it the case, that both the knowledges have *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (a series of particulars) as their content, because, a *svalakṣaṇa* does not have the capacity to generate many cognitions in a sequence, being totally identical in nature.

Text: 394

अथ युगपदेकविषयोत्पन्नाऽनेकविज्ञानापनोदार्थम्;

atha yugapadekaviṣayotpannā'nekavijñānāpanodārtham;

Translation: 394

Clarification:

We are saying so, in order to exclude the possibility of arising of many cognitions simultaneously, caused by one and the same object.

Text: 395

तदप्ययुक्तम्; एकविषयोत्पन्नानेकपुरुषसंवेदनस्य अप्रामाण्यमापनीपद्येत।

*tadapyayuktam; eka-viṣayotpannānekapuruṣasaṁvedanasya aprā-
māṇyamāpanīpadyeta.*

Translation: 395

Reply:

This is also not proper, because, this position will lead to inauthenticity of experiences of many people, caused by one and the same object.

Text: 396

अथ सामान्यैकविषयानेकविज्ञानापनोदार्थं विशेषणमुपादीयते; तदप्ययुक्तम्; न सामान्ये एकं विज्ञानमस्ति, नाप्यनेकं विज्ञानं तस्य स्वयमसम्भवात्।

atha sāmānyaikaviṣayānekavijñānāpanodārthaṁ viśeṣaṇamupādīyate; tadapyayuktam; na sāmānye ekaṁ vijñānamasti, nāpyanekaṁ vijñānaṁ tasya svayamasambhavāt.

Translation: 396

If you say that the qualifying clause “which causes the knowledge of that which is not known before” is added in the definition in order to exclude the possibility of many knowledges in which the sāmānya alone is the content. This is also improper, because, in your series of particulars, it is not the case that there is only one knowledge. Nor it is the case that there are many knowledges because by itself it is impossible.

Text: 397

तदाकारविरहे 'सामान्यविषयं विज्ञानम्' इति प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थाहेतुर्वक्तव्यः।

tadākāravirahe 'sāmānyaviṣayaṁ vijñānam' iti pratikarmavyavasthāheturvaktavyaḥ.

Translation: 397

If there is no form, in that then when we say this knowledge in “which series of particulars is the content” you should point out how to establish one-is-to-one relationship.

Text: 398

तदाकारे वा सामान्यस्य सदात्मता, अतात्त्विकाकारातादात्म्ये वा ज्ञानातात्त्विकत्वप्रसङ्गः।
tadākāre vā sāmānyasya sadātmatā, atāttvikākārātādātmye vā jñānātāttvikatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 398

If you say there is a form, then the series of particulars (which is unreal according to you) will become real or if you say that there is identity with the false form then it will make the knowledge itself as unreal.

Text: 399

किञ्च, एकविषये प्रवर्तमानयोः एकस्याऽप्रामाण्यम्, प्रमाणान्तरत्वाभावो वा?

kiñca, ekaviṣaye pravarttamānayoḥ ekasyā'prāmāṇyam, pramāṇāntaratvābhāvo vā?

Translation: 399

Moreover, out of the two knowledges referring to one object, one is not authentic or do you want to say, that it cannot be the object of another knowledge.

Text: 400

तद्यदि अप्रामाण्यम्; तद्युक्तम्; अविशिष्टैकार्थगृहीतिरूपत्वे उभयोः प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं वा विकल्पानुपपत्तेः, विकल्पे बाधकविषयोत्पन्नाऽनेकपुरुषविज्ञानभेदप्रसङ्गः।

tadyadi aprāmāṇyam; tadayuktam; aviśiṣṭaikārthagṛhītirūpatve ubhayoḥ prāmāṇyam aprāmāṇyam vā vikalpānupapattēḥ, vikalpe bādhakaviṣayotpannā'nekapuruṣavijñānabhedaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 400

If you say it is not authentic, it is not proper, because, if both have revealed one and the same object and not distinct ones, then either both are authentic or both are false. There is no other alternative and if you say that there is alternative, there will arise the contingency of distinguishing knowledges of different persons caused by contradictory objects.

Text: 401

अथाऽप्रमाणान्तरत्वं; तदप्यनुपपन्नम्; किमेकविषयोत्पादितानेकप्रत्यक्षादिज्ञानानां व्यक्ति-
नानात्वं नोपपद्यते, आहो आकारनानात्वम्?

athā'pramāṇāntaratvam; tadapyānupapannam; kimekaviṣayotpādītānekapratyaksādiññānānām vyaktinānātvam nopapadyate, āho ākāranānātvam?

Translation: 401

If you say it will be a different knowledge that also is not proper. There the question arises, is it the fact that the knowledges such as perception, caused by one object, cannot be treated as different knowledges or one will have to treat plurality of forms in those knowledges?

Text: 402

तद्यदि व्यक्तिनानात्वं न जाघटीति; तदसत्; एकनीलोत्पादितानेकनीलालोकविज्ञानानां व्यक्तिनानात्वदर्शनात्।

tadyadi vyaktinānātvam na jāghāṭīti; tadasat; ekanīlotpādītānekanīlālokovijñānānām vyaktinānātvadarśanāt.

Translation: 402

If you say the plurality of knowledges is not possible, it is not true, because it is our experience that many knowledges of light of blue thing produced by one blue thing are many in number.

Text: 403

अथ अनेकाकारता नोपपद्यते; तदयुक्तम्; नीलालोकविज्ञानानाम् अनेकाकारकत्वदर्शनात्।
athānekākāratā nopapadyate; tadayuktam; nīlālokovijñānānām anekākāratavadarśanāt.

Translation: 403

If you say, multiformedness of knowledges is not justifiable, that also is not proper, because we do find many forms in the knowledges of light of a blue thing.

Text: 404

न च तदुत्पादको नीलप्रपञ्चोस्ति, एकात्मतया स्वयमनुपगमात्।
na ca tadutpādako nīlaprapañcaḥ asti, ekātmatayā svayamanupagamāt.

Translation: 404

There are not many blue things which would have produced those knowledges because, blue thing being one cannot be said to be present consecutively in all knowledges.

Text: 405

अथ एकविषयत्वे प्रत्यक्षानुमानव्यपदेशानुपपत्ति;
atha ekaviśayatve pratyakṣānumānavyapadesānupapatti;

Translation: 405

Objection:

Well, if the object is only one, how can we refer to the knowledges of the object as perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge etc.?

Text: 406

तदेतदयुक्तम्; भिन्नकारणकार्यत्वेन व्यपदेश्योप(देशोप)पत्तेः। यथा एकनीलोत्पन्नानेकदेव-
दत्तज्ञानानां भिन्नकारणकार्यत्वेन [देवदत्तविज्ञानानां] भिन्नकर्तृकार्यत्वेन देवदत्तादिज्ञान-
व्यपदेशः तथेहापि।

*tadetadayuktam; bhinnakāraṇakāryatvena vyapadeśyopa(deśopa)-
patteḥ. yathā ekanīlotpannānekadevadattaññānānām bhinnakāraṇa-
kāryatvena [devadattaviññānānām] bhinnakartṛkāryatvena devada-
ttādiññānavyapadeśaḥ tatthehāpi.*

Translation: 406

Reply:

This is not correct, because it is possible to justify the reference of knowledges of one object, by different names on the basis of different sets of cause-and-effect relationship as knowledges produced by one blue thing to many persons called Devadatta are referred to as knowledges of Devadatta, on the basis of effects being produced by different agents, in terms of different cause-and-effect relationships, in the same way here also, references to different knowledges of the object can be made.

[२.अविसंवादिज्ञानमित्यस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्यापि निरासः।]

[2.avisamvādiññānamityasya pramāṇalakṣaṇasyāpi nirāsaḥ.]

Text: 407

अन्ये तु "अविसंवादि ज्ञानम्" [प्रमाणवा० २.१] प्रमाणमभिदधति।

anye tu "avisamvādi jñānam" [pramāṇavā.2.1] pramāṇamabhidadhati.

Translation: 407

Other (Dharmakīrti etc.) however say that knowledge which corroborates its content is called pramāṇa.

Text: 408

कोऽयमविसंवादार्थः – किं यथाव्यवस्थितार्थगृहीतित्वम्, बाधारहितत्वं वा प्रतीयमानार्थ-
जन्यता वा, प्रतीयमानार्थं प्रति प्रवर्त्तकत्वं वा, अर्थप्रापकत्वं वा?

ko'yamavisamvādārthaḥ - kim yathāvyavasthitārthagṛhītitvam, bādhā- rahitatvaṃ vā pratīyamānārthajanyatā vā, pratīyamānārtham prati pravartakatvaṃ vā, arthaprāpakatvaṃ vā?

Translation: 408

Here we would like to raise the following questions with regard to the meaning of the term “which corroborates”. (i) Does it mean revealing the object as it is? (ii) Or does it mean being devoid of contradiction? (iii) Or does it mean the state of being produced by the object which appears in the knowledge? (iv) Or does it mean the state of inducing the knower towards the object which has been known? (v) Or does it mean the state of causing the knower to get the object which was shown by the knowledge?

Text: 409

तद्यदि यथाव्यवस्थितार्थगृहीतित्वम्; तदाऽनुमानज्ञानं(ने) नोपपद्यते।
tadyadi yathāvyavasthitārthagṛhītitvam; tadā'numānajñānam(ne) nopapadyate.

Translation: 409

If you say does it mean revealing the object as it is? Then, it is not possible in the inferential knowledge.

Text: 410

अथ बाधारहितत्वम्; तदप्यनुमानज्ञाने नोपपद्यते।
atha bādhārahitatvam; tadapyanumānajñāne nopapadyate.

Translation: 410

If you say does it mean being devoid of contradiction? That also is not possible in the inferential knowledge.

Text: 411

अथ प्रतीयमानार्थोत्पाद्यत्वम्; तदप्यनुमानज्ञानस्य नोपपद्यते, सामान्याकारस्य जनकत्व-
व्यावृत्तेः। तथा, रागादिसंवेदनस्याप्यवभातार्थोत्पाद्यत्वं नोपपद्यते, स्वात्मोत्पादने
सामर्थ्यव्यतिरेकात्। तथा, योगिप्रत्यक्षस्य च प्रतीयमानार्थजन्यता न सम्भवति
व्यतीताऽनागतयोरजनकत्वात्, जनकत्वे वा अतीताऽनागतता हीयते।

atha pratīyamānārthotpādyatvam; tadapyanumānajñānasya nopapadyate, sāmānyākārasya janakatvavyāvṛtteḥ. tathā, rāgādisarive-

danasyāpyavabhātārthotpādyatvam nopapadyate, svātmotpādane sāmāthyavyatirekāt. tathā, yogipratyakṣasya ca pratīyamānārthajanyatā na sambhavati vyatītā'nāgatayorajanakatvāt, janakatve vā atītā'nāgatatā hīyate.

Translation: 411

If you say, does it mean the state of being produced by the object which appears in the knowledge? Then this also is not possible in the case of inferential knowledge, because, a universal form is excluded from the producer, in the same way it is not possible to explain how the knowledge of attachment etc. is not produced by the object which appeared in the knowledge, because, they do not have the capacity to produce itself. In the same way, the perception of a yogin is not produced by the object which appeared in the knowledge, because, a past object and a future object cannot be the producer of knowledge and if you consider them as producer of knowledge, then those objects cannot be called as past and future objects.

Text: 412

अथ प्रतीयमानार्थं प्रति प्रवर्तकत्वमविसंवादार्थः; तद् विपर्ययज्ञानस्यापि प्रवर्तकत्वं विद्यते। विपरीतोत्पन्नोदकबुद्धिः प्रवर्तते, न च तस्य अविसंवादोऽस्ति। सत्योदकज्ञानेऽपि जाते न प्रवर्तते केनापि हेतुना, तदपि विसंवादि स्यात्।

atha pratīyamānārtham prati pravartakatvamavisamvādārthaḥ; tad viparyayajñānasyāpi pravartakatvam vidyate. viparītotpannodakabuddhiḥ pravartate, na ca tasya avisaṁvādo'sti. satyodakajñāne'pi jāte na pravartate kenāpi hetunā, tadapi visamvādi syāt.

Translation: 412

If you say, does it mean the state of inducing the knower towards the object which has been known? Then as a matter of fact, a false knowledge also produces inducement. A person who got the false knowledge of water does take up activity of going forward at that time his knowledge cannot be called false and sometimes even if there is knowledge of true water, still he doesn't take activity

of going forward because of some reason. But according to your definition of *pramāṇa*, even this knowledge will become false.

Text: 413

अथ अर्थप्रापकत्वविसंवादः, तत्र किम्-अर्थमात्रप्रापकत्वम्, आहो अवभातार्थप्रापकत्वम्, तज्जातीयोदकप्रपाकत्वं वा, स्वोत्पादकऽर्थप्रापकत्वं वा, अथ स्वोत्पादककारकाणां ध्रुवभावित्वमविसंवादः?

atha arthaprāpakatvavisamvādaḥ, tatra kim-arthamātraprāpakatvam, āho avabhātārthaprāpakatvam, tajjātīyodakaprapākatvaṁ vā, svotpādaka'rthaprāpakatvaṁ vā, atha svotpādakakāraḥkṇām dhruvabhāvitvamavisamvādaḥ?

Translation: 413

If you say, does it mean the state of causing the knower to get the object which was shown by the knowledge? There we would like to ask, does it mean the state of causing the obtainment of mere object? Or does it mean the state of causing the obtainment of object which appeared in the knowledge? Or does it mean the state of causing the obtainment of water belonging to that class? Or does it mean the state of causing the obtainment of object which causes the knowledge? Or does the corroboration mean occurrence of definite number of causal factors which produce the knowledge?

Text: 414

यदि अर्थमात्रप्रापकत्वम्; केशोण्डुकेन्दुद्वयसंवेदनस्यापि अविसंवादित्वम् आपद्यते।

yadi arthamātraprāpakatvam; keśoṇḍukendudvayasamvedanasyāpi avisamvāditvam āpadyate.

Translation: 414

If you say, does it mean revealing the object as it is? Then, the knowledge of thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a person who comes into the shade from the sun, and the knowledge of two moons, should also be called two cognitions.

Text: 415

अथ अवभातार्थप्रापकत्वम्; तदा अनुमानज्ञानस्य अविसंवादित्वं न लभ्यते अवभातार्थाऽप्रापकत्वात्। अनुमानज्ञाने हि सामान्याकारोऽवभाति, न चासौ प्राप्यते स्वयमसत्त्वात्। तथा, योगिज्ञानस्य अतीतानागतार्थं समुत्पन्नस्य अर्थप्रापकत्वं न विद्यते।

atha avabhātārthaprāpakatvam; tadā anumānajñānasya avisamvāditvaṁ na labhyate avabhātārthā'prāpakatvāt. anumānajñāne hi sāmānyākāro'vabhāti, na cāsau prāpyate svayamasattvāt. tathā, yogijñānasya atītānāgatārthe samutpannasya arthaprāpakatvaṁ na vidyate.

Translation: 415

If you say, does it mean being devoid of contradiction? Then even the inferential knowledge, cannot be said to be a valid knowledge, because, it does not cause the obtainment of object, which appeared in the knowledge, because in the inferential knowledge, what appears is the universal form and that is never obtained because it itself has no existence. In the same way, the knowledge of past and future objects of a yogin cannot be said to be causing the obtainment of its object.

Text: 416

तथा, रागादिसंवेदनेऽपि जाते न अवभारगादिप्राप्तिरस्ति। तथा, प्रत्यक्षेऽपि विज्ञाने नाऽवभारार्थप्राप्तिरस्ति, क्षणिकत्वेन अस्तमितत्वात्।

tathā, rāgādisamvedane'pi jāte na avabhātarāgādiprāptirasti. tathā, pratyakṣe'pi vijñāne nā'vabhātārthaprāptirasti, kṣaṇikatvena āstamitatvāt.

Translation: 416

Likewise, even after the awareness of attachment, there is no obtainment of attachment which appeared in the knowledge. In the same way, even in a perceptual cognition, there is no obtainment of object which appeared in the cognition, because, that object being momentary, is no more present in the next moment.

Text: 417

अथ तज्जातीयोदकप्रापकत्वेन अविसंवादित्वमुच्यते; तदयुक्तम्; उदकत्वजातेरभावात्।
atha tajjātiyodakaprāpakatvena avisamvāditvamucyate; tadayuktam; udakatvajāterabhāvāt.

Translation: 417

If you say that knowledge is called corroborative, because it causes the obtainment of water belonging to the same class, it is not proper, because there is nothing called a generic property called wateriness.

Text: 418

अथ अनुदकत्वव्यावृत्तिर्जातिरित्युच्यते;
atha anudakatvavyāvṛttirjātiritiucyate;

Translation: 418

Clarification:

Well, the generic property viz. waterness according to us is the exclusion of that which is not water.

Text: 419

सा उदकव्यक्तिभ्योऽव्यतिरिक्ता, व्यतिरिक्ता वा?
sā udakavyaktibhyo'vyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?

Translation: 419

Reply:

There we may raise the following questions: Is that universal or generic property identical with the water individual? Or is it different from that?

Text: 420

यद्यव्यतिरिक्ता; तदा व्यक्तिरेव न जातिः।
yadyavyatiriktā; tadā vyaktireva na jātiḥ.

Translation: 420

If you say that it is identical, then there is only individual and there is no universal or generic property.

Text: 421

अथ व्यतिरिक्ता; सा वस्तुभूता, अवस्तुभूता वा?
atha vyatiriktā; sā vastubhūtā, avastubhūtā vā?

Translation: 421

If you say that it is different, then the question arises, whether it is real or unreal?

Text: 422

यदि वस्तुभूता; अभ्युपेतहानिः।
yadi vastubhūtā; abhyupetahāniḥ.

Translation: 422

If you say it is real, then it goes against the accepted position of your doctrine.

Text: 422

अथ अवस्तुभूता; तद्गतिः कथम्?
atha avastubhūtā; tadgatiḥ katham?

Translation: 422

If you say it is not unreal, then how do you know it?

Text: 423

न च उदकव्यक्तीनां नानात्वमुपपद्यते। यथा च नोपपद्यते तथा निवेदितं नैयायिकप्रत्यक्ष-
लक्षणाधिकारे।

*na ca udakavyaktīnāṃ nānātvamupapadyate. yathā ca nopapadyate
tathā niveditam naiyāyikapratyakṣalakṣaṇādhikāre.*

Translation: 423

It cannot be justified that water individuals are many in number. We have already demonstrated in the section discussing the definition of perception as proposed by the Naiyāyikas how the plurality of water individuals is not possible.

Text: 424

अथ स्वोत्पादकार्थप्रापकत्वमविसंवादकत्वम्; तदयुक्तम्; नयनालोकमनस्कारादेः
प्रत्यस्तमितत्वात्।

*atha svotpādakārthaprapakatvamavisamvādatvam; tadayuktam;
nayanālokamanaskārādeḥ pratyastamitatvāt.*

Translation: 424

If you say, a true cognition is that which causes the obtainment of an object which is produced by that object, it will not be correct, because the factors like eyes, light, mind etc. are no longer there (in function).

Text: 425

अथ स्वोत्पादकारकाणां ध्रुवभावित्वम् अविसंवादस्तदभावे तदभावप्रसङ्गात्; यद्येवं
केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्यापि ध्रुवभाविकारणाविसंवादोऽस्ति, अन्यथा आकस्मिकत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

atha svotpādakakārakāṇām dhruvabhāvitvam avisarivādastadabhāve tadabhāvaprasaṅgāt; yadyevam keśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi dhruvabhāvikāraṇāvisarivādo'sti, anyathā ākasmikavaprasaṅgāt.

Translation: 425

If you say, that the correctness of a cognition is nothing but the causal factors which produce the cognition being constant, because otherwise in the absence of that there will absence of the cognition. If you say so then, the factors which produce the knowledge of thread-like things which a person sees when he comes from the Sun, are also constant and therefore such a knowledge will also be called veridical, otherwise, such a cognition will be treated as without cause.

Text: 426

एवं चाव्यवस्थिते यदुक्तम्- “न ह्याभ्यामर्थं परिच्छिद्य प्रवर्तमानोऽर्थक्रियायां विसंवाद्यते” इति तद्बालविलसितम्।

evam cāvyaavasthite yaduktam - “na hyābhyāmartham paricchidya pravarttamāno'rthakriyāyām visarivādyate” iti tadbālavilasitam.

Translation: 426

When the fact is like this, your statement viz. “after determining the object by these two when a person takes up an action to obtain it his behaviour is frustrated” is nothing but fanciful ideas of children.

३. सौगतसम्मताया मानमेयसंख्याया निरसनम्।

[3. saugatasammatāyā mānameyasamkhyāyā nirasanam.]

Text: 427

तथा, मानमेयसंख्यापि सौगतमते नोपपद्यते।

tathā, mānameyasamkhyāpi saugatamate nopapadyate.

Translation: 427

In the same way, the number of pramāṇas (processes of knowing) and prameya (objects of knowing knowledge) as accepted by the Buddhists cannot be justified.

Text: 428

तदेव कथम्? कथ्यते-द्वे एव प्रमाणे न मानान्तरमस्ति। तद्विद्वित्वं किं व्यक्तिभेदेन, आकारभेदेन, विषयभेदेन वा?

*tadeva katham? kathyate-dve eva pramāṇe na mānāntaramasti.
taddvitvaṁ kiṁ vyaktibhedena, ākārabhedena, viṣayabhedena vā?*

Translation: 428

How is that? The following is the answer:

They say there are only two types of pramāṇa and there is no other type. There we would like to ask, you say there are two, does it mean there are two different individuals or there are two because their forms are different or they are two because their objects are different?

Text: 429

यदि व्यक्तिभेदेन; तदा अपरिसंख्येयत्वं ज्ञानव्यक्तीनामानन्त्याद् – द्वित्वानुपपत्तिः।
yadi vyaktibhedena; tadā aparisaṁkhyeyatvaṁ jñānavyaktīnāmānāntyaād - dvitvānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 429

If you say, there are two different individuals, then they should be innumerable in number, because there are infinite number of knowledge individuals and therefore you cannot maintain that they are only two.

Text: 430

न च ज्ञानानां भेदोऽस्ति;
na ca jñānānām bhedo'sti;

Translation: 430

Clarification:

There is no difference amongst knowledges.

Text: 431

अज्ञानाद्वि(द्वि)ज्ञानं ज्ञानात्मतया भिद्यते, ज्ञानान्तरात्तु कथं निवर्तते—किं ज्ञानात्मतया आकारान्तरेण वा? यदि ज्ञानाकारतया भिद्यते; तदान्येषामज्ञानात्मकत्वप्रसङ्गः, रसादेरिव।

ajñānādvī(ddhī)jñānaṁ jñānātmatayā bhidyate, jñānāntarāttu katham nivartate-kiṁ jñānātmatayā ākārantareṇa vā? yadi jñānākāratayā bhidyate; tadā anyeṣām ajñānātmakatvaprasaṅgaḥ, rasāderiva.

Translation: 431

Reply:

Knowledge is distinguished from non-knowledge as knowledge but how one knowledge can be distinguished from another knowledge? Is it distinguished as knowledge or as some other form?

Text: 432

अथ आकारान्तरेण व्यावर्त्तते; तदा अज्ञानात्मता तस्य उत्पद्यते, रसादेरिव।
atha ākāraṅtāreṇa vyāvarttate; tadā ajñānātmatā tasya utpadyate, rasāderiva.

Translation: 432

If you say it is distinguished by another form of knowledge, then knowledges will become non-knowledge, like taste etc.

Text: 433

अथ आकारभेदे ज्ञानयोर्भेदः; सोऽप्यनुपपन्न एव;
atha ākārabhede jñānāyorbhedaḥ; so'pyanupapanna eva;

Translation: 433

If you say the two knowledges become different, because they have two different forms, it is also not justifiable.

Text: 434

ज्ञानाकारव्यतिरेकेण प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्नकारान्तरमस्ति। तदुपगमे वा ज्ञानाकारविरहः स्यात्। न च आकारसमूहात्मकं ज्ञानम्, तस्याभिन्नात्मकत्वात्।
jñānākāravvyatirekeṇa pratyakṣānumānāyornākāraṅtaramasti. tadupagame vā jñānākāravirahaḥ syāt. na ca ākārasamūhātmakam jñānam, tasyābhinnātmakatvāt.

Translation: 434

Because perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge do not have any other form, other than the form of knowledge and if you accept that, it means that there is no form. It is not the case that the knowledge is of the form of collection of forms, because in that case it will become identical.

Text: 434a

अथ विषयभेदेन द्वैविध्यमुपपाद्यते; तथाऽनुमानज्ञानस्य विषयार्थो वक्तव्यः -

atha viṣayabhedena dvaividhyamupapādyate; tathā'numānajñānasya viṣayārtho vaktavyaḥ -

Translation: 434a

If you explain two knowledges viz. perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge on the basis of the difference between their objects, then you should tell us what could be the object of an inferential knowledge.

Text: 435

किम् अग्न्यादिस्वलक्षणविषयम्, विद्यमानसामान्यविषयम्, अपारस्मार्थिकसामान्यविषयं वा, निर्विषयं वा, स्वांशविषयं वा?

kim agnyādisvalakṣaṇaviṣayam, vidyamānasāmānyaviṣayam, apāra-mārthikasāmānyaviṣayaṁ vā, nirviṣayaṁ vā, svāṁśaviṣayaṁ vā?

Translation: 435

Is inferential knowledge, knowledge of svalakṣaṇa (mere particular), or of fire, or is it a knowledge of existent series of particulars or is it a knowledge of unreal universal, or is it a knowledge without content or is it a knowledge in which part of itself is the object?

Text: 436

यदि अग्न्यादिस्वलक्षणविषयम्; तदा प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः भेदानुपपत्तिः, अभिन्नविषयत्वात्।
yadi agnyādisvalakṣaṇaviṣayam; tadā pratyakṣānumānayoḥ bheda-nupapattiḥ, abhinnaviṣayatvāt.

Translation: 436

If you say inferential knowledge, is knowledge of svalakṣaṇa (mere particular) of fire, then there will be no difference in perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge, because in both the cases the object will be the same.

Text: 437

अथ आनुमानिके ज्ञाने अग्निमात्रं प्रतीयते, प्रत्यक्षे तु तार्णादिविशेषात्मतया प्रतीयते;
atha ānumānike jñāne agnimātraṁ pratīyate, pratyakṣe tu tāṛṇādi-viśeṣātmatayā pratīyate;

Translation: 437

Clarification:

In the inferential knowledge, mere fire is known, whereas, in the perceptual knowledge the specific fire produced from specific things, such as grass etc. is known.

Text: 438

यद्येवं स्वलक्षणविषयत्वं नातिवर्तते अनुमानस्य यदि नाम वह्नेरेव प्रपञ्चता।

yadyevam svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvaṃ nātivarttate anumānasya yadi nāma vahnereva prapañcatā.

Translation: 438

Reply: If it is so, still the inferential knowledge cannot be said to be the knowledge of svalakṣaṇa, if you are talking about fire alone.

Text: 439

अथ सत्सामान्यविषयत्वम् तथापि प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्न भेदोऽस्ति, सामान्यस्य स्वलक्षण-
रूपत्वात्। न च सत्सामान्यस्य विज्ञानविषयतोपपद्यते, नित्यत्वेन जनकत्वाकारार्पक-
त्वानुपपत्तेः। न च सत्सामान्यविषयत्वे भ्रान्ततोपपद्यते। “भ्रान्तिरप्यर्थसम्बन्धतः प्रमा”
इति न वक्तव्यम्।

atha satsāmānyaviṣayatvam tathāpi pratyakṣānumānayorna bhedo'sti, sāmānyasya svalakṣaṇarūpatvāt. na ca satsāmānyasya vijñānaviṣayatopapadyate, nityatvena janakatvākārārpakatvānupapatteḥ. na ca satsāmānyaviṣayatve bhrāntatopapadyate. “bhrāntirapyartha-sambandhataḥ pramā” iti na vaktavyam.

Translation: 439

If you say that it is knowledge of existent series of particulars of fire, still there will be no difference between a perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge, because universal according to you, is nothing but a series of particulars. (Moreover) if that universal is real, then also it cannot be said to be the object of knowledge, because since universal is accepted as permanent, it cannot have the capacity to offer the form of being a producer of that knowledge (in other words a permanent cannot cause its knowledge). Again, if that universal is real, the knowledge cannot be treated as unreal.

You should also not say “it is illusory at the same time veridical because of its relationship with an object”.

Text: 440

अथ असत्सामान्यविषयम्; न तर्हि तस्य भ्रान्तता असतः स्वेन रूपेण विद्यमानत्वात्। न च असद् विषयभावं प्रतिपद्यते, जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वव्यतिरेकात्।

atha asatsāmānyaviṣayam; na tarhi tasya bhrāntatā asataḥ svena rūpeṇa vidyamānatvāt. na ca asad viṣayabhāvaṁ pratipadyate, janakatvā”kārārpakatvavyatirekāṭ.

Translation: 440

If you say that, the inferential knowledge has unreal universal as its content, then it cannot be called a false knowledge, because, in that knowledge a false entity appears in its own form, viz. a false entity. Nor it is the case, that one understands absence of content in that knowledge, because, in that case, it cannot be said that, that object has produced that inferential knowledge.

Text: 441

अव्यतिरेके वा वस्तुत्वप्रसङ्गः, तत्प्रसक्तौ च प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदानुपपत्तिः।

avyatireke vā vastutvaprasaṅgaḥ, tatprasaktau ca pratyakṣānumānayorbhedānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 441

If you say it is identical, then the content will become real and if that becomes real, there will be no difference between a perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge.

Text: 442

अथ निर्विषयम्; न तर्हि मानयोर्भेदोऽस्ति, अनुमानज्ञानस्य विषयाऽसम्भवात्।

atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi mānayorbhedo’sti, anumānajñānasya viṣayā’sambhavāt.

Translation: 442

If you maintain that inferential knowledge is without content, then there is no difference between the two knowledges viz. the perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge, because, there is no object left for the inferential knowledge.

Text: 443

नापि भ्रान्तता निर्विषयत्वादेव। न च ज्ञानस्य स्वसत्तामात्रेण भ्रान्तता अभ्रान्तता च उपपद्यते, किन्तु परोपधानवशात्।

nāpi bhrāntatā nirviṣayatvādeva. na ca jñānasya svasattāmātreṇa bhrāntatā abhrāntatā ca upapadyate, kintu paropadhānavaśāt.

Translation: 443

Nor can such inferential knowledge be called a false knowledge, because there is no content in that. It is not the case that by mere being into existence, knowledge can be called false or true. But, it is to be decided on the basis of something else.

Text: 444

अथ स्वांशविषयम्; तथापि प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्न नानात्वम्, उभयोः स्वलक्षणविषयत्वात्। न चानुमानज्ञानस्य भ्रान्तता स्वांशस्याऽवञ्चनात्।

atha svāṁśaviṣayam; tathāpi pratyakṣānumānayorna nānātvam, ubhayoh svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvāt. na cānumānajñānasya bhrāntatā svāṁśasyā'vañcanāt.

Translation: 444

If you say that, the inferential knowledge has a part of knowledge as its content, still, the perceptual knowledge cannot be distinguished from inferential knowledge, because, both have svalakṣaṇa (mere particulars) as their content. It cannot be said that an inferential knowledge is false knowledge, because it cannot betray its own part.

Text: 445

तथा प्रत्यक्षस्यापि विषयो वक्तव्यः – किं रूपादिस्वलक्षणविषयमात्मविषयमुभयविषयं वा? *tathā pratyakṣasyāpi viṣayo vaktavyaḥ - kiṁ rūpādisvalakṣaṇa-viṣayam, ātmaviṣayam, ubhayaviṣayam vā?*

Translation: 445

In the same way, you should also tell us what can be the object of perceptual cognition? Is that object mere particular like color etc. or is that content the cognition itself or both?

Text: 446

तद्यदि रूपादिमात्रालोचकम्; तदयुक्तम्; तदनवगतौ एतद्गत्यभावात्। अथ ज्ञानमात्र-कायावगाहकम्; तदपि नोपपद्यते, विषयभावस्य जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन व्यवस्थितेः।

*tadyadi rūpādīmātrālocakam; tadayuktam; tadanavagatau etad-
gatyabhāvāt. atha jñānamātrakāyāvagāhakam; tadapi nopapa-
dyate, viṣayabhāvasya janakatvā”kārārpakatvena vyavasthiteḥ.*

Translation: 446

If you say, it is the indeterminate perception in which mere color etc. appear it will not be proper, because, in an indeterminate cognition the content cannot be known, and if that is not known, that will not be the knowledge of color etc.

Text: 447

न च स्वात्मनि जनकत्वमाकारार्पकत्वं चोपपद्यते-विषयिणमपेक्ष्य विषयो भवति, यथा कारणमपेक्ष्य कार्यं, कार्यञ्चापेक्ष्य कारणं तथेहापि। यदि च प्रत्यक्षज्ञानेन आत्ममात्रमात्मसात् क्रियते; तदाऽनुमानेप्येतदस्ति प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदानुपपत्तिः।

*na ca svātmani janakatvamākārārpakatvaṁ copapadyate-viṣayiṇa-
mapekṣya viṣayo bhavati, yathā kāraṇamapekṣya kāryaṁ, kārya-
ñcāpekṣya kāraṇaṁ tathehāpi. yadi ca pratyakṣajñānena ātmamātra-
mātmasāt kriyate; tadā’numānepyetadasti pratyakṣānumāna-
yorbhedānupapattiḥ.*

Translation: 447

If you say, perceptual cognition reveals merely its own form viz. the perceptual cognition then it is also not satisfactory, because, the presence of the content of cognition is decided as that which offers the form of being the producer. If the content is its own form, this idea of offering the form of being the cause or producer, does not fit in, because something is called content only in terms of the container i.e. the cognition. As something is called effect in terms of its cause, so also something is called in relation to its effect. The same logic is applicable here also. If you say that by a perceptual cognition mere perceptual cognition is included then this is possible also in the case of an inferential cognition and in that case there will no difference between a perceptual cognition and inferential cognition.

Text: 448

अथोभयं विषयीक्रियते; तदप्ययुक्तम्; एकोपलम्भस्य द्वितीयाकारपरिहारेण व्यवस्थि-
तत्वात्।

atha ubhayaṃ viṣayīkriyate; tadapyayuktam; ekopalambhasya dvitīyākāraparihāreṇa vyavasthitatvāt.

Translation: 448

If you say both i.e. the content as well as its own form are made the content of a perceptual cognition, that would also not be proper, because, knowledge of one is decided (in your doctrine) by excluding the other form.

Text: 449

यदि च रूपगृहीतिरेव ज्ञानगृहीतिः; तदा रूपस्य ज्ञानरूपता, ज्ञानस्य वा रूपरूपता, रूपगृहीतेर्वा रूपाऽव्यवस्थापकत्वम्। न च एकस्य आकारद्वयं पश्यामः।

yadi ca rūpagrḥītireva jñānagrḥītiḥ; tadā rūpasya jñānarūpatā, jñānasya vā rūparūpatā, rūpagrḥītervā rūpā'vyavasthāpakatvam. na ca ekasya ākāradvayaṃ paśyāmaḥ.

Translation: 449

If you say that the perception of color etc. itself is perception of cognition, then one will have to decide whether the color is of the form of cognition, or the cognition is of the form of color, or cognition of color cannot decide color. This is not our experience that one object has two forms.

Text: 450

न च द्वित्वावधारणा(ण)मिहोपपद्यते। प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानम् आत्मानं गृह्णदुपजायते नानुमानं विषययति। तथा, अनुमानमपि आत्मानमात्मसात्कुर्वदुपजायते, न प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानमव-द्योतयति। एवं द्वित्वसंख्याव्यवहारानुपपत्तिः।

na ca dvitvāvadhāraṇā(ṇa)mihopapadyate. pratyakṣaṃ jñānam ātmānaṃ grḥṇadupajāyate nānumānaṃ viṣayayati. tathā, anumānamapi ātmānamātmasātkurvadupajāyate, na pratyakṣaṃ jñānava-dyotayati. evaṃ dvitvasaṃkhyāvvyavahārānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 450

(Moreover), it is not possible to know this duality. The perceptual cognition arises through revealing its own form, but it cannot make inferential cognition as its content. Similarly, inferential cognition also arises by making its own form as its content, but not the

perceptual cognition as its content and therefore referring to them as “two” cannot be justified.

Text: 451

अथ विकल्पेन द्वयावधारणमिति चेत्;
atha vikalpena dvayāvadhāraṇamiti cet;

Translation: 451

Clarification:

They are called two alternatively and not “simultaneously”.

Text: 452

तदयुक्तम्; असावपि आत्मसंवेदनपर्यवसितत्वान्न द्वयं गृह्णाति। ग्रहणे वा अभ्युपेतहानम्।
तदनुपपत्तौ च द्वे एवेति जडचेष्टितम्।

tadayuktam; asāvapi ātmasaṁvedanaparyavasitatvānna dvayaṁ gṛhṇāti. grahaṇe vā abhyupetahānam. tadanupapattau ca dve eveti jadaceṣṭitam.

Translation: 452

Reply:

This is also not proper, because, that two is accepted (by you) as revealing one’s own form and hence cause the knowledge of duality. Granting that it causes the knowledge of duality, it will amount in giving up something which was already accepted and once that is demonstrated as impossible then to claim that the pramāṇas are two only, will be nothing more than an attempt of any insentient object.

0.5 सौगतसम्मतस्य प्रत्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा।

saugatasammatasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasya parīkṣā

Critical examination of the definition of perception of the Buddhists.

Text: 453

तथा, “प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनाऽपोढमभ्रान्तम्” [न्यायबि.१.४] इति न वक्तव्यम्, कल्पनापोढ-
पदस्य अपोह्यार्थासम्भवात्।

tathā, “pratyakṣaṁ kalpanā’poḍhamabhrāntam” [Nyāyabi.1.4] iti na vaktavyam, kalpanāpoḍhapadasya apohyārthāsambhavāt.

Translation: 453

Moreover, you should not define a perceptual cognition such as “a perceptual cognition is that which is non-illusory and which is free from mental construction” (*Nyāyabindu* 1.4) because which is free from mental construction, has nothing to exclude.

Text: 454

ननु कल्पनैव अपोह्या;

nanu kalpanaiva apohyā;

Translation: 454

Objection:

If we say, the mental construction itself is to be excluded then?

Text: 455

केयं कल्पना – किं गुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पादितं विज्ञानं कल्पना, आहो स्मृत्यु-त्पादकं विज्ञानं कल्पना, स्मृतिरूपं वा, स्मृत्युत्पाद्यं वा, अभिलापसंसर्गनिर्भासो वा, अभिलापवती प्रतीतिर्वा कल्पना, अस्पष्टाकारा वा, अतात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपा वा, स्वयं वाऽतात्त्विकी, त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतोऽर्थदृग्वा, अतीताऽनागतार्थनिर्भासा वा?

keyaṁ kalpanā - kiṁ guṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇotpāditaṁ vijñānaṁ kalpanā, āho smṛtyutpādakaṁ vijñānaṁ kalpanā, āho smṛtyurūpaṁ vā, smṛtyutpādyāṁ vā, abhilāpasamsarganirbhāso vā, abhilāpavatī pratītirvā kalpanā, aspaṣṭākārā vā, atāttvikārthagṛhītirūpā vā, svayaṁ vā'tāttvikī, trirūpālīṅgato'rthadṛgvā, atītā'nāgatārthanirbhāsā vā?

Translation: 455

Reply:

We would like to know what this mental construction is. Is a mental construction, a cognition which is caused by the qualifications viz. quality, action, universal, etc.? Or a mental construction is a cognition which produces remembrance or is it of the form of remembrance or is it something produced by remembrance? Or is it an appearance of relationship with language? Or is a mental construction a cognition which can be verbalized in language? Or is it something unreal? Or is it a cognition of an object, produced from a ground or reason having three features or aspects or forms ((i) being in the subject (ii) not being in that which is not a subject and

(iii) being in an example or instance.) Or is it a mental construction which reveals an object of the past and the future?

Text: 456

तद्यदि गुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पादितं विज्ञानं कल्पना; तत्किम् अविद्यमानगुणचलन-
जात्यादिविशेषणोत्पाद्यत्वेन कल्पना, उत विद्यमानोत्पाद्यत्वेन?

tadyadi guṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇotpāditam vijñānam kalpanā;
tatkim avidyamānaguṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇotpādyatvena kalpanā,
uta vidyamānotpādyatvena?

Translation: 456

If it is a mental construction, a cognition which is caused by the qualifications quality, action, universal, etc. then again the question arises whether it is a mental construction because it is produced by the qualifications such as quality, action and universal etc. which are non-existent? Or is it a mental construction, which is produced by those existing qualifications?

Text: 457

तद्यदि अविद्यमानगुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पाद्यत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदयुक्तम्; अविद्य-
मानस्य जनकत्वाभावादेव अकल्पनात्वम्।

tadyadi avidyamānaguṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇotpādyatvena kalpanā-
tvam; tadayuktam; avidyamānasya janakatvābhāvādeva akalpa-
nātvam

Translation: 457

If you say it is produced by the qualifications such as quality, action and universal etc. which are non-existent? Then it is not proper, because, if something is non-existent, it cannot be a cause and if something is not a cause, obviously, it cannot be called a mental construction.

Text: 458

अथ विद्यमानगुणचलनजात्यादिविशेषणोत्पाद्यत्वेन कल्पना; तत्किं सविषयं कल्पनाज्ञानं
निर्विषयं वा?

atha vidyamānaguṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇotpādyatvena kalpanā;
tatkim saviṣayam kalpanājñānam, nirviṣayam vā?

Translation: 458

If you say it is a mental construction caused by the qualifications viz. quality, action and universal which are existent, then, the question arises: Is that cognition called mental construction, contentful or contentless?

Text: 459

तद्यदि सविषयं सत् कल्पनाज्ञानम्; तदयुक्तम्; गुणचलनजात्यादिजन्यत्वेऽपि न कल्पनात्वम् अर्थसामार्थ्यसमुद्भवत्वस्याऽनतिवृत्तेः।

tadyadi saviṣayaṁ sat kalpanājñānam; tadayuktam; guṇacalanajātyādirjanyatve'pi na kalpanātvam arthasāmārthyasamudbhavatvasyā'nativṛtته.

Translation: 459

If you say it is contentful and still it is a mental construction it is not correct, because, if it has been produced by quality, action and universal etc. then it cannot be called a mental construction, because, you cannot override the property of being produced from something which is an object of a fruitful behaviour.

Text: 460

अथ निर्विषयं सत् कल्पना; तदा निर्विषयत्वमेव कल्पनात्वे कारणं न गुणचलन-जात्यादिविशेषणजन्यत्वम्।

atha nirviṣayaṁ sat kalpanā; tadā nirviṣayatvameva kalpanātve kāraṇaṁ na guṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇajanyatvam.

Translation: 460

If you say it is a mental construction, because it is contentless, then the ground for calling it a mental construction should be its being contentless and not being produced by the qualifications like quality, action and universal etc.

Text: 461

यदि च तन्निर्विषयम्; तदा न कल्पनाज्ञानम्, नाप्यकल्पनाज्ञानम्, ज्ञानमात्रता स्यात्। ज्ञानात्मतया च कल्पनात्वे सर्वं ज्ञानं कल्पनाज्ञानं स्यात्।

yadi ca tannirviṣayam; tadā na kalpanājñānam, nāpyakalpanājñānam, jñānamātratā syāt. jñānātmatayā ca kalpanātve sarvaṁ jñānaṁ kalpanājñānaṁ syāt.

Translation: 461

Again if it is contentless, then it cannot be called mental construction, nor can it be called non-mental construction. It will be reduced to mere cognition and if it is called mental construction, only because it is mere cognition then all knowledges will be called mental construction.

Text: 462

अथ स्मृत्युत्पादकं ज्ञानं कल्पना; तदयुक्तम्; रूपादिदर्शनादपि स्मृतिरुत्पद्यते, न च कल्पनात्वम्। “यत्सन्निधाने यो दृष्टः तद्दृष्टेस्ततौ [तद्ध्वनौ] स्मृतिः” इति वचनात्।
*atha smṛtyutpādakam jñānam kalpanā; tadayuktam; rūpādida-
 rśanādapi smṛtirutpadyate, na ca kalpanātvam. “yatsannidhāne yo
 dr̥ṣṭaḥ taddr̥ṣṭestatau [taddhvanau] smṛtiḥ” iti vacanāt.*

Translation: 462

If you say, the cognition which produces remembrance is called mental construction, that will not be proper, because, by seeing a color also i.e. from the knowledge of color, remembrance is produced. But color etc. is not considered to be a mental construction. This is in accordance with the statement viz. “if in the proximity of X, Y is perceived, then by seeing X, Y is remembered.”

Text: 463

अथ स्मृतिरूपत्वेन कल्पना; तत्रापि किं गृहीतग्राहित्वेन, निर्विषयत्वेन, अपूर्वार्थ-
 गृहीतिरूपत्वेन वा?

*atha smṛtirūpatvena kalpanā; tatrāpi kiṃ gr̥hītagrāhitvena, nirviṣa-
 yatvena, apūrvārthagr̥hītirūpatvena vā?*

Translation: 463

If you say, a cognition is a mental construction in the form of remembrance, there also a question arises, is it a mental construction as the revealer of something which is already known or because it is contentless or because it is the revealer of something new?

Text: 464

तद्यदि गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदा प्रथमानुभवस्यापि कल्पनात्वमापद्यते
 गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वाविशेषात् इत्युक्तं पुरस्तात्।

tadyadi gr̥hītārthagrāhitvena kalpanātvam; tadā prathamānubhavasayāpi kalpanātvamāpadyate gr̥hītārthagrāhitvāviśeṣāt ityuktam purastāt.

Translation: 464

If you say, it is a mental construction in the form of revealer of something which is already known, then the first experience should also be called a mental construction, because, that also is a cognition which has revealed something which was known before. This we have already discussed before.

Text: 465

*अथ निर्विषयत्वेन; तदा न कल्पनाकारता नाप्यकल्पनाकारता ज्ञानाकारव्यतिरेकेण।
atha nirviṣayatvena; tadā na kalpanākāratā nāpyakalpa- nākāratā
jñānākāravvyatirekeṇa.*

Translation: 465

If you say, it is a mental construction because it is contentless, then it has neither the form of a mental construction, nor the form of non-mental construction, apart from the form of the cognition.

Text: 466

*अथापूर्वार्थगृहीतित्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदयुक्तम्; न स्मृतेरपूर्वार्थगृहीतित्वमस्ति तदभावान्न
कल्पनात्वम्।*

athāpūrvārthagṛhītītvēna kalpanātvam; tadayuktam; na smṛterapūrvārthagṛhītītvamasti tadabhāvānna kalpanātvam.

Translation: 466

Again if you say, it is a mental construction because it reveals something new, that will not be correct, because, there is nothing new in the remembrance and in the absence of that it will not be called a mental construction, according to your definition.

Text: 467

यदि च अपूर्वार्थगृहीतित्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; रूपादिज्ञानानां कल्पनात्वमापद्यते।

yadi ca apūrvārthagṛhītītvēna kalpanātvam; rūpādiññānānām kalpanātvamāpadyate.

Translation: 467

Moreover, if you say that a cognition is a mental construction, if it reveals something new, then the knowledges of color etc. will have to be treated a mental construction.

Text: 468

अथ स्मृत्युत्पाद्यत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदा रूपादिज्ञानस्यापि निर्विकल्पकत्वेनाभिमतस्य स्मृत्युत्पाद्यत्वमस्ति, तदस्तु कल्पनाज्ञानम्।

atha smṛtyutpādyatvena kalpanātvam; tadā rūpādijñānasyāpi nirvikalpakatvenābhimatasya smṛtyutpādyatvamasti, tadastu kalpanājñānam.

Translation: 468

If you say that a cognition which is caused by remembrance is a mental construction, then even the knowledge of color etc. which is intended as indeterminate in character is caused by remembrance and so let that cognition be called mental construction.

Text: 469

अथ न भवति तत् कल्पनाज्ञानं, स्मृत्या बोधस्वभावतयोत्पादितं कल्पनाज्ञानं न स्मरणा-कारतयोत्पाद्यते;

atha na bhavati tat kalpanājñānam, smṛtyā bodhasvabhāvatayotpāditam kalpanājñānam na smaraṇākāratayotpādyate;

Translation: 469

Clarification:

Well that cannot be called a mental construction, because, the mental construction is produced by remembrance in the form of an understanding and not in the form of remembrance.

Text: 470

तदिदं मद्रिकल्पान्दोलितबुद्धेः निरुपपत्तिकाऽभिधानम्। न ह्येकस्य स्वभावद्वयमुत्पश्यामः।
tadidaṁ madvikalpāndolita buddheḥ nirupapattikā'bhidhānam. na hyekasya svabhāvadvayamutpaśyāmaḥ.

Translation: 470

Reply:

This illogical statement of yours is an outcome of your confused mind due to raising odd questions by us. One entity cannot have two natures.

Text: 471

अथ अभिलापसंसर्गप्रतिभासा प्रतीतिः कल्पना; स संसर्गः पारमार्थिकः, अपारमार्थिको वा?

atha abhilāpasamsargapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā; sa samsargaḥ pāramāṛthikah, apāramāṛthiko vā?

Translation: 471

If you say, that a mental construction is a cognition which reveals association with language, there also we can ask whether that relation is real or unreal?

Text: 472

यदि पारमार्थिकः; न तदा तस्य कल्पनात्वं रूपादिज्ञानस्येव।

yadi pāramāṛthikah; na tadā tasya kalpanātvam rūpādijñānasyeva.

Translation: 472

If you say it is real, then it cannot be said to be a mental construction, like the cognition of color.

Text: 473

अथ अपारमार्थिकः; कथं तदाभं विज्ञानम्, नैरात्म्यप्रसङ्गात्। न चाऽतात्त्विके विषयार्थः कश्चिन्नभ्यते, जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वसहोत्पादसत्तामात्रव्यतिरेकात्।

atha apāramāṛthikah; katham tadābham vijñānam, nairātmyprasaṅgāt. na cāṣṭāttvike viṣayārthah kaścillabhyate, janakatvākārārpakatvasahotpādāsattāmātravyatirekāṭ.

Translation: 473

And if you say it is unreal, then how can it be called a cognition reflecting that nature, because in that case, it will be devoid of its nature. In a false cognition, what has appeared as its content, is not formed, because, it doesn't have the state of producing the effect or the state of offering a form, or mere existence of being a product together.

Text: 474

यदि च अतात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपम्; तदा विपर्ययज्ञानम्। तच्च अव्यभिचारिपदेन अपोदितम्, न कल्पनापोढपदमुपादेयम्।

yadi ca atāttvikārthagṛhītirūpam; tadā viparyayajñānam. tacca avyabhicāripadena apoditam, na kalpanāpoḍhapadamupādeyam.

Translation: 474

If again a mental construction is taken as a cognition that reveals an unreal object, then that cognition will be called a false cognition and that can be excluded by a clause which is not false or which is not illusory and so there is no need to add the clause "which is free from mental construction in the definition of perception."

Text: 475

अथ अभिलापवती प्रतीतिः कल्पना, किम्-अभिलापात्मिका, आहो अभिलापोत्पाद्या, अभिलापगृहीतिर्वा?

atha abhilāpavatī pratītiḥ kalpanā, kim-abhilāpātmikā, āho abhilāpotpādyā, abhilāpagrḥītīrvā?

Translation: 475

If you say a mental construction is a cognition which is verbalizable, then the question arises, is it identical with the language? Or is it produced by language or is it the cognition of the language?

Text: 476

तद्यदि अभिलापात्मिका; प्रतीतिः कथम्? प्रतीतिश्चेत्; 'अभिलापात्मिका' इति न वक्तव्यम्। विरुद्धाकारयोस्तादात्म्यव्यतिरेकात्।

tadyadi abhilāpātmikā; pratītiḥ katham? pratītiśchet; 'abhilāpātmikā' iti na vaktavyam. viruddhākārayostādātmyavyatirekāṭ.

Translation: 476

If you say it is of the form of language, then how can it be called cognition? And if it is a cognition then you should not call it of the form of language, because, two entities having opposite characteristics, cannot be identical.

Text: 477

अथ अभिलापोत्पाद्या; तदा शब्दज्ञानानां कल्पनात्वमापद्यते। तेषां च कल्पनात्वे शब्दव्यवस्थानऽनुपपत्तिः स्यात्।

atha abhilāpotpādyā; tadā śabdajñānānāṃ kalpanātvamāpadyate. teṣāṃ ca kalpanātve śabdavyavasthāna'nupapattiḥ syāt.

Translation: 477

If you say it is caused by language, then the knowledge of language will have to be treated as mental construction and if that becomes

mental construction, then nothing can be decided on the basis of language.

Text: 478

अभिलापगृहीतित्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदा सर्वसामभिलापगृहीतीनां कल्पनात्वमापद्यते, तत्कल्पनात्वे शब्दव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः।

abhilāpaḡrḥītītvēna kalpanātvam; tadā sarvāsāmabhilāpaḡrḥītīnām kalpanātvamāpadyate, tatkalpanātvē śabdavyavasthānupattiḥ.

Translation: 478

If you say a cognition is a mental construction, because it reveals language, then all cognitions of language will have to be treated as mental construction, and if they are treated as mental constructions then nothing can be settled on the basis of language.

[१. प्रसङ्गायाताया अस्पष्टताया विकल्प्य दूषणम्।]

[1. *prasaṅgāyātāyā aspṣṭatāyā vikalpya dūṣaṇam.*]

Text: 479

अथ अस्पष्टाकारा प्रतीतिः कल्पना; अस्पष्टता का?

atha aspṣṭākārā pratītiḥ kalpanā; aspṣṭatā kā?

Translation: 479

If you say a cognition the form of which is not clear or blur, is a mental construction, we would like to know what is that blurriness?

Text: 480

किम् अविज्ञानात्मकत्वम्, आहो स्वलक्षणाजन्यत्वम्, अथ प्रतीयमानार्थाजन्यत्वम्, प्रतीयमानासत्यता वा, स्वलक्षणाप्रतिभासिता वा?

kim avijñānātmakatvam, āho svalakṣaṇājanyatvam, atha pratīyamānārthājanyatvam, pratīyamānāsatyatā vā, svalakṣaṇāpratibhāsītā vā?

Translation: 480

Does it mean “being of the nature of non-cognition?” or does it mean the “state of not being produced by svalakṣaṇa (mere particular).” If you say, it is the state of not being produced by the object which is known; in that case does it mean that whatever is known is false? Or does it mean a cognition in which svalakṣaṇa (mere particular) is not revealed?

Text: 481

तद्यदि अविज्ञानात्मकत्वमस्पष्टता; तद्युक्तम्; प्रतीतिरिह अस्पष्टाकारा गीयते, सा कथं विज्ञानात्मिका भवितुमर्हति?

*tadyadi avijñānātmakatvamaspaṣṭatā; tadayuktam; pratitiriha aspa-
ṣṭākārā gīyate, sā katham vijñānātmikā bhavitumarhati?*

Translation: 481

If you say, blurriness means being of the nature of non-cognition that will not be proper, because, here on one hand you are telling that the cognition is blur then how can that be called of the form of cognition?

Text: 482

अथ स्वलक्षणान्यता अस्पष्टता; तदा ज्ञानाकस्मिकत्वप्रसङ्गः।

atha svalakṣaṇānyatā aspaṣṭatā; tadā jñānākasmikatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 482

If you say, that not being produced by svalakṣaṇa is blurriness, then one will have to accept that cognition arises without any cause.

Text: 483

अथ प्रतीयमानार्थजन्यत्वम्; तदा रागादिसंवेदनस्य अस्पष्टता प्राप्नोति, रागादीनां स्वात्मसंवेदनोत्पादकत्वाऽयोगात्, स्वात्मोत्पादकत्वं वस्तूनां न दृष्टपूर्वम्। तथा केशोण्डु-कविज्ञानस्या(स्य) प्रतीयमानकेशोण्डुकोत्पाद्यत्वं न विद्यते, तदप्य(पि) स्पष्टाभ-मुपजायते न तु अस्पष्टाभम्, “न विकल्पानुबद्धस्य स्पष्टार्थप्रतिभासिता” [प्रमाणवा० ३.२८३] इति वचनात्।

*atha pratīyamānārthajānyatvam; tadā rāgādīsaṁvedanasya aspa-
ṣṭatā prāpnoti, rāgādīnām svātmasaṁvedanotpādatva'yogāt, svāt-
motpādatkavaṁ vastūnām na dṛṣṭapūrvam. tathā keṣoṇḍukavijñā-
nasyā(sya) pratīyamānakeṣoṇḍukotpādyatvaṁ na vidyate, tada-
pya(pi) spaṣṭābhamupajāyate na tu aspaṣṭābham, “na vikalpānuba-
ddhasya spaṣṭārthapratibhāsītā” [Pramāṇavā 3.283] iti vacanāt.*

Translation: 483

Again if you say that it is the state of not being produced by the object which is known, then the feeling of attachment etc. should be accepted as blur, because, attachment etc. do not take part in causing the feeling of attachment. So far we have not experienced

before that things produce themselves. It is true that the cognitions of thread-like things which appear to a person who comes from outside the Sun, is not caused by its content viz. thread-like things. Still, the cognition that appears is quite clear and not blurred. This is in support of the statement (in the *Pramāṇavārttika* 3.283) viz. "a cognition if affected by imagination is not a cognition which reflects its object clearly."

Text: 484

अथ स्वलक्षणाप्रतिभासित्वमस्पष्टता; तदा निर्विकल्पाभिमतकेशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्य अस्पष्टता प्राप्नोति, तत्र स्वलक्षणस्याप्रतिभासनात् स्पष्टाभं च तद्गीयते। न च ताथागते दर्शने तथाभूतं ज्ञानमस्ति यत् स्वलक्षणाप्रतिभासि, सर्वस्मिन् ज्ञाने ज्ञानकार्यप्रतिभासनात्।

atha svalakṣaṇāpratibhāsītvaṃ spaṣṭatā; tadā nirvikalpābhimatā-keṣoṇḍukavijñānasya aspaṣṭatā prāpnoti, tatra svalakṣaṇasyāpratibhāsanāt spaṣṭābhaṃ ca tadgīyate. na ca tāthāgate darśane tathābhūtaṃ jñānamasti yat svalakṣaṇāpratibhāsi, sarvasmin jñāne jñānakāryapratibhāsanāt.

Translation: 484

If you say being blurred is not reflecting *svalakṣaṇā*, then the cognitions of thread-like things which appear to a person who comes from outside the Sun, which is considered to an indeterminate cognition by you will become blurred, because there the *svalakṣaṇā* is not reflected clearly but still you accept it to be clear. There is no such knowledge in the Buddhist doctrine which does not reflect *svalakṣaṇā*, because in every knowledge effect of knowledge is reflected.

Text: 485

अथ प्रतीयमाना सत्यता अस्पष्टता; तदा केशोण्डुकेन्दुद्वयविज्ञानस्य अस्पष्टता प्राप्नोति। नच प्रतीयमानस्यासत्यता, विज्ञानकार्यस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात्। न च तस्य विसंवादोऽस्ति।

atha pratīyamānā satyatā aspaṣṭatā; tadā keṣoṇḍukendudvaya-vijñānasya aspaṣṭatā prāpnoti. naca pratīyamānasyāsatyatā, vijñānakāryasya pratīyamānatvāt. na ca tasya viśaṃvādo'sti.

Translation: 485

If you say, the blurriness is the truthfulness of what has appeared in a knowledge, then in the knowledge of thread-like things which

appear to a person who comes from outside the Sun, and the knowledge of two moons, will be considered as blurred, because in those knowledges whatever has appeared is not false, because, the form of knowledge has definitely appeared there and it is not the case that those forms do not match with the reality.

Text: 486

अथ अतात्त्विकार्थगृहीतिरूपा कल्पना; तदा केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्यापि कल्पनात्वमापद्यते।
atha atāttvikārthagṛhītirūpā kalpanā; tadā keśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi kalpanātvamāpadyate.

Translation: 486

If you say, that mental construction is the cognition which reveals an unreal thing, then the cognition of the knowledge of thread-like things which appear to a person who comes from outside the Sun, should also be treated as mental construction.

Text: 487

अथ स्वयमतात्त्विकी; तदा प्रतीतिः कथम्? प्रतीतिश्चेद्; अतात्त्विकी कथम्?
atha svayamatāttvikī; tadā pratītiḥ katham? pratītiśced; atāttvikī katham?

Translation: 487

If you say, mental construction is itself unreal, then how can it be called cognition? And if it is cognition how can it be called false?

Text: 488

अथ त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतोऽर्थदृक् कल्पना इति चेत्; सापि किं लिङ्गजन्यत्वेन कल्पना, आहो निर्विषयत्वेन?
atha trirūpāllīṅgato'rthadr̥k kalpanā iti cet; sāpi kiṃ liṅgajanyatvena kalpanā, āho nirviṣayatvena?

Translation: 488

Clarification:

If you say, mental construction or imagination is cognition of a thing, produced from a ground having three aspects: (i) being in the subject (ii) not being in that which is not a subject and (iii) being in an example or instance.

Text: 489

तद्यदि लिङ्गजन्यत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्;
tadyadi liṅgajanyatvena kalpanātvam;

Translation: 489

Reply:

There also the question arises, whether such cognition is to be treated as mental construction because it is produced by ground.

Text: 490

तदा लिङ्गावगाहकनिर्विकल्पकविज्ञानस्यापि कल्पनात्वमापद्यते। न च अनुमेयज्ञान-
स्याव्यवधानेन लिङ्गोत्पाद्यत्वमस्ति।

*tadā liṅgāvagāhakanirvikalpakavijñānasyāpi kalpanātvamāpadyate.
na ca anumeyajñānasyāvyavadhānena liṅgotpādyatvamasti.*

Translation: 490

If you say it is mental construction because it is produced by ground, then the indeterminate cognition which reveals the ground will also have to be treated as mental construction, it is not the case that inferential knowledge of a thing is produced by the ground without gap.

Text: 491

अथ निर्विषयत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदपि न योयुज्यते; स्वांशविषयत्वादानुमानज्ञानस्य।
*atha nirviṣayatvena kalpanātvam; tadapi na yoyujyate; svānśa-
viṣayatvādanumānājñānasya.*

Translation: 491

If you say it is a mental construction because it is contentless, that also does not fit in, because an inferential knowledge has some of its own part as its object.

Text: 492

अथ स्वांशविषयव्यतिरिक्तविषयो नास्ति, निर्विषयत्वेन कल्पनात्वमपदिश्यते;
*atha svānśaviṣayavyatiriktaviṣayo nāsti, nirviṣayatvena kalpanā-
tvamapadiśyate;*

Translation: 492

Clarification:

There is no content without involving some of its own part.

Therefore, a cognition is called a mental construction, if it is contentless.

Text: 493

तदा केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्यापि कल्पनात्वमापद्यते।

tadā keśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi kalpanātvamāpadyate.

Translation: 493

Reply :

In that case the cognition of the knowledge of thread-like things which appear to a person who comes from outside the Sun, should also be treated as mental construction.

Text: 494

अथ यत् निर्विकल्पकं तत् विस्पष्टतयोपजायते। आनुमानिकं तु अस्पष्टाभं तेन तत् कल्पनाज्ञानम्;

atha yat nirvikalpakaṁ tat viśpaṣṭatayopajāyate. ānumānikaṁ tu aśpaṣṭābhaṁ tena tat kalpanājñānam;

Translation: 494

Clarification:

Well, that is an indeterminate cognition, which arises as a clear cognition. An inferential cognition however, is not a clear cognition and therefore that cognition is called a mental construction.

Text: 495

तदयुक्तम्; अस्पष्टता च यथा न सम्भवति तथा प्रागेवोक्ता।

tadayuktam; aśpaṣṭatā ca yathā na sambhavati tathā prāgevoktā.

Translation: 495

Reply:

It is not correct. We have already told how an inferential cognition is blurred.

[२. प्रसङ्गायातायाः प्रत्यक्षीयस्पष्टताया विकल्प्य विडम्बनम्।]

[2. prasaṅgāyātāyāḥ pratyakṣīyāśpaṣṭatāyā vikalpya viḍambanam.]

Text: 496

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य च स्पष्टता का? किं स्वलक्षणजन्यता, आहो स्वलक्षणप्रतिभासिता?

pratyakṣajñānasya ca spaṣṭatā kā? kim svalakṣaṇajanyatā, āho svalakṣaṇapratibhāsītā?

Translation: 496

By the way, what do you mean by the clarity of a perceptual cognition? Does it mean the state of being caused by svalakṣaṇa? Or does it mean the state of revealing svalakṣaṇa?

Text: 497

tadyadi svlakṣaṇajanyatā; kiṁ pratyamānasvalakṣaṇajanyatā, tadviparītasvalakṣaṇajanyatā vā?

Translation: 497

If you say it is the state of being produced by svalakṣaṇa, there also the question arises, is it the state of being produced by the svalakṣaṇa which appears in the cognition? Or does it mean the state of being produced by the svalakṣaṇa which is opposite than what appears in the cognition?

Text: 498

tadyadi prātītyārūḍhasvalakṣaṇajanyatā; prātītau kimavabhāti – kimarthaḥ, jñānam, ubhayaṁ vā?

Translation: 498

If you say it is the state of being produced by svalakṣaṇa which appears in the cognition, then we would like to know what is that appears in the cognition? Is it an object or the cognition or both?

Text: 499

tadyadi arthaḥ; tadayuktam; aprātītāyāṁ prātītau tadanavabhāsanāt.

Translation: 499

If you say it is the object that appears in the cognition, it is not proper, because, unless the cognition is cognized, that cannot appear in the cognition.

Text: 500

अथ ज्ञानम्; न तर्हि तद् आत्मानमुत्पादयति, स्वात्मनि क्रियाव्यतिरेकात्।

atha jñānam; na tarhi tad ātmānamutpādayati, svātmani kriyā-vyatirekāt.

Translation: 500

If you say it is the cognition that appears in the cognition, it implies that it does not produce itself, because there cannot be any activity aimed at producing its own form.

Text: 501

अथ उभयं प्रतिभाति; तदयुक्तम्; एकोपलम्भस्य द्वितीयाकारपरिहारस्थितिधर्मत्वात्। यदि चोभयं प्रतिभाति; तदा अर्थवत् ज्ञानेनापि ज्ञानमुत्पाद्यते इत्यापद्यते। तच्चायुक्तम्, स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात्।

atha ubhayam pratibhāti; tadayuktam; ekopalambhasya dvitīyākāra-parihāraस्थितिधर्मत्वāt. yadi cobhayam pratibhāti; tadā arthavat jñānenāpi jñānamutpādyate ityāpadyate. taccāyuktam, svātmani kriyāvirodhāt.

Translation: 501

If you say both appear in the cognition that also is not proper, because at a time when one form is revealed, the other form is excluded and this is the property of cognition. Moreover, if you still hold that both appear in the cognition, then, as object produces the cognition, the cognition should also produce the cognition, and that cannot be justified, because the activity of producing cannot be directed towards one's own self.

Text: 502

अथ अप्रतीयमानस्वलक्षणजन्यता; व(त)द्गतिः कथम्?

atha apratīyamānasvalakṣaṇajanyatā; va(ta)dgatiḥ katham?

Translation: 502

If you say clarity of perception means being produced by svalakṣaṇa which does not appear in the cognition, then, the question arises how do you know it?

Text: 503

न प्रत्यक्षेण; अप्रतीयमानत्वादेव।

na pratyakṣeṇa; apratīyamānatvādeva.

Translation: 503

You cannot say that you know it by perception, because you have said that it does not appear in the cognition.

Text: 504

नाप्यनुमानेन, स्वभाव-कार्यलिङ्गानवगतेः।

nāpyanumāneṇa, svabhāva-kāryaliṅgānavagateḥ.

Translation: 504

Nor can you say that it is known by inference, because there is no ground reflecting the invariable concomitance of the type of “own nature”, or the invariable concomitance of the nature of cause-and-effect relationship.

Text: 505

न स्वभावानुमानं तत्कार्यतादात्म्ये, तदनवगतौ तस्याऽनवगतेः।

na svabhāvānumānaṁ tatkāryatādātmye, tadanavagatau tasyā'navagateḥ.

Translation: 505

It cannot be the inference of its nature, if it is identical with its effect, because, if that is not understood, its own nature also will not be understood.

Text: 506

नापि कार्यानुमानम्; तद्भूतकार्यानुपलब्धेः, पिशाचपरमाणुमहेश्वरकल्पार्थोत्पादितं कार्यं नेहोपलभ्यते।

nāpi kāryānumānam; tadbhūtakāryānupalabdheḥ, piśācaparamāṇu-maheśvarakalpārthotpāditaṁ kāryaṁ nehopalabhyate.

Translation: 506

Nor can it be the inference of the effect, because no effect produced by that is known. No effect produced by an object like ghost, atom, or God is found here.

Text: 507

अथ ज्ञानमेव तस्य लिङ्गम्; तदयुक्तम्; तेन सह तस्य सम्बन्धानवगतेश्चिन्मात्रतयैव न त्वन्योऽर्थः, न च चिदात्मानं जनयति।

atha jñānameva tasya liṅgam; tadayuktam; tena saha tasya sambandhānavagateśchinmātratayaiva na tvanyo'rthaḥ, na ca cidātmānaṁ janayati.

Translation: 507

If you say that, the very cognition or knowledge can be the ground to infer that, that will not be proper, because no relationship is known with that knowledge of that “clarity” because what is there is mere consciousness and there is no other object and it is not the case that consciousness produces consciousness.

Text: 508

समनन्तरज्ञानं तस्य हेतुः इति चेत;

samanantarajñānaṁ tasya hetuḥ iti cet;

Translation: 508

Clarification:

The cognition which immediately follows is the cause of that “clarity”.

Text: 509

तदयुक्तम्; तदवगतौ न मानमस्ति, परसन्तानज्ञानार्थकल्पं तदपि न स्वसंवेद्यं तत्कार्यज्ञानस्य ततो भिन्नत्वात् परसन्तानज्ञानार्थवत्।

tadayuktam; tadavagatau na mānamasti, parasantānājñānārthakalpaṁ tadapi na svasamvedyaṁ tatkāryajñānasya tato bhinnatvāt parasantānājñānārthavat.

Translation: 509

Reply:

It is not correct, because, there is no proof or process by which we can know it. Even it cannot be like the series of cognitions which follow, since it cannot be self revealed, because the knowledge of its effect will be different from it, like the object of the series of cognitions.

Text: 510

नाप्यनुमानेन; तदायत्तताया अनवगतेश्चिन्मात्रतयैव आत्मानमवगाहयति नान्यायत्ततया ततोऽन्यस्य पिशाचेश्वरे(र)तुल्यत्वात् ।

nāpyanumānena; tadāyattatāyā anavagateśchinmātratayaiva ātmānamavagāhayati nānyāyattatayā tato'nyasya piśāceśvare(ra)tulyatvāt.

Translation: 510

Neither can it be known by inference, because, the scope of inference to know that is not known. At the most it can cause the knowledge of itself as mere consciousness and not through the capacity of some thing else, because anything except that will be like a ghost or God.

Text: 511

यदि च समनन्तरविज्ञानोत्पाद्यत्वेन स्पष्टता; तदाऽनुमानज्ञानस्यापि समनन्तरज्ञानोत्पाद्यत्वेन निर्विकल्पकत्वमनुषक्तम्।

yadi ca samanantaravijñānotpādyatvena spaṣṭatā; tadā'numānajñānasyāpi samanantarajñānotpādyatvena nirvikalpakatvamanuṣaktam.

Translation: 511

Moreover, if you say that there is clarity in the perceptual cognition, because it is produced by the consecutive cognition, then, even the inferential knowledge should be accepted as an indeterminate knowledge because it is produced by the subsequent knowledge.

Text: 512

अथ स्वलक्षणप्रतिभासिता स्पष्टता; तत्र किं प्रतिभाति – किमर्थः, ज्ञानम्, उभयं वा? *atha svalakṣaṇapratibhāsītā spaṣṭatā; tatra kiṁ pratibhāti - kimarthaḥ, jñānam, ubhayaṁ vā?*

Translation: 512

If you say that, the clarity of perception means the revealing of the svalakṣaṇa then, also the question arises what does appear there? Is it the object or the knowledge or both?

Text: 513

तद्यदि अर्थः; तदयुक्तम्; अप्रसिद्धायाः(यां) प्रसिद्धौ तत्प्रसिद्ध्यभावात् ।

tadyadi arthaḥ; tadayuktam; aprasiddhāyāḥ(yāṁ) prasiddhau tatprasiddhyabhāvāt.

Translation: 513

If you say it is the object, it will not be proper, because if there is no awareness of the knowledge, there cannot be knowledge of that.

Text: 514

अथ ज्ञानम्; तदनुमानेऽपि प्रतिभाति तदप्यस्तु निर्विकल्पकम्। तन्निर्विकल्पकत्वे तर्हि अपोह्यो मृग्योऽधुना कल्पनापोढपदस्य।

atha jñānam; tadanumāne'pi pratibhāti tadapyastu nirvikalpakam. tannirvikalpakatve tarhi apohyo mṛgyo 'dhunā kalpanāpoḍhapadasya.

Translation: 514

And if you say that it is the cognition which appears there, then, that happens in the case of inferential knowledge also and so let inferential knowledge be treated as an indeterminate cognition and if that becomes an indeterminate cognition, then, now you will have to find out what is to be excluded by the word “which is free from mental construction or imagination.”

Text: 515

अथोभयं प्रतिभाति; तदयुक्तम्; एकोपलम्भस्य द्वितीयाकारपरिहारस्थितिधर्मत्वाभ्युपगमात्।
athobhayam pratibhāti; tadayuktam; ekopalambhasya dvitīyākāra-parihārasthitidharmatvābhyupagamāt.

Translation: 515

Again if you say that both appear in that knowledge, that is not correct, because what is accepted is the knowledge of one excludes the other form and this is the characteristics of knowledge.

Text: 516

अथ अतीतानागतार्थगृहीतिरूपा कल्पना; तत्र किमवभाति-अर्थः, तदभावो वा, न किञ्चिद्वा?
atha atītānāgatārthagṛhītirūpā kalpanā; tatra kimavabhāti-arthah, tadabhāvo vā, na kiñcidvā?

Translation: 516

If you say that, the mental construction is of the form of a cognition which reveals past and future object, there also question arises, what does appear there? Is it an object or absence of an object or nothing?

Text: 517

यद्यतीतोऽर्थः प्रतिभाति; न तर्हि तस्य कल्पनात्वम् वर्तमाननीलज्ञानवत्। नाप्यर्थस्य अतीतता प्रतीयमानत्वेन नीलजलादिवत्। नहि प्रतीयमानस्य अतीतता नाम। यदि च प्रतीयमानस्यापि अतीतता उच्यते तदा सर्वस्य बुद्ध्युपलक्षितस्य अतीतता भवेत्। ततश्च वर्तमानव्यवहारविरहः स्यात्।

yadyatīto 'rthaḥ pratibhāti; na tarhi tasya kalpanātvam varttamāna-nīlajñānavat. nāpyarthasya atītatā pratīyamānatvena nīlajalādivat. nahi pratīyamānasya atītatā nāma. yadi ca pratīyamānasyāpi atītatā ucyate tadā sarvasya buddhyupalakṣitasya atītatā bhavet. tataśca varttamānavyavahāravirahaḥ syāt.

Translation: 517

If you say a past object appears there, then, that cannot be called a mental construction like the knowledge of present blue object. Nor can it decide that, that object is a past object, because, that is being known at the present time, like the objects like blue object or water etc. As a matter of fact, what is being known at the present time cannot be said to belong to the past. And if you say that even that which is known at the present time belongs to the past, then, each and every thing which is known will have to be considered as belonging to the past. And in that case, nobody can refer to the present events.

Text: 518

अथ तदभावः प्रतिभाति; तस्याप्यतीतता नास्ति, स्वेन रूपेण विद्यमानत्वात्। नापि तद्विषयविज्ञानस्य कल्पनात्वमुपपद्यते अभावार्थसामर्थ्येन समुद्भवात्। असामर्थ्ये वा विषयार्थश्चिन्त्यः।

atha tadabhāvaḥ pratibhāti; tasyāpyatītatā nāsti svena rūpeṇa vidyamānatvāt. nāpi tadviṣayaviññānasya kalpanātvamupapadyate abhāvārthasāmarthyena samudbhavāt. asāmarthyē vā viṣayārthaścintyaḥ.

Translation: 518

If you say that, what appears there is absence of object even that cannot be said to belong to the past, because in its own form i.e. in the form of absence, it exists in the present and it is not proper

to say that the cognition of that absence is a mental construction, because such a cognition has arisen due to the object called absence. And if you say that absence does not have the capacity to call knowledge, then, it should specify the object of that knowledge.

Text: 519

अथ निर्विषयम्; न तर्हि तदतीतानागतार्थविज्ञानम् अतीतानागतार्थोपकाररहितमपदिश्यते।
atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi tadatītānāgatārthavijñānam atītānāga-
tārthopakārarahitamapadiśyate.

Translation: 519

If you say that, knowledge is contentless, then, you cannot say that such knowledge is of the past or of the future object. It cannot be referred to as cognition without being caused by past and future object.

Text: 520

न च निर्विषयत्वे सति सविकल्पकत्वं निर्विकल्पकत्वं वा, अपि तु ज्ञानात्मतयैव तस्याऽव्यवस्थितिः। न च ज्ञानमात्रतया तस्य सविकल्पकत्वमिष्यते सर्वज्ञानानां सविकल्पकत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

na ca nirviṣayatve sati savikalpakatvaṁ nirvikalpakatvaṁ vā, api tu jñānatmatayaiḥ tasyā'vyavasthitih. na ca jñānamātratayā tasya savikalpakatvamīṣyate sarvajñānānām savikalpakatvaprasaṅgāt.

Translation: 520

It is not the case that cognition is called determinate or indeterminate on the ground of it being contentless; rather it is not decided on the basis of the very nature of cognition. It cannot be the case that merely on the basis of its being cognition, it can be called a determinate cognition, because in that case all knowledges will become determinate knowledges.

Text: 521

यदि च निर्विषयत्वेन अतीतानागतार्थविज्ञानस्य सविकल्पकत्वमभ्युपेयते, निर्विकल्प-
काभिमतकेशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्यापि सविकल्पकत्वमापद्यते। न च अतीतानागतविज्ञानस्य
निर्विषयत्वमस्ति स्वांशपर्यवसितत्वात्। नापि स्वांशव्यतिरिक्तोऽर्थोऽन्योस्ति एकोपलस्ते
(०लम्भे)न अपोहितत्वात्। न च स्वांशस्य वञ्चनोपपद्यते, तदभावात् सर्वं विज्ञानं
सविकल्पकं निर्विकल्पकं वा वक्तव्यं भेदानुपपत्तेः।

yadi ca nirviṣayatvena atītānāgatārthavijñānasya savikalpakatvambhyupeyate, nirvikalpakābhimatakeśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi savikalpakatvamāpadyate. na ca atītānāgatavijñānasya nirviṣayatvamasti svāmśaparyavasitatvāt. nāpi svāmśavyatirikto'rtho'nyosti ekopalaste (lambhe)na apohitatvāt. na ca svāmśasya vañcanopapadyate, tadabhāvāt sarvaṃ vijñānaṃ savikalpakam nirvikalpakam vāvaktavyaṃ bhedānupapatteḥ.

Translation: 521

If you say the knowledge of past and future object is accepted as determinate knowledge on the ground of its being contentless then, there will arise the contingency of accepting knowledge of thread-like things which appear to a person who comes from outside the Sun, which is intended by you as indeterminate cognition as a determinate cognition. It is not the case that cognition of past and future object is contentless, because it amounts to be a part of itself. As a matter of fact, there is no other object other than its own part, because by knowing one, others are excluded. It is not proper to deny its own part because if that is not there, each and every cognition or knowledge can become either determinate or indeterminate, because it will be difficult to distinguish them.

Text: 522

यदप्युक्तम्- “कल्पनापोढं प्रत्यक्षम् अर्थसामर्थ्येन समुद्भवात् रूपादिस्वलक्षणवत्” इति; तत्र किं प्रतीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्भवत्वं विवक्षितम्, आहो अर्थमात्रोद्भवत्वम्?

yadapyuktam- “kalpanāpodham pratyakṣam arthasāmarthyena samudbhavāt rūpādisvalakṣaṇavat” iti; tatra kiṃ pratīyamāna-svalakṣaṇodbhavatvaṃ vivakṣitam, āho arthamātrodbhavatvam?

Translation: 522

You made a statement viz. “a perceptual cognition is that which is free from mental construction or imagination” because it is produced on the basis of the capacity of its object like the svalakṣaṇa viz. color etc. There we would like to ask, whether you want to say that such cognition is caused by the svalakṣaṇa which appears in the cognition or which is caused by mere object.

Text: 523

तद्यदि प्रतीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्भवत्वं विवक्षितम् तदा रागादिसंवेदनस्य योगिप्रत्यक्षस्य च प्रतीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्भवत्वं न लभ्यते।

tadyadi pratīyamānasvalakṣaṇodbhavatvaṁ vivakṣitam tadā rāgādisamvedanasya yogipratyakṣasya ca pratīyamānasvalakṣaṇodbhavatvaṁ na labhyate.

Translation: 523

If you say, the state of being produced by the svalakṣaṇa which appears in the cognition, is intended by you, then, one does not see that the feeling of attachment and the perception of a yogin are produced by the svalakṣaṇa which appears in the cognition.

Text: 524

अथ इन्द्रियजप्रत्यक्षविवक्षया इदमपदिश्यते अर्थसामर्थ्येन समुद्भूतत्वादिति साधनम्;
atha indriyajapratyakṣavivakṣayā idamapadiśyate arthasāmarthyena samudbhūtatvāditi sādhanam;

Translation: 524

Clarification:

Well, what is being stated here is that perceptual cognition which is caused by (the contact between) sense organ (an object) and the ground for such an assertion is the state of being caused by the capacity of its object.

Text: 525

तत्रापि [प्रतीयमानार्थसमुद्भव?]—स्य बाह्यार्थनिराकरणपरत्वात्।
tatrāpi [pratīyamānārthasamudbhava?]-sya bāhyārthanirākaraṇaparatvāt.

Translation: 525

Reply:

There also (according to your doctrine, what appears in the cognition cannot be an object outside) because you deny the existence of external object.

Text: 526

अस्तु वा बाह्योऽर्थः; तथापि किं तेन निमित्तात्मकेन उत्पाद्यते, आहो उपादानात्मकेन?

astu vā bāhyo'rthaḥ; tathāpi kiṃ tena nimittātmakena utpādyate, āho upādānātmakena?

Translation: 526

Granting that there is an external object, we would like to know whether that object is an efficient cause of its knowledge or a material cause of its knowledge.

Text: 527

तद्यदि निमित्तभूतेन उत्पाद्यते तदा तदुत्पादितरूपस्य रूपरूपता न प्राप्नोति निमित्तभूतरूपोत्पादितज्ञानवत्।

tadyadi nimittabhūtena utpādyate tadā tadutpāditarūpasya rūparūpatā na prāpnoti nimittabhūtarūpotpāditajñānavat.

Translation: 527

If you say being an efficient cause it produces the knowledge, then, the form of that cognition cannot be the form of color, like a cognition produced by the color which is the efficient cause of that cognition.

Text: 528

अथ उपादानात्मकेन उत्पाद्यते; तदा अनया रीत्या रूपरूपता आपद्यते ज्ञानस्य रूपोत्पादितरूपस्येव। ततः सर्वमविज्ञानात्मकं जगत् स्यात्। अविज्ञानात्मके च जगति मानमेयव्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गः। तत्प्रसक्तौ च कस्येदं लक्षणं प्रस्तूयते?

atha upādānātmakena utpādyate; tadā anayā rītyā rūparūpatā āpadyate jñānasya rūpotpāditarūpasyeva. tathaḥ sarvamavijñānātmakam jagat syāt. avijñānātmake ca jagati mānameyavyavahārahāvaprasaṅgaḥ. tatprasaktau ca kasyedaṃ lakṣaṇam prastūyate?

Translation: 528

If you say that, the external object produces its knowledge as its material cause, then, by this method a cognition becomes color. Like a color produced by color. And in that case, the entire universe will become of the nature of non-cognition. And once it becomes of the nature of non-cognition, in this world there will be no reference to knowledge and knowable. And once that is the consequence, then, definitions of what are you presenting here?

Text: 529

अथ उपादानभूतेन रूपेण रूपमुत्पाद्यते निमित्तात्मकेन तु ज्ञानमिति चेत्;

atha upādānabhūtena rūpeṇa rūpamutpādyate nimittātmakena tu jñānamiti cet;

Translation: 529

Clarification:

As a matter of fact, color produces color as a material cause, but it produces knowledge as an efficient cause.

Text: 530

तदिदं महानुभावस्य दर्शनम्। न ह्यबालिश एवं वक्तुमुत्सहेत, न ह्येकस्य अनेकाकारता नाम। न चानेकनामकरणे मेयाद्यन्यत्वमस्ति। अन्यत्वे वा न तर्हीदं वक्तव्यम्- “स्वविषयानन्तर-विषयसहकारिणेन्द्रियज्ञानेन मनोविज्ञानं निष्पाद्यते।”

tadidaṃ mahānubhāvasya darśanam. na hyabāliśa evaṃ vaktumut-saheta, na hyekasya anekākāratā nāma. na cānekanāmakaraṇe meyādyanyatvamasti. anyatve vā na tarhīdaṃ vaktavyam-“svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena manovijñānam niṣpādyate”.

Translation: 530

Reply:

This is indeed a philosophy of a great philosopher like you! As a matter of fact, unless one is a child, one will not be prompted to say like this. It is nobody's experience that one entity can have many forms. Even if you call one thing by many names, it is not different from what is called “knowable”. And if you treat it to be different, then, you should not say the following “a mental perception is caused by the sense perception, which is the auxiliary cause of the object arising after its own content.”

Text: 531

तदेवमिन्द्रियज्ञानस्य प्रतीयमानार्थसमुद्भवत्वाभावः। दृष्टान्तश्च साधनविकलः-न रूपादिस्वलक्षणस्य रूपरूपावभातार्थोद्भवत्वमस्ति।

tadevamindriyajñānasya pratīyamānārthasamudbhavatvābhāvaḥ. drṣṭāntaśca sādhanavikalāḥ-na rūpādisvalakṣaṇasya rūparūpāva-bhātārthodbhavatvamasti.

Translation: 531

Thus, a sense perception is not caused by the object which appears in the perception and the example which you have provided in support of your theses, is suffering from the defect of absence of the ground in the example, because it is not the case that svalakṣaṇa like color etc. is produced by the object which has appeared in the perception viz. the color.

Text: 532

अथ अप्रतीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्भवत्वं मे विवक्षितम्;

atha apratīyamānasvalakṣaṇodbhavatvaṁ me vivakṣitam;

Translation: 532

Clarification:

Well, what I intend is the perceptual cognition is produced by the svalakṣaṇa which is not being cognized.

Text: 533

तदाऽतीतानागतानुमानविकल्पानाम् अप्रतीयमानार्थोद्भवत्वेन निर्विकल्पकत्वमापद्यते।

tadā'tītānāgatānumānavikalpānām apratīyamānārthodbhavatvena nirvikalpakatvamāpadyate.

Translation: 533

Reply:

In that case, then, since inferential cognition of past and future object is produced by an object which is not being cognized at present, should become indeterminate cognition.

[३.एकोपलम्भसामर्थ्यात् विकल्पिकायाः समुद्भव इत्याद्युक्तेर्निरसनम्।]

[3.ekopalambhasāmarthyāt vikalpikāyāḥ samudbhava ityādyukter-nirasanam.]

Text: 534

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम्-“एकोपलम्भसामर्थ्याद् विकल्पिकायाः समुद्भवः- 'इदमुपलभे इदं नोपलभे' इति किल एकभूतलोपलम्भे सति विकल्पिका बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते- 'इदमुपलभे इदं नोपलभ्यते' इत्यादिका” एतदपि न युक्तम्। यथा रूपस्वलक्षणस्य सविकल्पकविज्ञानजनकत्वं नास्ति अविकल्पकत्वात्, तथा विज्ञानस्वलक्षणमपि सविकल्पकविज्ञानोत्पादकत्वमतिवर्तते अविचारकत्वाऽविशेषात्।

yadapyanyaduktam-ekopalambhasāmarthyād vikalpikāyāḥ samudbhavaḥ- 'idamupalabhe idam nopalabhe' iti kila ekabhūtalopalambhe sati vikalpikā buddhirutpadyate-'idamupalabhe idam nopalabhyate' ityādikā etadapi na yuktam. yathā rūpasvalakṣaṇasya savikalpakavijñānanajanakatvaṁ nāsti avikalpakatvāt, tathā vijñānasvalakṣaṇamapi savikalpakavijñānotpādakatvamativartate avicāratvā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 534

You also made another statement viz. “an imaginary cognition arises on the basis of cognition of one thing.” When we see one ground we say, “I perceive this” “I do not perceive this”, and after such constructed perception arises, we say “I see this”, “this is not seen” etc. This is also not correct. As a svalakṣaṇa of color is not capable of generating a determinate cognition, because it is not of a determinate nature, in the same way, the svalakṣaṇa of cognition also cannot transgress the character of being the producer of a determinate cognition, because it is also indeterminate in character.

Text: 535

अथ अविचारकत्वाऽविशेषेऽपि निर्विकल्पकविज्ञानस्य सविकल्पकविज्ञानोदयदानसामर्थ्यं जेगीयते;

atha avicāratvā'viśeṣe'pi nirvikalpakavijñānasya savikalpakavijñānodayadānasāmarthyam jēgīyate;

Translation: 535

Clarification:

Well, even if it is common to the indeterminate cognition, still an indeterminate cognition is considered as having the capacity of producing a determinate cognition. This is what we hold.

Text: 536

तदा रूपादिस्वलक्षणस्याप्येतदस्तु, ततश्च प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदानुपपत्तिः।

tadā rūpādisvalakṣaṇasyāpyetadastu, tataśca pratyakṣānumānayorbhedānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 536

Reply:

In that case, then, let the same capacity be ascribed to a svalakṣaṇa like color etc. also and in that case, one cannot justify the difference between a perceptual cognition and an inferential cognition.

[४. प्रत्यक्षसाधन एवेत्यादेर्बोद्धोक्तस्य खण्डनम्।]

[4. *pratyakṣasādhana evetyāderbauddhoktasya khaṇḍanam.*]

Text: 537

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम्-“प्रत्यक्षसाधन एव इन्द्रियधियः कल्पनाविरहः।” अथ कोऽयं कल्पनाविरहो नाम? किं ज्ञानकायतादात्म्यव्यवस्थितदेहः तद्विपरीतो वा?

yadapyanyaduktam-“pratyakṣasādhana eva indriyadhīyaḥ kalpanā- virahaḥ.” atha ko'yaṁ kalpanāviraho nāma? kiṁ jñānakāyatādātmya- vyavasthitadehaḥ, tadviparīto vā?

Translation: 537

You also made another statement, “the absence of mental construction of a sense perception is caused by perception only” there we would like to ask, what is this absence of mental construction? Does it mean the body settled by the identity of the form of knowledge or opposite of that?

Text: 538

तद्यदि ज्ञानतादात्म्येन व्यवस्थितः; तदा प्रत्यक्षसाधनः कल्पनाविरहः इति। किमुक्तं भवति? प्रत्यक्षसाधनो विज्ञानाकारः प्रत्यक्षधियः। न केवलं प्रत्यक्षकल्पनाविरहः प्रत्यक्षसाधन (नोऽ)नुमानधियोऽपि प्रत्यक्षसाधन एव, ज्ञानाकारस्य अनुमानज्ञानेऽपि भावात्।

tadyadi jñānatādātmyena vyavasthitah; tadā pratyakṣasādhanaḥ kalpanāvirahaḥ iti. kimuktaṁ bhavati? pratyakṣasādhano vijñānākāraḥ pratyakṣadhīyaḥ. na kevalaṁ pratyakṣakalpanāvirahaḥ pratyakṣasādhana(no')numānadhīyo'pi pratyakṣasādhana eva, jñānākārasya anumānajñāne'pi bhāvāt.

Translation: 538

If you say that, it is settled by the identity of the knowledge then, it means absence of mental construction, which is caused

by perception. What does it imply? It implies that the form of knowledge of a perceptual cognition is caused by perception. It is not the case that the absence of mental construction of a perception is caused by perception, but that of an inferential cognition is caused by perception only, because, the form of knowledge is also found in an inferential cognition.

Text: 539

अथ अनुमानज्ञानस्यापि आत्मसंवित्तौ कल्पनारहितत्वं बाह्याथपेक्षया कल्पनात्मक-
त्वमिति चेत्;

*atha anumānaññānasyāpi ātmasaṃvittau kalpanārahitatvaṃ bāhyār-
thāpekṣayā kalpanātmakatvamiti cet;*

Translation: 539

Clarification:

For the self awareness of even inferential cognition, there is absence of mental construction which stands for cognition of the form of mental construction, in terms of external object.

Text: 540

तदेतन्मुग्धाभिधान(नं) दुनोति मानसम्- “कथं स्युर्विविधाकाराः तदेकस्य वस्तुनः।”
*tadetanmugdhābhidhāna(naṃ) dunoti mānasam- “katham syurvivi-
dhākārāḥ tadekasya vastunaḥ.”*

Translation: 540

Reply:

This foolish reply disturbs our mind. The following statement comes to our mind, “how can one thing have various forms?”

Text: 541

अथ भेदेन व्यवस्थितः; तद्गतिः कथम्? न स्वसंवेद्योऽसौ, ज्ञानाकारव्यतिरेकात्। नापि
जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन गृह्यते, विरहस्य सामर्थ्यव्यतिरेकात्। एवं च सति यदुक्तम्-
“प्रत्यक्षसाधन एव इन्द्रियधियः कल्पनाविरहः” इति तद्बालवल्गितम्।

*atha bhedena vyavasthītaḥ; tadgatiḥ katham? na svasaṃvedyo'sau,
ññānākāravatyatirekāt. nāpi janakatvā”kārārpakatvena gṛhyate,
virahasya sāmartyavyatirekāt. evaṃ ca sati yaduktam- “pratyakṣa-
sādhana eva indriyadhīyaḥ kalpanāvīrahaḥ” iti tadbālavalgītam.*

Translation: 541

If you say it is settled on the basis of difference, how to understand it? It cannot be self-illuminating, because it is different from the form of cognition. Nor is it known as an entity, which offers its form of being a producer, because, an absence does not have such a capacity. Under these circumstances, your statement viz. “The absence of mental construction of a sense perception is caused by perception only” is nothing more than babbling of a child.

Text: 542

अथ 'गौः' इत्यादि ज्ञानं कल्पना। कथमस्य कल्पनात्वम्, अर्थेनाऽजनितत्वात्? यदि गवादेरर्थस्य गौरित्यादिज्ञानोत्पादनसामर्थ्यं स्यात् तदा प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातवेलायामपि कुर्यात् तदाऽत्मनोऽविशेषात्। तदुक्तम्—

यः प्रागजनको बुद्धेरुपयोगाविशेषतः।

स पश्चादपि तेन स्यादार्थापायेऽपि नेत्रधीः॥

atha 'gauḥ' ityādi jñānaṁ kalpanā. kathamasya kalpanātvam, arthenā'janitatvāt? yadi gavāderarthasya gaurityādi'jñānotpādana-sāmarthyam syāt tadā prathamākṣasannipātavelāyāmapi kuryāt tadā'tmano'viśeṣāt. taduktam-

yaḥ prāgajanako buddherupayogāviśeṣataḥ,

sa paścādapi tena syādarthāpāye'pi netradhīḥ.

Translation: 542

If you say cognition “this is a cow” is a mental construction, how do you say it is a mental construction? Is it because it is not produced by the object? If the object like cow etc. has the capacity of producing the cognition “this is a cow” then, it must produce at the time when our eyes fall on it, because at that time the form is not different, as it has been said “if a thing is not the cause of its knowledge, because it is not different from the point of view of utility, even if that object is not there, the visual perception will still occur.”

Text: 543

अथ शब्दस्मरणमपेक्ष्य उत्पादयति; तदेवास्तु तद्वेहानन्तरफलत्वाद् गौः इत्यादिज्ञानस्य। तदुक्तम्—

अर्थोपयोगेऽपि पुनः स्मार्त्तं शब्दानुयोजनम्।
अक्षधीर्यद्यपेक्षेत सोऽर्थो व्यवहितो भवेत्॥

तदेतदयुक्तम्। प्राथमिकज्ञानं 'गौः' इति ज्ञानम्, गोपिण्डावगाहिनि विज्ञाने 'गौः' इतिज्ञानसंज्ञा। ततश्च प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातजमपि भवति। एवं च पूर्वापरविज्ञानयोः एकविषयत्वे उभयोः 'गौः' इतिज्ञानसंज्ञाविषयत्वम्।

*atha śabdasmaraṇamapekṣya utpādayati; tadevāstu taddehānantara-
phalatvād gauḥ ityādiḥjñānasya. taduktam-*

*arthopayoge'pi punaḥ smārttam śabdānuyojanam,
akṣadhīryadyapekṣeta so'rtho vyavahito bhavet.*

*tadetadayuktam. prāthamikajñānam 'gauḥ' iti jñānam, gopiṇḍā-
vagāhini vijñāne 'gauḥ' itijñānasaṃjñā. tataśca prathamākṣa-
sannipātajamapi bhavati. evaṃ ca pūrvāparavijñānayoḥ ekavi-
ṣayatve ubhayoḥ 'gauḥ' itijñānasaṃjñāviṣayatvam.*

Translation: 543

If you say such a perception is produced with the help of remembrance of the word then, let the same be the case with the knowledge viz. this is a cow, because it will be treated as result following the previous body of knowledge as it has been said, “even if an object is involved in producing knowledge associating it with the word, is a mental activity.” If mental perception is required there, then, that object will have to be at a distance. All this is not proper. The first cognition that arises is “this is a cow”, its knowledge of an object which is given the name of cow. Thereafter it can also be a perception, caused by the first contact with the eyes. Thus, if the two consecutive cognitions have one and the same object, then, both the cognitions will refer to by the word ‘cow’.

Text: 544

नन्वेकस्य क्रमभाविविज्ञानजनकत्वम् किम्- एकेन स्वरूपेण, स्वरूपान्तरेण वा? एकेनैव स्वभावेन जनयति इति ब्रूमः।

*nanvekasya kramabhāvivijñānajanakatvam kim- ekena svarūpeṇa,
svarūpāntareṇa vā? ekenaiva svabhāvena janayati iti brūmah.*

Translation: 544

Well, you say that one object produces consecutive knowledges there we would like to ask, does it produce in one form or in different form? Our answer to this question is, it produces in one form.

Text: 545

नन्वेककालीनता पूर्वापरविज्ञानयोः एकस्वभावायत्तत्त्वे सति आपद्यते;
nanvekakālīnatā pūrvāparavijñānayoḥ ekasvabhāvāyattatve sati āpa-
dyate

Translation: 545

Objection:

Well, in that case two consecutive knowledges will be treated as belonging to one and the same time, if they are said to be sharing one and the same nature.

Text: 546

यद्येवम् एकनीलोत्पादितनयनालोकविज्ञानानाम् एकदेशसम्बन्धित्वम् एकाकारता
 एकव्यक्तित्वमापद्यते एकनीलोत्पाद्यत्वाऽविशेषात्।
yadyevam ekanīlotpāditanayanāloka vijñānānām ekadeśasambandhi-
tvam ekākāratā ekavyaktitvamāpadyate ekanīlotpādyatvā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 546

Reply:

If it is so, then, the perceptual knowledges caused by one blue thing, will be treated as related to one place, having one form and being unitary in character, because of its being produced by one blue thing.

Text: 547

अथ एवंभूतं तत् तस्य स्वरूपं यत् चित्रकार्यकरणात्मकम्;
atha evāmbhūtaṁ tat tasya svarūpaṁ yat citrakāryakaraṇātma-
kaṁ;

Translation: 547

Clarification:

Well, that is the nature of that thing, which is of the nature of producing a number of effects.

Text: 548

यद्येवं मामकेऽपि पक्षे क्रमभाव्यनेकार्यकरणात्मकमेव स्वरूपं स्वहेतुसामर्थ्यनियमित-
स्योत्पत्तेः। अथवा, यथा त्वदीये पक्षे मनोज्ञानं स्वलक्षणविषयं न च प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातजम्,
अपि तु इन्द्रियज्ञानेन स्वविषयानन्तरविषयसहकारिणा उत्पाद्यते तथा 'गौः' इत्यादिकमपि
ज्ञानं प्रथमाक्षजेन विज्ञानेन स्वविषयानन्तरविषयसहकारिणा स्मरणाद्युपहितेन चोत्पाद्यते
इति निर्विषयत्वाभावः, विषयान्तर[स्य] स्वकारणसामर्थ्यानुरोधेन 'गौः' इत्यादि
ज्ञानजननयोग्यस्योत्पत्तेः; स्मरणमपि समर्थमुत्पन्नं सत् गौः इत्युत्पादयति। एवं सति
यदुक्तम्-यः प्रागजनको बुद्धेः इत्यादि, तत् स्वपरमतमनालोच्यैव जेगीयते।

*yadyevaṃ māmake 'pi pakṣe kramabhāvyanekakāryakaraṇātmakameva
svarūpaṃ svahetusāmarthyaniyamitasyoṭpatteḥ. athavā, yathā
tvadīye pakṣe manoḥjñānaṃ svalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ na ca prathamā-
kṣasannipātajam, api tu indriyajñānena svaviṣayānantaraviṣaya-
sahakāriṇā utpādyate tathā 'gauḥ' ityādikamapi jñānaṃ
prathamākṣajena vijñānena svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇā
smaraṇādyupahitena cotpādyate iti nirviṣayatvābhāvaḥ, viṣayā-
ntara[sya] svakāraṇasāmarthyānurodhena 'gauḥ' ityādi jñānajana-
nayogyasyoṭpatteḥ; smaraṇamapi samarthamutpannaṃ sat gauḥ
ityutpādayati. evaṃ sati yaduktam-yaḥ prāgajanako buddheḥ ityādi,
tat svaparamatamanālocaiva jegīyate.*

Translation: 548

Reply:

If this is so, then, in our view also the nature of a thing can be of the nature of producing many consecutive effects, because an effect is invariably controlled by the capacity of its cause or as in your view a mental perception is considered as a cognition of perception and as it is not considered as caused by the first contact with the eyes, but it is considered as being produced by the sense perception, which helps another object then, its own object, in the same way the cognition such as this is a cow, is caused by the perception caused by the first contact with the eyes, which helps the object other than its own object, with the help of remembrance and hence it cannot be called contentless. The object other than its own object is capable of producing the knowledge such as this is a cow on the basis of the capacity of its own cause. Even remembrance which

occurs is capable of producing the knowledge such as this is a cow. When this is a fact, your statement viz. as it has been said “if a thing is not the cause of its knowledge, because it is not different from the point of view of utility, even if that object is not there, the visual perception will still occur” is being stated without due consideration of others as well your own views.

Text: 549

न च ज्ञानाकारव्यतिरेकेण वै(वि)कल्पाकारोऽन्योऽस्ति। कल्पनाकारो हि ज्ञानतादात्म्येन व्यवस्थितः। ततश्च कल्पनापोढं प्रत्यक्षम्। किमुक्तं भवति। ज्ञानापोढं प्रत्यक्षम्। यो यत्स्व-भावोपनिबद्धः स निवर्तमानः तमादाय निवर्तते। ततश्चाज्ञानात्मकं प्रत्यक्षं भिक्षूणां प्रसक्तम्।
na ca jñānākāravatyatirekeṇa vai(vi)kalpākāro'nyo'sti. kalpanākāro hi jñānatādātmyena vyavasthitaḥ. tataśca kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣam. kimuktaṁ bhavati? jñānāpoḍham pratyakṣam. yo yatsvabhāvopani- baddhaḥ sa nivarttamānaḥ tamādāya nivarttate. tataśca ajñānā- tmakam pratyakṣam bhikṣūṇām prasaktam.

Translation: 549

As a matter of fact, there is no other form of verbalizable knowledge other than the form of knowledge. The form of imagination is settled as identical to the knowledge and thereafter a perception free from imagination arises. What does it mean? It will mean a perception which is devoid of knowledge. If something is associated with its own nature, when that is excluded it goes along with its nature. This leads to the contingency that for the Buddhists a perception becomes of the nature of the non-knowledge.

[५. प्रत्यक्षलक्षणगतस्य अव्यभिचारिपदस्य निरसनम्।]

[5. *pratyakṣalakṣaṇagatasya avyabhicāripadasya nirasanam.*]

Text: 550

तथा अव्यभिचारिपदमपि नोपादेयम् अपोह्यज्ञानाऽसम्भवात्।
tathā avyabhicāripadamapi nopādeyam apohya jñānā'sambhavāt.

Translation: 550

In the same way, the clause “which is not erroneous” should also not be added to the definition of perception, because there is no possibility of any cognition which will be excluded by this clause.

Text: 551

ननु मार्त्तण्डपादसङ्घातोत्पादितं विज्ञानमपोह्यमस्ति।

nanu mārtaṇḍapādasaṅghātotpāditam vijñānamapohyamasti.

Translation: 551

Clarification:

Well, cognition (of water) produced by a group of rays of the Sun, will be excluded by that clause.

Text: 552

कथं तदपोह्यम्? अतथ्योदकविषयत्वात्।

katham tadapohyam? atathyodakaviṣayatvāt.

Translation: 552

How can that be excluded? Is it because it has a content viz. false water or unreal water?

Text: 553

यद्यतथ्योदकविषयम्; कथं तदपनीयते, अतथ्योदकाकारस्य स्वेन रूपेण विद्यमानत्वात् मधुरोदकदीर्घोदकाकारवत्?

yadyatathyodakaviṣayam; katham tadapanīyate, atathyodakākārasya svena rūpeṇa vidyamānatvāt madhurodakadīrghodakākāravat?

Translation: 553

If you say the content of that water is unreal, then, how do you exclude it? Because, there is water in its unreal form, like that form of sweet water and the form of huge water.

Text: 554

अथ तत्र मधुरोदकं विद्यते, स्वेन रूपेण प्रतीयमानत्वात्; तदिहाप्युदकं प्रतीयते 'उदकं गृह्णामि' इति व्यवहारदर्शनात्।

atha tatra madhurodakam vidyate, svena rūpeṇa pratīyamānatvāt; tadihāpyudakam pratīyate 'udakam gṛhṇāmi' iti vyavahāradarśanāt.

Translation: 554

Clarification:

If you say there is sweet water because it appears there in the

knowledge in its own form then, here also there is appearance of water, because we do say "I take water". Reply

Text: 555

सत्यम्, प्रतिभाति, अतथ्यं तु प्रतिभाति।

satyam, pratibhāti, atathyam tu pratibhāti.

Translation: 555

It is true that water appears, but what appears is false.

[६. प्रसङ्गायाताया अतथ्यताया विकल्प्य दूषणम्।]

[6. prasaṅgāyātāyā atathyatāyā vikalpya dūṣaṇam.]

Text: 556

अतथ्यता का? किं प्रतीयमानस्याभावः, अथ प्रतीयमान एवाऽभावः?

*atathyatā kā? kiṁ pratīyamānasyābhāvaḥ, atha pratīyamāna evā-
'bhāvaḥ?*

Translation: 556

What do you mean by falsity? Does it mean absence of what has appeared? Or does it mean the absence which has appeared?

Text: 557

यदि प्रतीयमानस्याभावः; सोऽत्र नावभाति, उदकाकार एवाऽवभाति।

*yadi pratīyamānasyābhāvaḥ; so'tra nāvabhāti, udakākāra evā'va-
bhāti.*

Translation: 557

If you say it is the absence of what has appeared, that has not appeared here, because what has appeared here is the form of water.

Text: 558

अथ प्रतीयमान एवाऽभावः; सोऽप्यनुपपन्न एव; न हि भावाकारे प्रतीयमाने अभावकल्पना युक्ता, अन्यथा रसाकारे प्रतीयमाने रूपाकारः परिकल्पयितव्यः। ततश्चालूनविशीर्णं जगत् स्यात्। यदि च अभावः प्रतिभाति; कथं तदुदकज्ञानं, मिथ्याज्ञानं चोच्यते अभावविषयस्य स्वेन रूपेण विद्यमानत्वात्?

*atha pratīyamāna evā'bhāvaḥ; so'pyanupapanna eva; na hi bhāvā-
kāre pratīyamāne abhāvakalpanā yuktā, anyathā rasākāre pratī-
yamāne rūpākāraḥ parikalpayitavyaḥ. tataścālūnaviśīrṇam jagat*

syāt. yadi ca abhāvaḥ pratibhāti; katham tadudakajñānam, mithyājñānam cocyate abhāvaviśayasya svena rūpeṇa vidyamānatvāt?

Translation: 558

If you say that, it is the absence which has appeared, that also is not proper, because if the form of absence has appeared, it is not proper to postulate absence there, otherwise, when in a case the form of taste has appeared, one can also postulate the form of color and if this is accepted, the entire world will become scattered without its being cut into pieces. Moreover, absence has appeared then, how would you call it the knowledge of water and also a false knowledge? Because, the object viz. absence does appear there in its own form.

Text: 559

*तदेतदुदकज्ञानम् उदकं विषययति, उदकाभावं, आत्मानं, न किञ्चिद् वा?
tadetadudakajñānam udakam viśayayati, udakābhāvaṁ, ātmānam,
na kiñcid vā?*

Translation: 559

There, we would like to know whether this knowledge of water has water as its content or absence of water as its content or the knowledge itself as its content, or no content at all?

Text: 560

*तद्यदि उदकं विषययति; तदा न तस्य मिथ्यात्वं मधुरोदकसंवेदनस्येव।
tadyadi udakam viśayayati; tadā na tasya mithyātvaṁ madhuroda-
kasamvedanasyeva.*

Translation: 560

If you say water is the content, then, it cannot be called erroneous knowledge, like the knowledge of sweet water.

Text: 561

*तत्र तथ्योदकं प्रतिभाति;
tatra tathyodakam pratibhāti;*

Translation: 561

Clarification:

But there real water appears.

Text: 562

किं यत् प्रतिभाति तत् तथ्योदकं, आहो यत् तथ्यं तत् प्रतिभाति?

kiṁ yat pratibhāti tat tathyodakam, āho yat tathyam tat pratibhāti?

Translation: 562

Reply:

Here the question arises, whether the water that appears in the knowledge of water, is real water or is it the real water that appears in the knowledge?

Text: 563

तद्यदि यत् प्रतिभाति तत् तथ्यम्; इहाप्युदकं प्रतिभाति, प्राप्ता तस्यापि तथ्यता।

tadyadi yat pratibhāti tat tathyam; ihāpyudakam pratibhāti, prāptā tasyāpi tathyatā.

Translation: 563

If you say what appears is real, then, in this case also, water appears in the knowledge and therefore, water will become real.

Text: 564

अथ यत् तथ्यं तत् प्रतिभाति; तस्य तथ्यता कथं ज्ञायते – किं प्रतीत्या, अन्यथा वा?

atha yat tathyam tat pratibhāti; tasya tathyatā katham jñāyate - kiṁ pratītyā, anyathā vā?

Translation: 564

If you say what is real that appears in the knowledge, there the question arises how is the reality of water known? Is it through knowledge or by some other way?

Text: 565

यदि प्रतीत्या; इहापि प्रतीतिरुत्पद्यते, अस्तु तथ्यता।

yadi pratītyā; ihāpi pratītirutpadyate, astu tathyatā.

Translation: 565

If you say it is by knowledge, and then, here also there is knowledge of water, then, let the water be true.

Text: 566

अथ प्रतीतिमन्तरेण तथ्यता उपपाद्यते; तथा सुस्थितानि वस्तूनि! सर्ववादसिद्धिः स्यात्।

atha pratītimantareṇa tathyatā upapādyate; tathā susthitāni vastūni! sarvavādasiddhiḥ syāt.

Translation: 566

If you say that, without knowledge, reality is explained, and then, all the things are settled as they are and it will lead to establishment of all theories.

Text: 567

अथ प्रतीयते—यदि नाम बाध्यते; 'प्रतीयते बाध्यते च' इति चित्रम्। प्रतीयमानत्वं च जनकत्वऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन व्याप्तं, यच्च न जनयति नाकारमर्पयति य(त)न्नावभाति, यथा रूपज्ञाने रसः। प्रतीयते चात्र उदकं, जनकत्वऽऽकारार्पकत्वोपपत्तिः, तदुपपत्तौ च न बाधोपपत्तिः, जनकत्वऽऽकारार्पकत्वस्य सत्त्वनिबन्धनत्वात्।

atha pratīyate-yadi nāma bādhyate; 'pratīyate bādhyate ca' iti citram. pratīyamānatvaṃ ca janakatva"kāṛārpakatvena vyāptam, yacca na janayati nākāramarpayati ya(ta)nnāvabhāti, yathā rūpa-jñāne rasah. pratīyate cātra udakam, janakatva"kāṛārpakatvopapattiḥ, tadupapattau ca na bādhopapattiḥ, janakatva"kāṛārpakativasya sattvanibandhanatvāt.

Translation: 567

If you say it is known and at the same time it is contradicted, then, it is funny because how is it that it is known and at the same time it is contradicted? The state of being known is pervaded by the state of offering the form being the producer of that cognition and if something does not produce, it does not offer the form and obviously it does not appear in the knowledge. For example, in the knowledge of color, the taste does not appear. Here, however the water does appear and therefore it satisfies the character of offering the form being the producer of the knowledge and once that is justifiable, how can there arise a contradiction? Because, the state of offering the form being the producer depends upon existence.

Text: 568

अथ अभावं विषययति; न तर्हि उदकज्ञानरूपता अभावगृहीतिरूपत्वात्। नापि तस्य मिथ्यात्वम्, अभावविषयत्वस्योपपत्तेः। न च सौगतमते अभावे कश्चिद् विषयार्थ उपपद्यते जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वव्यतिरेकात्। उदकाकारो हि प्रतीत्युत्कलितः, तदभावश्च अप्रातीतिक इहोपपाद्यते मुग्धबौद्धैः।

atha abhāvaṃ viṣayayati; na tarhi udakajñānarūpatā abhāvagrhitirūpatvāt. nāpi tasya mithyātvam, abhāvaviṣayatvasyopapatteḥ. na ca saugatamate abhāve kaścid viṣayārtha upapadyate janakत्वā"kāṛārpakatvavyatirekāt. udakākāro hi pratītyutkalitaḥ, tadabhāvaśca aprātītika ihopapādyate mugdhabaudhaiḥ.

Translation: 568

If you say absence is the content of the knowledge of water, then, it cannot be knowledge of water, because this knowledge will reveal only absence of water and according to the doctrine of Buddhists, there cannot be an object like absence, because it does not have the character of offering the form being the producer of the knowledge. What the Buddhist scholars foolishly doing is the form of water, is taken from the cognition of water and the absence of water which has not appeared in the cognition is being explained here.

Text: 569

अथ आत्मविषयम्; तथापि व्यभिचारिता नोपपद्यते स्वांशस्याऽवञ्चनात्, नहि ज्ञानमात्मानं विसंवदति। नापि तद् उदकज्ञानत्वेन व्यपदेश्यं रागादिसंवेदनवत्। नहि नीलाभं संवेदनं रसविज्ञानात्मकत्वेन व्यपदिश्यमानं दृष्टम्।

atha ātmaviṣayam; tathāpi vyabhicāritā nopapadyate svāṃśasyā'vañcanāt, nahi jñānamātmānam viśamvadati. nāpi tad udakajñānavena vyapadeśyam rāgādisarivedanavat. nahi nīlābham sarivedanam rasaviññānātmakatvena vyapadiśyamānam dṛṣṭam.

Translation: 569

If you say that, this cognition itself takes as object, then, this cognition cannot be said to be erroneous, because cognition cannot betray its own part, cognition cannot be contradictory to its own form. Nor cannot be said to be cognition of water, like the cognition of attachment. Nobody has seen that cognition of blue object is being referred to as cognition of taste.

Text: 570

अथ निर्विषयम्; न तर्हि तदुदकज्ञानं, उदकज्ञानतया तु प्रतिभाति, तेन जानीमो न निर्विषयम्।

atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi tadudakajñānaṁ, udakajñānatayā tu pratibhāti, tena jānīmo na nirviṣayam.

Translation: 570

If you say it is contentless, then, again it is not cognition of water. But, as a matter of fact, the cognition appears as cognition of water. By that we come to know that it is not without content.

Text: 571

यदि च निर्विषयं; कथं तन्मिथ्याज्ञानम्? ज्ञानमात्रानुरोधेन न मिथ्याज्ञानं नापि सम्यग्ज्ञानम्। न च भवतां पक्षे ज्ञानं निरालम्बनमस्ति स्वांशपर्यवसितत्वात्।
yadi ca nirviṣayam; katham tanmithyājñānam? jñānamātrānurodhena na mithyājñānaṁ nāpi samyagjñānam. na ca bhavatām pakṣe jñānaṁ nirālambanamasti svāśaparyavasitatvāt.

Translation: 571

Moreover, if it is without content, how is it called an erroneous cognition? Merely as cognition, no cognition is false or true. According to your doctrine, there is no cognition without content, because every cognition reveals its own part as its content.

[७. व्यभिचारित्वस्य विकल्प्य खण्डनम्।]

[7. vyabhicāritvasya vikalpya khaṇḍanam.]

Text: 572

विज्ञानस्य व्यभिचारिता किं – स्वसत्तामात्रानुरोधेन, आहो परसत्तानुरोधेन?
viññānasya vyabhicāritā kiṁ - svasattāmātrānurodhena, āho parasattānurodhena?

Translation: 572

(By the by) we would like to know what do you mean falsity of a cognition? Is it in terms of mere existence of itself or is it in terms of existence of something else.

Text: 573

तद्यदि स्वसत्तानुरोधेन; तथा सर्वविज्ञानानां व्यभिचारिता प्राप्नोति, ज्ञानरूपतायाः सर्वत्र भावात्, न किञ्चिद्विज्ञानमव्यभिचारि स्यात्।

tadyadi svasattānurodhena; tathā sarvaviññānānām vyabhicāritā prāpnoti, jñānarūpatāyāḥ sarvatra bhāvāt, na kiñcidviññānamavyabhicāri syāt.

Translation: 573

If you say it is in terms of its own existence, then, all knowledges should be declared as false knowledges, because in every knowledge, there is the form of knowledge and as a result and no cognition will be left as a true cognition.

Text: 574

अथ परसत्तानुरोधेन व्यभिचारिता उच्यते किम् - अनुपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन, आहो उपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन?

atha parasattānurodhena vyabhicāritā ucyate kiṃ - anupakāra-kaparasattānurodhena, āho upakāra-kaparasattānurodhena?

Translation: 574

If you say that, a cognition is a false cognition in terms of something else, is it due to existence of something else which does not provide any help or is it due to the existence of something else which offers some help?

Text: 575

तद्यदि अनुपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन व्यभिचारिता; तदा सर्वसंवित्तीनां व्यभिचारिता प्राप्नोति, अनुपकारकपरसत्ताऽविशेषात्।

tadyadi anupakāra-kaparasattānurodhena vyabhicāritā; tadā sarva-samvittīnām vyabhicāritā prāpnoti, anupakāra-kaparasattā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 575

If you say falsity is accounted for in terms of existence of something else which does not offer any help, then, all cognitions should be declared as false, because all share the same existence of something else, which does not offer any help.

Text: 576

अथ उपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन व्यभिचारि अभिधीयते किं - करणभूतपरोपकारक-परसत्तानुरोधेन, आहो कर्मतापन्नोपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन?

atha upakāra-kaparasattānurodhena vyabhicāri abhidhīyate kiṃ - karaṇabhūtaparopakāra-kaparasattānurodhena, āho karmatāpannopakāra-kaparasattānurodhena?

Translation: 576

Again if you say that cognition is called false because of the existence of something else, which offers some help, there also the

question arises, is it due to the existence of something else which offer some help being an instrument of it or due to the existence of something else, which offers some help of the nature of being object of the cognition.

Text: 577

तद्यदि करणभूतपरोपकारकसत्तानुवेधेन तदा सर्वासां संवित्तीनां मिथ्यात्वमापद्यते करणभूतपरोपकारकसत्ताऽविशेषात्।

tadyadi karaṇabhūtaparopakāraśattānuvedhena tadā sarvāsāṃ saṁvittīnāṃ mithyātvamāpadyate karaṇabhūtaparopakāraśattā'-viśeṣāt.

Translation: 577

If you say that, it is due to the existence of something else which offers some help of being an instrument, then, all cognitions should be declared as false, because, they all will have same character of having existence of something else which offers some help being an instrument.

Text: 578

अथ कर्मकारकोपकारकपरसत्तानुवेधेन मिथ्यात्वं; तदयुक्तम्; न तस्य मिथ्यात्वं सत्योदक- ज्ञानस्येव कर्मकारकेण उपक्रियमाणत्वात्।

atha karmakāraśopakāraśaparasattānuvedhena mithyātvam; tadyuktam; na tasya mithyātvam satyodakajñānasyeva karmakāraśeṇa upakriyamāṇatvāt.

Translation: 578

Again if you say that the cognition is false, due to the existence of something else, that is, the content of the cognition, which offers some help, being the content of the cognition that also will not be proper, because, that cognition of water cannot be said to be false, like the cognition of actual water which is being helped by water as its content.

[८. ज्ञानगतस्य सम्यक्त्वस्यापि विकल्प्य विदलनम्।]

[8. jñānagatasya samyaktvasyāpi vikalpya vidalanam.]

Text: 579

तथा सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वमपि कथम्? किं ज्ञानसत्तामात्रानुरोधेन, आहो परसत्तानुरोधेन?

tathā samyagjñānatvamapi katham? kiṃ jñānasattāmātrānurodhena, āho parasattānurodhena?

Translation: 579

Similarly, how, i.e., on what ground do you say that cognition is true cognition? Is it due to mere existence of cognition, or due to existence of something else, i.e. its content?

Text: 580

तद्यदि ज्ञानसत्तामात्रानुरोधेन सम्यक्त्वम्; तदा सर्वसंवित्तीनां सम्यक्त्वं प्राप्नोति ज्ञानाकारस्योपपत्तेः।

tadyadi jñānasattāmātrānurodhena samyaktvam; tadā sarvasaṃvittīnāṃ samyaktvaṃ prāpnoti jñānākārasyo-papatteḥ.

Translation: 580

If you say, it is true because of mere existence of the cognition, then, all cognitions will have to be true cognitions, because each cognition exists only as cognition.

Text: 581

अथ परसत्तानुरोधेन सम्यक्त्वं, तदा किमनुपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन, किं वा उपकारक-परसत्तानुरोधेन?

atha parasattānurodhena samyaktvaṃ, tadā kimanupakāarakaparasattānurodhena, kiṃ vā upakāarakaparasattānurodhena?

Translation: 581

If again you say that, a cognition is true because of existence of something else, there also the question arises, is it due to the existence of something else, which does not offer any help, or due to the existence of something else which offers some help?

Text: 582

तद्यदि अनुपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन सम्यक्त्वं, तदा सर्वासां संवित्तीनां सम्यक्त्वमापद्यते, अनुपकारकपरसत्ताऽविशेषात्।

tadyadi anupakāarakaparasattānurodhena samyaktvaṃ, tadā sarvāsāṃ saṃvittīnāṃ samyaktvamāpadyate, anupakāarakaparasattā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 582

If you say it is true due to the existence of something else, which does not offer any help, then, all cognitions should become true,

because this feature of existence of something else which does not offer any help is common to all.

Text: 583

अथ उपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन किम् - करणभूतपरोपकारकपरसत्तानुरोधेन, आहो कर्मता- पन्नोपकारकसत्तानुरोधेन?

atha upakāra-kaparasattānurodhena kim - karaṇabhūtaparopakāra-kaparasattānuvedhena, āho karmatāpannopakāra-kasattānuvedhena?

Translation: 583

If you say it is due to the existence of something else, which offers some help, then, is it due to the existence of something else, which offers some help, being an instrument or due to the existence of something else which offers some help, being its content?

Text: 584

तद्यदि करणभूतपरोपकारकसत्तानुरोधेन, तदा सर्वासां संवित्तीनां सम्यक्त्वमापद्यते, करणभूतपरोपकारकसत्ताविशेषात्।

tadyadi karaṇabhūtaparopakāra-kasattānuvedhena, tadā sarvāsāṃ saṁvittīnāṃ samyaktvamāpadyate, karaṇabhūtaparopakāra-kasattāviśeṣāt.

Translation: 584

If you say it is due to the existence of something else, which offers some help being an instrument, then, all cognitions will become true cognitions, because, all have existence, which causes some help being an instrument.

Text: 585

अथ कर्मतापन्नपरसत्तानुरोधेन सम्यक्त्वमभिधीयते, तदा रागादिसंवेदनस्य सम्यक्त्वं न प्राप्नोति अतीतानागतार्थविषयत्वे योगिज्ञानस्य च।

atha karmatāpannaparasattānuvedhena samyaktvamabhidhīyate, tadā rāgādisaṁvedanasya samyaktvaṃ na prāpnoti atītānāgatārthaviśayatve yogijñānasya ca.

Translation: 585

And if you say cognition is called true due to the existence of something else, being the content of the cognition, then, the

cognition of attachment etc. will not be called a true cognition. And the same will be the case with cognition of an ascetic in which the past and future objects will be the content.

Text: 586

यत् तत् व्यभिचारि ज्ञानं तत् किम् – व्यभिचारिभूतेन उपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते, आहो अव्यभिचारिभूतेनोपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते?

yat tat vyabhicāri jñānam tat kim - vyabhicāribhūtena upādāna-jñānena janyate, āho avyabhicāribhūtenopādānajñānena janyate?

Translation: 586

Whatever you consider as a false cognition, is it produced by the knowledge of its material cause, which is false or is it produced by the knowledge of its material cause, which is not false?

Text: 587

तद्यदि व्यभिचारिभूतेन उपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते, तदपि व्यभिचारिभूतेन प्राप्ता व्यभिचारि-परम्परा। सङ्ग्राह्यमव्यभिचारि न लभ्यते।

tadyadi vyabhicāribhūtena upādānajñānena janyate, tadapi vyabhicāribhūtena prāptā vyabhicāriparamparā. saṅgrāhyamavyabhicāri na labhyate.

Translation: 587

If you say, it is produced by the knowledge of its material cause, which is false, then, it will generate an unending series of false cognitions and in that case one can never know what a false cognition is.

Text: 588

अथ अव्यभिचारिभूतेनोपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते; तद् उपादानकारणमनुकुर्वद्वा उपजायते, अननुकुर्वद्वा?

atha avyabhicāribhūtenopādānajñānena janyate; tad upādānakāraṇamanukurvadvā upajāyate, ananukurvadvā?

Translation: 588

If you say, it is produced by the knowledge of its material cause, which is true, then, the question arises, is it produced by following the material cause or without following the material cause?

Text: 589

तद्यदि उपादानकारणानुकारेणोत्पाद्यते; तदा किमाप्नोति? अव्यभिचारि स्वरूपानुकारेण उत्पाद्यते। कथम्? अव्यभिचारस्य ज्ञानतादात्म्येन व्यवस्थितेः।

tadyadi upādānakāraṇānukāreṇotpādyate; tadā kimāpnoti? avyabhicāri svarūpānukāreṇa utpādyate. katham? avyabhicārasya jñānatādātmyena vyavasthiteḥ.

Translation: 589

If you say, it is produced by following the material cause, then, what is the outcome? Does it mean it produces the cognition following its own nature which is not false? But how can it happen? Because, the absence of falsity is settled by its identity with the cognition.

Text: 590

न च एकदेशानुकारित्वमस्ति उपादानकारणस्य निरवयवत्वात्। एवं सर्वं विज्ञानमव्यभिचारि प्रसक्तम् – अपोह्यज्ञानानुपपत्तिः।

na ca ekadeśānukāritvamasti upādānakāraṇasya niravayavatvāt. evaṁ sarvaṁ vijñānamavyabhicāri prasaktam - apohyajñānānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 590

You cannot say that, it follows only a part of the material cause, because the material cause has no parts. Thus, every knowledge will become true and there will be no false cognition which can be excluded by the clause “which is not erroneous.”

Text: 591

न च व्यभिचाराव्यभिचारौ ज्ञानाद् व्यतिरिक्तौ स्तः। यथा रसाकारो रूपाकारो वा ज्ञानाकाराद् भिन्नः न तथा व्यभिचाराऽव्यभिचारौ ज्ञानाद् व्यतिरिक्तौ। ततश्च व्यभिचाराकारो अत्र निराक्रियते। किमुक्तं भवति? ज्ञानाकारोऽत्र निराक्रियते। ततश्च अज्ञानात्मकं प्रत्यक्षं प्रसक्तं सौगतानाम्।

na ca vyabhicārāvvyabhicārau jñānād vyatiriktāu staḥ. yathā rasākāro rūpākāro vā jñānākārād bhinnāḥ na tathā vyabhicārā'vyabhicārau jñānād vyatiriktāu. tataśca vyabhicārākāro atra nirākriyate. kimuktaṁ bhavati? jñānākāro'tra nirākriyate. tataśca ajñānātmaṁ pratyakṣaṁ prasaktaṁ saugatānām.

Translation: 591

It is not the case that falsity and truthfulness are different from cognitions, as the form of taste and form of color are different from

their knowledges; the falsity and the truthfulness, are not different from their knowledges and what is happening here is the form of falsity is being excluded. What does it mean? As a matter of fact, the form of knowledge is itself being excluded and this will lead the Buddhist philosophers to accept perception which is not of the nature of cognition.

Text: 592

अपि च यथा रूपेण उपादानभूतेन जन्यते रूपम् तथा ज्ञानमपि उपादानभूतेनैव जन्यते। य एव तस्य रूपोत्पादने आत्मा स एव तस्य ज्ञानोत्पादनेऽपि। न हि तस्य ज्ञानोत्पादने आत्मान्यत्वम्।

api ca yathā rūpeṇa upādānabhūtena janyate rūpam tathā jñānamapi upādānabhūtenaiva janyate. ya eva tasya rūpotpādane ātmā sa eva tasya jñānotpādane 'pi. na hi tasya jñānotpādane ātmānyatvam.

Translation: 592

Moreover, as color is produced from the material viz. color, in the same way, cognition also is produced from something which is its material. Whatever, is the form of that with reference to the production of color, the same is the form with reference to the production of cognition. It does not have any other form with reference to the production of cognition.

Text: 593

अथ निमित्तभूतेन ज्ञानमुत्पाद्यते, उपादानभूतेन रूपमिति चेतुः

atha nimittabhūtena jñānamutpādyate, upādānabhūtena rūpamiti cet;

Translation: 593

Clarification:

Cognition is produced from what is called efficient cause, but a color is produced from the material cause.

Text: 594

तत्कथमेकस्य अनेकाकारयोगितोपपद्यते? न च संज्ञान्यत्वे मेयान्यत्वमुपपद्यते, रूपवद् विज्ञानस्यापि रूपरूपता प्राप्नोति। तत्प्राप्तौ च न परलोकी आत्मा, तदभावान्न परलोकः। इदमेवं चेतसि समारोप्याह भगवान् बृहस्पतिः-“परलोकिनोऽभावात् परलोकाभावः।”

*tatkathamekasya anekākārayogitopapadyate? na ca samjñānyatve meyā- nyatvamupapadyate, rūpavad vijñānasyāpi rūparūpatā prāp-
noti. tatprāptau ca na paralokī ātmā, tadabhāvānna paralokaḥ.
idamevaṁ cetasi samāropyāha bhagavān bṛhaspatiḥ-“paralokino-
’bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ.”*

Translation: 594

Reply:

Then how will you explain one thing having many forms? It is not the case that by calling by different names, the objects will become different as in the case of color, so also in the case of cognition, there is the nature of form and if that is obtained then, one cannot maintain that a self goes to another world and if that is not there, it follows that there is no world beyond this world of experience. Having kept this very idea in mind, the Lord Bṛhaspati has said, “since there are no persons who go to any other world, other than this, there is no other world, beyond this world.”

Text: 595

अथ रूपोपादानजन्यत्वेपि ज्ञानरूपतैव;
atha rūpopādānajanyatvepi jñānarūpataiva;

Translation: 595

Clarification:

Well, even if the cognition is produced from the material cause viz. color, it is nothing but cognition.

Text: 596

रूपस्यापि ज्ञानरूपता प्राप्ता रूपोपादानजन्यत्वात् ज्ञानरूपवत्।
rūpasyāpi jñānarūpatā prāptā rūpopādānajanyatvāt jñānarūpavat.

Translation: 596

Reply:

Then, a color becomes cognition because it is produced by the material called color, like the form of cognition.

Text: 597

अथ ज्ञा[नं ज्ञानेन उपादानभूतेन जन्य]ते;
atha jñā[naṁ jñānena upādānabhūtena janya]te;

Translation: 597

Clarification:

Cognition is produced by cognition, as its material cause.

Text: 598

रूपमपि तेनैव जन्यते, नहि तस्य रूपोपादाने आत्माऽन्यत्वम्। एवं च-

तदतद्रूपिणोभावाः तदतद्रूपहेतुजाः।

तद्रूपादि किमज्ञानं विज्ञानाभिन्नहेतुजम्॥ (प्रमाणवा.३.२५१)

*rūpamapi tenaiva janyate, nahi tasya rūpopādāne ātmāḥnyatvam.
evam ca-**tadatadrūpiṇobhāvāḥ tadatadrūpahetujāḥ,**tadrūpādi kimajñānaṁ vijñānābhinnahetujam. (pramāṇa.vā.3.251)***Translation: 598**

Reply:

Then the form is also produced by form, we do not say anything else other than itself, with reference to production of form. Thus, it has been said in the (*Pramāṇavārttika* 3.251) viz. “the similar and dissimilar, positive entities are caused by similar and dissimilar causes respectively.” And therefore, is it the case an entity other than cognition is caused by a cause identical with the cognition?**Text: 599**अथ रूपोपादानजन्यत्वे विज्ञानस्य न रूपात्मता तथा ज्ञानोत्पादन(ज्ञानोपादान)-
जन्यत्वेऽपि विज्ञानस्य न ज्ञानरूपता,*atha rūpopādānajanyatve vijñānasya na rūpātmatā tathā jñānot-
pādana(jñānopādāna)janyatve'pi vijñānasya na jñānarūpatā,***Translation: 599**

Clarification:

Well, even if cognition is produced by color, cognition is not identical with color. Similarly, even if cognition is generated by the factors of cognition, cognition cannot identical with cognition.

Text: 600

ततश्च नैरात्म्यप्रसङ्गः।

tataśca nairātmyprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 600

Reply:

Thus there will arise the contingency of absence of self.

Text: 601

अथ ज्ञानोपादानजन्यत्वे ज्ञानाकारपरिकल्पना तथा रूपोपादानजन्यत्वे रूपाकारता, आलोकोपादानजन्यत्वेन आलोकाकारता प्राप्नोति; ततश्च आकारकदम्बात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रसक्तम्। अनिष्टं चैतत्, अद्वयरूपत्वेनाऽभ्युपगमात्।

atha jñānopādānajanyatve jñānākāraparikalpānā tathā rūpopādāna-janyatve rūpākāratā, ālokopādānajanyatvena ālokākāratā prāpnoti; tataśca ākāradambātmakaṁ jñānaṁ prasaktam. aniṣṭaṁ caitat, advayarūpatvenā'bhīyupagamāt.

Translation: 601

If you say that, since a cognition is caused by the factor of cognition, we postulate the form of cognition. Similarly, when color is produced from the color, it gets the form of color. Likewise, when something is produced from the material of light it gets the form of light, then, it leads to a cognition having multiple forms. But this is not desirable, because, it is accepted as non-dual entity.

Text: 602

यत् तद्रूपोत्पाद्यं विज्ञानं तत्किम् - एकदेशेन रूपोत्पाद्यत्वेन स्थितम्, सर्वात्मना वा उत्पाद्यत्वेन पर्यवसितम्?

yat tadrūpotpādyam vijñānaṁ tatkim - ekadeśena rūpotpādyatvena sthitam, sarvātmanā vā utpādyatvena paryavasitam?

Translation: 602

You said that cognition is produced by that form. There, we would like to know (i) whether it is accepted as produced by the form partially? or (ii) whether it results in being produced totally?

Text: 603

तद्यदि एकदेशेन स्थितम्; तदयुक्तम्; अखण्डस्य एकदेशविरहात्।

tadyadi ekadeśena sthitam; tadayuktam; akhaṇḍasya ekadeśavirahāt.

Translation: 603

If you say it is produced by the form partially, that will not be proper because, that which is indivisible cannot have parts.

Text: 604

अथ सर्वात्मना रूपोत्पाद्यत्वेन पर्यवसितम्; तदा विज्ञानोत्पाद्यं न प्राप्नोति यथा एककारकसमूहोत्पाद्यत्वेन पर्यवसितस्य कारकसङ्घातस्य सङ्घातान्तरोत्पाद्यत्वं न दृष्टम्, ततश्च विज्ञानसङ्घातानुपपत्तिः।

atha sarvātmanā rūpotpādyatvena paryavasitam; tadā vijñānotpādyam na prāpnoti yathā ekakāraṅkasamūhotpādyatvena paryavasitasya kāraṅgasaṅghātasya saṅghātāntarotpādyatvaṁ na dr̥ṣṭam, tataśca vijñānasaṅghātānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 604

If you say, it results in being produced totally, then, it cannot be said that it is produced by cognition, as a collection of factors which is seen to be produced by one group of factors is not seen to have been produced by another group of factors. Therefore, the theory of chain of cognitions cannot be justified.

Text: 605

तथा रूपमपि ज्ञानमेकदेशेन कुर्यात्, सर्वात्मना करणपर्यवसितं वा?

tathā rūpamapi jñānamekadeśena kuryāt, sarvātmanā karaṇaparyavasitam vā?

Translation: 605

In the same way, a color will produce its knowledge, is it by part or in totality?

Text: 606

तद्यदि एकदेशेन करोति; तदयुक्तम्; अखण्डस्य एकदेशाऽयोगात्।

tadyadi ekadeśena karoti; tadayuktam; akhaṇḍasya ekadeśā'yogāt.

Translation: 606

If you say it will produce in part, it will not be proper, because, that which is indivisible cannot have parts.

Text: 607

अथ सर्वात्मना करोति; तदा रूपं सर्वात्मना विज्ञानकरणे पर्यवसितं न रूपान्तरकरणे प्रवर्तते, यथा एककारकसामग्री एककार्योत्पादनपर्यवसिता कार्यान्तरसवित्री न भवति, तथा रूपमपि रूपान्तरोत्पादकं न भवति, ततश्च रूपान्तरस्य आकस्मिकत्वम् कथं तदा (०कत्वम्, तदाऽऽ)कस्मिकत्वे कार्यानुमानं विलुप्यते सौगतानाम्।

atha sarvātmanā karoti; tadā rūpaṃ sarvātmanā vijñānakaraṇe paryavasitaṃ na rūpāntarakaraṇe pravarttate, yathā ekakāraṇasāmagrī ekakāryotpādanaparyavasitā kāryāntarasavitṛī na bhavati, tathā rūpamapi rūpāntarotpādakaṃ na bhavati, tataśca rūpāntarasya ākasmikatvam kathaṃ tadā(Okatvam, tadā”)kasmikatve kāryānumānaṃ vilupyate saugatānām.

Translation: 607

If you say it will produce in totality, then, when color is said to produce its cognition in totality, it is not engaged in producing another color, as a collection of one type of factors when engaged in producing one effect is not engaged in producing another effect. Similarly, a color also does not produce another color. Thus, (the Buddhists must explain) how another color is produced. Is it without a cause? If you accept it without a cause, then, the Buddhists will have to forgo the inference of effect on the basis of the cause.

Text: 608

अथ अनेककार्योत्पादकत्वेन पर्यवसितं रूपस्वरूपम्; तदा घट-संख्या-सामान्यादेरपि अनेकाधिकरणाश्रितात्मकं रूपम्, वृत्तिविकल्पदोषानुपपत्तिः।

atha anekakāryotpādatkatvena paryavasitaṃ rūpasvarūpam; tadā ghaṭa-saṃkhyā-sāmānyāderapi anekādhikaraṇāśritātmakeṃ rūpam, vṛttivikalpadoṣānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 608

Well, if you say, the form of a color terminates in producing many effects, then, entities like pot, number, universal etc. will have to be accepted as having many loci and this will lead to the impossibility of showing the fault of conjecturing relations.

[९. जातिं प्रतिवदितुं बौद्धैर्दत्तानां दूषणानामेकैकशो निरासः।]

[9. jātiṃ prativaditum bauddhairdattānāṃ dūṣaṇānāmeikaikaśo nirāsaḥ.]

Text: 609

इतोऽपि वृत्तिविकल्पदोषानुपपत्तिः - वृत्तिविकल्पदोषेण वृत्तेरेव निराकरणं कृतम्, न घट-संख्या-सामान्यादेः, ततोऽन्यत्वात्। नहि अन्यस्याऽभावे अन्यस्याभावोऽस्ति,

असम्बन्धात्। नहि अनुदकः कमण्डलुः इत्युक्ते कमण्डलोरभावः प्रतीयते, कपालानां तदुदकस्य वा, अपि तु कमण्डलुना साकम् उदकस्य विश्लेषमात्रं प्रतीयते।

ito'pi vṛttivikalpadoṣānupapattiḥ - vṛttivikalpadoṣeṇa vṛttereva nirā-karaṇam kṛtam, na ghaṭa-samīkhyā-sāmānyādeḥ, tato'nyatvāt. nahi anyasyā'bhāve anyasyābhāvo'sti, asambandhāt. nahi anudakaḥ kamaṇḍaluḥ ityukte kamaṇḍalorabhāvaḥ pratīyate, kapālānām tadudakasya vā, api tu kamaṇḍalunā sākam udakasya viśleṣamātram pratīyate.

Translation: 609

For the following reasons also the fault of conjecturing relations is not possible to be raised – by the fault of conjecturing the relation, the very relationship is denied and not the whole such as pot, number and universal, because they are different from that. It is not the case that if there is absence of something else (say X) there will be absence of something else (say Y), because they are not related. When someone says there is no water in the vessel, one understands that there is no vessel or one understands that or the absence of the parts of the vessel or of the water of the vessel but what is understood is, the mere disassociation of water with the vessel.

Text: 610

ननु नैयायिकैः वृत्तिमद्-घट-सामान्यमभ्युपेयते, तदभावे कथं तस्य संस्थितिः?
nanu naiyāyikāiḥ vṛttimad-ghaṭa-sāmānyamabhyupeyate, tadabhāve katham tasya saṁsthitih?

Translation: 610

Objection:

Well, the logicians do accept universal of pot having existence and so if that is not there, how can that exist?

Text: 611

यद्येवं रूपरसविज्ञानानामपि वृत्तिरभ्युपेयते नैयायिकैः, तदभावेऽपि सद्भावोऽभ्युपगम्यते तेषां भवद्भिः।

yadyevaṁ rūparasavijñānānāmapi vṛttirabhyupeyate naiyāyikāiḥ, tadabhāve'pi sadbhāvo'bhypagamyate teṣām bhavadbhiḥ.

Translation: 611

Reply:

If it is so, the Naiyāyikas also accept cognitions of color and taste, but, in spite of their absence you accept their presence.

Text: 612

अथ तानि प्रतिभान्ति वृत्त्यभावेऽपि, तेन तेषामभ्युपगमः क्रियते;

atha tāni pratibhānti vṛttyabhāve'pi, tena teṣāmabhyupagamaḥ kriyate;

Translation: 612

Clarification:

Well, even if they do not exist, they appear and therefore we accept them.

Text: 613

यद्येवं घट-संख्या-सामान्यादेरपि स्वरूपं प्रतिभाति अभिन्नानुगतात्मतया। न चानुभूयमानस्य निह्नवो युक्तः सर्वापलापप्रसङ्गात्। अनुपलब्धौ वा सैव समर्था, अलं वृत्तिविकल्पदोषेण। यद्युपलभ्यते; तदा वृत्तिविकल्पदोषो न वक्तव्यः।

yadyevam ghaṭa-saṅkhyā-sāmānyāderapi svarūpaṁ pratibhāti abhinna-nugatātmatayā. na cānubhūyamānasya nihnavo yuktaḥ sarvāpālāpaprasaṅgāt. anupalabdhou vā saiva samarthā, alaṁ vṛttivikalpa-doṣeṇa. yadyupalabhyate; tadā vṛttivikalpadoṣo na vaktavyaḥ.

Translation: 613

Reply:

If it is so, then, the form of pot, number and universal etc. also appears as identical and consecutively present in all subsequent cases. It is not proper to deny something which is being experienced, because, if it is so, then, there will arise the contingency of denying everything and something is not experienced that alone is capable of causing such an experience and so, there is no need of the fault of conjecturing relationship.

Text: 614

अथ नोपलभ्यते; तथापि न वक्तव्यः।

atha nopalabhyate; tathāpi na vaktavyaḥ.

Translation: 614

If you say it is not experienced, even then, you should not make such an argument.

[१०. देशभेदेनाऽग्रहणात् इत्यादेः समालोच्य प्रतिविधानम्]

[10. deśabhedena'grahaṇāt ityādeḥ samālocya pratividhānam.]

Text: 615

यदप्युक्तम्- “देशभेदेनाऽग्रहणाद् घट-सामान्यानुपपत्तिः”; तदप्युक्तम्; न देशभेदेन वस्तूनां भेदोऽपि तु आकारभेदेन, अभिन्नानुगतात्मतया तयोः स्वरूपमनुभूयते। न देशभेदाग्रहणेन स्वावयवाधिकरणेन सह तयोस्तादात्म्यं सिद्ध्यति असत्त्वं वा।

yadapyuktam-“deśabhedena'grahaṇād ghaṭasāmānyānupapattiḥ”;tadapyayuktam; na deśabhedena vastūnām bhedo'pi tu ākārabhedena, abhinnānugatātmatayā tayoh svarūpamanubhūyate. na deśabhedā-grahaṇena svāvayavādhikaraṇena saha tayostādātmyam siddhyati asattvam vā.

Translation: 615

You had said that there is nothing called universal of pot because it is not known through the differentiation of space, this is also not proper, because, things are not distinguished on account of difference of space. They are distinguished on the account of the difference in their shapes. Both, pot and universal are experienced as 'uniform and consecutively present' in subsequent instances. Unless the difference of space is grasped, their identity with their parts and the locus is not established nor is the absence established.

Text: 616

यद्याकारभेदेन ग्रहणम्; तदा देशभेदेनाग्रहणस्य अप्रयोजकत्वम् (अप्रयोजनकत्वम्), आकारभेदग्रहणेन स्वरूपान्यत्वस्य प्रबोधितत्वात्।

yadyākārabhedena grahaṇam; tadā deśabhedena'grahaṇasya aprayojakatvam, ākārabhedagrahaṇena svarūpānyatvasya prabodhitatvāt.

Translation: 616

If knowledge arises due to the difference in shapes, then, not knowing due to the difference in space cannot be the prompting factor, because, by the knowledge of the difference of shapes, the knowledge of another form is caused.

Text: 617

अथ आकारान्यत्वेन नावबोधोऽस्ति;

atha ākārānyatvena nāvabodho'sti;

Translation: 617

Clarification:

Well, there is no knowledge as having different shapes.

Text: 618

स एवास्तु, असद्व्यवहारसमर्थत्वात्, किं देशभेदाग्रहणेन? स्वहेतोरेव नियतदेशकाल-
नियमितस्योत्पत्तेर्न देशान्तरादौ ग्रहणम्, अन्यथा रूपादेरसत्त्वं स्यादितरदेशलग्न-
स्याऽग्रहणात्।

*sa evāstu, asadvvyavahārasamarthatvāt, kiṃ deśabhedāgrahaṇena?
svahetoreva niyatadeśakālaniyamitasyoṭpatterna deśāntarādau gra-
haṇam, anyathā rūpāderasattvaṃ syāditaradeśalagnasyā'grahaṇāt.*

Translation: 618

Reply:

Then let it be the same. When it is capable of causing the use of its non-existence, what is the need of not knowing the difference of space? When it is possible to explain that, it is regularly produced in a particular space and time out of its own cause, there is no knowledge of it a different place. Otherwise, one will have to accept that there is no color because one does not know that it is associated with another place.

[११. नास्ति घटसामान्यम्, तदग्रहेऽग्रहात् इत्यस्य विभञ्जनम्।]

[11. nāsti ghaṭasāmānyam, tadagrahe'grahāt ityasya vibhañjanam.]

Text: 619

यदप्युक्तम्- “नास्ति घटसामान्यम्, तदग्रहेऽग्रहात्” किमनेन क्रियते? किम् अवयवाधि-
करणाऽव्यतिरेकप्रतिपादनम्, आहो असत्त्वप्रतिपादनम्?

*yadapyuktam- “nāsti ghaṭasāmānyam, tadagrahe'grahāt” kimanena
kriyate? kim avayavādhikaraṇā'vyatirekapratipādanam, āho asattva-
pratipādanam?*

Translation: 619

You had also said “there is nothing called universal of a pot” because when the pot is not known, this is also not known. There the

question arises, what do you want to say by this? Do you want to say that there is nothing over and above the locus of thoughts? Or do you want to say that there is nothing called universal?

Text: 620

तद्यदि अव्यतिरेकप्रतिपादनं क्रियते; कस्यात्र पक्षीकरणम्? किं घटसामान्यस्य, आहो तदवयवाधिकरणस्य?

tadyadi avyatirekapratipādanam kriyate; kasyātra pakṣīkaraṇam? kim ghaṭasāmānyasya, āho tadavayavādhikaraṇasya?

Translation: 620

If you say that, you are saying that there is nothing other than locus of parts, then, what do you want to state as the subject (pakṣa) of this inference? Is it universal of pot? Or is it the locus of its parts?

Text: 621

तद्यदि घटसामान्यस्य पक्षीकरणम्, तत्किम् – अवगतस्य, अनवगतस्य वा?

tadyadi ghaṭasāmānyasya pakṣīkaraṇam tatkim - avagatasya, anavagatasya vā?

Translation: 621

If you are making the universal of pot, as the subject, there again the question arises is this subject known? Or is it unknown?

Text: 622

तद्यदि अनवगतस्य; तद्युक्तम्; नह्यनवगते धर्मिणि हेतोरुत्थानमस्ति। न चाश्रयवैकल्य(ये) गमकत्वम्।

tadyadi anavagatasya; tadyuktam; nahyanavagate dharmiṇi hetorutthānamasti. na cāśrayavaikalya(ye) gamakatvam.

Translation: 622

If you say, it is not known, it will not be proper, because unless the subject is known, no ground or reason (hetu) can be pointed out there. And if there is no locus, it cannot lead to the inference of the probandum.

Text: 623

अथ अवगतस्य; तदा तेनैव भिन्नाकारावगमेन अव्यतिरेकप्रत्यायकसाधनं बाध्यते।

atha avagatasya; tadā tenaiva bhinnākārāvagamena avyatirekapratyāyakasāadhanam bādhyate.

Translation: 623

If you say that, the subject is known, then, by that only different form is known and therefore the ground which will cause the knowledge of non-difference will be contradicted.

Text: 624

अथ तदवयवाधिकरणस्य पक्षीकरणम्; तत्रापि किम् – स्वस्मात् स्वरूपाद् अव्यतिरेकः साध्यते, [आहो परस्मात्] इति?

atha tadavayavādhikaraṇasya pakṣīkaraṇam; tatrāpi kim - svasmāt svarūpād avyatiṛekah sādhyate, [āho parasmāt] iti?

Translation: 624

If again you say that the locus of its parts is presented as the subject, there also one can ask, is it the fact that something is being established which is not different from its own form or (from other form)?

Text: 625

[यदि स्वस्मात् स्वरूपादव्यतिरेकः साध्यते;] सिद्धसाध्यतया सम्बोधयितव्याः।

[yadi svasmāt svarūpādavyatiṛekah sādhyate;] siddhasādhyatayā sambodhayitavyāḥ.

Translation: 625

(If you say that, non-difference from its own part is established) then, it should be addressed as something to be established which is already known.

Text: 626

अथ परस्मादव्यतिरेकः साध्यते; स परात्मा प्रतिपन्नः, अप्रतिपन्नो वा?

atha parasmādavyatiṛekah sādhyate; sa parātmā pratipannaḥ, apratipanno vā?

Translation: 626

If you say the non-difference from something else is being established, there also the question arises, that something else is known or not known.

Text: 627

यदि प्रतिपन्नः स किम् – भिन्नाकारतया अवगतः, अभिन्नाकारतया वा?

yadi pratipannaḥ sa kim - bhinnākāratayā avagataḥ, abhinnākāratayā vā?

Translation: 627

If you say it is known, there also the question arises, whether it is known in another form or is it known in identical form?

Text: 628

तद्यदि भिन्नाकारतयोपलब्धः; तदाऽनेनैव भिन्नाकारावगमेन अभेदप्रत्यायकं साधनं बाध्यते।
tadyadi bhinnākāratayopalabdhaḥ; tadā'nenaiiva bhinnākārāvaga-
mena abhedapratyāyakam sādhanam bādhyate.

Translation: 628

If you say it is known as another form, then, by this very fact when another form is known, the ground to generate the identity would be contradicted.

Text: 629

अथाभिन्नाकारतयाऽवगतः; न तर्हि परात्मा, इदानीं स्वस्मात् स्वरूपादव्यतिरेकः साध्यत इति सिद्धसाध्यतया सम्बोधयितव्याः।

athābhinnākāratayā'avagataḥ; na tarhi parātmā, idānīm svasmāt sva-
rūpādavyatirekaḥ sādhyata iti siddhasādhyatayā sambodhayitavyāḥ.

Translation: 629

If you say, it is known in identical form, then, it is not of the form of anything else and therefore now, we will be establishing non-difference from its own form, and in that case, you should call it something which is being established that is already known.

Text: 630

अथ अनवगतः; न तर्हि एकत्वं रथतुरगविषाणयोरिव।

atha anavagataḥ; na tarhi ekatvaṁ rathaturagaviṣāṇayoriva.

Translation: 630

Again if you say, it is not known, then, it cannot be said to be one like horns of horse of a chariot which are fictitious.

Text: 631

अथ अभावः साध्यः; तत्रापि कस्य पक्षीकरणम्- किं घटसामान्यस्य, आहो तदवयवाधिकरणस्य?

atha abhāvaḥ sādhyah; tatrāpi kasya pakṣīkaraṇam - kiṁ ghaṭasāmānyasya, āho tadavayavādhikaraṇasya?

Translation: 631

Again if you say, you want to establish absence, there also, the question arises what will be the subject of that absence? Will it be the universal of pot or will it be the locus of the parts of pot?

Text: 632

तद्यदि घटसामान्यस्य पक्षीकरणम्; तत्किम् – अवगतस्य, अनवगतस्य वा?
tadyadi ghaṭasāmānyasya pakṣīkaraṇam; tatkim - avagatasya, anavagatasya vā?

Translation: 632

If you say, the pot in general will be the subject, there too, the question arises, whether it will be the subject being known or unknown?

Text: 633

यद्यवगतस्य; तदा तेनैव सद्भावावगमेन अभावहेतोर्बाध्यमानत्वादगमकत्वम्।
yadyavagatasya; tadā tenaiva sadbhāvāvagamena abhāvahetorbādhyamānatvādagamakativam.

Translation: 633

If you say it will be the subject being known, then, by that itself existence will be known and therefore, the ground to establish absence will become contradicted and as such it cannot be a ground to establish the probandum.

Text: 634

अथ नावगतम्; कथं तस्य पक्षीकरणम्, स्वयमनवगतस्य पक्षीकरणायोगात्?
atha nāvagatam; katham tasya pakṣīkaraṇam, svayamanavagatasya pakṣīkaraṇāyogāt?

Translation: 634

If you say, it will be the subject without being known, then, how can it be the subject? because, anything if it is not known cannot be accepted as subject in an inference.

Text: 635

अथ अवयवाधिकरणस्य पक्षीकरणम्, घटसामान्यं नास्तीति प्रतिज्ञा; तदग्रहेऽग्रहादित्यस्य हेतोः तदभावेन सह सम्बन्धो नास्ति। तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिसम्बन्धाभावे सति कथं गमकत्वम्?

atha avayavādhikaraṇasya pakṣīkaraṇam, ghaṭasāmānyam nāstīti pratijñā; tadagrahe'grahādityasya hetoḥ tadabhāvena saha sambandho nāsti. tādātmyatadutpattisambandhābhāve sati katham gamakatvam?

Translation: 635

If you say the locus of its parts will be made the subject, then, your proposition is “there is nothing called universal of pot?” because, unless it is known, it can never be known and as such this ground will not have the relation of invariable concomitance with the absence of universal of absence of pot. As a matter of fact, if the invariable concomitance, either in the form of identity or causing effect relationship is not there, how can something be called a ground?

Text: 636

तदग्रहेऽग्रहादित्यस्य कोऽर्थः? किम् – अवयवाधिकरणग्रहणमेव घटसामान्यस्य ग्रहणम्, आहो अवयवाधिकरणग्रहणानन्तरं घटसामान्यस्य ग्रहणम्, किं वा घटसामान्यस्याग्रहणमेव विवक्षितम्?

tadagrahe'grahādityasya ko'rthah? kim - avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇameva ghaṭasāmānyasya grahaṇam, āho avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇānantaram ghaṭasāmānyasya grahaṇam, kiṁ vā ghaṭasāmānyasyā-grahaṇameva vivakṣitam?

Translation: 636

When you say, unless it is known, it cannot be known, what do you mean by it? Do you mean the knowledge of the locus of the part itself is the knowledge of universal of pot or after the knowledge of the locus of parts the knowledge of potness is the knowledge of universal of pot? Or do you want to say that there is no knowledge of universal of pot?

Text: 637

तद्यदि अवयवाधिकरणग्रहणमेव घटसामान्यस्य ग्रहणम् विवक्षितम्; तदा नानेनाव्यतिरेकः अन्यतरासत्त्वं वा प्रतिपाद्यते, यथा नीलतद्धियोः एकोपलम्भेऽपि नान्यतराभावः, अव्यतिरेको वा, तथा नीललोहितयोः एकोपलम्भेऽपि नान्यतराभावः, अव्यतिरेको वा।

tadyadi avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇameva ghaṭasāmānyasya grahaṇam vivakṣitam; tadā nānenāvvyatirekaḥ anyatarāsattvaṁ vā pratipādyate, yathā nīlataddhiyoḥ ekopalambhe'pi nānyatarābhāvaḥ, avyati-reko vā, tathā nīlalohitayoḥ ekopalambhe'pi nānyatarābhāvaḥ, avyati-reko vā.

Translation: 637

If you intend that, the knowledge of the locus of parts itself is the knowledge of universal of pot, then, you are not explaining either difference from many or absence of either of the two. For example, out of the two viz. a blue object and its knowledge, even if one is known, there cannot be absence of the other or non-difference. In the same way, out of the two viz. a blue and a red thing, even if there is presence of one, one cannot say there is absence of other or there is no absence.

Text: 638

अथ अवयवाधिकरणग्रहणानन्तरं घटसामान्यग्रहणं विवक्षितम्; तदा नानेनाव्यतिरेकः साध्यते अन्यतरासत्त्वं वा, यथा रूपग्रहणानन्तरं रससंवेदनं न तयोरेकतां गमयति अन्यतरासत्त्वं वा।

atha avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇānantaram ghaṭasāmānyagrahaṇam vivakṣitam; tadā nānenāvvyatirekaḥ sādhyate anyatarāsattvaṁ vā, yathā rūpagrahaṇānantaram rasasamvedanam na tayorekatām gamayati anyatarāsattvaṁ vā.

Translation: 638

If you intend to say that, after the knowledge of locus of parts, there is knowledge of universal of pot, then, you are not establishing either the absence of absence of many, i.e. identity or absence of other. For example, after the knowledge of color, if there is knowledge of taste, neither it causes the knowledge of identity nor absence of other.

Text: 639

अथ अग्रहणमेव विवक्षितं घटसामान्यस्य; तदा 'तदग्रहेऽग्रहात्' इत्येतन्न वक्तव्यम्, 'अग्रहात्' इत्येतावदस्तु। नहि अन्यस्याऽग्रहे तदनुपलम्भसिद्धिः, तत्स्वभावविनिवृत्तिनिबन्धनत्वात् तदनुपलम्भस्य।

atha agrahaṇameva vivakṣitam ghaṭasāmānyasya; tadā 'tadagrahe'grahāt' ityetaṇṇa vaktavyam, 'agrahāt' ityetāvadastu. nahi anyasyā'grahe tadanupalambhasiddhiḥ, tatsvabhāvavinivṛttinibandhanatvāt tadanupalambhasya.

Translation: 639

If you say that, what is intended is the absence of knowledge of universal of pot, then, you should not say, in the absence of knowledge of that, there is absence of knowledge of universal. You should simply say, "Because there is absence of knowledge of universal." It is not the case that, if there is no knowledge of something else, it is established that, there is absence of knowledge of that, because; the absence of knowledge of X depends upon the absence of nature of X.

Text: 640

न चायं व्यतिरेकार्थो लभ्यते, 'तदग्रहेऽग्रहात्' इत्यस्य हेतोः घटसामान्यस्याग्रहणमेव, अपि तु अवयवाधिकरणग्रहणानन्तरं घटसामान्यस्य ग्रहणं लभ्यते ततश्च विपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धो भवति।

na cāyaṁ vyatirekārho labhyate, 'tadagrahe'grahāt' ityasya hetoḥ ghaṭasāmānyasyāgrahaṇameva, api tu avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇānantaram ghaṭasāmānyasya grahaṇam labhyate tataśca viparītasā-dhanād viruddho bhavati.

Translation: 640

Neither the following meaning is understood from the expression, "In the absence of knowledge of that, there is absence of knowledge." Because of this ground, there will indeed be absence of knowledge of universal of pot. But what follows from this expression is: after the knowledge of locus of its parts, there will be knowledge of universal of pot. And if that is so, this ground will become a contradictory ground, because, it will establish just opposite of what is intended by you to be established.

[१२. एकपिण्डग्रहणकाले उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्येत्यादेः समीक्ष्य प्रतिवचनम्।]

[12. ekapiṇḍagrahaṇakāle upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyetyādeḥ samīkṣya prativacanam.]

Text: 641

यदप्यभ्यधायि- “एकपिण्डग्रहणकाले उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलब्धेर्नास्ति सामान्यम्।” क एवमाह नोपलब्धं सामान्यम्। अपि तु उपलब्धमेव। कथं ज्ञायते? द्वितीयादि-पिण्डदर्शने सति पूर्वे पिण्डे स्मृतिदर्शनात् ‘अनेन सदृशोऽसौ’ एवमनुस्मरति। अथवा एकपिण्डग्रहणकाले तदुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तं न भवति, तेन नोपलभ्यते। उपलब्धिलक्षण-प्राप्तिरिह अनेकसहकारिपिण्डोपनिपातः। यदि चोपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तम्, कथं नोपलभ्यते? *yadapyabhyadhāyi - “ekapiṇḍagrahaṇakāle upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhernāsti sāmānyam.” ka evamāha nopalabdham sāmānyam. api tu upalabdham eva. katham jñāyate? dvitīyādipiṇḍadarśane sati pūrve piṇḍe smṛtidarśanāt ‘anena sadrśo’sau’ evamanusmarati. athavā ekapiṇḍagrahaṇakāle tadupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam na bhavati, tena nopalabhyate. upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptiriha anekasahakāripīṇḍopanipātaḥ. yadi copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam, katham nopalabhyate?*

Translation: 641

You said, “since, at the time of knowledge of one individual, there is no non-knowledge of something which could have been known, had it been present there.” In this connection, we would like to ask, “Who said universal is not known?” As a matter of fact, it is known. Now the question is how is it known? After seeing the second individual, there is remembrance of the first individual in the form such as, “this is similar to that”. Or at the time of knowing one individual, since that which would have been known, had it been there, is not found here and so it is not known. The knowledge of something which is fit to be known, incorporates many auxiliary factors. If something is fit to be known, how is it not known?

Text: 642

अथ नोपलभ्यते; न तर्हि उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तम्। उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तिरिह प्रत्ययान्तर-साकल्य(ल्यं) स्वभावविशेषस्स(श्च)। एतच्चेद् विद्यते; कथमनुपलब्धिः? एवंभूतस्या-प्यनुपलम्भे परिकल्प्यमाने सर्ववस्तूनामनुपलम्भप्रसङ्गः। उपलब्धौ वा अन्यत् कारणम् अन्वेष्टव्यम्।

atha nopalabhyate; na tarhi upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam. upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptirīha pratyayāntarasākalya(lyam) svabhāvaviśeṣassa (śca). etaced vidyate; kathamanupalabdhīḥ? evambhūtasypyanupalambhe parikalpyamāne sarvavastūnāmanupalambhaprasaṅgaḥ. upalabdhou vā anyat kāraṇam anveṣṭavyam.

Translation: 642

If you say, because it is not seen, then, how do you call it something which is fit to be seen? Here, the knowledge of something which is fit to be known means, a bundle of defining features arising after the knowledge of that thing. And if that is there, how can it be said that it is not known? If one postulates absence of knowledge of such a thing, then, there will arise the contingency of absence of everything in this universe. And when it is known, one will have to find out what could be the cause of such knowledge.

Text: 643

अथ प्रत्ययान्तरसाकल्यमात्रं विवक्षितम्, न तत्स्वभावविशेषः;
*atha pratyayāntarasākalyamātram vivakṣitam, na tatsvabhāva-
viśeṣaḥ;*

Translation: 643

Clarification:

Well, what is intended here is mere collection of features arising out of the knowledge of that thing and not particular nature of that thing.

Text: 644

यद्येवम् अदृश्यस्यैव अनुपलब्धिः, न दृश्यानुपलब्धिरस्ति। यदि च अन्यकारकसाकल्यम् उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तिरभिधीयते, तदाप्युपलब्ध्या भवितव्यं नानुपलब्ध्या। इतरकारकसाकल्यं हि उपलम्भजननसामर्थ्यम्। तच्चेद् विद्यते; कथमनुपलब्धिः? तस्मादनुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यैव अनुपलब्धेः(ब्धिः), नोपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य।

yadyevam adṛśyasyaiva anupalabdhīḥ, na dṛśyānupalabdhirasti. yadi ca anyakāraṇasākalyam upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptirabhidhīyate, tadāpyupalabdhīyā bhavitavyam nānupalabdhīyā. itarakāraṇasākalyam hi upalambhajananasāmartyam. taced vidyate; kathamanu-

palabdhih? tasmādanupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyaiva anupalabdheḥ (bdhīḥ), nopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya.

Translation: 644

Reply:

If it is so, it will mean absence of something which is not seen, but not absence of something which is fit to be seen. At that time also, there has to be presence and not absence. The collection of other factors is nothing but the capacity to produce the knowledge of a thing and if it is there, how can one say that it is not known? Therefore, the knowledge of absence of only that which is not fit to be known, and never of that which is fit to be known.

[१३. क्षीरोदकवद्विवेकेनाग्रहणान्नास्ति सामान्यमित्युक्तेः खण्डनम्।]

[13. kṣīrodakavadvivekenāgrahaṇānnāsti sāmānyamityukteḥ khaṇḍanam.]

Text: 645

यदप्युवाच-“क्षीरोदकवद् विवेकेनाऽग्रहणात् नास्ति सामान्यम्;” तदप्ययुक्तम्; विवेको हि आकारान्यत्वं व्यक्तीनामननुगमरूपता, सामान्यं तु अनुगताकारम्, अनयोः सारूप्यम्। तैः सह सारूप्यमस्य इति विविक्ताकारावगमदर्शनात् तथा, क्षीरोदकयोरपि विविक्तमेव ग्रहणम्।
yadapyuvāca-“kṣīrodakavad vivekenā’grahaṇāt nāsti sāmānyam;” tadapyayuktam; viveko hi ākārānyatvaṁ vyaktīnāmananugamarūpatā, sāmānyam tu anugatākāram, anayoḥ sārūpyam. taiḥ saha sārūpyamasya iti viviktākārāvagamadarśanāt tathā, kṣīrodakayorapi viviktameva grahaṇam.

Translation: 645

You also said “since individual and universal are not known distinctly as water and milk and therefore there is nothing called universal.” That also is not proper, because, difference means ‘being of different form’ which cannot be a common property of the individuals, universals on the other hand, is a common consecutive form; there is similarity between the two. Since, there is similarity in them, there is knowledge of distinct form. In the same way, water and milk are also known distinctly.

Text: 646

तत्र क्षीरोदकयोः एकभाजननिक्षेपे सति किं – केवलं क्षीरं प्रतिभाति आहो उदकमुभयं वा?
tatra kṣīrodakayoḥ ekabhājananikṣepe sati kim - kevalam kṣīram pratibhāti āho udakamubhayam vā?

Translation: 646

When one pours water and milk in a vessel, what do you find? Is it milk or water or both.

Text: 647

तद्यदि क्षीरमेव प्रतिभाति; कथं तदुदकाकारान्न विविक्तं भवति?
tadyadi kṣīrameva pratibhāti; katham tadudakākārānna viviktaṁ bhavati?

Translation: 647

If you say only milk appears, then, how is it that, it is not distinct from the form of water?

Text: 648

अथ उदकं केवलं प्रतिभाति; तदपि कथं क्षीरान्न विविक्तं भवति?
atha udakam kevalam pratibhāti; tadapi katham kṣīrānna viviktaṁ bhavati?

Translation: 648

If you say only water appears, then, also, how is it not distinct from milk?

Text: 649

अथ उभयं प्रतिभाति; तदा उभयोरितरेतराकारविविक्तयोर्ग्रहणं तादात्म्यव्यतिरेकात्।
atha ubhayam pratibhāti; tadā ubhayoritaretarākāraviviktayorgrahaṇam tādātmyavyatirekāṭ.

Translation: 649

If you say, both appear, then, the knowledge of both, distinct from each other occurs, without identity.

[१४. एकत्र दृष्टो भेदो हि- इत्यादेः कारिकायाः प्रतिवदनम्।]

[14. ekatra dṛṣṭo bhedo hi- ityādeḥ kārīkāyāḥ prativadanam.]

Text: 650

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम्-

एकत्र दृष्टो भेदो हि क्वचिन्नान्यत्र दृश्यते।

न तस्माद् भिन्नमस्त्यन्यत् सामान्यं बुद्ध्यभेदतः। (प्रमाणवा.३.१२६)

इत्येतदप्ययुक्तम्। एकत्र दृष्टे(ष्ट)स्य भेदस्य अन्यत्र दर्शनमस्त्येव, यथा घटवस्त्रादेः
एकावयवोपरिदृष्टस्य अवयवान्तरलग्नस्य उपलम्भात्, तथा सामान्यमपि भिन्नमस्ति,
अनुगताकारस्य बुद्धिभेदेनाध्यवसीयमानत्वात्।

yadapyanyaduktam-

ekatra dr̥ṣṭo bhedo hi kvacinnānyatra dr̥śyate.

na tasmād bhinnamastyanyat sāmānyam buddhyabhe

dataḥ. (Pramāṇavā.3.126)

*ityetadapyayuktam. ekatra dr̥ṣṭe(ṣṭa)sya bhedasya anyatra darśa-
namastyeva, yathā ghaṭavastrādeḥ ekāvayavoparidr̥ṣṭasya avayavā-
ntaralagnasya upalambhāt, tathā sāmānyamapi bhinnamasti, anuga-
tākārasya buddhibhedenādhyavasīyamānatvāt.*

Translation: 650

You had also said the following: “the difference seen in one place is not seen elsewhere.” Therefore, a universal is not different, because; it does cause identical knowledge. This statement is also wrong, because it is a fact that difference seen in one place, is also seen elsewhere. For example, pot and cloth seen associated with one type of parts and another type of parts, in the same way, a universal is also different, because by different determinate cognitions, it is determined as of uniform nature.

[१५.नित्यस्य क्रमेतराभ्यामित्यादेः प्रतिसमाधानम्।]

[15.nityasya krametarābhyāmityādeḥ pratisamādhānam.]

Text: 651

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम्-“नित्यस्य क्रमेतराभ्यामर्थक्रियाकरणसामर्थ्यं नास्तीत्यसत् सामान्यम्”;
तदेतदयुक्तम्; उभयथाप्यर्थक्रियासम्पादनमुपपद्यते युगपत्, क्रमेण च।

yadapyanyaduktam- “*nityasya krametarābhyāmarthakriyākaraṇasā-
marthyam nāstītyasat sāmānyam*”; *tadetadayuktam; ubhayathāpya-
rthakriyāsampādanamupapadyate yugapat, krameṇa ca.*

Translation: 651

You had also said the following: “since an eternal entity does not have the capacity to contribute to fruitful behavior, either in a

sequence or without a sequence, the concept of universal is not true.” This is also not proper, because; in both ways, one can explain that, it contributes to fruitful behavior either together or in a sequence.

Text: 652

ननु क्रमकर्तृत्वमभिन्नस्य नोपपद्यते, कार्यस्यैककालीनता प्राप्नोति; एतच्चाऽसमीचीनम्; यथा भवतां पक्षे एकं नीलस्वलक्षणमनेकाकारकार्यं नियतदेशसम्बन्धि जनयति नयना-लोकमनस्कारादिरूपम्, न च कार्याणामेकाकारता एकदेशसम्बन्धिता वा विद्यते एक-स्वभावसमुद्भवत्वेऽपि, तथा इहापि एवंभूतं तत्सामान्यं यत् क्रमेतराभ्यां कार्योत्पा-दात्मकम्।

nanu kramakartṛtvamabhinnasya nopapadyate, kāryasyaikakālīnatā prāpnoti; etañcā'samīcīnam; yathā bhavatām pakṣe ekam nīlasvalakṣaṇamanekākārakāryaṁ niyatadeśasambandhi janayati nayanā-lokamanaskārādirūpam, na ca kāryāṇāmekākāratā ekadeśasambandhitā vā vidyate ekasvabhāvasamudbhavatve'pi, tathā ihāpi evaṁbhūtaṁ tatsāmānyaṁ yat krametarābhyāṁ kāryotpādātmakam.

Translation: 652

Objection:

Well, that which is identical, that is one and without a second, cannot be said to be an agent, because it leads to occurrence of an effect, at one and the same time, which is not proper. For example, according to your doctrine, one blue particular, causes an effect of different form with reference to a specific place in the form of light of eyes, impression etc. Even if there produced by single character, the effects do not have one form or they are not related to one space. In the same way, here also, the universal under discussion, is of the form which can contribute effects either together or jointly.

Text: 653

ननु यदि क्रमेण कार्यं करोति तदा तदेव जनकम्, तदेव चाऽजनकम्;

nanu yadi krameṇa kāryaṁ karoti tadā tadeva janakam, tadeva cā'janakam;

Translation: 653

Objection:

Well, if it produces an effect in a sequence, then, the same is to be

treated as the producer and the same can be non-producer of an effect.

Text: 654

सत्यम्, तदेव जनकं तदेव चाऽजनकम्।

satyam, tadeva janakam tadeva cā'janakam.

Translation: 654

Reply:

What you say is correct. The same is the producer and the same is not the producer.

Text: 655

ननु जनकाऽजनकयोर्भेदप्रसङ्गः;

nanu janakā'janakayorbhedaprasaṅgaḥ;

Translation: 655

Objection:

Well, in that case, there will arise the contingency of producer becoming different from non-producer.

Text: 656

न प्रसङ्गोस्ति, यथा त्वदीये पक्षे एकं नीलस्वलक्षणं स्वकायपिक्षया जनकम्, स्वकारणात्मापेक्षया तु अजनकम्, न तस्य स्वरूपभेदोऽस्ति।

na prasaṅgosti, yathā tvadīye pakṣe ekam nīlasvalakṣaṇam svakāyāpekṣayā janakam, svakāraṇātmāpekṣayā tu ajanakam, na tasya svarūpabhedo'sti.

Translation: 656

Reply:

That cannot be a contingency, because, as according to you one and the same blue particular is said to be producer, in terms of its effect and the same is said to be a non-producer in the form of its cause and in spite of that, there is no difference in its form.

Text: 657

अथ स्वकारणमात्मानं च जनयति; तदयुक्तम्; तदात्मानं कुर्वदुत्पन्नं वा कुर्यात्, अनुत्पन्नं वा?

atha svakāraṇamātmānam ca janayati; tadayuktam; tadātmānam kurvadutpannam vā kuryāt, anutpannam vā?

Translation: 657

If you say its own cause does not produce itself, it will not be correct. There the question arises, whether while producing itself it will produce something which is already produced or it will produce something which is not yet produced.

Text: 658

तद्यदि उत्पन्नं करोति; तदयुक्तम्; कृतस्य करणयोगात्।

tadyadi utpannam karoti; tadayuktam; kṛtasya karaṇāyogāt.

Translation: 658

If you say it produces something which is already produced. It is not proper, if something is produced, it cannot be produced again.

Text: 659

अथाऽनुत्पन्नं करोति; असतः कः कारकार्थः? तथा स्वकारणमपि न जनयति इतरेतरा-
श्रयत्वदोषप्रसङ्गात्। अतः तदेव कारकं तदेव च अकारकमिति, तथा सामान्यमपि
जनकम- जनकं च।

*athā'nutpannam karoti; asataḥ kaḥ kārakārthaḥ? tathā svakāraṇa-
mapi na janayati itaretarāśrayatvadoṣaprasaṅgāt. ataḥ tadeva
kārakam tadeva ca akārakamiti, tathā sāmānyamapi janakamaja-
nakam ca.*

Translation: 659

And if you say that, it will produce something which is not yet produced, there the question arises, what is the meaning of the producer, in the case of something not produced. Moreover, in that way it also does not produce its own cause, because it will lead to the defect of mutual dependency. Therefore, whatever is a producing factor, the same is also a non-producing factor. In the same way, universal also is a producer and also a non-producer.

Text: 660

न चार्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वाभावेऽसत्त्वं सिद्ध्यति, यथा वह्नेः अयोगोलकाङ्गारावस्थायां
धूमोत्पादकत्वाभावेऽपि न निवर्तते वह्निरूपता, स्वहेतोरेव तथाभूतस्योत्पत्तेर्वह्निस्वभावस्य
धूमजनकात्मकस्य च, तथा अन्यदपि कार्यं स्वहेतुनोत्पादितं यत् वस्तुस्वभावं
कार्याऽजनकात्मकं च, तथा सामान्यमपि वस्तुभूतं न च कार्यमुत्पादयति।

na cārthakriyākartṛtvābhāve'satvam siddhyati, yathā vahneḥ ayogolakāṅgārāvasthāyām dhūmotpādakatvābhāve'pi na nivartate vahnirūpatā, svahetoreva tathābhūtasyoṭpattervahnisvabhāvasya dhūmajanakātmakasya ca, tathā anyadapi kāryam svahetunotpāditaṃ yat vastusvabhāvaṃ kāryā'janakātmakaṃ ca, tathā sāmānyamapi vastubhūtaṃ na ca kāryamutpādayati.

Translation: 660

It cannot be said that, if it is accepted that there is absence of producerhood of any fruitful behavior, then, it will mean that, it does not exist. For example, when the fire is in the form of a red hot iron ball, even if it does not produce smoke, it does not lose its character of being a fire. The nature of fire, of that type i.e. of the form of being the producer of smoke is produced from its own cause. In the same way, another effect also is produced by its own cause viz. the nature of a thing i.e. being of the form of not producer of an effect. Similarly, universal is an entity which does not produce an effect.

Text: 661

ननु यदि कार्यं नोत्पादयति, तदस्तीति कथं वेत्सि?

nanu yadi kāryam notpādayati, tadastīti katham vetsyi?

Translation: 661

Objection:

Well, if does not produce an effect, how do you know that it exists?

Text: 662

तदुपलब्ध्या।

tadupalabdhyā.

Translation: 662

Reply:

Through its knowledge.

Text: 663

ननु तदनुत्पाद्या कथं तद्गृहीतिर्भवति? स्वहेतुसामर्थ्यनियमितायाः तद्गृहीत्यात्मतयो-
त्पत्तेः।

nanu tadanutpādyā katharṁ tadgrhītirbhavati? svahetusāmarthyā-niyamitāyāḥ tadgrhītyātmatayotpatteh.

Translation: 663

Objection:

Well, how is it that, its knowledge is not produced by that? That is produced in the form of knowledge of that universal which is determined by the capacity of its cause.

Text: 664

नच तदुत्पाद्यत्वेन तद्गृहीतित्वम्; चक्षुरादेरपि संवेद्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्। न च विषयाकारयोगित्वेन तद्गृहीतित्व(त्वं) विज्ञानात्मना व्यतिरेकेण विषयाकारसमावेशायोगात्। योऽसौ आकारो विषयार्पितः स किं ज्ञानाकाराद् भिन्नः, अभिन्नो वा?

naca tadutpādyatvena tadgrhītitvam; cakṣurāderapi samvedyatvaprasaṅgāt. na ca viṣayākārayogitvena tadgrhītitva(tvaṁ) vijñānātmanā vyatirekeṇa viṣayākārasamāveśāyogāt. yo'sau ākāro viṣayārpitaḥ sa kiṁ jñānākārād bhinnah, abhinno vā?

Translation: 664

Reply:

It is not the case that the knowledge of universal is called knowledge, because, it is produced by that universal. Had it been so, there will arise the contingency of eyes etc. revealing themselves. It is also not the case that, because, the universal contributes to the form of knowledge of universal, therefore it is called knowledge of universal, because, without the form of knowledge, the association of form of object in the knowledge is not possible. There also the question arises, is the form in the knowledge contributed in the object is different from the form of knowledge or identical with that?

Text: 665

यदि भिन्नः; स तात्त्विकः; अतात्त्विको वा?

yadi bhinnah; sa tātvikah; atātviko vā?

Translation: 665

If you say, it is different, then, again the question arises, whether it is real or unreal?

Text: 666

यदि तात्त्विकः; तद्गतिः कथम्?

yadi tāttvikah; tadgatih katham?

Translation: 666

If you say, it is real, then, how is it known?

Text: 667

किं स्वसंवेद्यत्वेन; आहो जनकत्वाकारार्पकत्वेन?

kiṁ svasaṁvedyatvena; āho janakatvākārārpakatvena?

Translation: 667

Is it known as being self revealed or as contributed the form of being the producer?

Text: 668

तद्यति स्वसंवेद्यत्वेन; तदयुक्तम्; अज्ञानात्मतया स्वसंवेद्यत्वायोगात्।

tadyati svasaṁvedyatvena; tadayuktam; ajñānātmatayā svasaṁvedyatvāyogāt.

Translation: 668

If you say, it is known as something to be known by itself, it will not be proper, because since it is of the nature of non-knowledge, it cannot reveal itself.

Text: 669

अथ जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन; तदा प्राप्ता आकारपरम्परा।

atha janakatvā”kārārpakatvena; tadā prāptā ākārāparamparā.

Translation: 669

If you say, it is known as contributed the form as a producer, then, one will have to postulate an endless series of forms (i.e. it will lead to infinite regress).

Text: 670

अतात्त्विकः; तद्गतिर्नोपपद्यते; स्वसंवेद्यत्वजनकत्वव्यतिरेकात्।

atāttvikah; tadgatirnopapadyate; svasaṁvedyatvajanakatvavyatirekāt.

Translation: 670

If you say, it is unreal, then, its knowledge cannot be explained, because it will be neither self-illuminating nor producer of anything.

Text: 671

अथ अव्यतिरिक्तः; स तात्त्विकः, अतात्त्विको वा?

atha avyatiriktaḥ; sa tāttvikaḥ, atāttviko vā?

Translation: 671

If you say, it is identical with the form of knowledge, there again the question arises whether it is a fact or it is a fiction?

Text: 672

यदि तात्त्विकः; स जडात्मा, तद्विपरीतो वा?

yadi tāttvikaḥ; sa jaḍātmā, tadviparīto vā?

Translation: 672

If you say, it is a fact, again question arises, is it non-sentient matter or opposite of it?

Text: 673

यदि जडात्मा; न तर्हि चित्ता सह तादात्म्यम्—चिदचितोः तादात्म्यानुपपत्तिः।

yadi jaḍātmā; na tarhi citā saha tādātmyam—cīdacitoḥ tādātmyā-nupapattiḥ.

Translation: 673

If it is a non-sentient matter, then, it cannot be identical with anything sentient (i.e. one who has consciousness) because, identity between conscious and unconscious is not possible.

Text: 674

अथ तद्विपरीतः; तदा ज्ञानमात्रता स्यात्। ज्ञानरूपता च सर्वज्ञानावधारणा—(०ज्ञानसाधारणा)प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः।

atha tadviparītaḥ; tadā jñānamātratā syāt. jñānarūpatā ca sarvajñā-nāvadhāraṇā(0jñānasādhāraṇā)pratīkarmavyavasthānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 674

If you say, it is conscious, then, it will be mere knowledge and the form of knowledge is common to all knowledges and in that case, it will be difficult to explain any individual object or action.

Text: 675

अथ अतात्त्विकः; तदा ज्ञानस्यापि अतात्त्विकत्वं प्राप्नोति।

atha atāttvikaḥ; tadā jñānasyāpi atāttvikatvaṁ prāpnoti.

Translation: 675

If you say it is a fiction, then, knowledge also will become fictitious.

Text: 676

यदि च विज्ञानतादात्म्येन आकारोत्पत्तिर्भवति; विज्ञानं सर्वकारकनिष्पाद्येन साधारणम् –
प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः। एवं च सति यदुक्तम्–

अर्थेन घटयत्येनां नहि मुक्त्वार्थरूपताम्।

तस्मादर्थधिगतेः प्रमाणं मेयरूपता॥

तन्मुग्धविलसितं सौगतानाम्।

*yadi ca vijñānatādātmyena ākārotṭpattirbhavati; vijñānaṃ sarvakā-
rakaniṣpādyena sādharmaṇam pratikarmavyavasthānupapattiḥ. evaṃ
ca sati yaduktam-*

arthena ghaṭayatyenāṃ nahi muktvartharūpatām,

tasmādarthādhigateḥ pramāṇaṃ meyarūpatā.

tanmugdhavilasitaṃ saugatānām.

Translation: 676

If you say, the form is produced as identical with the knowledge, then, since knowledge is common to all as being produced by all factors, it will be difficult to explain each and every object and action. When such is the case, your statement viz. “the form of the content of knowledge, is caused by the content without giving up the form of content, therefore, the proof for the knowledge of content is the very form of the content,” is nothing but a fanciful imagination of the Buddhists.

Text: 677

तदेवं वृत्तिविकल्पादिदूषणं सामान्यादौ न सम्भवति यथा एकं रूपम् अनेककार्योत्पादकत्वेन
साधारणम्, तथा एकं सामान्यम् अनेकाधारसाधारणम्।

*tadevaṃ vṛttivikalpādīdūṣaṇaṃ sāmānyādau na sambhavati yathā
ekaṃ rūpam anekakāryotpādatkatvena sādharmaṇam, tathā ekaṃ
sāmānyam anekādhārasādharmaṇam.*

Translation: 677

In this way, the criticism of relation and imagination is not possible with reference to a universal. As one color is common as producer of many effects, similarly, one universal is common in many loci.

Text: 678

अथ एकरूपं नानेकं कार्यं जनयति अपि तु एकमेव; तत्रापि किं रूपमेव केवलमुत्पादयति, उत ज्ञानमेव?

atha ekarūpaṁ nānekaṁ kāryaṁ janayati api tu ekameva; tatrāpi kiṁ rūpameva kevalamutpādayati, uta jñānameva?

Translation: 678

If you say that, one color does not produce many effects, but only one effect, there also a question arises, is it the fact that it produces only color or only knowledge?

Text: 679

तद्यदि रूपमेव केवलमुत्पादयति; तदा रूपस्याऽग्रहणं प्राप्नोति विज्ञानाऽजननात्।
tadyadi rūpameva kevalamutpādayati; tadā rūpasyā'grahaṇaṁ prāpnoti vijñānā'jananāt.

Translation: 679

If you say, it produces only color, then, it means that it is not known, because it does not produce knowledge.

Text: 680

अथ ज्ञानमेव केवलमुत्पादयति तथापि मानसं प्रत्यक्षं न प्राप्नोति। स्वविषयानन्तरविषय-सहकारिणेन्द्रियज्ञानेन यज्जन्यते तत् मानसं प्रत्यक्षम्। न च स्वविषयानन्तरभावी विषयोऽस्ति रूपान्तराजनकात्। तस्मादेकमेव रूपं विज्ञाननीलादिकार्यसाधारणं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। चक्षुरूपालोकादीनि कारणानि विज्ञानमुत्पादयन्ति, तानि किमेकस्वभाव-युक्तानि, आहो नियतस्वभावयुक्तानि?

atha jñānameva kevalamutpādayati tathāpi mānasaṁ pratyakṣaṁ na prāpnoti. svaviśayānantaraviśayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena yajjanyate tat mānasaṁ pratyakṣam. na ca svaviśayānantarabhāvī viśayo'sti rūpāntarājanakāt. tasmādekameva rūpaṁ vijñānanilādikāryasādhāraṇaṁ pratipattavyam. cakṣurūpālokādīni kāraṇāni vijñānamutpādayanti, tāni kimekasvabhāvayuktāni, āho niyatasvabhāvayuktāni?

Translation: 680

If you say, it produces only knowledge, even then, there cannot arise any mental perception. A mental perception is that perception, which is produced by the knowledge of senses, which is the auxiliary

cause of the content which comes after its own content. And here there is no content which arises after its own content, because it does not produce another color. Therefore, one has to accept single color, which is common to knowledge blue color etc. We say that the factors such as eyes, color, light etc. produce knowledge. Here the question arises, whether they produce knowledge having one and the same nature or having specific individual nature?

Text: 681

तद्यदि एकस्वभावतया उत्पादयति(न्ति); तदा कारकैकत्वं प्राप्नोति अभिन्नस्वभाव-
योगित्वात्।

*tadyadi ekasvabhāvatayā utpādayati(nti); tadā kārakāikatvaṁ prā-
pnoti abhinnaśvabhāvayogitvāt.*

Translation: 681

If you say that, they produce having one and the same nature, then, one should say, there is only one factor, because all factors possess identical nature.

Text: 682

अथ नियतस्वभावयुक्तानि ज्ञानरूपं कार्यं जनयन्ति, तदा विज्ञानस्य अभेदरूपता निवर्तते,
नियतस्वभावकारकजन्यत्वाद् रूपशब्दादिवत्।

*atha niyatasvabhāvayuktāni jñānarūpaṁ kāryaṁ janayanti, tadā
vijñānasya abhedarūpatā nivartate, niyatasvabhāvakārajanyatvād
rūpaśabdādivat.*

Translation: 682

If you say, they produce knowledge possessing individual specific nature, and then, it cannot be maintained, that the knowledge is identical, as color, sound, etc. are different because they are produced by factors having specific individual character.

Text: 683

अथ विविधादपि कारणादखण्डितरूपं कार्यं भवति; एवं च कार्यभेदात् भिन्नकारणानुमानं
निवर्तते - एकस्वभावादपि विज्ञानादनेकं नयनालोकादिकार्यमुत्पद्यते, अनेकस्मादपि एकं
भवति। एवं च सति नियतकार्यदर्शने नियतकारणानुमानं निवर्तते।

*atha vividhādapi kāraṇādakhṇḍitarūpaṁ kāryaṁ bhavati; evaṁ
ca kāryabhedād bhinnakāraṇānumānaṁ nivartate - ekasvabhāv-*

dapi vijñānādanekam nayanālokādikāryamutpadyate, anekasmādapi ekam bhavati. evam ca sati niyatakāryadarśane niyatakāraṇānumānam nivartate.

Translation: 683

If you say, from various types of causes an indivisible or uniform effect is produced, then, there cannot be inference of different causes on the basis of different effects. As a matter of fact, from a single knowledge having a single characteristic, many effects of eyes, light etc. are produced. Similarly, from many causes, one effect is produced. When such is the case, the inference of specific cause on the basis of specific effect will not remain valid.

Text: 684

अथ एकस्मादेव कारणादेकं कार्यं भवति न बहूनां सङ्कलितानाम् एकफलोत्पादकत्वम्। ततश्च नियतकार्यदर्शने नियतकारणानुमानं केन निवार्यते?

atha ekasmādeva kāraṇādekam kāryam bhavati na bahūnām saṅkalitānām ekaphalotpādakatvam. tataśca niyatakāryadarśane niyata-kāraṇānumānam kena nivāryate?

Translation: 684

Likewise, from a single cause, a single effect will arise. Many causes together cannot be said to be producer of one effect and so who can debar the operation of inference of specific cause on seeing the specific effect.

Text: 685

तदेतदसमीचीनम्; यद्येकं कारणम् एकं कार्यं जनयति तदाऽभ्युपगमविरोधः- “चतुर्भ्य-
श्चित्तचैत्ता भवन्ति, बोधाद्बोधरूपता विषयाकारता” इत्यादि। एकमेव जनयति किम्-
समानजातीयत्वेन, आहो तदाकारत्वेन, किं वा पूर्वापरकालभावित्वेन?

*tadetadasamīcīnam; yadyekam kāraṇam ekam kāryam janayati tadā'bhyupagamavirodhaḥ- “caturbhyaścittacaittā bhavanti, bodhād-
bodharūpatā viṣayākāratā” ityādi. ekameva janayati kim- samāna-
jātīyatvena, āho tadākāratvena, kiṁ vā pūrvāparakālabhāvitvena?*

Translation: 685

This is not at all proper. If you maintain that, one cause will generate one effect, then, it will go against what you have already

accepted. For instance, you have said, “the mental states arise from four things, the conscious state, from the consciousness’ and also the form of the content etc.” Moreover, when you say one cause produces one effect, the question arises, is it in the form of the same class or in the form of that or in the form of something arising in a sequence?

Text: 686

तद्यदि समानजातीयत्वेन जनकत्वम्; तदा समानकालीनं पश्चादुत्पन्नमपि जनयेत्।
tadyadi samānajāṭīyatvena janakatvam; tadā samānakālīnam paścādutpannamapi janayet.

Translation: 686

If you say it produces things of the same class, then, it can also produce something which comes later but belonging to the same kind.

Text: 687

अथ तदाकारानुकारित्वेन जनकम्, तत्राप्येतदेव दूषणम्।
atha tadākārānukāritvena janakam, tatrāpyetadeva dūṣaṇam.

Translation: 687

If you say, it is a producer imitating the form of that, there also the same objection can be raised.

Text: 688

अथ पूर्वापरकालभावित्वेन जनकम्; न तर्हीदं वक्तव्यम् 'एकमेव जनकम्' चक्षूरूपालोक-
मनस्काराणां पूर्वकालभावित्वाऽविशेषात्।
atha pūrvāparakālabhāvitvena janakam; na tarhīdam vaktavyam 'ekam eva janakam' cakṣūrūpālokamanaskārāṇāṃ pūrvakālabhāvitvā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 688

If you say, it is a producer coming in sequence then, you should not say one and only one is the producer, because the factors such as eyes, color, light and mind all belong to the earlier time.

Text: 689

एवञ्च अनेकोपादानोत्पाद्यत्वेन आकारकदम्बकस्वरूपं विज्ञानं प्रसक्तम्। रूपाद्याकार-
परिहारे वा विज्ञानाकारस्याप्यनुपपत्तिः। तदनुपपत्तौ नैरात्म्यप्रसङ्गः।

evañca anekopādānotpādyatvena ākārakadambakasvarūpaṃ vijñānaṃ prasaktam. rūpādyākāraparihāre vā vijñānākārasyāpyanupapattiḥ. tadanupapattaṃ nairātmyaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 689

Thus, since it is produced by many factors, knowledge appears to be of the form of many forms and if you try to exclude the form of color, the form of knowledge will remain unexplained and if that remains unexplained, it will lead to the contingency of voidness of characteristics.

Text: 690

किञ्च, ज्ञानं कार्यैकस्वभावम्, कारणैकस्वभावम्, उभयस्वभावं वा?

kiñca, jñānaṃ kāryaikasvabhāvam, kāraṇaikasvabhāvam, ubhaya-svabhāvaṃ vā?

Translation: 690

Moreover, what is the fact is knowledge always of the form of an effect or is it of the form of cause or is it of the form of both?

Text: 691

तद्यदि कारणैकस्वभावम्; तदा कार्यरूपता न सम्भवति, तदभावे न वस्तुत्वम्, संस्कृतानां वस्तुत्वाभ्युपगमात्।

tadyadi kāraṇaikasvabhāvam; tadā kāryarūpatā na sambhavati, tadabhāve na vastutvam, saṃskṛtānāṃ vastutvābhyupagamāt.

Translation: 691

If you say, it is of the form of cause, then, it cannot have the form of effect and if it does not have the form of effect, then, it cannot be an entity at all, because, according to you, only that which is produced is accepted as an entity.

Text: 692

नापि कारणरूपता उपपद्यते; अनाधीयमानाऽतिशयत्येन जनकत्वाऽयोगात्।

nāpi kāraṇarūpatā upapadyate; anādhyamānā'tiśayatyena janakत्वā'yogāt.

Translation: 692

It cannot be of the form of cause also, because, unless something additional is super-imposed, it cannot be called the cause.

Text: 693

अथ कार्यैकस्वभावम्; तथापि न सदात्मकम्, अर्थक्रियाऽकरणे वस्तुत्वविरहात् ।
atha kāryaikasvabhāvam; tathāpi na sadātmakam, arthakriyā'karaṇe vastutvavirahāt.

Translation: 693

If you say that, knowledge is always of the form of effect, still, it is not eternal, because, if it does not contribute to a fruitful behavior, it cannot be considered to be an entity.

Text: 694

अथ उभयात्मकम्; एकमनेकात्मकं भवति? केन त्वं विप्रलम्भितः? नहि एकस्य अनेक-
नामकरणे नानातोपपद्यते। न चानेकनामका(क)रणमुपपद्यते, निमित्तस्याविचित्रत्वात्।
atha ubhayātmakam; ekamanekātmakaṃ bhavati? kena tvam vipralambhitah? nahi ekasya anekanāmakaraṇe nānātopapadyate. na cānekanāmakā(ka)raṇamupapadyate, nimittasyāvicitratvāt.

Translation: 694

If you say knowledge is of the nature of both a cause and an effect, it means one and the same thing can be of many natures. Who has confused you? Even if one thing is given many names, it does not become many. Moreover, it is not possible even to name it by many names, because the ground for application of the term knowledge is not many.

Text: 695

एवं विज्ञानस्याऽसम्भवे सति सन्तानानुपपत्तिः; अभ्रान्तभ्रान्तद्वैतस्याऽनुपपत्तिश्च।
evaṃ vijñānasyā'sambhаве sati santānānupapattiḥ; abhrāntabhrāntadvaitasyā'nupapattiśca.

Translation: 695

Thus, when knowledge itself remains impossible to explain, there can be no justification for a series of knowledges. Also, there is no justification in holding the duality of non-erroneous and erroneous.
[१६. प्रसङ्गात् बौद्धाभिमतस्य सन्तानस्य असिद्धत्वप्रदर्शनम्।]

[16. prasāṅgāt boddhābhimatasya santānasya asiddhatvapradaśanam.]

Text: 696

इतोऽपि सन्तानस्याऽसिद्धिः विज्ञानस्य एकत्वात्। तदेकत्वं च आकारान्तरस्यानुपपत्तेः;
उपपत्तौ वा ज्ञानाकारविरहप्रसङ्गः। तत्प्रसक्तौ च सन्तानाऽनुपपत्तिः।

ito'pi santānasyā'siddhiḥ vijñānasya ekatvāt. tadekatvaṁ ca ākārāntarasyānupapattēḥ; upapattau vā jñānākāravirahaprasaṅgaḥ. tatprasaktau ca santānā'nupapattiḥ.

Translation: 696

For this reason also viz. because knowledge is one, the series of knowledges cannot be established. Knowledge is one means, there is no form other than the form of knowledge possible and even if it is possible there will arise the contingency of knowledge having no form and once that is the fact, there cannot be a series of knowledges.

Text: 697

इतोऽपि विज्ञानसन्तानानुपपत्तिः- विज्ञानम् असद्धर्मात् सदात्मतया निवर्तते, स्वरूपान्तरात्तु कथं व्यावर्त्तते? किं सदात्मतया, आहो आकारान्तरेण?
ito'pi vijñānasantānānupapattiḥ- vijñānam asaddharmāt sadātmatayā nivartate, svarūpāntarāttu katham vyāvarttate? kim sadātmatayā, āho ākārāntareṇa?

Translation: 697

For the following reason also, there is no possibility of a series of knowledges viz. a knowledge is excluded as being existent from that which is non-existent. But how can it be excluded from its other form? There the question arises, is it excluded as being existent or in terms of another form?

Text: 698

तद्यदि सदात्मतया व्यावर्त्तते; तदा रूपादेः असदाकारता प्राप्नोति, वाजिविषाणयोरिव।
tadyadi sadātmatayā vyāvarttate; tadā rūpādeḥ asadākāratā prāpnoti, vājiviṣāṇayoriva.

Translation: 698

If you say that, it is excluded as being existent, then, entities like color will have to be accepted as non-existent like horns of horse.

Text: 699

अथ आकारान्तरेण निवर्तते; तदा ज्ञानस्य असत्स्वभावता प्राप्नोति, तुरगविषाणवदिति।
atha ākārāntareṇa nivartate; tadā jñānasya asatsvabhāvatā prāpnoti, turagaviṣāṇavaditi.

Translation: 699

If you say that, it is excluded in terms of other form, then, it means that the knowledge is fictitious like horns of horse.

Text: 700

अथ विज्ञानाकारतया निवर्तते रूपादिभ्यो विज्ञानम्; सा विज्ञानाकारता सत्स्वभावा, असत्स्वभावा[वा]?

atha vijñānākāratayā nivartate rūpādibhyo vijñānam; sā vijñānākāratā satsvabhāvā, asatsvabhāvā[vā]?

Translation: 700

If you say that, knowledge is excluded in the form of knowledge, like knowledge of color etc. is excluded from color etc. there the question arises, is that form of knowledge real or unreal?

Text: 701

तद्यदि सत्स्वभावा; तदा ज्ञानाकारतया निवर्तते इति किमुक्तं भवति?

tadyadi satsvabhāvā; tadā jñānākāratayā nivarttata iti kimuktaṁ bhavati?

Translation: 701

If you say that, it is real, then, what do you mean by saying “it is excluded in the form of knowledge?”

Text: 702

सदात्मतया निवर्तते, विज्ञानसदाकारयोरव्यतिरेकात्। ततश्च रूपादेरसदाकारता प्राप्नोति तुरगविषाणवदिति पूर्वोदितमेव दूषणमापद्यते।

sadātmatayā nivartate, vijñānasadākārayoravyatirekāt. tataśca rūpāderasadākāratā prāpnoti turagaviṣāṇavaditi pūrvoditameva dūṣaṇamāpadyate.

Translation: 702

If you say that, it is excluded as real and existent, because knowledge and existence of knowledge cannot be separated. Then, again the entities like color etc. will become non-existent, like the horns of horse, which is the same objection raised before.

Text: 703

अथ असत्स्वभावा; तदा खरविषाणवद् विज्ञानरूपतां परित्यजति, त्यागे विज्ञान-सन्तानानुपपत्तिः, तदनुपपत्तौ चैत्यवन्दनादिक्रियाऽनर्थक्यम्।

atha asatsvabhāvā; tadā kharaviṣāṇavad vijñānarūpatām parityajati, tyāge vijñānasantānānupapattih, tadanupapattau caityavandanādīkriyā'narthakyaṃ.

Translation: 703

If you say, it is unreal then, its character of being knowledge will vanish, like rabbits horn and once it is not knowledge that cannot be a series of knowledge and when there is no series of knowledge, the activities viz. the praying of 'caitya' will become meaningless.

Text: 704

इतोऽपि विज्ञानसन्तानानुपपत्तिः, तदुत्पादकविज्ञानस्य पूर्वापरसहोत्पन्नविज्ञानं प्रति स्वरूपाविशेषाद् यदेव पूर्वसहोत्पन्नविज्ञानापेक्षया स्वरूपं तदेव अपरविज्ञानापेक्षयापि स्वरूपं, विज्ञानस्य निरवयव[व]त्वेन, ततश्च यथा पूर्वसहोत्पन्नविज्ञानस्य हेतुर्न भवति, एवमपरविज्ञानस्यापि हेतुर्न भवति, तत्स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तव्यापारातिशयस्यानुपलब्धेः।

ito'pi vijñānasantānānupapattih, tadutpādakavijñānasya pūrvāpara-sahotpannavijñānam prati svarūpāviśeṣād yadeva pūrvasahotpannavijñānāpekṣayā svarūpaṃ tadeva aparavijñānāpekṣayāpi svarūpaṃ, vijñānasya niravaya[va]tvena, tataśca yathā pūrvasahotpannavijñānasya heturna bhavati, evamaparavijñānasyāpi heturna bhavati, tatsvarūpavyatiriktavyāpārātiśayaśyānupalabdheḥ.

Translation: 704

For the following reason also, there cannot be a series of knowledges viz. the nature of the knowledge which is suppose to produce the series remains the same with reference to the prior and the later knowledges. In other words, whatever is the form of knowledge, prior to the series with reference to the knowledge which arises before the same is the form of knowledge with reference to the knowledge which follows. Since, knowledge does not have parts; therefore, as it does not become the cause of previous knowledge, so also it is not the cause of the following knowledge, because there is no extra function other than its own form.

Text: 705

अथ पूर्वकालभाव एवातिशयः तेन तस्य हेतुत्वमुपपाद्यते;

atha pūrvakālabhāva evātiśayaḥ tena tasya hetutvamupapādyate;

Translation: 705

Clarification:

Being at the previous moment, may be treated as the extra function and that is why that can be called as the cause of following knowledge.

Text: 706

यद्येवं यथा देवदत्तज्ञानपूर्वकालभावि देवदत्तज्ञानकारणं तथा सर्वपुरुषज्ञानानां देवदत्त-
ज्ञानकालोत्पन्नानां देवदत्तज्ञानं प्रति हेतुत्वं प्रसक्तम्; तत्प्रसक्तौ अनेकद्वीपदेशान्तरित-
पुरुषानुस्यू(नुभू) तार्थानुस्मरणं स्यात्। तथा, स्वजनभुजङ्गमादौऽ(मादावन) नुभूतेप्य-
र्थेऽनुस्मरणं स्यात्। तथा, तथागतावदातज्ञानजन्यत्वे देवदत्तज्ञानानामवदातता स्यात्।
ततश्च सर्वे सर्वज्ञाः स्युः।

*yadyevam yathā devadattajñānapūrvakālabhāvi devadattajñāna-
kāraṇam tathā sarvapuruṣajñānānām devadattajñānakālotpannā-
nām devadattajñānam prati hetutvam prasaktam; tatprasaktau
anekadvīpadeśāntarītapuruṣānusyū(nubhū)tārthānusmaraṇam syāt.
tathā, svajanabhujāṅgamādau'(mādāvana)nubhūtepyarthe'nusma-
raṇam syāt. tathā, tathāgatāvadātajñānājanīyatve devadattajñānā-
nāmavadātata syāt. tataśca sarve sarvajñāḥ syuḥ.*

Translation: 706

Reply:

If it is so, then, suppose as the knowledge of Devadatta of previous moment, is the cause of the subsequent knowledge of Devadatta, in the same way, all knowledges of all people produced at the time of knowledge of Devadatta should be treated as the cause of the knowledge of Devadatta and if that is accepted, then, there should be remembrance of all things experienced by people living in many islands and places. Similarly, there will be remembrance with reference to things which were experienced by own people and serpents. Likewise, since knowledges of Devadatta are produced by pure knowledge of Buddha, the knowledges of Devadatta should also become pure and as a consequence of it all should become all-knowing.

Text: 707

अथ नैव अवदातता देवदत्तादिज्ञानानाम्, तथागतवदातज्ञानोपादानजन्यत्वेऽपि देवदत्ता-
दिज्ञानेनापि जनितत्वात्; तज्जन्यत्वेनैव तथागतज्ञानस्याप्यवदातरूपता न प्राप्नोति।

*atha naiva avadātata devadattādirjñānānām, tathāgatāvadāta-
jñānopādānanyatve'pi devadattādirjñānenāpi janitatvāt; tajjanya-
tvenaiva tathāgatajñānasyāpyavadātarūpatā na prāpnoti.*

Translation: 707

Clarification:

Well, the knowledges of Devadatta will not be pure knowledges, because, although these knowledges of Devadatta etc. are produced by the pure knowledges of the Buddha, still these knowledges of Devadatta are also produced by the knowledges of Devadatta etc.

Text: 708

ततश्चासावपि अवीतरागः स्यादसर्वज्ञश्च। इतश्च सन्तानानुपपत्तिः, विज्ञानयोः सहोत्पादे
हेतुफलभावानुपपत्तेः। यदैव कारणज्ञानं विनश्यति तदैव कार्यज्ञानं जायत इति वः
सिद्धान्तः।

*tataścāsāvapi avītarāgaḥ syādasarvajñāśca. itaśca santānā-
nupapattih, vijñānayoḥ sahotpāde hetuphalabhāvānupapatteḥ.
yadaiva kāraṇajñānam vinaśyati tadaiva kāryajñānam jāyata iti
vaḥ siddhāntaḥ.*

Translation: 708

Reply:

Then, the knowledge of the Buddha also cannot be said to be pure, because, it is also produced by the knowledge of the Buddha and in that case, the Buddha also cannot be said to be free from defects like desire etc. and as a consequence he too cannot be considered as all-knowing.

Text: 709

कारणज्ञानस्य च विनाशः तदुत्पाद एव। ततश्च कारणज्ञानविनाशकाले कार्यज्ञानं
भवति। किमुक्तं भवति? कारणज्ञानोत्पादकाल एव भवति। ततश्च सहोत्पन्नयोः
हेतुफलभावानुपपत्तिः एककालोद्गतयोः गोविषाणयोस्वि। कारणज्ञानस्य च
अनुपप(नुत्प)न्नस्योत्पत्तिवद् अनुत्पन्नस्य विनाशप्रसङ्गः। ततश्च क्षणमपि नोपलभ्येत,
उपलब्धौ वा सततोपलम्भप्रसङ्गः, तदात्मभूतविनाशस्य उपलम्भविधाताकर्तृत्वात्।
विधातकर्तृत्वे वा एकक्षणोपलम्भस्यापि अनुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गः।

*kāraṇajñānasya ca vināśaḥ tadutpāda eva. tataśca kāraṇajñāna-
vināśakāle kāryajñānaṁ bhavati. kimuktaṁ bhavati? kāraṇajñā-
notpādakāla eva bhavati. tataśca sahotpannayoh̄ hetuphalabhā-
vānupapattiḥ ekakālodgatayoh̄ govīṣāṇayoriva. kāraṇajñānasya ca
anupapa(nutpa)nnasyotpattivad anutpannasya vināśaprasaṅgaḥ.
tataśca kṣaṇamapi nopalabhyeta, upalabdhou vā satatopalambha-
prasaṅgaḥ, tadātmarshūtavināśasya upalambhavighātākartṛtvāt.
vighātākartṛtve vā ekakṣaṇopalambhasyāpi anupapattiprasaṅgaḥ.*

Translation: 709

For this reason also, there cannot be series of knowledges viz. two knowledges are produced together, i.e. it cannot be decided, which one is the cause and which one is the effect. According to your doctrine, the moment the knowledge which is treated as cause is destroyed, at the same time, the knowledge which is treated as effect is produced. The destruction of the knowledge which is the cause, is itself is the effect of that cause. Thus, at the time of the destruction of the knowledge which is the cause, there arises the knowledge of effect. What do you mean by this? It means the knowledge which is an effect, arises at the time of knowledge, which is the cause and that is why it cannot be decided which of the two knowledges, which have arisen simultaneously, is the cause and which one is the effect, like two horns of a cow which have grown simultaneously and there will arise the contingency viz. like the production of the knowledge which is the cause, which is not yet produced there will be destruction of that which is not yet born and it will take to a situation that, it cannot be known even for a moment and if it is known, then, it will continue to be known for ever, because it being of the nature of destruction it does not have the capacity either to know or to destroy or if we accept that it has the capacity to destroy, then, there will arise the contingency that, it can never be known even for a moment.

Text: 710

अथ एकक्षणोपलभ्यस्वभावकं सञ्जातं तेन (न) सततोपलब्धिः अनुपलब्धिर्वा;

atha ekakṣaṇopalabhyasvabhāvakaṁ sañjātani tena (na) satatopalabdhīḥ anupalabdhīrvā;

Translation: 710

Clarification:

In that case, it has become an entity which has the nature of being for a moment and therefore there can be neither its knowledge for ever nor non-knowledge for ever.

Text: 711

यद्येवं द्वादशाष्टक्षणोपलभ्यस्वभावकं सञ्जातं किन्न कल्प्यते? किञ्च, उत्पादविनाशयोरभेदे सति कार्यकारणयोः समं विनाशः स्यात्।

yadyevarṁ dvādaśāṣṭakṣaṇopalabhyasvabhāvakaṁ sañjātani kinna kalpyate? kiñca, utpādivināśayorabhede sati kāryakāraṇayoḥ samam vināśaḥ syāt.

Translation: 711

Reply:

If it is so, then, why don't you postulate it as having the nature of being known for twelve or eight moments? Moreover, if production and destruction are made identical then, there will be destruction of cause and effect simultaneously.

Text: 712

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम्-“मातुरुदरनिःक्रम(निष्क्रम)णानन्तरं यदाद्यं ज्ञानं तज्ज्ञानान्तरपूर्वकं ज्ञानत्वाद् द्वितीयज्ञानवत्।” न, असिद्धत्वाद् दृष्टान्तस्य, द्वितीयादिज्ञानस्यापि यथा ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वं नावगाहयितुं पार्यते तथा प्रागेव आवेदितम्। किञ्च, यदि (द्वि)ज्ञानत्वात् ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वानुमानम्, न किलाऽवबोधात्मककारणमन्तरेण बोधात्मकं कार्यमुपपद्यते।

yadapyanyaduktam- “māturudaraniḥkrama(niṣkrama)ṇānantaram yadādyam jñānam tajjhānāntarapūrvakam jñānatvād dvitīya-jñānavat.” na, asiddhatvād drṣṭāntasya, dvitīyādiññānasyāpi yathā jñānapūrvakatvam nāvagāhayitum pāryate tathā prāgeva āveditam. kiñca, yadi (ddhi)jñānatvāt jñānapūrvakatvānumānam, na kilā'va-bodhātmakakāraṇamantareṇa bodhātmakaṁ kāryamupapadyate.

Translation: 712

You had also said the following: “the first knowledge after coming out of mother's womb is also preceded by another knowledge,

because it is a knowledge, like the second knowledge.” This inference also is not correct because, here the example is not established yet. It is not possible to know that, the second knowledge is preceded by the previous knowledge (since the second knowledge is not yet born) and in spite of that you have mentioned it as an example. Moreover, your inference says that, this knowledge is preceded by another knowledge, because it is knowledge. But, it is not the case that, without the cause of the form of knowledge there can be an effect in the form of knowledge.

Text: 713

एतच्चावद्यम्- अबोध्मात्मकादपि नीलालोकलोचनादिकारणादुपजायते;

etaccāvadyam - abodhātma kādapi nīlālokalocanādikāraṇādupajāyate;

Translation: 713

Objection:

But this is not proper, because, knowledge does arise from the cause which is not of the form of knowledge viz. from the blue thing, light, eyes, etc.

Text: 714

तदा गर्भादौ यदाद्यं विज्ञानं तद्भूतसंवातादेव भविष्यति न ज्ञानान्तरं परिकल्पनीयम्। यस्यानन्तरं यद्भवति तत्तस्य कारणं नापरिदृष्टसामर्थ्यं, विज्ञानाभावे विज्ञानजन्याकारता निवृत्ता न तु ज्ञानाकारता, यथा इन्द्रियव्यापारमन्तरेणोपजायमाने मनोविज्ञाने इन्द्रिय-जन्याकारता निवर्तते न तु ज्ञानाकारता।

tadā garbhādau yadādyam vijñānam tadbhūtasamvātādeva bhaviṣyati na jñānāntaram parikalpanīyam. yasyānantaram yadbhavadati tattasya kāraṇam nāparidrṣṭasāmarthyam, vijñānābhāve vijñānajanyākāratā nivṛttā na tu jñānākāratā, yathā indriyavyāpāramantareṇopajāyamāne manovijñāne indriyajanyākāratā nivarṭtate na tu jñānākāratā.

Translation: 714

Reply:

Then, the first knowledge in the womb can be from collection of matters and in that case, you should not postulate another

knowledge, as the cause of the first knowledge. It is everybody's knowledge that, if X follows Y, then, Y is the cause of X. In the absence of knowledge, the form caused by the knowledge will not be there but, not the form of knowledge as in the case of knowledge caused by mind without the function of sense organs, the form produced by the sense organ is not found, no doubt, but not the form of knowledge.

Text: 715

यदि च सदृशात् सदृशस्योत्पत्तिर्नियम्यते तदा धूमेन दहनानुमानं न प्राप्नोति, दहनस्य धूमसारूप्यमन्तरेण उपादानकारणत्वायोगात्।

yadi ca sadṛśāt sadṛśasyotpattirniyamyaṭe tadā dhūmena dahanānumānam na prāpnoti, dahanasya dhūmasārūpyamantareṇa upādānakāraṇatvāyogāt.

Translation: 715

If you restrict similar effect from similar cause, then, you cannot explain inference of fire from smoke, because, in that case unless smoke is treated as similar to fire, fire cannot be the cause of smoke.

Text: 716

अथ रूपरूपता सारूप्यमुभयोरिति चेत्, तदिहापि स्वलक्षणरूपता सारूप्यं भूतविज्ञानयोः, अलं परलोकविज्ञानकल्पनया।

atha rūparūpatā sārūpyamubhayoriti cet; tadihāpi svalakṣaṇarūpatā sārūpyam bhūtavijñānayoḥ, alaṃ paralokavijñānakalpanayā.

Translation: 716

If you say, there is similarity of both, in terms of similarity in form, then, here also there is similarity between matter and knowledge in terms of their being unique particulars and therefore, there is no need of postulating knowledge of previous birth.

Text: 717

अथ विज्ञानरूपता भूतानां न विद्यते तेन तेषामुपादानकारणत्वं नास्ति विज्ञानं प्रतीतिश्चे(प्रतीति चे)त्;

atha vijñānarūpatā bhūtānām na vidyate tena teṣāmupādānakāraṇatvam nāsti vijñānam pratītiśce(pratīti ce)t;

Translation: 717

Clarification:

Well, matters are not of the form of knowledge and therefore, they cannot be the material cause of knowledge. Since, knowledge is nothing but awareness.

Text: 718

इहापि धूमरूपता नास्ति दहनस्य, नोपादानकारणत्वं, तदभावे न दहनानुमानम्। तथा, अनुभवज्ञानादानुभवज्ञानस्यैव निष्पत्तिरभ्युपेया उपादानकारणानुकारित्वेन कार्यस्य निष्पत्यभ्युपगमात्। न च एकदेशानुकारित्वमस्ति तद्विजस्यऽविचित्रत्वात्। अनुभवा-काराननुकारित्वे च ज्ञानाकारताविरहः स्यात्, अनुकरोति च विज्ञानरूपतां, तेन कथं नानुभवात्मकम्? तदुपपत्तौ च प्राप्ता अनुभवपरम्परा इत्यतः स्मरणानुपपत्तिः, तदनुपपत्तौ च अनुमानज्ञानस्याप्यनुपपत्तिः, ततश्च सर्वव्यवहारविलोपप्रसङ्गश्च। एवं (प्रसङ्गः। एवञ्च) न सन्तानसिद्धिः,

ihāpi dhūmarūpatā nāsti dahanasya, nopādānakāraṇatvam, tadabhāve na dahanānumānam. tathā, anubhavajñānādanubhavajñānasyaiva niṣpattirabhyupeyā upādānakāraṇānukāritvena kāryasya niṣpatyabhyupagamāt. na ca ekadeśānukāritvamasti tadbījasya 'vicitravāt. anubhavākārānanukāritve ca jñānākāratāviraḥ syāt, anukaroti ca vijñānarūpatām, tena katham nānubhavātmakam? tadupapattau ca prāptā anubhavaparamparā ityataḥ smaraṇānupapattih, tadanupapattau ca anumānajñānasyāpyanupapattih, tataśca sarvavyavahāravilopaprasaṅgaśca. evaṁ (prasaṅgaḥ. evaṁ ca) na santānasiddhiḥ,

Translation: 718

Reply:

Then, here also fire is not of the form of smoke. Therefore, fire cannot be the material cause of smoke and if it is not the cause of smoke, then, there cannot be inference of fire on the basis of smoke. Similarly, you should accept arising of experience from experience only, because, you have accepted that, an effect arises in accordance with its material cause. It is also not true that, an effect imitates its cause partially, because, the cause of an effect does not allow variation. If the effect viz. knowledge does not follow the form of experience, it will lose its knowledgehood. Therefore, it does

follow the form of knowledge. Therefore, how can you say, it is not of the form of experience and once that is explained, a chain of experiences is unavoidable and therefore, one can never explain any remembrance.

Text: 719

नापि सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकज्ञानद्वैराशयमस्ति, नापि व्यभिचाराव्यभिचारद्वैविध्यमुपपद्यते सौगते मते।

nāpi savikalpakānirvikalpakajñānadvairāśyamasti, nāpi vyabhicārāvyabhicāradvaividhyamupapadyate saugate mate.

Translation: 719

Neither there can be the dichotomy of determinate and indeterminate knowledge. Nor can there be the dichotomy of erroneous and non-erroneous knowledge according to the doctrine of Buddhists.

0.6 मीमांसकाभिमतस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य निरासः

[mīmāṃsakābhimatasya pratyakṣasya nirāsaḥ.]

(Refutation of the definition of Perception as accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas)

Text: 720

तथा, “सत्सम्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत् प्रत्यक्षम्” [जैमि. १.१.४]; तदपि प्रत्युक्तम्। कथम्? एतत्सूत्रं कदाचित् लक्षणपरम्, कदाचिच्च कारकसंख्याप्रतिपादनपरम्, कदाचिच्चानुवादपरम्।

tathā, “satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam” [Jaimini.1.1.4]; tadapi pratyuktam. katham? etatsūtram kadācīt lakṣaṇaparam, kadācicca kārakasaṅkhyāpratipādanaparam, kadāciccānuvādaparam.

Translation: 720

In the same way, the definition of perception as given by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system viz. “when there is proper contact with the sense organs (with the object) of a person there arises a perceptual knowledge” (Jaimini 1.1.4) can also not be justified. How is it so? Because, this aphorism of Jaimini is sometimes treated as a

statement of definition, sometimes as providing the number of cases and again sometimes as a restatement.

Text: 721

तद्यदि लक्षणपरम्; तदावबोधस्याव्यभिचारित्वं नावगन्तुं पार्यते-नादुष्टकारणजन्यत्वेन, नापि प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्येन, नापि बाधारहितत्वेन, नान्यथा वा-सर्वं पूर्वोदितमनुस्मृत्य वक्तव्यम्।

tadyadi lakṣaṇaparam; tadāvabodhasyāvvyabhicāritvaṁ nāvagantum pāryate- nāduṣṭakāraṇajanyatvena, nāpi pravṛtṭisāmarthyena, nāpi bādharahitatvena, nānyathā vā-sarvaṁ pūrvoditamanusmṛtya vaktavyam.

Translation: 721

If it is treated as a definition, then, the fact that such a perceptual knowledge has to be non-erroneous, cannot be understood. It cannot be understood as non-erroneous either on account of its being produced by defectless causes, nor can it be said to be non-erroneous on the ground of its capacity to produce fruitful behavior, nor it can be non-erroneous because, it is not contradicted, nor by any other way or by any other ground. All these objections should be raised recollecting what we discussed before.

Text: 722

नापि इन्द्रियार्थसम्प्रयोगजत्वं विज्ञानस्यावबोधस्य चार्वाग्भागविदावगम्यते, तदतीन्द्रियत्वेन तदायत्तताऽनधिगतेः। नापि इन्द्रियजन्यत्वमवगन्तुं पार्यते, इन्द्रियाणामतीन्द्रियत्वादेव।

nāpi indriyārthasamprayogajatvaṁ vijñānasyāvabodhasya cārvāg-bhāgavidāvagamyaṭe, tadatīndriyatvena tadāyattatā'nadhigateḥ. nāpi indriyajanyatvamavagantum pāryate, indriyāṇāmatīndriyatvādeva.

Translation: 722

A person who is observing a thing from one side does not know whether the contact of his sense organ is proper with the entire object. Since the contact is beyond the grasping capacity of a sense organ, he cannot know the extent of such a contact. Nor can he know that such a knowledge has been produced by the sense organ, because, he cannot see the sense-organ.

Text: 723

अथ अवबोधान्यथानुपपत्त्या सन्निकर्षपरिकल्पना क्रियते; अवबोधस्य अन्यथानुपपत्तिर्न भवति काऽनुमा?

atha avabodhānyathānupapattyā sannikarṣaparikalpanā kriyate; avabodhasya anyathānupapattirna bhavati kā'numā?

Translation: 723

If you say that, he will infer such a contact with his sense organ considering that without such a contact such knowledge cannot arise. It is not correct, because, it is not the case that such a knowledge cannot be explained otherwise and therefore, where is the question of resorting to inference?

Text: 724

अथ कारकसंख्यार्थम्; किं तेन परिसंख्यातेन प्रयोजनम्? आलोकादीनामपि कारकत्वात् तान्यपि परिसंख्येयानि भवन्ति।

atha kārakasamkhyārtham; kiṁ tena parisamkhyātena prayojanam? ālokādīnāmapi kārakatvāt tānyapi parisamkhyeyāni bhavanti.

Translation: 724

If you see this statement of Jaimini mentioned above informs about the number of cases or producing factors we would like to know what is the purpose of counting such factors, because, there are other factors like light, etc. they should also have been counted in the statement.

Text: 725

अथ अनुवादपरता; प्रसिद्धस्यानुवादो नाऽप्रसिद्धस्य। नच अध्यक्षं क्वचिद्विदितम्।

atha anuvādaparatā; prasiddhasyānuvādo nā'prasiddhasya. naca adhyakṣam kvacidviditam.

Translation: 725

If you say that, the statement of Jaimini is a restatement. There, I must remind you that, a restatement is possible of only that which is already known and not of that which is not known. In the present case, perceptual knowledge is nowhere known.

Text: 726

ननु लोके विदितम्;

nanu loke viditam;

Translation: 726

Clarification:

Well it is known to the world.

Text: 727

'न विदितम्' इति ब्रूमः, अव्यभिचारितयाऽनवगतेः। नापि सत्संप्रयोगजत्वं विदितम्, ततश्च प्रत्यक्षानधिगतिः, तदनवगतौ चानुवादानुपपत्तिः।

*'na viditam' iti brūmah, avyabhicāritayā'navagateḥ. nāpi satsa-
mprayogajatvaṁ viditam, tataśca pratyakṣānadhigatiḥ, tadana-
vagatau cānuvādānupapattiḥ.*

Translation: 727

Reply:

Well, we are not saying that, it is not known, what we are saying that, it is not known as non-erroneous. Nor is it known that, it is produced by a proper contact with the sense organs, that is why, we say that, perceptual knowledge is not known and if it is not known, there cannot be any restatement of that.

Text: 728

इतोप्यनुवादानुपपत्तिः प्रयोजनाभावात्। नहि प्रयोजनं विना अनुवादः प्रवर्तते, अनूद्य क्वचित् किञ्चिद्विधीयते प्रतिषिध्यते वा।

*itopyanuvādānupapattiḥ prayojanābhāvāt. nahī prayojanaṁ vinā
anūdyah pravartate, anūdyā kvacit kiñcidvidhīyate pratiṣidhyate
vā.*

Translation: 728

Also, restatement is not possible, because, there is no purpose behind it. You know very well that, without a purpose, no restatement occurs. It is our experience that, after restating either something is enjoined or something is prohibited.

Text: 729

नन्वत्रापि धर्म प्रति निमित्तत्वं प्रतिषिध्यते। तदुक्तम्—“धर्म प्रत्यनिमित्तं प्रत्यक्षं विद्यमानो-
पलम्भनत्वात् सम्प्रयोगजत्वाच्च।”

*nanvatrāpi dharmāṁ prati nimittatvaṁ pratiṣidhyate. taduktam-
“dharmāṁ pratyanimittāṁ pratyakṣaṁ vidyamānopalambhanatvāt
samprayogajatvācca.”*

Translation: 729

Clarification:

Well, here also the cause or the ground for Dharma is prohibited or negated and it has been stated “a perceptual knowledge cannot be the ground for the knowledge of Dharma because, it can only reveal that which exists in the present time, since it is caused by proper contact with the sense organs.”

Text: 730

तत्र किम् अन्यपदार्थावभासोत्पन्नं प्रत्यक्षं धर्मं प्रति निमित्तत्वेन प्रतिषिध्यते, किं वा धर्मावभासोत्पन्नम्, अनुत्पन्नं वा?

tatra kim anyapadārthābhāsoṭpannam pratyakṣam dharmam prati nimittatvena pratiṣidhyate, kim vā dharmābhāsoṭpannam, anuṭpannam vā?

Translation: 730

Here we have some questions: Is that perception which is produced in the form of appearance of something else is prohibited as the ground to know Dharma, or, is it because pseudo-dharma reflects in it, or, is it not produced at all?

Text: 731

तद्यदि अन्यपदार्थावभासोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षव्यावृत्तिः क्रियते; तदाऽविप्रतिपत्त्या सम्बोधयितव्या जडमतयः।

tadyadi anyapadārthābhāsoṭpannapratyakṣavyāvṛtṭiḥ kriyate; tadā'-vipratipattiyā sambodhayitavyā jaḍamatayaḥ.

Translation: 731

If you say, the statement of Jaimini excludes perception in which something else appears, then, those dull-headed should be addressed without any problem.

Text: 732

अथ धर्म्य(र्मा)वबोधकोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षव्यावृत्तिः क्रियते; तदा विरोधेन प्रत्यवस्थेयो भवति-धर्मावबोधकोत्पन्नं प्रत्यक्षम्, न च धर्मनिमित्तमिति व्याहतमपदिश्यते, अन्यथा चोदनावचनजनितविज्ञानस्यापि धर्मावबोधकत्वेन उत्पन्नस्यातन्निमित्तत्वं स्यात्।

atha dharmya(rmā)vabodhakotpannapratyakṣavyāvṛtṭiḥ kriyate; tadā virodhena pratyavastheyo bhavati-dharmāvabodhakotpannam

pratyakṣam, na ca dharmanimittamiti vyāhatamapadiśyate, anyathā codanāvacanajanitaviññānasyāpi dharmāvabodhakatvena utpannasyātannimittatvaṃ syāt.

Translation: 732

If you say that, the perception which has arisen to reveal Dharma is being excluded by the statement, then, it should be counter-acted with opposition: it means a perceptual knowledge is produced to reveal Dharma and at the same time, you say, it is not the ground for Dharma. These are contradictory. Otherwise, even the knowledge arising from the statement of injunction, will not be a ground, since it has arisen to convey Dharma.

Text: 733

अथानुत्पन्नस्य धर्मावबोधकत्वं नास्ति; केनात्र प्रतिपद्यते-यन्नोत्पन्नं तद् धर्मावबोधकम्? नापि कमलदलावबोधकं स्वयमसत्त्वात्।

athānutpannasya dharmāvabodhakatvaṃ nāsti; kenātra pratipadyate- yannotpannam taddharmāvabodhakam? nāpi kamaladalāvabodhakam svayamasatvāt.

Translation: 733

If you say that, unless it is produced, how can it cause knowledge of Dharma? Then, who understands here “whatever is not produced causes the knowledge of Dharma? It cannot be the case that, a lotus is not born and still it causes the knowledge of petals of lotus.

Text: 734

यदप्युक्तम्- 'सत्सम्प्रयोगजत्वात्' इति, तदप्ययुक्तम्; सत्सम्प्रयोगजत्वं यथा न भवति तथा प्रागेवोक्तम्।

yadapyuktam- 'satsamprayogajatvāt' iti, tadapyayuktam; satsamprayogajatvaṃ yathā na bhavati tathā prāgevoktam.

Translation: 734

You have given the ground that, it is a perceptual knowledge because it is produced by proper contact of the sense organ with the object. That is also not proper and we have already shown it before, how a perception cannot be said to be produced by proper contact.

Text: 735

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम्-“विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात् किल प्रत्यक्षं विज्ञानं विद्यमानमवबोधयति”; यद्येवं न केवलं प्रत्यक्षम् अपि तु सर्वप्रमाणोत्पादितं विज्ञानं विद्यमानावबोधकम्।

yadapyanyaduktam-“vidyamānopalambhanatvāt kila pratyakṣam vijñānam vidyamānavabodhayati”; yadyevam na kevalam pratyakṣam api tu sarvapramaṇotpāditam vijñānam vidyamānavabodhakam.

Translation: 735

You have given another ground such as “since a perception reveals that which exists in present time, it is knowledge which causes the knowledge of existent thing.” In this connection we would like to say that, if it is so, then, it is not only perception, but knowledges produced by all process of knowing, cause the knowledge of existent thing.

Text: 736

अथ चोदनाजनितं विज्ञानमविद्यमानकर्तव्यार्थावबोधकम्; यद्यविद्यमानम्; कथमवबोध्यते? *atha codanājanitam vijñānamavidyamānakartavyārthāvabodhakam; yadyavidyamānam; kathamavabodhyate?*

Translation: 736

Clarification:

Well, the knowledge produced by a Vedic injunction conveys that meaning which does not exist at the present time and which is required to be performed i.e. the vedic sacrifice.

Text: 737

अथ अवबोध्यते; कथमविद्यमानता? अवबोध्यमानत्वेनैव विद्यमानता प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणावबोधितार्थवदिति। नाप्यवबोधनमवबोध्यमन्तरेण उपजायते प्रत्यक्षावबोधनवत्।

atha avabodhyate; kathamavidyamānatā? avabodhyamānatatvenaiiva vidyamānatā pratyakṣapramāṇāvabodhitārthavaditi. nāpyavabodhanamavabodhyamantareṇa upajāyate pratyakṣāvabodhanavat.

Translation: 737

Reply:

If you say, which does not exist in the present time, then, how is its knowledge caused? And if the knowledge is caused by injunction,

then, how can it be said that it does not exist? Something it is said to exist when it is presented as being known like an object which is revealed by the means of perception. No act of knowing is possible without the object which is being known, like the act of perceptual knowledge.

Text: 738

अपि च चोदनावचनजनितविज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वमुपपद्यते, अविद्यमानविषयत्वात् केशोण्डुकज्ञानवत्। केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्यापि प्रतीयमानोपकारकार्थाभावे मिथ्यात्वम्, तदिहापि प्रतीयमानोपकारकार्थो[ना]स्त्येव, कथं न मिथ्यात्वम्? तदन्वये वा कर्तव्यार्थविषयत्वं प्रतिहीयेत चोदनावचसः। किञ्च, चोदनाजनितं विज्ञानं कर्तव्यतार्थविषयं वा तदभावविषयं निर्विषयं वा?

api ca codanāvacaṇajanitavijñānasya mithyātvamupapadyate, avidyamānaviṣayatvāt keśoṇḍukajñānavat. keśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi pratīyamānopakāra-kārthābhāve mithyātvam, tadihāpi pratīyamānopakāra-kārtho[nā]styeva, katham na mithyātvam? tadanvaye vā kartavyārthaviṣayatvaṁ pratihīyeta codanāvacaṣaḥ. kiñca, codanājanitam vijñānam kartavyatārthaviṣayam vā tadabhāva- viṣayam nirviṣayam vā?

Translation: 738

Moreover, if what you say is accepted, then, the knowledge arising from the Vedic injunction will become a false knowledge, because, it reflects an object which does not exist, like the knowledge of thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a person who comes into the shade from the sun. As a matter of fact, even the knowledge of thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a person who comes into the shade from the sun, will become false if there is no element which causes such perception. And here also, there is nothing which prompts the knowledge of Dharma to arise and so how is the knowledge arising from a Vedic injunction not false? If this is the way we are construing the Vedic injunction, then, the Vedic injunction will lose its content which is presented as some activity to be performed. Moreover, we would like to ask whether the content of the knowledge which arises from a Vedic

injunction is an activity which is to be performed or is the content absence of that or there is no content at all?

Text: 739

तद्यदि कर्तव्यतार्थविषयम्; तदा तस्य वर्तमानतैव प्रतीत्युत्कलितत्वाद् विद्यमान-
तोयादिवत्।

*tadyadi kartavyatārthaviṣayam; tadā tasya vartamānataiva pratītyu-
tkalitativād vidyamānatoyādivat.*

Translation: 739

If you say, it has a content which is presented as an activity to be performed, then, that activity is known to exist in the present time from that understanding, like water in the present time (presented by the erroneous perception of water in the mirage).

Text: 740

तोयादेरप्रतीयमानत्वं स्वसत्ताधूमादग्नौ सति जनकत्वादिना निमित्तेन
*toyāderapratīyamānatvaṁ svasattādhūmādagṇau sati janakatvādinā
nimittena*

Translation: 740

(The sentence is defective, hence not translated.)

Text: 741

एतच्चेद् विद्यते; कथमविद्यमानता?
etacced vidyate; kathamavidyamānatā?

Translation: 741

And if it is there, how can it be said that it does not exist?

Text: 742

अथ तदभावविषयम्; तस्यापि स्वेन रूपेण विद्यमानत्वात् न कर्तव्यता।
*atha tadabhāvaviṣayam; tasyāpi svena rūpeṇa vidyamānatvāt na
kartavyatā.*

Translation: 742

If you say that, the content arising from the Vedic injunction, is absence of that, then, that also i.e. absence also exists in present time in its own form, but it cannot be an object for performance.

Text: 743

अथ निर्विषयम्; न तर्हि चोदना कर्तव्यावबोधिका अपि तु निर्विषया इत्येवं वक्तव्यम्।
atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi codanā karttavayāvabodhikā api tu nirviṣayā ityevaṃ vaktavyam.

Translation: 743

If you say that, the understanding of the Vedic injunction has no content at all, then, you should say that the Vedic injunction does not convey any act to be performed. But it is contentless.

Text: 744

एवंस्थिते यथा प्रत्यक्षं विद्यमानोपलम्भकं तथा अन्यान्यपि प्रमाणानि।
evaṃsthite yathā pratyakṣaṃ vidyamānopalambhakaṃ tathā anyānyapi pramāṇāni.

Translation: 744

When this is the situation, it is proper to say that, as a perceptual knowledge reveals something existent, in the same way, the other knowledges arising from other processes of knowing also reveal something which is existent.

Text: 745

बुद्धिजन्म प्रत्यक्षम्, नच बुद्ध्यवगमे प्रमाणमस्ति। प्रत्यक्षावसेया सा न भवति, स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्। अनुमानगम्यापि न भवति, तया प्रतिबद्धलिङ्गानवगतेः।
buddhijanma pratyakṣam, naca buddhyavagame pramāṇamasti. pratyakṣāvaseyā sā na bhavati, svayamanabhyupagamāt. anumānagamyāpi na bhavati, tayā pratibaddhaliṅgānavagateḥ.

Translation: 745

You have said that perception is knowledge that arises, but you do not find any proof for the knowledge of such perception. That knowledge cannot be determined by perception, because, you too hold the same view (according to the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā - knowledge is not perceived but it is inferred.) This cannot be known by inference either, because we do not know any ground which has invariable concomitance with the object of inference viz. knowledge.

Text: 746

अथ अर्थापत्त्या प्रतीयते; किम्-घटार्थान्यथानुपपत्त्या, आहो तदुपादानपरित्यागान्यथानुपपत्त्या, घटावबोधान्यथानुपपत्त्या वा?

atha arthāpattiyā pratiyate; kim-ghaṭārthānyathānupapattiyā, āho tadupa-dānaparityāgānyathānupapattiyā ghaṭāvabodhānyathānupapattiyā vā?

Translation: 746

If you say that, perception can be known by process of implication, there we would like to know whether without postulating the knowledge of pot, the pot cannot be explained or whether without postulating knowledge giving up of the material cause of the pot cannot be explained or without postulating knowledge the knowledge of the pot cannot be explained?

Text: 747

तद्यदि घटार्थान्यथानुपपत्त्या; तदयुक्तम्, न बुद्धिकार्यो घटः, अपि तु बुद्धिरिह तत्कार्या।
tadyadi ghaṭārthānyathānupapattiyā; tadayuktam, na buddhikāryo ghaṭaḥ, api tu buddhiriha tatkāryā.

Translation: 747

If you say without postulating the knowledge of pot, the pot cannot be explained, that is not proper, because, pot is not effect of knowledge. Rather, the knowledge of pot is produced by the pot.

Text: 748

अथ घटोपादानपरित्यागान्यथानुपपत्त्या बुद्धिपरिकल्पना क्रियते; तदयुक्तं, बुद्धिस्वरूपस्यानेककालान्तरावस्थानायोगादर्थापत्तेर्निर्विषयत्वम्। केनापि बलवता प्रेरितो बुद्धिमन्तरेण वा तदुपप्लवाद्वा घटोपादानपरित्यागाय घटते तेन सन्दिग्धाऽर्थापत्तिः। नच सम्बन्धग्रहणमन्तरेण नियतायां बुद्धौ प्रतिपत्तिरुपपद्यते। अर्थापत्तितस्तु तदनुपपत्तौ इन्द्रियकल्पनापि दुर्घटा।

atha ghaṭopādānaparityāgānyathānupapattiyā buddhiparikalpanā kriyate; tadayuktam, buddhisvarūpasyanekakālāntarāvasthānāyogāt arthāpattirniṛviṣayatvam. kenāpi balavatā prerito buddhimantareṇa vā tadupaplavādvā ghaṭopādānaparityāgāya ghaṭate tena sandi-gdhā'rthāpattiḥ. naca sambandhagrahaṇamantareṇa niyatāyām buddhau pratipattirupapadyate. arthāpattitastu tadanupapattau indriyakalpanāpi durghaṭā.

Translation: 748

If you say, without postulating knowledge giving up of the material cause of the pot cannot be explained, that also is not proper, because, the form of the knowledge cannot continue to exist for a longer time and as such the knowledge by implication will become contentless. Without the knowledge being prompted by some strong factor or because of confusion, there occurs the elimination of the material cause of a pot and therefore, this may lead to a doubtful pre-supposition. It is not the case that without the knowledge of relationship, there can be awareness of a specific knowledge and if that does not happen through the process of pre-supposition then, even the postulation of sense organ will be a difficult task.

Text: 749

अथ अवबोधान्यथानुपपत्त्या बुद्धिपरिकल्पना क्रियते; तस्यापि बुद्ध्या सह सम्बन्धो नास्ति, कथमवबोधयति? अवबोधे चावगते प्रत्यक्षावगतैव बुद्धिः नावबोधगम्या, अवबोधबुद्धिविज्ञानशब्दानां पर्यायत्वादवबुध्यते ज्ञायत इत्येकोऽर्थः।

atha avabodhānyathānupapatyā buddhiparikalpanā kriyate; tasyāpi buddhyā saha sambandho nāsti, kathamavabodhayati? avabodhe cāvagate pratyakṣāvagataiva buddhiḥ nāvabodhagamya, avabodha- buddhivijñānaśabdānām paryāyatvādavabudhyate jñāyata ityeko 'rthaḥ.

Translation: 749

If you say, without postulating knowledge, the knowledge of the pot cannot be explained, that also is not proper, because, even that does not have relationship with the knowledge. Then, how can it cause the knowledge of that. Once the knowledge is understood, it means that knowledge is directly perceived and not by the knowledge of pre-supposition. The terms avabodha, buddhi and vijñāna are synonymous and all the three have one meaning viz. knowledge.

0.7 सांख्यसम्मतस्य प्रत्यक्षलक्षणस्य निरसनम्।

[sāṅkhyasammatasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasya nirasanam.]

(Refutation of the definition of Perception as accepted by the Sāṅkhyas)

Text: 750

तथा “श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरविकल्पिका” एतदपि प्रत्युक्तम्; श्रोत्रादिका(क)रणानां शब्दादि-विषयाकारतया विपरिणामो वृत्तिशब्देनाभिधीयते। सा चानेकप्रकारा भवति-सम्यग्-ज्ञानरूपा विपर्ययज्ञानसन्देहरूपा च। तदुक्तम्- “तमो मोहो महामोहस्तामिस्रोऽन्ध-तामिस्रः।” (भवसं. उ. ३.१०) इत्यादि। तद्यदि श्रोत्रादिवृत्तेः प्रत्यक्षत्वम्; तदा विपर्ययादिवृत्तेरपि प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्राप्नोति।

tathā “śrotrādivṛttiravikalpikā” etadapi pratyuktam; śrotrādikā(ka)-raṇānām śabdādiviṣayākāratayā vipariṇāmo vṛttiśabdenābhidhīyate. sā cānekaprakārā bhavati-samyagjñānarūpā viparyayajñānasandeharūpā ca. taduktam- “tamo moho mahāmohastāmisro’ndhatāmisraḥ” (Bhavasam. u. 3.10) ityādi. tadyadi śrotrādivṛtteḥ pratyakṣatvam; tadā viparyayādivṛtterapi pratyakṣatvaṃ prāpnoti.

Translation: 750

In the same way, the statement of the Sāṃkhya philosophers viz. “an indeterminate knowledge is the modification of the mind through the sense organs viz. ears etc.” is also refuted. The term *vṛtti* stands for the modification of the instruments such as ears etc. in the form of their content viz. sound etc. Such modifications are of various types viz. of the form of true cognition, in the form of erroneous cognition, in the form of doubt. It has been said in the same system-“ignorance, delusion, great delusion, confusion, great confusion, etc.” Now, if the modification of the senses such as ears etc. is called perception, then, the modification such as illusion etc. should also be called perception.

Text: 751

अथ अबाधितपदोपादानं क्रियते; तत् सूत्रे न श्रूयते। भवतु वा तस्य कल्पना, तथापि अव्यभिचारित्वं ज्ञातुं न शक्यते। तच्च नैयायिकप्रत्यक्षलक्षणाधिकारे प्रपञ्चितम्।

atha abādhitapadopādānam kriyate; tat sūtre na śrūyate. bhavatu vā tasya kalpanā, tathāpi avyabhicāritvaṃ jñātum na śakyate. tacca naiyāyikapratyakṣalakṣaṇādhikāre prapañcitam.

Translation: 751

If you add a clause viz. that which is not “contradicted” that is not found in the original aphorism in the original text of the system.

Or, granting that you add the clause, still how can you know that the perceptual cognition is non-erroneous? We have elaborately discussed this in the section discussing the definition of perception as given by the Naiyāyikas.

Text: 752

यदि चाव्यभिचारिपदेन विपर्ययरूपा वृत्तिरपोद्यते तत्तदात्मतया व्यवस्थिता सम्यग्रूपापि वृत्तिरपोदिता भवति। ततश्च संग्राह्या न लभ्यते वृत्तिः।

yadi cāvvyabhicāripadena viparyayarūpā vṛttirapodyate tattadātmatayā vyavasthitā samyagrūpāpi vṛttirapoditā bhavati. tataśca saṁgrāhyā na labhyate vṛttiḥ.

Translation: 752

If by the word “non-erroneous” an illusory perception is excluded, then, in that form even the established true cognition, will become excluded and in that case, no cognition will be left to be included in the category of perception.

Text: 753

अथ सम्यग्रूपा वृत्तिरिह संग्राह्या; तदाऽपोह्या न लभ्यते, वृत्तीनां स्वरूपैकताभ्युपगमात्। भेदानभ्युपगमे चाभ्युपेतहानम्। नहि भवतां पक्षे इन्द्रियाद् भिद्यन्ते वृत्तयः। तच्चेदभिन्नम्, कथं वृत्तीनां भेदः? भेदाभ्युपगमे इन्द्रियैकत्वं हीयते। इन्द्रियाव्यतिरेकित्वं न वक्तव्यम्। इन्द्रियाव्यतिरेकित्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने नीललोहितघटादीनां सर्वदा उपलम्भः स्यात्, इन्द्रियावस्थाने तदव्यतिरिक्ताया वृत्तेः अवस्थानसम्भवात्, तत्सम्भवे च घटाद्यनुपलम्भानुपपत्तिः।

atha samyagrūpā vṛttrīha saṁgrāhyā; tadā'pohyā na labhyate, vṛttīnāṁ svarūpaikatābhyupagamāt. bhedānabhyupagame cābhyupetahānam. nahi bhavatāṁ pakṣe indriyād bhidyante vṛttayah. tacedabhinnam, katham vṛttīnāṁ bhedaḥ? bhedābhyupagame indriyaikatvaṁ hīyate. indriyāvyatirekitvaṁ na vaktavyam. indriyāvyatirekitve'bhyupagamyamāne nīlalohitaghaṭādīnāṁ sarvadā upalambhaḥ syāt, indriyāvasthāne tadavyatiriktāyā vṛtteḥ avasthānasambhavāt, tatsambhave ca ghaṭādyanupalambhānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 753

If you say that, by perception you should include a true cognition then, nothing remains to be excluded because, cognitions are

accepted as having uniform form and if you do not accept difference in cognitions, then, you will lose your accepted position. According to your doctrine the cognitions are not differentiated from the senses and therefore, if this is identical, how can there be difference in cognitions? and if you accept difference, that the sense organ is one, will be lost. You should not say that, it is not different from the senses, because, if you accept that, it is not different from the senses, one will always find objects like blue pot, red pot etc. If the sense organ exists, the cognition which is not different from its modification, will also be there and when that is there, you cannot establish the absence of pot etc.

Text: 754

अथ वृत्तिसद्भावेपि अनुपलब्धिः; न कदाचिदुपलब्धिः स्यात्, नहि भवतां पक्षे किञ्चिदपूर्वं जायते पूर्वं वा निरुद्ध्यते। ततश्च सर्वस्याऽस्तित्वे उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी किंकृते? सदोपलब्धिरनु[प]लब्धिर्वा। नह्येवं वादिनो द्वितीया गतिरस्ति।

atha vṛttisadbhāvepi anupalabdhiḥ; na kadācidupalabdhiḥ syāt, nahi bhavatāṃ pakṣe kiñcidapūrvam jāyate pūrvam vā niruddhyate. tataśca sarvasyā'stitve upalabdhyanupalabdhiḥ kimkṛte? sadopalabdhiranu[pa]labdhirvā. nahyevam vādinō dvitīyā gatirasti.

Translation: 754

If you say, in spite of there is modification of the senses, there can be absence of knowledge of a pot. In that case, the occasional knowledge of a thing cannot be explained. Because, according to your doctrine, there is nothing which is produced new. Or, there is anything which is stopped. Therefore, when everything is there, how to explain knowledge and absence of knowledge of a thing, or this may lead to constant knowledge of presence or constant knowledge of absence. There is no way out for those who hold such a view.

Text: 755

किञ्च, शब्दादय उपलभ्यन्ते किमनुपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते, आहोस्विदुपलभ्य-स्वभावा(वाः)?

kiñca, śabdādaya upalabhyante kimanupalabhyasvabhāvā upalabhyante āhosvidupalabhyasvabhāvā(vāḥ)?

Translation: 755

Moreover, we hear sound, there the question arises, is it the fact that we hear sound which is of the nature of something which cannot be known? or we hear sound which has the nature of being something which can be known?

Text: 756

तद्यदि अनुपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते; तदा उपलब्धिः कथम्? यदि अनुपलभ्यस्वभावाः कथम् उपलभ्येरन्? अन्यथा आत्मादेरप्युपलब्धिः स्यात्।

tadyadi anupalabhyasvabhāvā upalabhyante; tadā upalabdhiḥ katham? yadi anupalabhyasvabhāvāḥ katham upalabhyeran? anyathā ātmāderapyupalabdhiḥ syāt.

Translation: 756

There, if you say the sounds which are of the nature of not being known, are heard, then, how is it heard? Because, if it is of the nature of that which can be known, then, how can they be heard? Otherwise, entities like soul etc. can also be known.

Text: 757

अथ उपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते; अनुपलब्धिः कथम्? किं तेनैवाकारेण, आहोस्विद् आकारान्तरेण?

atha upalabhyasvabhāvā upalabhyante; anupalabdhiḥ katham? kiṁ tenaivākāreṇa, āhosvid ākārāntareṇa?

Translation: 757

If you say, they are heard because they are of the nature of being known, then, how to explain the knowledge of its absence? There also the question arises, whether it is not known in the same form or in some other form?

Text: 758

यदि तेनैव आकारेण अनुपलब्धिः; आत्मादेरपि अनुपलब्धिर्न प्राप्नोति, उपलब्धौ वा बीजान्तरं वचनीयम्।

yadi tenaiva ākāreṇa anupalabdhiḥ; ātmāderapi anupalabdhirna prāpnoti, upalabdhou vā bījāntaram vacanīyam.

Translation: 758

If you say, it is not known in the same form, then, even entities like soul etc. cannot be said to be not known and if it is known, then, it should state some other reason or ground for that.

Text: 759

अथाकारान्तरेण नोपलभ्यन्ते; तथाप्युपलभ्यमानाऽनुपलभ्यमानयोः नैकत्वम्, शब्दा-
त्माकारयोरिव, नहि उपलभ्यस्वभावाच्छब्दादनुपलभ्यस्वभाव आत्माऽव्यतिरिक्तो दृष्टः।
*atha ākāraṅtāreṇa nopalabhyante; tathāpi upalabhyamānā'nupa-
labhyamānayoḥ naikatvam, śabdātmākārayoriva, nahi upalabhya-
svabhāvācchabdādanupalabhyasvabhāva ātmā'vyatirikto dr̥ṣṭaḥ.*

Translation: 759

If you say that, in other form it is not known, even then, that which is being known and that which is not known, cannot be identical, like the forms of sound and soul. It is not the case that, the soul which is of the nature of not being known is identical with the sound which is of the nature of being known.

Text: 760

अथ तस्यैवाऽभिव्यक्तस्योपलब्धिः; तत्स्वरूपवदभिव्यक्तेः सर्वदानव(दाव)स्थानात्
सततोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः।
*atha tasyaivā'bhivyaktasyopalabdhīḥ; tatsvarūpavadabhivyakteḥ sar-
vadānava(dāva)sthānāt satatopalabdhīprasāṅgaḥ.*

Translation: 760

If you say, the same thing when manifest is known, then, it means that like its own form the manifestation is not present always and in that case it will lead to the contingency of knowing always at all time.

Text: 761

अथ तिरोधाने सति अनुपलब्धिः; तदा तत्स्वरूपतादात्म्यात् सततानुपलम्भप्रसङ्गः,
उभयोर्वाऽवस्थाने सममुपलम्भाऽनुपलम्भौ स्याताम्। ततश्च- 'इदानीमुपलभे पूर्वं
नोप(पा)लभे' इति व्यवहारविरहः स्यात्। तथा, 'पूर्वमुप(पा)लभे इदानीं नोपलभे'
इत्येतदपि न प्राप्नोति।

*atha tirodhāne sati anupalabdhīḥ; tadā tatsvarūpatādātmyāt sata-
tānupalambhaprasāṅgaḥ, ubhayorvā'vasthāne samamupalambhā'nu-*

palambhau syātām. tataśca- 'idānīmupalabhe pūrvam nopā(pā)labhe' iti vyavahāravirahaḥ syāt. tathā, 'pūrvamupa(pā)labhe idānīm nopālabhe' ityetaḍapi na prāpnoti.

Translation: 761

If you say that, when there is disappearance, there will be knowledge of absence then, because of its identity with its form there will arise the contingency of the knowledge of its absence always. Again, if both exist at one and the same time, then, there will be knowledge of presence and knowledge of absence simultaneously. Thereby, it will lead to the denial of our experiential behavior viz. “I did not see it before, but I see it now.” Similarly, we cannot say, “I saw it before and I do not see it now.”

Text: 762

अथ अवयवोपचये सति उपलम्भः; तस्य सर्वदा भावात् सर्वदोपलम्भप्रसङ्गः।
atha avayavopacaye sati upalambhaḥ; tasya sarvadā bhāvāt sarvadopalambhaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 762

If you say, when there is growth in the form, there will be the knowledge of presence. Then, it will lead to its knowledge always because it will continue to exist always.

Text: 763

अथ स्वलक्षणपुष्टौ सत्यामुपलम्भः; तस्याः सर्वदा सत्त्वात् सततोपलम्भप्रसङ्गः।
atha svalakṣaṇapuṣṭau satyāmupalambhaḥ; tasyāḥ sarvadā satvāt satatopalambhaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 763

If you say, when own characteristics are present, there will knowledge of presence, then, since it always be there, there will be always knowledge of presence.

Text: 764

अथ संस्थानोत्कर्षे सत्युपलम्भः; तस्यापि सर्वदा विद्यमानत्वात् सततोपलब्धिः स्यात्। तस्माद् येन येन निमित्तेन उपलम्भपरिकल्पना, तस्य तस्य सर्वदा भावात् सततोपलम्भप्रसङ्गः।

atha samsthānotkarṣe satyupalambhaḥ; tasyāpi sarvadā vidyamānavāt satatopalabdhiḥ syāt. tasmād yena yena nimittena upalambha-parikalpanā, tasya tasya sarvadā bhāvāt satatopalambhaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 764

If you say, if there is growth in the structure of a thing there will be knowledge of the thing, then, since it will always be there, there will always be knowledge of the thing. Therefore, on whatever ground you postulate the knowledge of presence, since that ground exists always, there will always be the knowledge of the thing.

Text: 765

अथ देशकालकारकापबन्धादनुपलम्भः; तदा तस्यापबन्धस्य सर्वदा भावादनुपलम्भाऽनुपरमः स्यात्।

atha deśakālakārakāpabandhādanupalambhaḥ; tadā tasyāpabandhasya sarvadā bhāvādanupalambhā'nuparamaḥ syāt.

Translation: 765

If you say that, when there is disassociation of space, time and factor, there will be knowledge of absence. Then, such a disassociation will always be there and the knowledge of absence in that case will never cease.

Text: 766

तथा, इन्द्रियाणामपि करणरूपता नोपलभ्यते फलवैकल्यात्।

tathā, indriyāṇāmapi karaṇarūpatā nopalabhyate phalavaikalyāt.

Translation: 766

Similarly, we do not see the instrumentality of the sense organs because they do not produce any results.

Text: 767

ननु अस्ति विज्ञानं फलम्;

nanu asti vijñānaṁ phalam;

Translation: 767

Clarification:

Well, there is result viz. the cognition.

Text: 768

न, तस्य सर्वदा विद्यमानत्वात्। सर्वदा विद्यमानयोः हेतुफलभावो नोपपद्यते, यथा गुणानां परस्परमात्मभेदानां वा। नहि आत्मा आत्मान्तरस्य हेतुर्भवति तत्फलं वा, तथा इहापि

अनाद्यन्ता सत्ता न फलं हेतुर्वा उच्यते। किञ्च, भूजलादि अनेकं कार्यं-तत्किं गुणत्रयाद् व्यतिरिक्तम्, अव्यतिरिक्तं वा?

na, tasya sarvadā vidyamānatvāt. sarvadā vidyamānayoḥ hetu-phalabhāvo nopapadyate, yathā guṇānām parasparamātmabhedānām vā. nahi ātmā ātmāntarasya heturbhavati tatphalaṁ vā, tathā ihāpi anādyantā sattā na phalaṁ heturvā ucyate. kiñca, bhūjalādi anekam kāryam-tatkiṁ guṇatrayād vyatiriktam, avyatiriktam vā?

Translation: 768

Reply:

It is not true, because, that result is always there. When two things always exist one cannot be the cause of the other or the effect of the other e.g. the qualities or the mutual differences of the selves. It is not the case that one self is the cause of another self or one self is the effect of another self. In the same way, here also the existence without a beginning and an end cannot be said to be either effect or cause. Moreover, there are many effects such as earth, water etc. Are these effects different from the three ingredients or constituents of nature or identical with them?

Text: 769

तद्यदि व्यतिरिक्तम्; तत्किं तात्त्विकम्, अतात्त्विकं वा?

tadyadi vyatiriktam; tatkiṁ tāttvikam, atāttvikam vā?

Translation: 769

If you say, they are different, there the question arises, whether it is real or unreal?

Text: 770

तद्यदि तात्त्विकम्; न तर्हि गुणत्रयोपादानपूर्वकम्, ततो भिन्नत्वाद् आत्मस्वरूपवत्। न च गुणत्रयेण सह अन्यतमोऽपि सम्बन्ध उपपद्यते तद्भिन्नकार्यस्य। न मात्रामात्रिकसम्बन्धः, नापि सहचरसहचरि[त]भावः, नापि निमित्त-नि(नै)मित्तिकभावः, उपकार्योपकारकभावो वा।

tadyadi tāttvikam; na tarhi guṇatrayopādānapūrvakam, tato bhinnatvād ātmasvarūpavat. na ca guṇatrayeṇa saha anyatamo'pi sambandha upapadyate tadbhinnakāryasya. na mātrāmātrikasambandhaḥ, nāpi sahasahasahacari[ta]bhāvah, nāpi nimittani(nai)mittikabhāvah, upakāryopakārahāvoh vā.

Translation: 770

If you say, it is real, then, it is not the fact that, it is preceded by the material cause viz. the three ingredients, because it is different from them like the nature of the self. Not even a single relationship is tenable with an effect which is different from those three ingredients. Such a relation can neither be relation of part and whole, nor associate and associated, nor cause and effect, nor helper and helped.

Text: 771

अथ अतात्त्विकम्; कथं तेन गुणत्रयं प्रतीयते, गुणत्रयेण सह सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः? न च सदसतोः सम्बन्ध उपपद्यते आत्मखरविषाणयोरिव। तदभावात् नानुमानाद् गुणत्रयप्रतिपत्तिः। नापि प्रत्यक्षेण गुणावधारणम्, स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्। तदुक्तम्—

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति।
यत्तु दृष्टिपथप्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम्॥

तदनवगमे च न भोग्येन भोक्तुरनुमानम्। ततश्च नात्मा, न गुणत्रयम्।

atha atāttvikam; katham tena guṇatrayam pratīyate, guṇatrayeṇa saha sambandhānupapatteḥ? na ca sadasatoḥ sambandha upapadyate ātmakhalaviṣāṇayoriva. tadabhāvāt nānumānād guṇatrayapratipattiḥ. nāpi pratyakṣeṇa guṇāvadhāraṇam, svayamanabhyupagamāt. taduktam-

*guṇānām paramam rūpam na dr̥ṣṭipathamṛcchati,
yattu dr̥ṣṭipathapṛāptam tanmāyeva sutucchakam.*

tadanavagame ca na bhogyena bhokturanumānam. tataśca nātmā, na guṇatrayam.

Translation: 771

And if you say that, it is unreal, then, how is it that the three ingredients are known there? Because, there cannot be a relationship with the three ingredients and the effect. It is not the case that there can be a relationship between existent and non-existent, like the self and the horns of a rabbit and once that is not there through inference also the three ingredients can be justified. The three ingredients cannot be known by perception, because you yourself do not accept this. As the statement goes

- “the real form of the three ingredients is not visible by eyes and what is visible to the eyes is the insignificant illusive object (māyā).” And once those three ingredients are not known, that cannot be the inference of the enjoyer on the basis of the object of enjoyment. This amount to saying that, there is no self and there are no three ingredients (guṇas).

Text: 772

अथ अव्यतिरिक्तम्; तत्किम्-तात्त्विकम्, अतात्त्विकम् वा?
atha avyatiriktam; tatkim-tāttvikam, atāttvikam vā?

Translation: 772

If you say, it is identical, then, question arises whether it is real or unreal?

Text: 773

यदि तात्त्विकम्; तदा कार्याणामपरिसंख्येयत्वे गुणानामप्यपरिसंख्येयता। ततश्च 'त्रयो गुणाः' इति न वक्तव्यम्।
yadi tāttvikam; tadā kāryāṇāmaparisankhyeyatve guṇānāmapyaparisankhyeyatā. tataśca 'trayo guṇāḥ' iti na vaktavyam.

Translation: 773

If you say, it is real, then, since the effects are innumerable the ingredients are also to be postulated as innumerable. And in that case, you should not say that there are three ingredients.

Text: 774

अथ गुणानां त्रित्वम्; तदा कार्यस्यापि त्रित्वं प्राप्नोति, आनन्त्यं हीयते।
atha guṇānāṃ tritvam; tadā kāryasyāpi tritvaṃ prāpnoti, ānantyaṃ hīyate.

Translation: 774

If you say, ingredients are only three, then, effects also should be only three. And in that case, the effects cannot be said to be innumerable.

Text: 775

तथा, कार्यस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वे गुणानामपि प्रत्यक्षत्वम्।
tathā, kāryasya pratyakṣatve guṇānāmapi pratyakṣatvam.

Translation: 775

Similarly, if an effect is perceivable, the ingredients also should be perceivable.

Text: 776

किं विषयं प्रधानानुमानम्? गुणत्रयं प्रधानम्, तच्च उपलब्धम् अलम् अन्वयशक्तिपरिमाण-
वैश्वरूप्योपकार्योपकारकादिसाधनेन।

*kiṁ viṣayaṁ pradhānānumānam? guṇatrayaṁ pradhānam,
tacca upalabdhām alam anvayaśaktiparimāṇavaiśvarūpyopakāryo-
pakāraḥkādisādhanena.*

Translation: 776

What is the object of inference of the gross matter? You say the gross matter has three ingredients. These ingredients are known, then, enough of the factors such as, relation, potentiality, measure, universality, helping factors and those which are helped!

Text: 777

अथ नोपलभ्यते प्रधानम्; तदव्यतिरिक्तं कार्यमपि नोपलभ्येत, तदभावान्न पुरुषसिद्धि-
रूपपद्यते।

*atha nopalabhyate pradhānam; tadavyatiriktam kāryamapi nopala-
bhyeta, tadabhāvānna puruṣasiddhirupapadyate.*

Translation: 777

If you say, pradhāna is not known, then, one should not find an effect identical with that. And in the absence of pradhāna, it is not possible to establish the self.

Text: 778

अथ अतात्त्विकम्; तदा गुणत्रयस्यापि अतात्त्विकत्वम्। तदभावात् न चित्सिद्धौ प्रमाणमस्ति।
तदसिद्धौ परलोकिनोऽभावात् परलोकाभावः।

*atha atāttvikam; tadā guṇatrayasyāpi atāttvikatvam. tadabhāvāt na
citsiddhau pramāṇamasti. tadasiddhau paralokino'bhāvāt paralokā-
bhāvah.*

Translation: 778

If you say, it is unreal, then, the three ingredients also will become unreal. In the absence of that, there will be no proof to establish consciousness. And if consciousness is not established, then, there

will be no people going to the next world and once they are not there, there will not be even the next world.

Text: 779

तदेवं प्रत्यक्षं नोपपद्यते।

tadevaṃ pratyakṣaṃ nopapadyate.

Translation: 779

This is how; one cannot establish any perceptual cognition.

0.8 नैयायिकाभिमतस्यानुमानस्य निरसनम्

[naiyāyikābhimatasyānumānasya nirasanam]

(Refutation of the definition of inference as accepted by the Naiyāyikas)

Text: 780

अथ इदानीमनुमानं विचार्यते—किं पुनरनुमानम्? “तत्पूर्वकमनुमानम्” [न्यायसू. १.१.५] कथम्? कथ्यते— रसवतीप्रदेशे नयनादिव्यापारेण दहनधूमयोः सम्बन्धावधारणं क्रियते, तेन च संस्कारः, तदुत्तरकालं द्वितीयलिङ्गदर्शनम्; तदनन्तरं व्याप्तिस्मरणम्, व्याप्ति-स्मरणानन्तरं परामर्शज्ञानमनुमानं लिङ्गसचिवम्। तदभावे तस्याभावः तत्पूर्वकत्वात्। नहि कारणं विना कार्यं लोके भवदृष्टम्, प्रत्यक्षं च कारणं गीयते तदभावात् कथमनुमानक्लृप्तिः, क्लृप्तौ वा कार्याऽकस्मिकत्वप्रसङ्गः। प्रत्यक्षाभावमङ्गीकृत्य उक्तम्— “अविनाभावसम्बन्धस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्।”

atha idānīmanumānaṃ vicāryate—kiṃ punaranumānam? “tatpūrvakamanumānam” [Nyāyasū.1.1.5] katham? kathyate— rasavatīpra- deśe nayanādivyāpāreṇa dahanadhūmayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam kriyate, tena ca saṃskāraḥ, taduttarakālam dvitīyaliṅgadarśanam; tadanantaram vyāptismaraṇam, vyāptismaraṇānantaram parāmar- śajñānāmanumānam liṅgasacivam. tadabhāve tasyābhāvaḥ tatpūrvakavāt. nahi kāraṇam vinā kāryam loke bhavaddrṣṭam, pratyak- ṣaṃ ca kāraṇam gīyate tadabhāvāt kathamanumānaklṛptiḥ, klṛptau vā kāryā’kasmikatvaprasaṅgaḥ. pratyakṣābhāvamaṅgikṛtya uktam— “avinābhāvasambandhasya grahītumaśakyatvāt.”

Translation: 780

Let us now discuss; inference. What is an inference? The *Nyāya Sūtra* defines inference as “that which is preceded by perception.” How can this definition work? Let us elaborate. In a kitchen

one comes to know the relationship between fire and smoke through the function of eyes. That knowledge produces impression. At a subsequent time, the person observes the smoke second time. Thereafter, there arises the remembrance of the relationship of invariable concomitance (between smoke and fire). After the remembrance of this invariable concomitance, there arises the confirmatory knowledge along with the ground smoke and this is called inference. (In the definition mentioned above), it has been said that inference is preceded by perception. It means that in the absence of the perception, there will be absence of inference. No one has seen in the world, that, there arises an effect without a cause. In this context of inference, you say that perception is the cause. And so in the absence of the perception, how can inference be known? And if it is known, it implies that an effect can arise without a cause. Having accepted the absence of perception it has been said "it is impossible to know the relation of invariable concomitance."

Text: 781

इतोप्यविनाभावसम्बन्धग्रहणानुपपत्तिः—किं सामान्ययोस्सम्बन्धावधारणम्, आहो स्वलक्षणयोः, सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोर्वा?

itopyavinābhāvasambandhagrahaṇānupapattiḥ—kiṁ sāmānyayossambandhāvadhāraṇam āho svalakṣaṇayoḥ sāmānyasvalakṣaṇayorvā?

Translation: 781

For the following reason also, it is not possible to know the invariable concomitance relationship. Because the question arises, is it the knowledge of relationship between two universals? Or, is it the knowledge of relationship between two particulars? Or, is it a relationship between a universal and a particular?

Text: 782

तद्यदि सामान्ययोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्; तदयुक्तम्; सामान्यानुपपत्तेः। तदनुपपत्तिश्च प्रागेवोपपादिता। नापि सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोः, सामान्यासम्भवादेव। नापि स्वलक्षणयोः, दहनधूमव्यक्तीनामानन्त्यात्, अभिन्नानेकानुगामिनिमित्ताऽसम्भवाच्च। तद्भावेऽपि आनन्त्यस्याऽनतिवृत्तेः, अतिवृत्तौ वा भावाभावप्रसङ्गः, तत्प्रसक्तौ च वद इदानीं कस्य सम्बन्धावधारणम्?

tadyadi sāmānyayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam; tadayuktam; sāmānyānupapatteḥ. tadanupapattiśca prāgevopapāditā. nāpi sāmānyasvalakṣaṇayoḥ, sāmānyāsambhavādeva. nāpi svalakṣaṇayoḥ, dahanadhūmavyaktīnāmānantyāt, abhinnānekānugāminimittā'sambhavācca. tadbhāve'pi ānantyasyā'natīvr̥tteḥ, atīvr̥ttau vā bhāvābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ, tatprasaktau ca vada idānīm kasya sambandhāvadhāraṇam?

Translation: 782

There, if you say that, here the relationship between two universals is decided, that will not be proper. Because, there is nothing called universal and we already demonstrated before how it is difficult to establish an entity called universal. Nor can there be relationship between universal and a particular on the same ground of impossibility to establish an entity called universal. Nor can there be relationship between two particulars, because there are innumerable fire individuals and innumerable smoke individuals and there is no possibility of an entity which can be the ground by which the identical individuals can be brought together. Accepting that, that is there, the fault of endless regress cannot be prevented and if it is prevented, still there will arise the contingency of that entity being positive and negative at one and the same time and if that is the consequence, tell us whose relationship are you going to know?

Text: 783

देशकालस्वभावविप्रकर्षाच्च न व्यक्तीनां सम्बन्धावधारणायालं प्रत्यक्षम्। न च सम्बन्धिग्रहणमन्तरेण सम्बन्धबुद्धेरुपपत्तिः तदधिकरणत्वात् सम्बन्धतद्बुद्धयोः। न च सम्बन्धग्रहणसमये सर्वे सम्बन्धिनोऽवभान्ति, अप्रतिभासनात्। न चाप्रतीयमानस्य प्रतीयमानत्वं कल्पयितुं न्याय्यमतिप्रसङ्गात्। अन्यथा हि रासने विज्ञाने रसे प्रतीयमाने रूपमपि कल्प्यं स्यात्।

deśakālasvabhāvaviprakarṣācca na vyaktīnām sambandhāvadhāraṇāya alaṃ pratyakṣam. na ca sambandhigrahaṇamantareṇa sambandhabuddherupapattiḥ tadadhikaraṇatvāt sambandhatadbuddhyoḥ. na ca sambandhagrahaṇasamaye sarve sambandhino'vabhānti,

apratibhāsanāt. na cāpratīyamānasya pratīyamānatvaṃ kalpayitum nyāyāyam, atiprasaṅgāt. anyathā hi rāsane vijñāne rase pratīyamāne rūpamapi kalpyam syāt.

Translation: 783

Because of the distance in space, time and nature, the perception is not capable of deciding the relationship of individuals. Moreover, unless the relata are known, the relationship cannot be known, because, the relation and its knowledge are based on them. It is also not the case that at the time of knowing the relationship, all the relata are known because they do not appear before us. It is also not proper to postulate something as being known when it is not being known because, it will lead to unwanted consequence. Otherwise, in the perception of taste, when the taste is known, one will have to postulate there color also.

Text: 784

अथ अविनाभावसम्बन्धग्रहणकालोपलक्षितकतिपयव्यक्तीनां सम्बन्धावधारणम्, न सर्वासामिति चेत्;

atha avinābhāvasambandhagrahaṇakālopalakṣitakatipayavyaktīnāṃ sambandhāvadhāraṇam, na sarvāsāmiti cet;

Translation: 784

Clarification:

If we say that at the time of knowledge of the invariable concomitance, the relationship of only few individuals is known, not of all individuals.

Text: 785

यद्येवं तासामेव गमकत्वं नान्यासाम्। नहि अन्यस्य सम्बन्धे अन्यस्य गमकत्वमस्ति, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। न जातु देवदत्तनयनघटसम्बन्धे जाते जलादौ ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते नियत-देशकालस्वभावाऽयोगित्वात्।

yadyevam tāsāmeva gamakatvaṃ nānyāsām. nahi anyasya sambandhe anyasya gamakatvamasti, atiprasaṅgāt. na jātu devadattanayanaghaṭasambandhe jāte jalādau jñānamutpadyate niyatadeśa-kālasvabhāvā'yogitvāt.

Translation: 785

Reply:

If you say so, then, only those individuals can become the ground for inferential knowledge and not the other individuals. It is not a fact that, if the relationship is known with something that can be the ground for knowing something else, because this will lead to the fault of over-application. It is not the case that when the eyes of Devadatta are connected with a pot, he gets the knowledge of water.

Text: 786

स्वभाव स्यात्।

*svabhāva syāt.***Translation: 786**

(.....The text is broken and hence does not make any sense.....)

Text: 787

आत्मान्यत्वे च अन्यस्य सम्बन्धे अन्यस्याऽगमकत्वं तदाकारव्यतिरेकात्। अव्यतिरेके वा पर्वते नैकबलकृ धूमाकारानुप्रवेशप्रसङ्गः स्यात्। तदनुप्रवेशे च न तत्संवित्त्यानुमेया अग्निसंवित्तिरुपपद्यते, नालिकेरद्वीपवासिन इव तयोः सम्बन्धानवगतेः। तदनवगतिश्च अनुमेयदहनस्य पिशाचेश्वरतुल्यत्वात्। पावकसम्बन्धिसंवित्तौ सम्बन्धबुद्धेरुपपत्तिरति-प्रसङ्गात्। तस्माद् धूमा लिङ्गावगम इवा तात्त्विक्या दृष्ट्या न केनाप्युत्पाद्यते इति किन्न कल्प्यते धूमबलेन धूमधूमस्वरूपं किमधुनोत्पन्नम्, चिरोत्पन्नम्, कारणद्वा जातम्, आकस्मिकम् मात्रावद्योतकत्वेन पर्यवसिते आकस्मिकमपि स्वरूपमुपपद्यते जगतो वैश्वरूप्यदर्शनात्।

*ātmānyatve ca anyasya sambandhe anyasyā'gamakatvaṃ tadākāra-
vyatirekāt. avyatireke vā parvate naikabalakṛ dhūmākārānuprave-
śaprasaṅgaḥ syāt. tadanupraveśe ca na tatsaṃvittyānumeyā
agnisaṃvittirupapadyate, nālikeradvīpavāsina iva tayoh̄ samba-
ndhānavagateḥ. tadanavagatiśca anumeyadahanasya piśāce-
śvaratulyatvāt. pāvakasambandhisāṃvittau sambandhabuddheru-
papattiratiprasaṅgāt. tasmād dhūmā liṅgāvagama ivā
tāttvikyā dṛṣṭyā na kenāpyutpādyate iti kinna kalpyate dhūmabalena
..... dhūmadhūma- svarūpaṃ kimadhu- notpannam, cirotpannam,
kāraṇādvā jātam, ākasmikam mātrāvadyotakatvena paryavasite
ākasmikamapi svarūpamupapadyate jagato vaiśvarūpyadarśanāt.*

Translation: 787

If the relatum is different from itself, then, something having relationship with something cannot be the ground for inferring something else, because, it will not have that form and if the form is not different, on the mountain (the text is broken..) there will arise the contingency of taking the form of smoke and once that form is taken, on the basis of the knowledge of smoke, there will not arise the knowledge of fire, because like the people living in the island of coconut trees they will not have the relation between smoke and fire. There will be knowledge of relation in the knowledge of that which is related to fire and this will be an unwanted consequence. Therefore, (the text is broken.) like the knowledge of the ground or reason (text is broken) As a matter of fact, by nobody it cannot be produced and therefore, why not is it being postulated on the strength of smoke (the text is broken)? Is the nature of smoke produced now? Or, already produced for a long time? Or, is it produced with its cause? (the text is broken) (the text is broken) When it terminates in revealing the quantity, sometimes a sudden form is also justifiable, because, the universe is of all forms.

Text: 788

अथ आकस्मिकत्वे नियतदेशकालसम्बन्धित्वं न लभ्यते; तन्न युक्तं, तत्स्वभावस्य तस्योत्पत्तेराकस्मिकनियतदेशकालसम्बन्धाभावानवगतेः। एवंभूतं तत् कारणं विनोत्पन्नं यन्नियतदेशकालप्रतिष्ठितदेहम्। एवञ्च स्थिते धूमोपलम्भे सति नानुमेयाग्निप्रतिपत्तिः, अनुपलम्भात्।

atha ākasmikatve niyatadeśakālasambandhitvaṃ na labhyate; tanna yuktam, tatsvabhāvasya tasyotpatterākasmikaniyatadeśakālasambandhābhāvānavagateḥ. evaṃbhūtaṃ tat kāraṇaṃ vinotpannaṃ yanniyatadeśakālapratīṣṭhitadeham. evaṅca sthite dhūmopalambhe sati nānumeyāgnipratīpattiḥ, anupalambhāt.

Translation: 788

If you say, it is without a cause, then, it cannot be said to be related with a particular space and time. It is not proper. Since, it is produced because, it is of the nature of that, one cannot

know the absence of the relationship with a particular space and particular time, with reference to something which has come into being without a cause. Such is the thing which is produced without a cause and which occupies a particular, time and particular place. When this is the case, on the knowledge of smoke, there cannot be inferential knowledge of fire, because, it is not there.

[१. कार्यहेतुकानुमाननिरासाय कार्यत्वस्य खण्डनम्।]

[1. kāryahetukānumānanirāsāya kāryatvasya khaṇḍanam.]

Text: 789

इतोऽपि नानुमेयप्रतिपत्तिः, धूमस्य कार्यरूपत्वाऽऽसम्भवात्। तदनुपपत्तिश्च सत्ताविच्छेद-
स्यानवगतेः।

ito'pi nānumeyapratipattiḥ, dhūmasya kāryarūpatvā'sambhavāt. tadanupapattiśca sattāvicchedasyānavagateḥ.

Translation: 789

For the following reason also, the knowledge of object of an inferential cognition is not possible. Because, the smoke cannot be called an effect. Its impossibility is due to not knowing its disassociation with the existence.

Text: 790

ननु प्रत्यक्षेणैव अवगम्यते;

nanu pratyakṣeṇaiva avagamyate;

Translation: 790

Clarification:

Well it can be known by perception itself.

Text: 791

किं तत् प्रत्यक्षं विधिमुखेन उपजायते, आहो प्रतिषेधमुखेन?

kiṃ tat pratyakṣaṃ vidhimukhena upajāyate, āho pratishedhamukhena?

Translation: 791

Reply:

There the question arises, does this perceptual cognition arise in a positive way or in a negative way?

Text: 792

तद्यदि विधिमुखेन उपादीयते; तत्किं धूमविषयम्, आहो अन्यविषयम्, निर्विषयं वा?
tadyadi vidhimukhena upādīyate; tatkiṁ dhūmaviṣayam, āho anyaviṣayam, nirviṣayam vā?

Translation: 792

If you say, it arises in a positive way, then, one can ask, is it a perception which the object being smoke, or, is it a perception of something else, or, is it a perception having no content at all?

Text: 793

तद्यदि धूमविषयम्; तदा तत्स्वरूपावगाहिना तत्स्वरूपास्तित्वं विधीयते न तत्स्वरूपखण्डना।

tadyadi dhūmaviṣayam; tadā tatsvarūpāvagāhinā tatsvarūpāstitvaṁ vidhīyate na tatsvarūpakhaṇḍanā.

Translation: 793

If you say it is perception of smoke, then, its existence is enjoined by the knowledge in which there is form of smoke and not by knowledge which destroys its form.

Text: 794

अथ अन्यविषयम्; न तर्हि तेन तस्य खण्डना विधीयते तत्स्वरूपवत्, अपि तु यद् यद्विषयं तत् तत्स्यैवाऽस्तित्वं विदधाति।

atha anyaviṣayam; na tarhi tena tasya khaṇḍanā vidhīyate tatsvarūpavat, api tu yad yadviṣayam tat tasyaiivā'stitvaṁ vidadhāti.

Translation: 794

If you say, it is a perception of something else, then, by that its rejection is not possible, like its form. Rather it will enjoin the existence of that which appeared as the object of the knowledge.

Text: 795

अथ निर्विषयम्; न तर्हि तत् किञ्चिद् विदधाति नापि प्रतिषेधति मूकान्धबधिरतुल्यत्वात्।
atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi tat kiñcid vidadhāti nāpi pratiṣedhati mūkāndhabadhiratulyatvāt.

Translation: 795

If you say it is perception without content, then, it means that, it does not enjoin anything, nor does it negate anything, because it will be similar to someone who is deaf and dumb.

Text: 796

अथ प्रतिषेधमुखेन उपादीयते; तदपि किं धूमविषयम्, आहो अन्यविषयम्, निर्विषयं वा?
atha pratiṣedhamukhena upādīyate; tadapi kiṁ dhūmaviṣayam, āho anyaviṣayam, nirviṣayam vā?

Translation: 796

If you say, it is taken in a negative way, is that also knowledge of which smoke is the object or something else is the object, or it has no object at all?

Text: 797

तद्यदि धूमविषयम्; तदा तत्सत्तोपनिबद्धं तत्स्वरूपास्तित्वविधायकं न तु व्यावर्तकम्।
tadyadi dhūmaviṣayam; tadā tatsattopanibaddham tatsvarūpāstītvaviḍāyakam na tu vyāvarttakam.

Translation: 797

If you say, the object is smoke, then, whatever is associated with its existence, will enjoin the existence of its form or nature and it will not exclude it.

Text: 798

अथ अन्यविषयम्; अन्यविषयपर्यवसायिना न तत्सत्ताखण्डना अवद्योत्यते तत्सत्तावत्।
atha anyaviṣayam; anyaviṣayaparyavasāyīnā na tatsattākhaṇḍanā avadyotyate tatsattāvat.

Translation: 798

If it is a perception of something else, then, it does not imply the rejection of its existence by that which culminates in having something as its object, because it exists there like the existence.

Text: 799

अथ निर्विषयम्; न तत् किञ्चिद्विदधाति नापि प्रतिषेधति मूढात्मतयोत्पत्तेः।
atha nirviṣayam; na tat kiñcidvidadhāti nāpi pratiṣedhati mūḍhātmatayotpatteḥ.

Translation: 799

If you say, it is without object, then, it does not enjoin anything, nor does it reject anything, because it emerges without any consciousness.

Text: 800

अथ सत्ताविच्छेदो हि प्रध्वंसः, सोऽनेन आत्मसात् क्रियते;

atha sattāvicchedo hi pradhvaṁsah, so'neṇa ātmasāt kriyate;

Translation: 800

Clarification:

Well, the destruction means disassociation with existence and that is being adopted by it.

Text: 801

नेदं चतुरस्रं वचः। प्रध्वंसो हि विषयान्तरम्, तत्रोत्पन्नं विज्ञानं तत्स्वरूपास्तित्वविधायकं न तु कस्यचित् प्रतिषेधकम्। तस्मिंश्च संवेद्यमाने न कस्यचित् खण्डनाऽवगम्यते स्वविषयपर्यवसायीनि विज्ञानानि स्वविषयास्तित्वविधानपराणि। का कस्य खण्डना?

nedam caturasram vacah. pradhvaṁso hi viṣayāntaram, tatrotpannam vijñānam tatsvarūpāstitvavidhāyakam na tu kasyacit pratiṣedhakam. tasmimśca sanvedyamāne na kasyacit khaṇḍanā'vagamyate svaviṣayaparyavasāyīni vijñānāni svaviṣayāstitvavidhānaparāṇi. kā kasya khaṇḍanā?

Translation: 801

Reply:

This will not have intermittent answer. Destruction is something else. The knowledge of it enjoins existence of its nature. It does not reject anything, when that is known, rejection of nothing is understood. The knowledges which terminate in their own content they convey enjoining of existence of its own. Who rejects whose existence?

Text: 802

अथ प्रध्वंसज्ञाने धूमस्वरूपं न प्रतिभाति, तेनासौ तस्य खण्डना इति चेत्;

atha pradhvaṁsajñāne dhūmasvarūpaṁ na pratibhāti, tenāsau tasya khaṇḍanā iti cet;

Translation: 802

Objection:

Well in the knowledge of destruction, the nature of smoke does not appear and therefore, it is said that it is rejection of that.

Text: 803

यद्येवं त्रैलोक्यस्य खण्डना, तस्मिन् धूमध्वंसज्ञाने त्रैलोक्यं नावभाति, त्रैलोक्यात्मको वा न भवति ध्वंसः।

yadyevam trailokyasya khaṇḍanā, tasmīn dhūmadhvamsajñāne trailokyam nāvabhāti, trailokyātmako vā na bhavati dhvamsaḥ.

Translation: 803

Reply:

If it is so, there can be rejection of the three worlds, because when that knowledge of destruction of smoke arises, the three worlds do not appear, or in other words, the destruction does not take the form of the three worlds.

[२. प्रसङ्गात् विरोधपदार्थस्य विकल्प्य दूषणम्।]

[2. prasaṅgāt virodhapadārthasya vikalpya dūṣaṇam.]

Text: 804

अथ धूमविरोधित्वेन असौ धूमस्य खण्डना इति चेत्;

atha dhūmavirodhitvena asau dhūmasya khaṇḍanā iti cet;

Translation: 804

Clarification:

Well, that is called rejection of smoke, because it opposes smoke.

Text: 805

कः पुनरसौ विरोधार्थः? किम्-अतदाकारता, आहो असमानकालीनता तत्सद्भावे तस्यानुपलम्भो वा, तज्जन्यता वा, तज्जनकत्वं वा, भिन्नक्रियाकर्तृत्वं वा, भिन्नहेतू-त्पाद्यत्वं वा, आश्रितानाश्रितत्वं वा?

kaḥ punarasau virodhārthaḥ? kim-atadākaratā, āho asamānakālīnatā tatsadbhāve tasyānupalambho vā, tajjanyatā vā, tajjanakativam vā, bhinnakriyākartṛtvaṁ vā, bhinnahetūtūtpādyatvaṁ vā, āśritānāśritatvaṁ vā?

Translation: 805

Reply:

What is the meaning of opposition? Does it mean not having the form of that? Or does it mean not being of the same time? Or, does it mean in the presence of X, in the presence of Y? or, does it mean

being caused by that? or, does it mean it is produced by that? or, does it mean being an agent of different actions? Does it mean the state of being produced by different causes? or, does it mean the state of not being located in that which is located?

Text: 806

तद्यदि तावद् अतदाकारता विरोधः; तदा त्रैलोक्यस्य सा खण्डना, न केवलं धूमस्य, त्रैलोक्याकारपरिहारेण तत्स्थितेः।

tadyadi tāvad atadākāratā virodhaḥ; tadā trailokyasya sā khaṇḍanā, na kevalam dhūmasya, trailakyākāraparihāreṇa tatsthiteḥ.

Translation: 806

If you say by opposition, of having the form of that, that will mean rejection of three worlds, because that exists devoid of the form of the three worlds and not only of the smoke.

Text: 807

अथ असमानकालीनता विरोधार्थः; तदा अतीतानागतवर्तमानकालानामन्योन्यविरोधित्व-प्रसङ्गः। न चासना-(चासमान)कालीनता स स्वभावेन उभयोः स्वभावोपपत्तेः।

atha asamānakālīnatā virodhārthaḥ; tadā atītānāgatavartamānakālānamanyonyavirodhitvaprasaṅgaḥ. na cāsana-(cāsamāna)kālinatā sa svabhāvena ubhayoḥ svabhāvopapatteḥ.

Translation: 807

If you say, the meaning of opposition is not belonging to one and the same time, then, the things of past, present and future will contradict one another. That cannot be said to be belonging to different time, because individual nature can be justified by their own nature.

Text: 808

अथ तत्सद्भावे तस्यानुपलब्धिः विरोधार्थः; तदा अतिदूरादिनिमित्तोपनिपाते सति तदनुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा, न च तेषां तत्खण्डनात्मता। तथा, दीपाभावे घटधूमादेरनुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा, न च सा घटधूमादेः सत्ता खण्डिता।

atha tatsadbhāve tasyānupalabdhiḥ virodhārthaḥ; tadā atidūrādinimittopanipāte sati tadanupalabdhirdṛṣṭā, naca teṣāṃ tatkhaṇḍanātmatā. tathā, dipābhāve ghaṭadhūmāderanupalabdhirdṛṣṭā, na ca sā ghaṭadhūmādeḥ sattā khaṇḍitā.

Translation: 808

If you say, in the presence of X, absence of Y, is the meaning of the term opposition, then, it is a fact that when something is at a far distance, due to the ground of distance, that thing is not visible. But that does not amount to rejection of that thing; in the same way, when there is no land we do have experience of absence of pot, smoke etc. But that does not amount to the rejection of the existence of pot, smoke etc.

Text: 809

अथ दूरादिनिमित्तोपनिपाते यत्रानुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा तत्रोपलब्धिरपि पुनर्दृष्टा, इह तु पुनः ध्वंसे सञ्जाते न जातु धूमकुम्भादेरुपलब्धिरस्ति।

atha dūrādinimittopanipāte yatrānupalabdhirḍṣṭā tatropalabdhirapi punarḍṣṭā, iha tu punaḥ dhvaṁse sañjāte na jātu dhūmakumbhāderupalabdhirasti.

Translation: 809

Clarification:

However, in a situation where the circumstances such as longer distance etc. crop up, and because of that, there is no knowledge, in that case, we do find that, there is perception again. Here, however, once the destruction has taken place there is no knowledge of smoke, pot etc.

Text: 810

केन नोपलभ्यते? किं केनापि, आहो सर्वज्ञातृभिः?

kena nopalabhyate? kiṁ kenāpi, āho sarvajñātṛbhiḥ?

Translation: 810

Reply:

By whom it is not perceived? Is it by anybody? Or by one who knows everything?

Text: 811

तद्यदि केनापि नोपलभ्यते, तेन तदा तस्य स्वरूपखण्डना; तदयुक्तम्, दूरा[व]रणादि-निमित्तोपनिपाते सति यथैके तमर्थं न पश्यन्ति अपरे पश्यन्ति, एवं सति सञ्जाते ध्वंसे तमर्थम् एके नोपलभन्ते अन्ये तु उपलप्स्यन्त इति।

tadyadi kenāpi nopalabhyate, tena tadā tasya svarūpakhaṇḍanā; tadayuktam, dūrā[va]raṇādinimittopanipāte sati yathaike tamartham na paśyanti apare paśyanti, evaṃ sati sañjāte dhvaṃse tamartham eke nopalabhante anye tu upalapsyanta iti.

Translation: 811

If you say, it is not known by anybody and therefore its form is denied, it will not be proper, because, as due to the factors such as distance, cover, etc. people do not see a particular thing, but others can see it, in the same way, when destruction occurs, some people do not see it but others will.

Text: 812

अथ सर्वज्ञातृभिर्नोपलभ्यते; कानुमा? 'एतदनुभवविकलाः सर्वे ज्ञातारः'; न मानमस्ति, परचित्तवृत्तीनां दुस्त्वयत्वाद् बुद्धिवैचित्र्यस्य च उपपत्तेः।
atha sarvajñātṛbhirnopalabhyate; kānumā? 'etadanubhavavikalāḥ sarve jñātārah'; na mānamasti, paracittavṛttīnāṃ duranvayatvāt buddhivaicitryasya ca upapatteḥ.

Translation: 812

If you say that, it is not known by those who are all-knowing, what will be the inferential knowledge there? Will it be like “all knowers are devoid of experience of this?” There is no proof for this, because, the mental states of others are inaccessible and it is also a fact that, different people have different knowledges.

Text: 813

ध्वंसे सति अनुपलब्धिः किं-नियतदेशकाले, सर्वदा वा?
dhvaṃse sati anupalabdhiḥ kiṃ-niyatadeśakāle, sarvadā vā?

Translation: 813

After the destruction, does the knowledge of absence take place at a particular space and a particular time? Or does it occur always?

Text: 814

तद्यदि नियतदेशकाले अनुपलब्धिः; तदा न सत्तापगमोऽवगम्यते, सिद्धसाध्यतया च बोद्धव्याः।
tadyadi niyatadeśakāle anupalabdhiḥ; tadā na sattāpagamo'vagamyate, siddhasādhyatayā ca boddhavyāḥ.

Translation: 814

If you say that, such knowledge of absence occurs at a particular space and time, then, it means that, the absence of existence is not understood. They should be understood as something which is going to be established that which is already known.

Text: 815

अथ सर्वदेशकाले नोपलभ्यते; तदयुक्तम्, न नियामकं किञ्चिद् बीजमस्ति, न च बीजमन्त-
रेणाभ्युपगमो युक्तः।

*atha sarvadeśakāle nopalabhyate; tadayuktam, na niyāmakam kiñcid
bījamasti, na ca bījamantareṇābhyupagamo yuktaḥ.*

Translation: 815

If you say that, it is not known in all space and time, it will not be proper, because there is no ground to specify it. It is not proper to accept anything without a ground.

Text: 816

अथ ध्वंसे सति सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वे कथं वस्तुत्वसंस्थितिः?

atha dhvaṁse sati sarvopākhyārahitatve katham vastuṭvasaṁsthitih?

Translation: 816

Objection:

Well, after the destruction a thing loses all its reference and so how can that be called an entity?

Text: 817

कदा सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वम्? किम् उपलब्ध्यवस्थायाम्, आहो अनुपलब्ध्यवस्थायाम्?
*kadā sarvopākhyārahitatvam? kim upalabdhyavasthāyām, āho anu-
palabdhyavasthāyām?*

Translation: 817

Reply:

There we would like to ask, when did it lose its reference? Is at the time when it is known or at the time when it is not known?

Text: 818

तद्यदि उपलब्धिमधिकृत्योच्यते; उपलभ्यते च सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वं च इति चित्रम्।
*tadyadi upalabdhimadhikṛtyocyate; upalabhyate ca sarvopākhyā-
rahitatvam ca iti citram.*

Translation: 818

If you say that, we are referring to the time when it is known, this is not understandable, because, it is funny to say that, it is known and at the same time, it has lost all its reference.

Text: 819

अथ अनुपलब्धवस्थामङ्गीकृत्योच्यते सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वम्; तदयुक्तम्, दूरावरणादि-
निमित्तोपनिपाते सति अनुपलब्धौ सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वं सत्त्वं च इत्यनेकान्तः। यदि च ध्वंसे
सति अत्यन्तानुपलम्भः; अनुपलम्भप्रपञ्चोऽयं न तत्स्वरूपस्यातावद(तादव)स्थ्यम्,
आवराणादिकृतानुपलम्भे यथा।

*atha anupalabdhyavasthāmaṅgīkṛtyocyate sarvopākhyārahitatvam;
tadayuktam, dūrāvaraṇādīnimittopanipāte sati anupalabdhou
sarvopā- khyārahitvaṁ sattvaṁ ca ityanekāntaḥ. yadi ca dhvaṁse
sati atyantānupalambhaḥ; anupalambhaprapañco'yaṁ na tatsvarū-
pasyaṭāvada(tādava)sthyam, āvaraṇādīkṛtānupalambhe yathā.*

Translation: 819

If you say that, we are saying so accepting the state of its non-knowledge and because of that, the state of its being devoid of all references, it will not be proper, because, when there is no knowledge after the presence of the grounds such as longer distance, cover etc. there is lack of all references and at the same time, there is existence. This is inconsistent. If after the destruction, there is absolute absence of knowledge, then, this description of non-knowledge of its form remains as it is, as we can see in the case of non-knowledge caused by covering a thing.

Text: 820

तज्जन्यता विरोधार्थः; तदा दण्डादिनापि जनितत्वात् तद्विरोधित्वप्रसङ्गः। न च
व्यापारातिशयोऽस्ति, तं प्रति क्रियातिरेकस्य अनुपलब्धिः(ब्धेः)।

*tajjanyatā virodhārthaḥ; tadā daṇḍādīnāpi janitatvāt tadviro-
dhitvaprasaṅgaḥ. na ca vyāpārātiśayo'sti, taṁ prati kriyātirekasya
anupalabdhiḥ(bdheḥ).*

Translation: 820

If you say that, the state of being produced by that, is the meaning of opposition, then, since a pot is produced by the stick, it will be

considered in opposition with that. You cannot say that, there is an additional factor viz. function, because with reference to that, the additional function is not seen.

Text: 821

अथ तज्जनकत्वं विरोधार्थः; तदयुक्तम्, न घटधूमात्मा तद् ध्वंसोत्पाद्यः तैरेव अनभ्युपगमात्। यदि च तज्जनकत्वेन विरोधित्वम्; तदा अभावज्ञानस्य अभावो विरोधी स्यात्।
atha tajjanakatvaṁ virodhārthaḥ; tadayuktam, na ghaṭadhūmātmā tad dhvaṁsotpādyah taireva anabhyupagamāt. yadi ca tajjanakatvena virodhitvam; tadā abhāvaññānasya abhāvo virodhī syāt.

Translation: 821

If you say, the state of producing that is the meaning of opposition then, that will also not be proper, because, the form of pot and smoke is not produced by their destruction, because, they themselves do not accept it. If something is taken as “opposing” because, it is produced by something, then, absence should be called opposing the knowledge of absence.

Text: 822

अथ भिन्नार्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वम्; तदा सर्वे सर्वस्य विरोधिनः प्राप्नुवन्ति।
atha bhinnārthakriyākartṛtvam; tadā sarve sarvasya virodhinaḥ prāpnuvanti.

Translation: 822

If you say, the state of being the agent of different fruitful activities is the meaning of opposition, then, everything will be opposing everything.

Text: 823

अथ भिन्नहेतूत्पाद्यत्वं विरोधार्थः; तदयुक्तम्, एकेन देवदत्तेन कुम्भतद्विच्छेदयोरुत्पाद्यमानत्वात्।
atha bhinnahetūtpādyatvaṁ virodhārthaḥ; tadayuktam, ekena devadattena kumbha-tadvicchedayorutpadyamānatvāt.

Translation: 823

If you say that, the state of being produced by different causes is the meaning of opposition, that will not be proper because by single Devadatta both the pot and its destruction can be produced.

Text: 824

यदि च नियतहेतूपाद्यत्वेन विरुद्धत्वं जेगीयते सदसतोः; तदा सर्वे भावा नियतसामग्र्या उत्पाद्या अन्योन्यविरोधिनो भवेयुः। नित्यानित्याकारयोर्विरोधप्रसङ्गः, नित्याकारस्य निर्बीजत्वात्, बीजवत्त्वे वा नित्यतैव न स्यात्।

yadi ca niyatahetūtpādyatvena viruddhatvaṃ jegīyate sadasatoḥ; tadā sarve bhāvā niyatasāmagryā utpādyā anyonyavirodhino bhaveyuh. nityānityākārayorvirodhaprasaṅgaḥ, nityākārasya nirbījatvāt, bījavatve vā nityataiva na syāt.

Translation: 824

If you say that, a positive and a negative entities are produced by specific causes and this is what you mean opposition, then, all positive entities will be opposing one another, since they are produced by specific set of causes. There will arise contingency of opposition between eternal form and non-eternal form, because the eternal form is without a cause and if that is produced by a cause, then, that will lose its character of being eternal.

Text: 825

अथ आश्रितानाश्रितत्वं विरोधार्थः; तदा आत्मज्ञानयोः विरोधित्वमापनीपद्यते,
atha āśritānāśritatvaṃ virodhārthaḥ; tadā ātmajñānayoḥ virodhitvamāpanīpadyate,

Translation: 825

If you say that, the state of being dependent (located) and not dependent (not located) is the meaning of opposition, then, there will be opposition of self and knowledge of self.

Text: 826

कुम्भापगमस्य सर्वविरोधित्वं प्राप्नोति, आश्रितानाश्रितत्वस्याऽविशेषात्।
kumbhāpagamasya sarvavirodhitvaṃ prāpnoti, āśritānāśritatvasyā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 826

(Similarly), the removal of a pot will oppose everything because, it is all the same viz. located and not located.

Text: 827

न च सम्बन्धमन्तरेण षष्ठी सम्पद्यते, अपि तु सम्बन्धे सति देवदत्तनयनतुर्गव्यपदेशो यथा।

na ca sambandhamantareṇa ṣaṣṭhī sampadyate, api tu sambandhe sati devadattanayanaturagavyapadeśo yathā.

Translation: 827

Without a relation there cannot be a genitive case-ending. Rather, where there is a relation, there can be reference to eyes of Devadatta or horse of Devadatta.

Text: 828

अथ सम्बन्धमन्तरेण कुम्भाभावव्यपदेशोऽभ्युपगम्यते; तदास्तं गतं विश्वं स्यात्, सम्बन्धाभावस्याऽविशेषात्।

atha sambandhamantareṇa kumbhābhāvavyapadeśo 'bhyupagamyate; tadāstaṁ gataṁ viśvaṁ syāt, sambandhābhāvasyā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 828

If you say, you accept the reference of absence of pot without revelation, then, the entire universe is lost, because, there is no difference in the absence of relation.

[३. हेतुफलसम्बन्धावधारणस्यानुपपत्तिप्रकटनम्।]

[3. *hetuphalasambandhāvadhāraṇasyānupapattiprakāṣanam.*]

Text: 829

इतोऽपि हेतुफलसम्बन्धावधारणं नोपपद्यते—किं निरुपचरितकारणग्रहणानन्तरं गृह्यते कार्यम्, आहोस्विद् उपचरितकारणग्रहणानन्तरम्?

ito'pi hetuphalasambandhāvadhāraṇaṁ nopapadyate—kiṁ nirupacaritakāraṇagrahaṇānantaraṁ grhyate kāryam, āhosvid upacaritakāraṇagrahaṇānantaram?

Translation: 829

For the following reason also it is not possible to determine the relationship between cause and effect: Is it the case that an effect is known after the knowledge of unimagined cause or after the knowledge of imagined cause?

Text: 830

यदि निरुपचरितकारणग्रहणानन्तरं गृह्यते; तदयुक्तम्, साम्प्रया अतीन्द्रियत्वेन संवेदना-योगात्।

yadi nirupacaritakāraṇagrahaṇānantaram grhyate; tadayuktam, sāmagryā atīndriyatvena samvedanāyogāt.

Translation: 830

If you say that, an effect is known after the knowledge of unimagined cause, that will not be proper, because, as the collection of factors is beyond the range of sense organs, there cannot be any knowledge.

Text: 831

अथ उपचरितकारणानन्तरीयकत्वेन तद् गृह्यते तेन तस्य तत् फलम्; तदयुक्तम्, उपचरितस्य कारणत्वमेव न विद्यते कथं तत् फलतां याति। अन्यच्च, तन्तूनां कार्यं वस्तुं(स्त्रं) किम्-पूर्वापरकालभावित्वेन, आहो पूर्वापरग्रहणेन?

atha upacaritakāraṇānantarīyakatvena tad grhyate tena tasya tat phalam; tadayuktam, upacaritasya kāraṇatvameva na vidyate katham tat phalatām yāti. anyacca, tantūnām kāryam vastūm (stram)kim-pūrvāparakālabhāvitvena, āho pūrvāparagrahaṇena?

Translation: 831

If you say that, the effect is known because of a set of imagined causes and therefore, this is an effect of that, that will not be proper because that which is imagined cannot be called the cause at all, how can anything be called an effect of that? Moreover, you say that, the cloth is an effect of its threads, there the question arises, is it because there is temporal sequence between them? Or, because their sequence is known?

Text: 832

तद्यदि पूर्वापरकालभावित्वेन; तदा नियतकारणकार्यत्वं न लभ्यते अम्बरफलस्य, तत्समानकालीनाऽनेककार्योत्पादकानां तत्पूर्वापरकालभावित्वाविशेषात्।

tadyadi pūrvāparakālabhāvitvena; tadā niyatakāraṇakāryatvam na labhyate ambaraphalasya, tatsamānakālīnā'nekakāryotpādakānām tatpūrvāparakālabhāvitvāviśeṣāt.

Translation: 832

If you say that, there is temporal sequence between them, then, we cannot specify that, such-and-such effect is caused by such-and-such cause. Under the sky, there are many effects coming into being in a sequence of time and at one and the same time, out of many causes

of the same time and there is no difference in that [therefore how to decide, what the cause is and what the effect is?]

Text: 833

अथ अन्वयव्यतिरेकयुक्तस्य यस्य पूर्वकालभावित्वं तत्कारणं तदस्ति, ध्रुवभावि-
कार्यदर्शनात्।

*atha anvayavyatirekayuktasya yasya pūrvakālabhāvitvam tatkāra-
ṇam tadasti, dhruvabhāvīkāryadarśanāt.*

Translation: 833

Clarification:

Well, by the application of the principle of positive and negative concomitance, between X and Y, one can decide that if X invariably precedes Y, then, X is the cause of Y.

Text: 834

अन्वयव्यतिरेकशब्देन किमभिधीयते? किम्-कारणम्, अन्यद्वा?

anvayavyatirekaśabdena kimabhidhīyate? kim-kāraṇam, anyadvā?

Translation: 834

Reply:

What do you mean by the term positive and negative concomitance?
Does it mean a cause or something else?

Text: 835

तद्यदि कारणम्; तदा न किञ्चिद् बाध्यते कारणात्मतया तत्कारणम्।

*tadyadi kāraṇam; tadā na kiñcid bādhyate kāraṇātmatayā
tatkāraṇam.*

Translation: 835

If you say, it means a cause, then, nothing is obstructing and
therefore, in the form of cause, it is a cause.

Text: 836

अथ अन्यत् तत्; न जानीमः किं तद् इति? न च पूर्वापरभावः सिद्धोऽत्र ज्ञानमन्तरेण।
ज्ञानं विना न जाने किं सहोत्पन्नौ, पूर्वापरभावोत्पन्नौ वा, अनुत्पन्नौ वा?

*atha anyat tat; na jānīmaḥ kiṁ tad iti? na ca pūrvāparabhāvaḥ
siddho 'tra jñānamantareṇa. jñānam vinā na jāne kiṁ sahotpannau,
pūrvāparabhāvotpannau vā, anutpannau vā?*

Translation: 836

If you say, it is something else, we do not know what is that something else. The sequence cannot be decided without the knowledge. Without the knowledge we do not know whether they are produced together or produced in a sequence, or they are not produced at all.

Text: 837

अथ पूर्वापरग्रहणक्रमेण पूर्वापरोत्पाद-तदभावव्यवस्था इति चेत्;

atha pūrvāparagrahaṇakrameṇa pūrvāparotpāda-tadabhāvavyavasthā itī cet;

Translation: 837

Clarification:

We can decide effect's coming into being in a sequence or not coming into being in a sequence, by the sequence of knowledge of what precedes and what follows.

Text: 838

तदेतदपि ग्रहणेऽपि तुल्यम्। सती सत्ता संवेद्यते नाऽसती। सहोत्पन्नयोरपि क्रमेण ग्रहणं दृष्टं गोविषाणयोः। अनुत्पन्नयोश्च गोत्वाऽस्तित्वयोः। तथा, पटग्रहणानन्तरं तन्तूनां ग्रहणं दृष्टम्। तथा, एकमेव ग्रहणं दृष्टम्, न च तयोर्भेदोऽस्ति, न च तयोर्हेतुफलभावः। यथा च भेदो नास्ति तथाप्रागेव प्रपञ्चितम्।

*tadetadapi grahaṇe'pi tulyam. satī sattā samvedyate nā'satī. sahotpannayorapi krameṇa grahaṇam dṛṣṭam govīṣāṇayoḥ anutpanna-
yośca gotvā'stitvayoḥ. tathā, paṭagrahaṇānantaram tantūnām graha-
ṇam dṛṣṭam. tathā, ekameva grahaṇam dṛṣṭam, na ca tayorbhe-
do'sti, naca tayorhetuphalabhāvaḥ. yathā ca bhedo nāsti tathā-
prāgeva prapañcitam.*

Translation: 838

Reply:

Even this remains the same, even when it is known. If something exists, its existence is known and not otherwise. One can have knowledge of two things in a sequence, in spite of the fact that, the two things are produced simultaneously as it can be seen, as it is known of the two horns of a cow. We have also seen that the

two things, which are not produced, that are eternal, also can be known in a sequence e.g. the universal of universal of “cowness” and “existence”. In the same way after the knowledge of cloth, knowledge of threads is also seen. Thus, there is only one knowledge and there is no difference between the two. There is no relationship between the two called cause and effect. That there is no difference has already been discussed before.

Text: 839

एवं संवेदनमपि संवेद्यात् न भिद्यते सदाकारतया, न च तयोराकारान्तरमस्ति, एकं हि वस्तु।
evam saṁvedanamapi saṁvedyāt na bhidyate sadākāratayā, na ca tayorākārāntaramasti, ekaṁ hi vastu.

Translation: 839

Similarly, knowledge is also not different from what is known in the form of a positive entity. It is also not the case that the two have two different forms. In reality, there is only one entity.

Text: 840

इतोऽपि हेतुफलयोर्विज्ञानं न वेदनम्, यथा उत्पन्नं विज्ञानं स्वसंवेदनं न भवति,
 विज्ञानाकारातिरिक्ताकारान्तरविरहात्।
ito'pi hetuphalayorvijñānam na vedanam, yathā utpannam vijñānam svasaṁvedanam na bhavati, vijñānākārātiriktākārāntaravirahāt.

Translation: 840

Because of the following ground also the knowledge of cause and effect is not an experience: As a knowledge when produced, is not said to be revealer of itself, because there is no form other than the form of knowledge.

Text: 841

अथ क्रियातिरेकापायेऽपि स्वसंवेदनमपदिश्यते;
atha kriyātirekāpāye'pi svasaṁvedanamapadiśyate;

Translation: 841

Clarification:

Well, even if there is no additional activity, there is reference to self-illumination.

Text: 842

अस्वसंवेदनं किं न व्यपदिश्यते, क्रियातिरेकाभावस्याऽविशेषात्?

asvasaṁvedanaṁ kiṁ na vyapadiśyate, kriyātirekābhāvasyā'viśeṣāt?

Translation: 842

Reply:

Then what is the reason that absence of self-illumination is not referred to. Because, even there, there is absence of additional activity?

Text: 843

तथा, अर्थस्यापि न तद्वेदनम्।

tathā, arthasyāpi na tadvedanam.

Translation: 843

In the same way, there cannot be knowledge of even the object.

Text: 844

अथ कथं तत् अर्थस्य वेदनं न भवति?

atha katham tat arthasya vedanaṁ na bhavati?

Translation: 844

Objection:

Then how will you call it the knowledge of the object?

Text: 845

कथ्यते-तत् सत्तामात्रेण अर्थस्य वेदनम्, तज्जन्यतया वा?

kathyate-tat sattāmātreṇa arthasya vedanam, tajjanyatayā vā?

Translation: 845

Reply:

Is it the case that there is knowledge of object by mere existence, or is it because it is caused by that?

Text: 846

तद्यदि सत्तामात्रेण अर्थस्य वेदनम्; तदा विश्वस्य तद्वेदनं स्यात् तद्वेहाविशेषात्।

tadyadi sattāmātreṇa arthasya vedanam; tadā viśvasya tadvedanam syāt taddehāviśeṣāt.

Translation: 846

If you say that, there is knowledge of object by mere existence, then, there should be knowledge of the whole world? Because there is no difference in the body of the universe.

Text: 847

अथ तज्जन्यतया तत्संवेदनमुद्गीयते; तदा नयनालोकेश्वरादेरपि तत् संवेदनमापद्यते, तैर्जन्यमानत्वोपपत्तेः। न चार्थस्य व्यापारातिरेकोऽस्ति, क्रियातिरेकस्यानधिगतेः। व्यापारातिरेके हि नियतफलोऽर्थः स्यात्।

atha tajjanyatayā tatsaṁvedanamudgīyate; tadā nayanālokeśvarāderapi tat saṁvedanamāpadyate, tairjanyamānatvopapatteḥ. na cārthasya vyāpārātireko'sti, kriyātirekasyānadhigateḥ. vyāpārātireke hi niyataphalo'rthaḥ syāt.

Translation: 847

If you say that, some knowledge is called knowledge of that object, because, it is produced by that, then, since a knowledge is produced by eyes, light, God etc. it should be called knowledge of eyes, light and God. Because, one can easily justify that, it is produced by them. There is no additional function of an object, because, one does not know that additional activity. Had there been additional function, an object could have been accepted as the result of a specific object.

Text: 848

भवतु;

bhavatu;

Translation: 848

Objection:

Let it be, what is the harm?

Text: 849

न, अदृष्टत्वात्, एकं हि इदं फलं कारककदम्बसम्पाद्यम्। ततश्चार्थसंवेदनवत् तत्सर्व-कारकसंवेदनवत्त्वप्रसङ्गः।

na, adṛṣṭatvāt, ekaṁ hi idaṁ phalaṁ kārakakadambasampādyam. tataścārthasaṁvedanavat tatsarvakārakasaṁvedanavattva-prasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 849

Reply:

No, it cannot be, because, it is not experienced by anybody. This is a single effect, which is accomplished by a collection of factors. Thus,

like the knowledge of an object, there will arise the contingency of knowledge of all the factors of that collection.

Text: 850

अथ कारकान्तरस्य न तत् वेदनम्; अर्थस्यापि न तत् वेदनम्। तदभावात्तद् हेतुफलभावावगमः। तदनवगतौ च न कार्यं दृष्ट्वा कारणं प्रत्येति।

atha kārakāntarasya na tat vedanam; arthasyāpi na tat vedanam. tadabhāvānna hetuphalabhāvāvagamaḥ tadanavagatau ca na kāryam dṛṣṭvā kāraṇam pratyeti.

Translation: 850

If you say that, it is not the knowledge of other factors, we say that, it is also not the knowledge of that object and in the absence of that, there is no knowledge of cause and effect relationship. And once the cause and effect relationship is not known, no one can have the knowledge of its cause by seeing an effect.

Text: 851

अपि च, कार्यं दृष्ट्वा किमयमनुमाता कारणं स्मरति, आहो प्रत्येति?

api ca, kāryam dṛṣṭvā kimayamanumātā kāraṇam smarati, āho pratyeti?

Translation: 851

Moreover, after seeing the effect, is it the fact that the inferer remembers the cause or deduces it?

Text: 852

तद्यदि स्मरति; तन्नाननुभूतं स्मर्त्तुमीशः।

tadyadi smarati; tannānanubhūtam smarttumīśaḥ.

Translation: 852

If you say that, he remembers he is not capable of remembering because, he has not experienced it before.

Text: 853

अथ प्रत्येति; तत्रापि किमुपचरितं प्रत्येति, आहो निरुपचरितम्?

atha pratyeti; tatrāpi kimupacaritam pratyeti, āho nirupacaritam?

Translation: 853

If you say that, he deduces it, there also the question arises whether he deduces something which is imagined or unimagined?

Text: 854

तद्यदि उपचरितं प्रत्येति; तदयुक्तम्, तेन सह सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः, अकारकत्वेन गमकत्वानुपपत्तिः।

tadyadi upacaritaṁ pratyeti; tadayuktam, tena saha sambandhānupapattēḥ, akāraikatvena gamakatvānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 854

If you say, he deduces something which is imagined, that will not be proper, because, with that, there cannot be the relation of invariable concomitance, since it will not be a causal factor, it cannot be treated as the ground for deduction.

Text: 855

अथ निरुपचरितं प्रत्येति; तत्रापि किम्-विद्यमानमविद्यमानं वा?

atha nirupacaritaṁ pratyeti; tatrāpi kim-vidyamānamavidyamānaṁ vā?

Translation: 855

If you say, he deduces something which is unimagined, there also the question comes to our mind, whether he deduces something which is existent or non-existent.

Text: 856

तद्यदि विद्यमानम्; तदयुक्तम्, जनकत्वयोगेन जनकमपदिश्यते, यथा दण्डयोगेन दण्डी, द्रव्यत्वयोगेन द्रव्यम्। न भवतां पक्षे जनकत्वयुक्तस्य अनेककालाऽन्तरावस्थानमस्ति, कार्यानेकत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

tadyadi vidyamānam; tadayuktam, janakatvayogena janakamapadiśyate, yathā daṇḍayogena daṇḍī, dravyatvayogena dravyam. na bhavatāṁ pakṣe janakatvayuktasya anekakālā'ntarāvasthānamasti, kāryānekatvaprasaṅgāt.

Translation: 856

If you say, he deduces something which is existent, it will not be proper, because, on account of something being the producer, something is called as the producer e.g. someone is called 'man with a stick' only when he has association with the stick. Similarly, something is called a substance only when it has association with substanceness. According to your doctrine, however, nothing which

is associated with the property of being a producer or cause is accepted as existent in different times, because, in that case, it will lead to the contingency of accepting many effects.

Text: 857

अथ जनकत्वे सत्यपि न जनयति; सर्वदैवाऽहेतुः स्यात्।

atha janakatve satyapi na janayati; sarvadaivā'hetuḥ syāt.

Translation: 857

If you say that, in spite of the fact i.e. it is a cause and still it does not produce, then, that should always be non-cause.

Text: 858

अथ अविद्यमानं प्रत्येति; अविद्यमानम्, प्रत्येति च इति चित्रम्।

atha avidyamānaṁ pratyeti; avidyamānam, pratyeti ca iti citram.

Translation: 858

If you say that, he deduces something non-existent, then, it is very funny to say that, something is non-existent and still he comes to know through inference.

Text: 859

किञ्च, कार्यं दृष्ट्वा कारणं प्रत्येति, आहो कारणपूर्वकत्वम्, कारणपूर्वकं वा कार्यम्।

kiñca, kāryaṁ dr̥ṣṭvā kāraṇaṁ pratyeti, āho kāraṇapūrvakatvam, kāraṇapūrvakaṁ vā kāryam.

Translation: 859

Moreover, is it the fact that, after seeing the effect, he comes to know the state of its being preceded by the cause or the effect is preceded by the cause?

Text: 860

तद्यदि कारणं प्रत्येति; तदा एतदापद्यते-अस्ति कारणं कार्यात्, यथा अस्ति आत्मा काकस्य काष्ण्यात्।

tadyadi kāraṇaṁ pratyeti; tadā etadāpadyate-asti kāraṇaṁ kāryāt, yathā asti ātmā kākasya kāṣṇyāt.

Translation: 860

If you say that, he comes to know the cause, then, the following is the consequence: One will deduce i.e. “cause, because there is effect” “as there is self, because, there is black color of a crow.”

Text: 861

अथ तत्कारणपूर्वकत्वं कार्यस्यानुमीयते; तत्कारणपूर्वकत्वम्-स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्धः, सत्ता वा, धर्मान्तरं वा?

atha tatkāraṇapūrvakatvaṁ kāryasyānumīyate; tatkāraṇapūrvakatvam-svakāraṇasattāsambandhaḥ, sattā vā, dharmāntaram vā?

Translation: 861

If you say the state of occurring prior to the effect is inferred of the effect, what is the meaning of the state of occurring prior to the effect? Does it mean a relation of the existence of its cause or simply existence or any other property?

Text: 862

तद्यदि स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्धोऽनुमीयते; तदयुक्तम्, तस्य प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात्। न च प्रत्यक्षेण अवगम्यमाने अनुमानं न्याय्यम्, हेतावप्यनुमानप्रसङ्गात्। तदुक्तम्-“सामान्ये सिद्धसाध्यताम्(ता), सामान्यं समानता प्रत्यक्षानुमानविषयत्वेन अर्थस्य।”

tadyadi svakāraṇasattāsambandho'numīyate; tadayuktam, tasya pratyakṣaviṣayatvāt. na ca pratyakṣeṇa avagamyamāne anumānaṁ nyāyīyam, hetāvapyanumānaprasaṅgāt. taduktam- “sāmānye siddhasādhyatām(tā), sāmānyam samānatā pratyakṣānumānaviṣayatvena arthasya.”

Translation: 862

If you say, the relation of the existence of its own cause, which is inferred, it will not be proper, because, that is the object of perception. When something is known by perception, it is not proper to know it by inference. In that case, even with reference to the ground of the inference, one will have to know it by inference. That is why, it is said “if it is universal, then, it is proving something which is already proved.” Universal means sameness. It means sameness of a thing through perception and inference.

Text: 863

अथ सत्ताऽनुमीयते; साऽपि प्रत्यक्षेणावगम्यते अलमनुमानेन। इहाप्येतद् द्रष्टव्यम्- 'सामान्ये सिद्धसाध्यता'। अथवा सिद्धस्य विद्यमानस्य साधनम् सिद्धसाधनम्। यथा च न तौ स्तः तथा प्रागेव प्रपञ्चितम्।

atha sattā'numīyate; sā'pi pratyakṣeṇāvagamyate alamanumānena.

ihāpyetad draṣṭavyam- 'sāmānye siddhasādhyatā'. athavā siddhasya vidyamānasya sādhanam siddhasādhanam. yathā ca na tau staḥ tathā prāgeva prapañcitam.

Translation: 863

If you say that, existence is inferred and that too is known by perception, then, there is no need of inference. Here also, it should be noted “when there is universal, it is establishing something which is already established.” Or, the word siddha-sādhanam means proving something existent which is already known. Both these states are not possible here which we have already discussed before.

Text: 864

अथ कारणपूर्वकत्वं धर्मान्तरं तदनुमीयते; तदपि उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्ताधिकरणस्थं प्रत्यक्षवसेयम्, न मानान्तरमाकाङ्क्षति। न च अनुपलब्धिकारणम् आवरणदूरादि किञ्चिदस्ति। अनुपलब्धौ वा घटादावप्यनुपलम्भप्रसङ्गः। तदुक्तम्-“विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः।” विशेषो हि अनुमानैकग्राह्योऽर्थः तेन सह सम्बन्धो नावगतः। तदनवगतौ न लिङ्गात् लिङ्गा(लिङ्गि)गतिः। नच षट्पदार्थव्यतिरिक्तं धर्मान्तरमस्ति स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्, अभ्युपगमे वा अभ्युपेतहानम्। यदि च कारणपूर्वकत्वं धर्मान्तरं तदनुमीयते लिङ्गात्; न तर्हि कारणमवगतं दिगीश्वरादि।

atha kāraṇapūrvakatvaṁ dharmāntaraṁ tadanumīyate; tadapi upalabdhyilakṣaṇaprāptādhikaraṇasthaṁ pratyakṣavaseyam, na mānāntaramākāṅkṣati. na ca anupalabdhyikāraṇam āvaraṇadūrādi kiñcidasti. anupalabdhyau vā ghaṭādāvapyanupalambhaprasaṅgaḥ. taduktam- “viśeṣe'nugamābhāvaḥ”. viśeṣo hi anumānaikagrāhyo'rthaḥ tena saha sambandho nāvagataḥ. tadanavagatau na liṅgāt liṅgā-(liṅgi)gatiḥ. naca ṣaṭpadārthavyatiriktaṁ dharmāntaramasti svayamanabhyupagamāt, abhyupagame vā abhyupetahānam. yadi ca kāraṇapūrvakatvaṁ dharmāntaraṁ tadanumīyate liṅgāt; na tarhi kāraṇamavagataṁ digīśvarādi.

Translation: 864

If you say that, some other property in the form of the state of being preceded by a cause is inferred, then, that also which is present in the locus of something which can be known by perception is to be determined by perception and that does not require any other

means to know it and there is no ground for non-knowledge such as cover, distance etc. and in spite of that, it is not known, then, even pot etc. will not be known as it has been said- “if there is a particular thing, then, there is no common characteristic in it.” A particular thing is that which can be determined only by inference. But with that the relationship is not known and if the relationship is not known, on the basis of the ground the thing to be inferred cannot be inferred. There is no additional entity over and above the six categories of entities and you yourself have not accepted it and if you accept it now then, it will result into the fault of denying something which has already been accepted. If another property in the form of the state of being preceded by cause is inferred, on the basis of some ground then, it means that what is actual cause viz. space, God etc. is not known.

Text: 865

अथ कारणपूर्वकं कार्यमेव प्रतीयते; तदेतत् प्रज्ञामान्द्यविचेष्टितम्। कथम्? तत्स्वरूपस्य प्रत्यक्षावगाहितदेहस्य किमनुमानेन? अत्रापि तदेव उपनतम्- 'सामान्ये सिद्धसाधनम्' समानं प्रत्यक्षानुमानविषयत्वे सामान्यमित्यपदिश्यते, तस्मिन् सामान्ये साध्यमाने साधनवैफल्यमापद्यते। किंच, यद्यनुमानादपि कार्यं प्रत्येति; कारणं न केनाप्यवद्योतितं स्यात्। तदनवद्योतने कालादिव्यवहारविरहः स्यात्।

*atha kāraṇapūrvakam kāryameva pratīyate; tadetat prajñāmā-
ndyaviceṣṭitam. katham? tatsvarūpasya pratyakṣāvagāhitadehasya
kimanumānena? atrāpi tadeva upanātam- 'sāmānye siddhasādha-
nam' samānam pratyakṣānumānaviśayatve sāmānyamityapadiśyate,
tasmin sāmānye sādhyamāne sādhanavaiphalīyamāpadyate. kiñca,
yadyanumānādapi kāryam pratīyati; kāraṇam na kenāpyavadyotitam
syāt. tadanavadyotane kālādīvyavahāravirahaḥ syāt.*

Translation: 865

If you say that, what is known as something preceded by the cause, is nothing but the effect, then, it is a reflection of lack of intelligence. If you ask me how, I would say what is the need of an inference to know something, which can be known by perception. Here also, the same logic has cropped up viz. “when there is universal, it is the case of proving something which is already proved.” Something is called

universal, when both universal and perception become operative to it and so if someone wants to establish that universal, it will amount to a fruitless act of proving. Moreover, if you say that from inference effect can be known, then, nothing can point to its cause and once the cause is not indicated, it will lead to absence of reference to time etc.

Text: 866

तथा, कारणदर्शनेन कार्यानुमानमपि न सम्भवति। भवतां पक्षे कारकाणां सामग्र्यं जनकम्। तच्चेन्न प्रत्यक्षं न च साधनान्तरं विद्यते तत्स्वरूपावेदकम्। अपि च, लिङ्गग्रहणानन्तरं व्याप्तिस्मरणम्, तदनु परामर्शज्ञानम्, ततोऽनुमेयप्रतिपत्तिः। न च एतावन्तं कालं सामग्र्यवस्थानमस्ति।

tathā, kāraṇadarśanena kāryānumānamapi na sambhavati. bhavatām pakṣe kārakāṇām sāmāgryam janakam. taccenna pratyakṣam na ca sādhanāntaram vidyate tatsvarūpāvedakam. api ca, liṅgagrahaṇānantaram vyāptismaraṇam, tadanu parāmarśajñānam, tato'numeyapratipattiḥ. na ca etāvantaṁ kālam sāmāgryavasthānamasti.

Translation: 866

Similarly, by seeing the cause, the inference of the effect is also not possible. According to your doctrine, the collection of factors is considered to be the cause. If that is not perceivable, then, there is no other ground which can reveal its form. Moreover, after knowing the ground, there should be the remembrance of the invariable concomitance between the inferences on the basis of the ground, followed by confirmatory knowledge, followed by inferential knowledge. For such a long duration of time, the collection of factors cannot continue to exist.

Text: 867

अथ कारकैकदेशग्रहणे सति कार्यमनुमिमीषे; तदयुक्तम्, कारकैकदेशरूप(शस्या)-जनकत्वात्। जनकत्वयोगे सति जनकम् इत्यपदिश्यते। नच जनकत्वयुक्तस्य अनुमेयप्रतिपत्तिकाले अवस्थानमस्ति। न चाकारकं कार्यं गमयति अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

atha kārakaikadeśagrahaṇe sati kāryamanumimīṣe; tadayuktam, kārakaikadeśarūpa(śasyā)janakatvāt. janakatvayoge sati janakam

ityapadiśyate. naca janakatvayuktasya anumeyapratipattikāle avasthānamasti. na cākāraṁ kāryaṁ gamayati atiprasaṅgāt.

Translation: 867

If you say, by knowing a part of that collection of factors, you will infer the effect that is not proper. Because, the part of the collection of factors, is not capable of generating the inferential knowledge. (We all know that) when something possesses the property of being a cause, it is called cause and what is associated with being the cause does not exist at the time of the knowledge of the thing to be inferred i.e. the effect. If something is not an instrumental case, it cannot be the cause of the knowledge of the effect. Otherwise, it will lead to unwanted consequences.

[४. कृतकत्वहेतुकस्यानित्यत्वानुमानस्याप्यघटमानत्वप्रदर्शनम्।]

[4. *kr̥takatvahetukasyānityatvānumānasyāpyaghaṭamānatvapradarśanam.*]

Text: 868

तथा, कृतकत्वेन अनित्यत्वानुमानमपि नोपपद्यते, अनित्यत्वं हि स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्धः, सत्ता वा, धर्मान्तरं वा, शब्दध्वंसो वा, शब्दस्वरूपं वेति। तत्र तावत् स्वकारणसत्ता-सम्बन्ध-सत्ता-धर्मान्तरस्वरूपपक्षे उक्तमेव दूषणम्।

tathā, kr̥takatvena anityatvānumānamapi nopapadyate, anityatvaṁ hi svakāraṇasattāsambandhaḥ, sattā vā, dharmāntaraṁ vā, śabdadhvaṁso vā, śabdasvarūpaṁ veti. tatra tāvat svakāraṇa-sattāsambandha-sattā-dharmāntarasvarūpapakṣe uktameva dūṣaṇam.

Translation: 868

In the same way, on the basis of the property of being an effect one cannot infer that something is not eternal. What will be the meaning of the term anityatva? Does it mean the relation with the existence of its own cause or mere existence or any other property or the destruction of sound or the nature of sound? If you say that, it is the relationship of the existence of its own cause or mere existence or some other property or its own form, then, we have already presented to you our criticisms.

Text: 869

अथ ध्वंसोऽनुमीयते; तदयुक्तम्, तेन सह सम्बन्धानवगतेः। न शब्दसत्ताकाले तद्ध्वं-
सोऽस्ति, तदभावात् सम्बन्धाऽवगतिः, एकस्य सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः। न चाभावस्य विषय-
भावोऽस्ति, भावे वा शब्दलिङ्गं न भवेत्। शब्दलिङ्गसद्भावे वा विज्ञानस्य अभावो न विषयः,
तदभावात्। एतेन तपनोदयास्तमित्योर्गम्यगमकभावः पर्युदस्तो वेदितव्यः।

atha dhvaṁso'numīyate; tadayuktam, tena saha sambandhānavagateḥ. na śabdāsattākāle taddhvaṁso'sti, tadabhāvāna sambandhā'vagatiḥ, ekasya sambandhānupapatteḥ. na cābhāvasya viśayabhāvo'sti, bhāve vā śabdaliṅgaṁ na bhavet. śabdaliṅgasadbhāve vā vijñānasya abhāvo na viśayaḥ, tadabhāvāt. etena tapanodayāstamityorgamyagamakabhāvaḥ paryudasto veditavyaḥ.

Translation: 869

If you say, what is inferred is destruction, which is also not proper, because, with that no relationship is known, because, when there is existence of sound there is no destruction of sound and when that is not there, the knowledge of relationship is not possible, because, a single entity cannot have a relationship. An absence cannot be treated as an object. If it is treated, then, the sound cannot be the ground. If the sound is taken as a ground, then, absence of knowledge cannot be the object, because it is not there. By this argument between the rising of the sun and the setting of the sun, one being the ground for the knowledge of the other, stands rejected.

0.9 आत्मानुमानस्य निरासः।

[ātmānumānasya nirāsaḥ.]

(Refutation of the definition of Inference of the Self)

[१. नैयायिकादिसम्मतस्यात्मानुमानस्य निरासः।]

[1. naiyāyikādisammatasya ātmānumānasya nirāsaḥ.]

Text: 870

तथा, [आत्मा]नुमान(नं) सुखद्वेषा(ष)ज्ञानादिना न सम्भवति, तेन सह सम्बन्धान-
वगमात्, तदनवगतौ च अनुमानानर्थक्यम्। किं चात्र साध्यते? किम्-ज्ञान-सुखादीनाम्
आश्रितत्वम्, आहोस्विद् आश्रयाश्रितं वा ज्ञानस्वरूपम्?

tathā, [ātmā]numāna(naṁ) sukhadveṣā(ṣa)jñānādinā na sambhavati, tena saha sambandhānavagamāt, tadanavagatau ca anumānā-

narthakyam. kim cātra sādhyate? kim-jñānasukhādīnām āśritatvam, āhosvid āśrayāśritam vā jñānasvarūpam?

Translation: 870

Similarly, it is not possible to infer the self, on the basis of happiness, hatred, knowledge etc. because, the relationship between them cannot be known. And if the relationship between them is not known, the inference will become inoperative. (As a matter of fact), what is being inferred here? Is it known that knowledge, happiness etc. are located somewhere? Or is it known that the nature of knowledge is such that it is located in a locus?

Text: 871

त(अ)थाश्रितत्वं साध्यते; तदा आत्म(त्मा) नैवाऽवबोधितः, ततोऽन्यत्वाद् आश्रित-
त्वस्य।

*ta(a)thāśritatvaṃ sādhyate; tadā ātma(tmā) naivā'vabodhitah, tato-
'nyatvād āśritatvasya.*

Translation: 871

If you say, what is being established is the state of its being located, then, it means that, the self is not known, because the state of being located is different from that.

Text: 872

अथ आत्मा साध्यते; तदेवं भवति-अस्ति आत्मा विज्ञानात्, नच व्यधिकरणस्य गमकत्वं
विद्यते।

*atha ātmā sādhyate; tadevaṃ bhavati-asti ātmā vijñānāt, naca
vyadhikaraṇasya gamakatvaṃ vidyate.*

Translation: 872

If you say that, the self is being established, then, that may be something like this viz. there is self, because, there is knowledge. If the ground exists in some other locus, it cannot be the ground to know the object of inference.

Text: 873

अथ आश्रितं ज्ञानस्वरूपं साध्यते; तच्च प्रत्यक्षणावगतम्। अन्योऽनुमानस्य विषयो
वक्तव्यः। कथं ज्ञानसुखादि आत्मसम्बन्धित्वेन व्यपदिश्यते-किं सत्तामात्रेण, आहो
तज्जन्यतया, तज्जनकत्वेन वा, तत्समवायित्वेन वा, तत्स्वरूपतादात्म्याद्वा?

atha āśritam jñānasvarūpam sādhyate; tacca pratyakṣeṇāvagatam. anyo'numānasya viśayo vaktavyaḥ. katham jñānasukhādi ātma-sambandhitvena vyapadiśyate-kiṃ sattāmātreṇa, āho tajjanyatayā, tajjanakatvena vā, tatsamavāyitvena vā, tatsvarūpatādātmyādvā?

Translation: 873

If you say that, the nature of knowledge is that, it is located and that is what is being established, then, it is known by perception. As a matter of fact, the object of inference has to be different from that of perception. (Moreover, how do you say that knowledge, happiness is related with the self?) Is it related just as an existence or being or as something produced by that? Or, as being producer of something? Or, as something being present by the relation of inherence? Or, as being of identical in nature?

Text: 874

तद्यदि सत्तामात्रेण सुखं विज्ञानं वा आत्मनोऽपदिश्यते; तदा आत्मवत् सर्वे भावाश्चेतनाः स्युः विज्ञानसत्ताऽविशेषात्। तथा, सर्वे सुखिनो भवेयुः, आनन्दसत्ताऽविशेषात्।
tadyadi sattāmātreṇa sukham vijñānam vā ātmano'padiśyate; tadā ātmavat sarve bhāvāścetanāḥ syuḥ vijñānasattā'viśeṣāt. tathā, sarve sukhino bhaveyuh, ānandasattā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 874

If you say that, by mere existence happiness or knowledge is said to be of the self, then, like the self, all the positive entities should be taken as conscious, because they are not different from the existence of knowledge. Similarly, all will become happy because they are not different from the existence of joy.

Text: 875

अथ तज्जन्यतया विज्ञानमात्मनोऽपदिश्यते; तदा नयनालोकपटाः चेतनाः स्युः, तैर्जन्यमानत्वाऽविशेषात्।
atha tajjanyatayā vijñānamātmano'padiśyate; tadā nayanālokaṭaḥ cetanāḥ syuḥ, tairjanyamānatvā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 875

If you say that, since knowledge is produced by that, knowledge is said to be of the self, then, eyes, light, cloth etc. should also

be conscious, because they too produce the knowledge and as such there is no difference with them.

Text: 876

अथ तज्जनकत्वेन तस्य इति चेत्; तदयुक्तम्, न विज्ञानेन आत्मा उत्पाद्यते भवतां पक्षे, उत्पादने वा स्मरणानुपपत्तिः।

atha tajjanakatvena tasya iti cet; tadayuktam, na vijñānena ātmā utpādyate bhavatām pakṣe, utpādane vā smaraṇānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 876

If you say, as the producer of the self, the self is called like that, that will not be proper, because according to you, knowledge does not produce self and if you say that, it produces self, then, one cannot explain remembrance.

Text: 877

अथ आत्मसमवायित्वेन विज्ञानम् आत्मनोऽपदिश्यते; न, तदभावात्। भवतु वा, समवाये(यो) हि अखण्डितात्मा सर्वात्मवस्त्रादिसाधारणः। ततः सर्वे चेतनाः स्युः।

atha ātmasamavāyitvena vijñānam ātmano'padiśyate; na, tadabhāvāt. bhavatu vā, samavāye(yo) hi akhaṇḍitātmā sarvātmavastrādisādhāraṇaḥ. tataḥ sarve cetanāḥ syuḥ.

Translation: 877

If you say, since the knowledge exists in the self by inherence, it is said to be of the self, it is not correct, because, that is not the case. Or granting that it is the relation of inherence, being one without any part, is common to all self, cloth, etc. and as such all will become conscious.

Text: 878

अथ विज्ञानोपलक्षितस्य नान्यत्र सम्भवोऽस्ति; तदयुक्तम्, तद् उपलक्षितस्य अन्यत्र सम्भवात्, तत्सम्भवश्च तस्य एकत्वात्। असम्भवे वा समवायानेकत्वप्रसङ्गः, असमवायित्वं वाऽन्येषाम्।

atha vijñānopalakṣitasya nānyatra sambhavo'sti; tadayuktam, tad upalakṣitasya anyatra sambhavāt, tatsambhavaśca tasya ekatvāt. asambhave vā samavāyānekatvaprasaṅgaḥ, asamavāyitvam vā'nyeṣām.

Translation: 878

If you say, nothing else can be indicated by knowledge, it is also not true. Because, what is indicated by that is possible to exist somewhere else and it is possible because it is one. If you say, it is not possible then, you should accept many inferences or other entities not existing by the relationship of inference.

Text: 879

तथा, विज्ञानसमवाय आत्मनः समवायः किम् – सत्तामात्रेण, आहोस्विद् आत्मजनकत्वेन, तज्जन्यत्वेन, तत्समवायित्वेन, आत्मस्वरूपतादात्म्याद्वा?

tathā, vijñānasamavāya ātmanah samavāyaḥ kim - sattāmātreṇa, āhosvid ātmajanakatvena, tajjanyatvena, tatsamavāyitvena, ātmasvarūpatādātmyādvā?

Translation: 879

Similarly, if you say, inference of knowledge is inference of the self; there, we would like to ask, is it so by mere existence, or, as the producer of the self, or, as being produced by the self, or, being existent in the self by relationship of inference, or, on account of being identical with the nature of the self?

Text: 880

तद्यदि सत्तामात्रेण आत्मनः समवायोऽपदिश्यते; तदा ज्ञानसमवायसत्ताऽविशेषात् सर्वेषां ज्ञानसमवायित्वप्रसङ्गः।

tadyadi sattāmātreṇa ātmanah samavāyo'padiśyate; tadā jñānasamavāyasattā'viśeṣāt sarveṣāṃ jñānasamavāyitvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 880

If you say, as mere existence, the inference of the self is referred to as such, then, there is no difference in the inference of knowledge and existence, everything will be treated as being in the self by the relationship of inference.

Text: 881

अथ तज्जन्यत्वेन; तदयुक्तम्, नहि आत्मना समवायोत्पादनं क्रियते, नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्।
atha tajjanyatvena; tadayuktam, nahi ātmanā samavāyotpādanam kriyate, nityatvābhyupagamāt.

Translation: 881

If you say, as being produced by the self, that also is not proper, because, it is not the case that inherence is produced by the self, because, according to you inherence is eternal.

Text: 882

अथ तज्जनकत्वेन आत्मनः समवायः; तदनुपपन्नम्, आत्मनो नित्यत्वात्।
atha tajjanakatvena ātmanah samavāyah; tadanupapannam, ātmano nityatvāt.

Translation: 882

If you say that, as producer of the self, there is inherence of the self, it will not be proper, because self is eternal.

Text: 883

अथ आत्मनि समवेतः तेन आत्मसमवायोऽभिधीयते; तदयुक्तम्, समवायान्तरानभ्युपगमात्।

atha ātmani samavetaḥ tena ātmasamavāyo'bhidhīyate; tadayuktam, samavāyāntarānabhyupagamāt.

Translation: 883

If you say, because it is present in the self by the relation of inherence, we say inherence of the self, it will not be proper, because, you have not accepted any other inherence.

Text: 884

अथ आत्मतादात्म्येन वर्तत इति आत्मसमवायः उच्यते; तदा आत्मा विद्यते नान्यः समवायोऽस्ति तत्स्वभावानुप्रवेशात्। एवं विज्ञानानन्दादीनां समवायसम्बन्धेन न नियतात्मव्यपदेश उपपद्यते।

atha ātmatādātmyena vartata iti ātmasamavāyah ucyate; tadā ātmā vidyate nānyaḥ samavāyo'sti tatsvabhāvānupraveśāt. evam vijñānānandādīnāṃ samavāyasambandhena na niyatātmavyapadeśa upapadyate.

Translation: 884

If you say, because it exists as identical with the self, we say that, there is inherence with the self. In that case, it means that, there is self and there is nothing else as inherence, because, it is included

in the nature of the self. In this way, one cannot refer to the self as something where knowledge, joy etc. exists by the relation of inherence.

Text: 885

अथ आत्मतादात्म्येनोपजायमानं विज्ञानानन्दादिकम् आत्मनोऽपदिश्यते;
atha ātmatādātmyenopajāyamānaṁ vijñānānānandādikam ātmano'pa-
diśyate;

Translation: 885

Clarification:

Well, since knowledge, joy etc. arise as identical with the self, they are said to be of the self.

Text: 886

तदा विकारी प्राप्नोति अनया भङ्ग्या आत्मा। ततश्च स्मरणानुमानप्रत्यभिज्ञानानुपत्तिः।
tadā vikārī prāpnoti anayā bhaṅgyā ātmā. tataśca smaraṇānumāna-
pratyabhijñānānupattiḥ.

Translation: 886

Reply:

In that case, by this argument the self becomes an entity which undergoes a change and as a consequence of this, remembrance, inference and recollection cannot be explained.

Text: 887

इतोपि आत्मा सुखादिकार्याधिकरणोऽवगन्तुं न पार्यते;
itopi ātmā sukhādikāryādhikaraṇo'vagantum na pāryate.

Translation: 887

For the following reason also the self cannot be understood as a locus of the effect viz. happiness etc.

Text: 887a

किं तेनात्मना अनुपजातातिशयेन तापादि कार्यं क्रियते, आहोस्विद् उपजातातिशयेनापि,
किं व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेनाव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन वा?

kiṁ tenātmānānupajātātīśayena tāpādi kāryaṁ kriyate, āhosvi-
dupajātātīśayenāpi kiṁ vyatiriktopajātātīśayenāvvyatiriktopajātātī-
śayena vā?

Translation: 887a

Here the question arises, is it the case that the self produces the effect in it viz. unhappiness etc. without being affected by any additional change or being affected by additional change or by possessing distinct additional change or by possessing additional change not different from itself.

Text: 888

तद्यदि अनुपजातातिशयेन उत्पाद्यते तापादि कार्यम्; तदा सर्वदा कुर्यात्, अनुपजातबलस्य कार्यकारणाभ्युपगमात्, न तापादिविकलः स्यात्, समं सुखादिकार्यं प्रसज्यते।

tadyadi anupajātātīśayena utpādyate tāpādi kāryam; tadā sarvadā kuryāt, anupajātabalasya kāryakāraṇābhyupagamāt, na tāpādivikalah syāt, samam sukhādi kāryam prasajyate.

Translation: 888

If you say, the effect such as unhappiness etc. produced without being affected by any additional change, then, the self should always produce such effects, because the cause and effect relationship is accepted of that whose strength is not disturbed and in that case, the self can never be free from unhappiness or the self will keep on producing happiness simultaneously.

Text: 889

अथ अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन उत्पाद्यते तापादिकार्यं; तदा अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशय इति किं भणितं भवति? आत्मा उपजायते। ततश्च स्मरणानुमानप्रत्यभिज्ञानानुपपत्तिः।

atha avyatiriktōpajātātīśayena utpādyate tāpādikāryam; tadā avyatiriktōpajātātīśaya iti kiṁ bhaṇitam bhavati? ātmā upajāyate. tataśca smaraṇānumānapratyabhiññānānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 889

If you say that, the self produces effect such as unhappiness etc. on account of its being associated with additional change not different from itself, then, what is to be understood by the expression “being associated with additional change, not different from itself?” Does it mean self is produced, if it is so, then, one cannot explain remembrance, inference and recollection.

Text: 890

अथ व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन जन्यते तापादिकार्यम्; स तेनात्मना सह सम्बद्धो वा, न वा?

atha vyatiriktopakātātīśayena janyate tāpādikāryam; sa tenātmanā saha sambaddho vā, na vā?

Translation: 890

If you say, the effects such as unhappiness is produced because of the additional change different from the self, then, the question arises whether that change is associated with the self or not.

Text: 891

यदि न सम्बद्धः; स तस्यातिशयः कथम्?

yadi na sambaddhaḥ; sa tasyātīśayaḥ katham?

Translation: 891

If you say, it is not associated, then, how can that be called additional change of the self?

Text: 892

अथ सम्बद्धः किम् – जनकत्वेन, अथ जन्यत्वेन, तत्समवायित्वेन वा?

atha sambaddhaḥ kim - janakatvena, atha janyatvena, tatsamavāyitvena vā?

Translation: 892

If you say that, it is associated, then, also the question arises whether it is associated as a producer, or, as produced, or, as that in which the additional change resides by the relation of inherence.

Text: 893

तद्यदि जनकत्वेन सम्बद्धः; तदा आत्मा तेनातिशयेन उत्पद्यते इति स्मरणानुपपत्तिः।

tadyadi janakatvena sambaddhaḥ; tadā ātmā tenātīśayena utpadyate iti smaraṇānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 893

If you say that, it is related as the producer, then, it will mean that the self is produced by that additional factor and in that case, it will not be possible to explain remembrance.

Text: 894

अथ जन्यत्वेन; सोऽपि तेन कथमुत्पाद्यते? किम्-अनुपजातातिशयेन, व्यतिरिक्तोप-जातातिशयेन वा – इति प्राप्ता प्रश्नपरम्परा।

atha janyatvena; so'pi tena kathamutpādyate? kim-anupajātātiśayena, vyatiriktopajātātiśayena vā - iti prāptā praśnaparamparā.

Translation: 894

If you say, it is associated as being produced by that self there also the question arises, how is it produced by the self? Is it as unaffected change, or, as an additional change distinct from itself and in this way one can go on asking a series of questions.

Text: 895

अथ तत्समवायित्वेन; न, तस्य सर्वसाधारणत्वात्, तदभावाच्च।

atha tatsamavāyitvena; na, tasya sarvasādhāraṇatvāt, tadabhāvācca.

Translation: 895

If you say, it is associated as inherent cause, it is not correct, because, it is common to all and also because, it is not there.

Text: 896

अथ एककार्यजनकत्वेन सम्बद्धः; तदेवेदं चिन्तयितुमारब्धम्-किमिदं जनकत्वं नामेति? किञ्च, यदेव अनुपजातेऽतिशये आत्मनो रूपं तदेव जातेऽपि, तत् कथं कार्यं कुर्यात्?

atha ekakāryajanakatvena sambaddhaḥ; tadevedam cintayitumārabdham-kimidam janakatvam nāmeti? kiñca, yadeva anupajāte'tiśaye ātmano rūpaṁ tadeva jāte'pi, tat katham kāryaṁ kuryāt?

Translation: 896

If you say that, it associated as a producer of one effect, then, the same we have started thinking about and the question comes to our mind is: what is the meaning of producer? Moreover, whatever is the form of the self at the state of its not being affected by any change, the same is its character after it is affected by a change. Therefore, how can it be a producer of an effect?

Text: 897

अथ पूर्वरूपस्यातादवस्थ्यम्; सुस्थितं नित्यत्वम्! अथ तादवस्थ्यम्; तथापि न करोति कार्यम्।

atha pūrvarūpasyaātādavasthyam; susthitaṃ nityatvam! atha tādavasthyam; tathāpi na karoti kāryam.

Translation: 897

If you say, its earlier form does not remain the same, then, it is clear that the self is eternal and if you say that, it remains the same, even then, it cannot produce an effect.

Text: 898

एवं नैयायिकादिमतेनात्मन उपभोगस्मरणादिकं न जाघटीति।

evam̐ naiyāyikādimatenātmana upabhogasmaraṇādikaṃ na jāghatīti.

Translation: 898

In this way, according to the doctrine of Naiyāyika etc. it cannot be explained that the self enjoys, the self remembers etc.

[२. जैनमते उपभोगाद्यनुपपत्तिप्रकटनेन आत्मानुमाननिराससूचना।]

[2. jainamate upabhogādyanupapatti prakāṭanena ātmānumānānirāsasūcanā.]

Text: 899

यस्यापि देहपरिमाणमात्र आत्मा, तस्यापि सुखदुःखोपभोगानुभवस्मरणानुपपत्तिः। कथम्? उपपाद्यते – सुखादिकार्यम् आत्मनो भिन्नम्, अभिन्नम्, भिन्नाभिन्नं वा?

yasyaāpi dehaparimāṇamātra ātmā, tasyāpi sukhaduḥkhopabhogānubhavasmarāṇānupapattiḥ. katham? upapādyate - sukhādikāryam ātmano bhinnam, abhinnam, bhinnābhinnam̐ vā?

Translation: 899

The Jainas think that, self is of the size of a body. For them also, it is not possible to explain how such a self can have an experience of happiness, unhappiness etc. and how can self remember anything. If you ask me how the following is the explanation: One may ask whether the effect viz. happiness etc. is different from the self or identical with the self or different-cum-identical with the self.

Text: 900

तद्यदि भिन्नम्; तत्किम् – सत्तामात्रेण, तज्जन्यत्वेन, तज्जनकत्वेन, तत्समवायित्वेन वा – इति पूर्वोक्तं दूषणमनुसृत्य वक्तव्यम्।

*tadyadi bhinnam; tatkim - sattāmātreṇa, tajjanya-
katvena, tatsamavāyitvena vā - iti pūrvoktaṁ dūṣaṇamanusṛtya
vaktavyam.*

Translation: 900

If you say, it is different, there also the question arises, is it different by mere existence or as being produced by that, or, as producer of that, or, as an inherent cause of that? All these questions are to be answered in the same way as discussed before.

Text: 901

अथ अभिन्नं सुखदुःखोपभोगस्मरणादिकार्यमुत्पद्यते; एवं तर्हि आत्मा उत्पद्यते। तदुत्पत्तौ स्मरणानुमानानुपपत्तिः, सुखादिवद् आत्मनो नानात्वोपपत्तेः।

*atha abhinnaṁ sukhaduḥkhopabhogasmaraṇādikāryamutpadyate;
evaṁ tarhi ātmā utpadyate. tadutpattau smaraṇānumānānupapattiḥ,
sukhādivad ātmano nānātvopapatteḥ.*

Translation: 901

If you say that, the effect viz. the experience of happiness and unhappiness and remembrance etc. are produced as identical with the self, then, it will mean that, the self is produced and if you accept that self is produced, you cannot explain remembrance and inference because as happiness etc. are many selves also are many.

Text: 902

अथ एक एव आत्मा; सुखादेरप्येकता प्राप्ता। ततश्च एकत्वे अनुभवस्यैवावस्थानाद् अनुमानस्मरणानुपपत्तिः।

*atha eka eva ātmā; sukhāderapyekatā prāptā. tataśca ekatve
anubhavasyaivāvasthānād anumānasmaraṇānupapattiḥ.*

Translation: 902

If you say, the self is only one, then, happiness should also be one and if that is one, experience will have to be taken as one and in that case it will not be possible to explain inference and remembrance.

Text: 903

अथ नानात्वं सुखादीनाम्; आत्मनोऽपि तदेवापद्यते, तदव्यतिरेकात्।

*atha nānātvaṁ sukhādinām; ātmano'pi tadevāpadyate, tadavya-
tirikāt.*

Translation: 903

If you say that, happiness etc. are many, then, self should also be many, because, they are not different from them.

Text: 904

अथ सुखादिभेदेऽपि आत्मा नैव भिद्यते; तदा सुखादितादात्म्यं न लभ्यते। अथ सुखादितादात्म्यम्;

atha sukhādibhede'pi ātmā naiva bhidyate; tadā sukhāditādātmyam na labhyate. atha sukhāditādātmyam;

Translation: 904

If you say that, even if happiness etc. are different, still, the self remains one and the same. Then, self cannot be considered to be identical to happiness etc.

Text: 905

तदा एकता नोपपद्यते, सुखादिवत् नानात्मोपपत्तेः।

tadā ekatā nopapadyate, sukhādivat nānātmopapatteḥ.

Translation: 905

If you say that, happiness is identical to self etc. then, you cannot maintain that, self is one, because, like happiness etc. the self will become many.

Text: 906

अथ भिन्नाभिन्नं सुखादिकार्यं तेन नोदितं दूषणमिति चेत्;

atha bhinnābhinnam sukhādikāryam tena noditam dūṣaṇamiti cet;

Translation: 906

Objection:

Well, the effect viz. happiness etc. is different-cum-identical and therefore, such a question cannot be raised.

Text: 907

कथम्? किम् आकारान्यत्वेन, आहोस्वित् कार्यान्यत्वेन, कारणान्यत्वेन वा?

katham? kim ākāraṇyatvena, āhosvit kāryānyatvena, kāraṇānyatvena vā?

Translation: 907

Reply:

How? As being of different form? Or, because of different effect or being different from cause?

Text: 908

तद्यद्याकारान्यत्वेन आत्मनो भिद्यते सुखादिकार्यम्; तदयुक्तम्, आकारान्यत्वं हि अन्यो-
न्याकारपरिहारेण स्वात्मना व्यवस्थितम्, अभेदपर्युदासेन भिन्नबुद्धिविषयत्वेनावस्थितेरे-
कत्वानुपपत्तिः। एकत्वं हि एकस्वभावता, एकस्वाभाव्ये हि नानास्वभावता नोपपद्यते,
नानास्वाभाव्ये हि एकस्वभावतो(ता)नोपपद्यते - अन्योन्याकारपरिहारेण एतावाकारौ
व्यवस्थितौ।

*tadyadyākārānyatvena ātmano bhidyate sukhādikāryam; tadayu-
ktam, ākārānyatvam hi anyonyākārāparihāreṇa svātmanā vyava-
sthitam, abhedaparyudāseṇa bhinnabuddhiviṣayatvenāvasthitereka-
tvānupapattiḥ. ekatvam hi ekasvabhāvatā, ekasvābhāvye hi nānā-
svabhāvatā nopadyate, nānāsvābhāvye hi ekasvabhāvato(tā) -
nopadyate- anyonyākārāparihāreṇa etāvākārau vyavasthitau.*

Translation: 908

If you say that, the effect viz. happiness etc. is different from the self, because, it is of different form, which will not be proper, because, being different from a form means, being in ones own form, by giving up mutual form and since, it will be different from identity, it will become object of different knowledges and as such, one cannot justify that it is one. Being one means, having one nature and if something has one nature, there cannot be many natures in it and if something has many natures, it cannot have one nature and this is how by giving up mutual form, these two forms will remain as they are.

Text: 909

अथ कारणान्यत्वेन भेदपरिकल्पना;
atha kāraṇānyatvena bhedaparikalpanā;

Translation: 909

Clarification:

Well, we are postulating difference because of its being different from the cause.

Text: 910

तदयुक्तम्, भिन्नादपि कारणादभिन्नं कार्यं दृष्टम्। मृत्पिण्डदण्डाद्यनेकं कारणमखण्डितं कार्यं
जनयति। तथा एकेनापि कारणेनानेकं कार्यं जन्यमानं दृष्टं घटादि। तेन न कारणभेदेन

वस्तूनां भेदः, नापि कार्यभेदेन, अपि तु आकारभेदेनैव भेदः। स च आकारभेदः अस्ति सुखात्मनोः, कथमभेदः?

tadayuktam, bhinnādapi kāraṇādabhinnam kāryam dṛṣṭam. mṛt-piṇḍadaṇḍādyanekaṁ kāraṇamakhaṇḍitam kāryam janayati. tathā ekenāpi kāraṇenānekaṁ kāryam janyamānaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ ghaṭādi. tena na kāraṇabhedena vastūnām bhedaḥ, nāpi kāryabhedena, api tu ākārabhedenaiva bhedaḥ. sa ca ākārabhedāḥ asti sukhātmanoḥ, kathamabhedaḥ?

Translation: 910

Reply:

It is not proper. Because, we do find that, even out of different causes, identical effect is produced e.g. a set of factors such as ball of mud, stick, etc. produces one undivided effect. In the same way, by a single cause many effects are produced and we see them in the form of pot etc. Therefore, there is no difference of things because of the difference in cause. Nor there is difference because of difference in effects. As a matter of fact, the difference is caused only due to the difference in form and that difference in the form is certainly found in happiness and self and therefore how can there be identity between the two?

Text: 911

किंच, येनैव आकारेण सुखम् आत्मनो भिद्यते तेनैव आकारेण अभिन्नम्, आहोस्विद् आकारान्तरेण?

kimca, yenaiva ākāreṇa sukham ātmano bhidyate tenaiva ākāreṇa abhinnam, āhosvid ākārantareṇa?

Translation: 911

Moreover, is it the fact that the very form, by which happiness is distinguished from the self, by the same form, it is identical? Or by some other form?

Text: 912

तद्यदि तेनैवाकारेण अभिन्नम्; तस्य तावदेकान्ताऽभेदः प्रतिपन्नो भवति भवता।

tadyadi tenaivākāreṇa abhinnam; tasya tāvadekāntā'bhedaḥ prati-panno bhavati bhavatā.

Translation: 912

If you say, it is identical by the same form, then, you have accepted absolute identity with that.

Text: 913

अथ आकारान्तरेण अभिन्नम्; आकारान्तरं सुखं न भवति, तदभेदेऽपि सुखस्य भेदात्।
atha ākārāntareṇa abhinnaṃ; ākārāntaraṃ sukhaṃ na bhavati, tadabhede'pi sukhasya bhedaṭ.

Translation: 913

If you say, it is identical by another form, then, it means that, another form is not happiness and even if it is identical, the self will be different from happiness.

[३. प्रसङ्गात् जैनाभिमतस्यानेकान्तवादस्य निरसनम्।]

[3. *prasaṅgāt jainābhimatasyānekāntavādasya nirasanam.*]

Text: 914

एवं च स्थिते-“तदेव नित्यम् तदेव चानित्यम्” इत्येतन्नोपपद्यते, सुखात्मनोर्भेदात्।
 अनाद्यन्ता सत्ता नित्या, आद्यन्तवती चाऽनित्या।

*evaṃ ca sthite-“tadeva nityam tadeva cānityam” ityetanno-
 papadyate, sukhātmanorbhedāt. anādyantā sattā nityā, ādyantavatī
 cā'nityā.*

Translation: 914

Thus, your statement “the same is eternal and the same is non-eternal,” is not proper, because, happiness and the self are different. An existence which has no beginning and no end is eternal and an existence which has a beginning and an end is non-eternal.

Text: 915

तथा-“पररूपतयाऽसत्त्वं स्वरूपेण सत्त्वम्” इत्येतदपि न सम्भवति। पररूपेण न
 भावः नाप्यभावः, अपि तु स्वेन रूपेण भाव एकात्मकः-एकं हीदं वस्तूपलभ्यते,
 तच्चेदभावः किमिदानीं भावो भविष्यति? तद्यदि पररूपतयाऽभावः; तदा घटस्य
 घ(प)टरूपता प्राप्नोति, यथा पररूपतया भावत्वेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे पररूपानुप्रवेशः, तथा
 अभावत्वेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे पररूपानुप्रवेश एव। ततश्च सर्वं सर्वात्मकं स्यात्।

*tathā-“pararūpatayā'satvaṃ svarūpeṇa sattvaṃ” ityetadapi na
 sambhavati. pararūpeṇa na bhāvaḥ nāpyabhāvaḥ, api tu svena*

*rūpeṇa bhāva ekātmakaḥ-ekam hīdam vastūpalabhyate, taceda-
bhāvaḥ kimidānīm bhāvo bhaviṣyati? tadyadi pararūpatayā'bhāvaḥ;
tadā ghaṭasya gha(pa)ṭarūpatā prāpnoti, yathā pararūpatayā bhāva-
tve'ṅikriyamāṇe pararūpānupraveśaḥ, tathā abhāvatvepyaṅgikriya-
māṇe pararūpānupraveśa eva. tataśca sarvaṁ sarvātmakaṁ syāt.*

Translation: 915

Similarly, your another statement, “in another form it is non-existent, and in its own form it is existent is also is an impossibility.” In another form, neither a positive entity nor a negative entity exists, rather in ones own form, a positive entity is considered to be of a single form and as such one finds one entity and if that entity is absence, then, what will be the positive entity? Therefore, if you say that, in another form, there is absence, then, one can also say, there is no pot in the form of a cloth. As, if a positive entity is accepted having another form, then, that will be included in another form. In the same way, if it is accepted as an absence, it will be included in another form and as a consequence, everything will become identical with everything.

Text: 916

अथ पररूपस्याभावः; तदविरोधि त्वैकत्वं तस्याऽभावः। नहि तस्मिन् सति भवान्
तस्यानुपलब्धेर्द्रष्टा, अन्यथा हि आत्मनोप्यभावो भवेत्।

*atha pararūpasyābhāvaḥ; tadavirodhi tvaikatvaṁ tasyā'bhāvaḥ. nahi
tasmin sati bhavān tasyānupalabdherdraṣṭā, anyathā hi ātmanopya-
bhāvo bhavet.*

Translation: 916

If you say, it is absence of another form, then, one and the same will not be opposing that other and absence of that will be the absence of that other. It is also not the fact that when that is there, you are the experiencer of that absence of experience. Otherwise, there will be absence of self also.

Text: 917

अथ आत्मसत्ताऽविरोधित्वेन स्वात्मनोऽभावो न भवत्येव;

atha ātmasattā'virodhitvena svātmano'bhāvo na bhavatyeva;

Translation: 917

Clarification:

Well, there will be no absence of ones own self, because it will not be contradictory to the existence of the self.

Text: 918

परसत्ताविरोधित्वात् परस्याप्यभावो न भवति।

parasattāvirodhitvāt parasypāpyabhāvo na bhavati.

Translation: 918

Reply:

In that case, because of the non-contradiction of existence of something else, there will be no absence, of that something else.

Text: 919

अथापराकारतया नोपलभ्यते तेन परस्य भावो न भवति;

athāparākāratayā nopalabhyate tena parasya bhāvo na bhavati;

Translation: 919

Clarification:

Since, that is not experienced as having another form, therefore, there will not be absence of another form.

Text: 920

अभावाकारतया च अनुपलब्धेः परस्याभावोऽपि न भवेत्।

abhāvākāratayā ca anupalabdheḥ parasypābhāvo 'pi na bhavet.

Translation: 920

Reply:

Then, since it will not be known as having the form of absence, there will no absence of other form.

Text: 921

अथ अभावाकारतया उपलभ्यते; तदा भावोऽन्यो नास्ति, अभावाकारान्तरितत्वात्-
अभावस्वभावावगाहिनावबोधेन अभाव एव द्योतितो न भावः। यथा सुखावगाहकेन विज्ञानेन
सुखमेवाऽवद्योतितं न दुःखम्।

*atha abhāvākāratayā upalabhyate; tadā bhāvo 'nyo nāsti, abhāvākā-
rāntaritatvāt abhāvasvabhāvāvagāhināvabodhena abhāva eva dyotito
na bhāvah. yathā sukhāvagāhakena vijñānena sukhamevā 'va-
dyotitarī na duḥkham.*

Translation: 921

If you say, it is known as having the form of an absence, then, it means that, there is no other positive entity. Since, it includes the form of an absence, the knowledge in which the nature of absence will appear as its content, will reveal only absence and not any positive entity as the knowledge of happiness, reveals happiness and not unhappiness.

Text: 922

अथ सुखज्ञानेन दुःखमपि गृह्यते;
atha sukhajñānena duḥkhamapi grhyate;

Translation: 922

Objection:

Well, by knowledge of happiness, unhappiness is also known.

Text: 923

तदिदानीं सुखदुःखयोरेकता प्राप्नोति। ततश्च पर्यायरूपतया भेदाभ्युपगमो हीयते-
 अभिन्नात्मकं जगत् स्यात्। एवञ्च स्थिते यदुक्तं- “भागे सिंहो नरो भागे योऽर्थो
 भागद्वयात्मकः। तमभागं विभागेन नरसिंहं प्रचक्षते॥” इति,

*tadidānīm sukhaduḥkhaḥyorekatā prāpnoti. tataśca paryāyarūpatayā
 bhedaḥbhyupagamo hīyate-abhinnātmakam jagat syāt. evaṅca sthite
 yaduktam- “bhāge simho naro bhāge yo'rtho bhāgadvayātmakaḥ,
 tamabhāgam vibhāgena narasimham pracakṣate.” iti,*

Translation: 923

Reply:

In that case happiness, unhappiness will become one and the same and as a consequence they will become synonymous and there will be no knowledge of difference between them and consequently, the whole world will become one and the same. When such is our analysis, your statement “a thing having two parts, one part of which is a lion and the other man, is called nṛsimha- man-lion” is not proper. Because, the whole universe becomes indivisible.

Text: 924

तन्न प्राप्नोति विश्वस्याऽखण्डरूपत्वात्। एतदपि न वक्तव्यम्- ‘एको भावः सर्वभावस्वभावः,
 सर्वे भावा एकभावस्वभावाः, एको भावस्तत्त्वतो येन दृष्टः सर्वेभावास्तत्त्वतस्तेन दृष्टाः॥’

*tanna prāpnoti viśvasyā'khaṇḍarūpatvāt. etadapi na vaktavyam-
“eko bhāvaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ, sarve bhāvā ekabhāvasvabhāvāḥ,
eko bhāvastatvato yena dṛṣṭaḥ sarvebhāvāstattvatastena dṛṣṭāḥ.”*

Translation: 924

You should also not say the following “one positive entity is of the nature of all positive entities; all entities are of the nature of one positive entity and therefore, one who has realized even one positive entity, in its real form, one can conclude that, he has seen all positive entities in their real forms.”

Text: 925

अथ पर्याया इतरेतरात्मना भिद्यन्ते सर्वभावानाम्;
atha paryāyā itaretarātmanā bhidyante sarvabhāvānām;

Translation: 925

Clarification:

Well, the knowledges of all positive entities are distinguished on the basis of mutual form.

Text: 926

एवं तर्हि भावाऽभावपर्याययोरपि भेदोऽस्तु। इमामेव मूर्खतां दिगम्बराणामङ्गीकृत्य उक्तं
सूत्रकारेण यथा-

“नग्न! श्रव(म)णक! दुर्बुद्धे! कायक्लेशपरायण!
जीविकार्थेऽपि चारम्भे केन त्वमसि शिक्षितः॥”

evam tarhi bhāvā'bhāvaparyāyayorapi bhedo'stu. imāmeva mūrkhātāṃ digambarāṇāmaṅgīkṛtya uktam sūtrakāreṇa yathā-

“nagna! śrava(ma)ṇaka! durbuddhe! kāyakleśaparāyaṇa!
jīvikārthe'pi cārambhe kena tvamasi śikṣitaḥ.”

Translation: 926

Reply:

In that case, let there be difference of the pairs of positive and negative entities also. Taking this way, illogical argument of the Jainas the author of the sūtras has said the following: “Oh nude ascetic, Oh foolish one, Oh engaged in giving torture to the body, who has taught you in the beginning even for your livelihood?”

[४. सांख्यमतेऽपि भोगानुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनेनात्मानुमाननिरासः।]

[4. sām̐khyamate 'pi bhogānupapattipradarśanenātmanūmānanirāsaḥ.]

Text: 927

तथा सांख्यमतेनाप्यात्मनो भोगो नैव सम्पद्यते भोगस्यात्मनि अवृत्तेः। भोगशब्देन सुख-
मभिधीयते, तत्संवेदनं वा? तदुभयं बुद्धौ वर्तते नात्मनि, एवञ्च व्यवस्थिते बुद्धेर्भोक्तृत्वं
नात्मनः।

*tathā sām̐khyamatenāpi ātmano bhogo naiva sampadyate bhogasya
ātmani avṛtṭeḥ. bhogaśabdena sukhamabhīdhīyate, tatsam̐vedanaṁ
vā? tadubhayaṁ buddhau vartate nātmani, evaṅca vyavasthite buddherbhokṛtvaṁ
nātmanaḥ.*

Translation: 927

In the same way, even according to the doctrine of Sām̐khya, it is not possible to explain how the self enjoys, because the enjoyment does not exist in the self. By the word enjoyment, what do you mean? Do you mean happiness or awareness of happiness? Both occur only in the intellect and not in the self. When such is the fact, according to you, the intellect can be said to be an enjoyer and not the self.

Text: 928

अथ बुद्धिगतेनापि भोगेनैव आत्मनो भोक्तृत्वमभिधीयते; तदा बुद्धिगतेन कर्तृत्वेन आत्मनः
कर्तृत्वं प्रसज्यते। ततश्च “कर्ता न भवति” इत्येतन्न वक्तव्यम्।

*atha buddhigatenāpi bhogenaiva ātmano bhokṛtvaṁabhīdhīyate;
tadā buddhigatena kartṛtvena ātmanaḥ kartṛtvaṁ prasajyate.
tataśca “kartā na bhavati” ityetanna vaktavyam.*

Translation: 928

If you say that, even if the enjoyment resides in the intellect, still, the self can be said to be the enjoyer, then, since doeriness exists in the intellect, let the self be called the doer and if it is acceptable to you, you should not say “the self is not the doer.”

Text: 929

अथ आत्मनि कर्तृत्वस्याऽवृत्तेः अकर्ता इत्यपदिश्यते; भोगस्याप्यतद्वृत्तेः सम्भुग् न
भवत्यात्मा।

*atha ātmani kartṛtvasyā'vṛtteḥ akartā ityapadiśyate; bhogasyāpya-
tadvṛtteḥ sambhug na bhavatyātmā.*

Translation: 929

Since, the doerness does not exist in the self, self is called “not a doer” then, since, the enjoyment also does not exist in the self, the self cannot be called the enjoyer.

Text: 930

अथ अस्ति कर्तृत्वं यदि नाम औपचारिकम्, यथा भृत्ये जयपराजयौ वर्तमानौ स्वामिनि उपचर्यते तथा बुद्धौ वर्तमानं कर्तृत्वं पुंसि उपचर्यते; यद्येवम् भोगोऽपि बुद्धौ वर्तमानः पुरुषस्यौपचारिकः प्राप्तः।

atha asti kartṛtvaṁ yadi nāma aupacārikam, yathā bhṛtye jayaparājayau vartamānau svāmini upacaryate tathā buddhau vartamānaṁ kartṛtvaṁ puṁsi upacaryate; yadyevam bhogo'pi buddhau vartamānaḥ puruṣasyaupacārikaḥ prāptaḥ.

Translation: 930

Clarification:

Well, in a secondary sense, the self is called a doer as when a servant becomes the winner or becomes defeated, as the master of that servant is secondarily called the winner or defeated, in the same way, although the doerness exists in the intellect, still secondarily self is called the doer.

Text: 931

औपचारिकोऽपि आत्मनि न सम्भवति; अन्यत्र मुख्यतयानभ्युपगमात्। भोगोऽभावे च आत्मनो मोक्षचिन्ता न कर्तव्या। बन्धनवान् मुच्यते। न चात्मनि बन्धनमस्ति। भोगो हि बन्धनम्। स चात्मनि नैव विद्यते, तदभावात् मोक्षोऽपि निरुपपत्तिकः।

*aupacāriko'pi ātmani na sambhavati; anyatra mukhyatayānabhyu-
pagamāt. bhogā'bhāve ca ātmano mokṣacintā na kartavyā. bandha-
navān mucyate. na cātmani bandhanamasti. bhogo hi bandhanam.
sa cātmani naiva vidyate, tadabhāvāt mokṣo'pi nirupapattikaḥ.*

Translation: 931

Reply:

If it is so, then, the real locus of the enjoyment is the intellect and in a secondary way, the self is called the enjoyer. As a matter of

fact, even secondarily the self cannot be called the enjoyer, because, enjoyment is not accepted as existing primarily somewhere else i.e. in the intellect and when the enjoyment is not there, the self need not worry about salvation or liberation or freedom from bondage. One who is bound, can be liberated. There is no bondage in the self. Enjoyment could have been the bondage, but that does not exist in the self and since that is not there, one cannot explain liberation also.

Text: 932

तथा, आत्मनोऽस्तित्वं न सिद्ध्यति भोक्तृत्वस्याभावे। भोग्येन भोक्तुरनुमानम्।
tathā, ātmano'stitvaṁ na siddhyati bhoktrtvasyābhāve. bhogyena bhokturanumānam.

Translation: 932

Similarly, since there is nothing called enjoyerness, one cannot prove the existence of the self. One can infer the enjoyer on the basis of the object of enjoyment.

Text: 933

यथा सूपादिमात्रं भोक्त्रविनाभूतं दृष्टम्, तथा प्रधानं सविकारं भोग्यं तेन भोक्ताऽनुमीयते;
yathā sūpādīmātram bhoktravinābhūtaṁ dr̥ṣṭam, tathā pradhānam savikāraṁ bhogyam tena bhoktā'numīyate;

Translation: 933

Clarification:

As the things like soup etc. is always seen related with the enjoyer, in the same way, the object of enjoyment viz. on the basis of the changing pradhāna the enjoyer can be inferred.

Text: 934

एतच्चायुक्तम्; आत्मनो भोक्तृत्वाभावे कथं भोग्येन आत्माऽनुमीयते, आत्मना सह भोग्यस्य सम्बन्धानवगतेः? तदनवगतिश्च आत्मनः प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वात्। तदविषयत्वं च 'विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः' इत्युक्तम्।

etaccāyuktam; ātmano bhoktrtvābhāve katham bhogyena ātmā'numīyate, ātmanā saha bhogyasya sambandhānavagateḥ? tadanavagatiśca ātmanah pratyakṣāviṣayatvāt. tadaviṣayatvaṁ ca 'viśeṣe'nugamābhāvaḥ' ityuktam.

Translation: 934

Reply:

This is not proper, because, when the self cannot be the enjoyer, how can be the self be inferred on the basis of the object of enjoyment? We do not know the relationship between the self and the object of enjoyment. We do not know because the self cannot be the object of perception. To explain that the self cannot be the object of perception, it has been said, “There is no consecutive character to specify it.”

Text: 935

अथ प्रत्यक्षेण आत्मा अवधार्यते; तदा प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वेन आत्मनः समानता प्रत्यक्षानुमानविषयत्वेन, ततश्च सिद्धसाध्यता।

atha pratyakṣeṇa ātmā avadhāryate; tadā pratyakṣaviṣayatvena ātmanaḥ samānatā pratyakṣānumānaviṣayatvena, tataśca siddhasādhya-

Translation: 935

If you say, the self is determined on the basis of perception, then, the self becomes the object of perception and also object of inference and thus becomes object of both, perception and inference and this leads to the fault of knowing something which is already known.

Text: 936

सूपादिभोक्त्रविनाभूतं दृष्टम्; तत्किम्-देहादिव्यतिरिक्तभोक्त्रविनाभूतं दृष्टम्, आहोस्विद् देहमात्रभोक्त्रविनाभूतं दृष्टम्?

sūpādibhoktravinābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam; tatkim-dehādivyatiriktabhoktravinābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam, āhosvid dehamātrabhoktravinābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam?

Translation: 936

You have said that, the object of enjoyment like soup is invariably related to the enjoyer. There we would like to ask, “Is it seen invariably related with the enjoyer who is different from body etc?” Or, is it seen invariably related with the enjoyer who is nothing else but the body?

Text: 937

तद्यदि देहादिव्यतिरिक्तभोक्त्राविनाभूतं दृष्टम्; तदा दृष्टान्तोऽपि दार्ष्टान्तिकप्रतितुल्यः, आत्मनोऽतीन्द्रियत्वेन।

tadyadi dehādivyatiriktabhoktrāvinābhūtam dṛṣṭam; tadā dṛṣṭānto 'pi dārṣṭāntikapratitulyaḥ, ātmano 'tīndriyatvena.

Translation: 937

If you say, it is seen invariably related with the enjoyer, different from the body, then, the example becomes comparable to that for which, this is an example, because, the self is beyond the range of sense organs.

Text: 938

अथ प्रत्यक्षेणावधारित आत्मा; तदा सिद्ध आत्मा, किमनुमानेन?

atha pratyakṣeṇāvadhārita ātmā; tadā siddha ātmā, kimanu-mānena?

Translation: 938

If you say that, self is determined by perception, then, the self is already established, in that case what is the need of inference?

Text: 939

अथ देहमात्रभोक्त्रविनाभूतं दृष्टम्; तदा देहविकाराणां भोगयोगेन नात्मनः सिद्धिः।

atha dehamātrabhoktravinābhūtam dṛṣṭam; tadā dehavikārāṇām bhogayogena nātmanah siddhiḥ.

Translation: 939

If you say, it is seen invariably related with the enjoyer, who is nothing but the body, then, the enjoyment gets associated with the changes of the body and therefore, the self cannot be established.

Text: 940

भवतु वा आत्मनो भोगः, तथापि अकृत-कृताभ्यागमनाशदोषप्रसङ्गः-अकृतस्य कर्मणः फलमभ्येति आत्मनः, कृतस्य च कर्मणः फलं न सम्पद्यते बुद्धिः। यदि च अकृतस्य कर्मणः फलमभ्येति; तदा मुक्तात्मनामपि तत्फलं स्यात्, आत्मवृत्तिनियमहेतोरभावात्। ततश्चाकैवल्यप्रसङ्गः।

bhavatu vā ātmano bhogaḥ, tathāpi akṛta-kṛtābhyāgamanāśadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ-akṛtasya karmaṇah phalamabhyeti ātmanah, kṛtasya ca karmaṇah phalam na sampadyate buddhiḥ. yadi ca akṛtasya karmaṇah phalamabhyeti; tadā muktātmanāmapi tatphalam syāt, ātmavṛttinīyamahetorabhāvāt. tataścākaivalyaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 940

Or, let us accept that, the self has enjoyment, still, this will lead to the defect of getting the effect of an act, which the self has not performed and not getting the result of an act, which the self has performed. The self will get the result of an act, which the self has not performed, and the intellect will not get the result in spite of the fact that, the intellect has performed the act and if it is allowed that, one gets the result of an act which he has not performed, then, even those selves who have not performed the acts, will get the result, because, there will be nothing in the self which can control this situation and as a consequence of this there can never be liberation.

[५. सांख्यसम्मतस्य कैवल्यस्यानुपपत्तिकत्वोपपादनम्।]

[5. sāṅkhyasammataśya kaivalyaśyānupapattikatvopapādanam.]

Text: 941

इतश्च कैवल्यं नोपपद्यते, भोग्यभोजकयोरवस्थानात्। नहि भवतां पक्षे सदात्मानं परित्यजति भोग्यम्। येनाकारेण आत्मनो भोग्यत्वेनावस्थितम्, नहि तदाकास्मतिवर्तते, आत्मनो भोक्तृत्वाकारस्य अनतिवृत्तेः। अतिवृत्तौ च आत्मोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः।

itaśca kaivalyaṁ nopapadyate, bhogyabhōjakayoravasthānāt. nahi bhavatāṁ pakṣe sadātmānaṁ parityajati bhogyam. yenākāreṇa ātmano bhogyatvenāvasthitam, nahi tadākāsmativartate, ātmano bhokṭṛtvākārasya anativṛtṭeḥ. ativṛttau ca ātmocchedaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 941

For the following reason also, no liberation is possible according to the Sāṅkhya school of thought, because, there is nothing called object of enjoyment and the enjoyer. According to your doctrine, it is not the case that, the object of enjoyment leaves the self. The self does not leave its form by which form it is said to be the enjoyer of the object of enjoyment, because, the self does not or cannot over-ride the form of its being the enjoyer and if it over-rides, then, there will be no self left in this universe.

[६. वेदान्तसम्मतस्यानन्दरूपकैवल्यस्यायुक्तिकताप्रदर्शनम्।]

[6. vedāntasammataśyānandarūpakāivalyaśyāyuktikatāpradarśanam.]

Text: 942

येऽपि आनन्दरूपमात्मनः कैवल्यमभिदधाति तेऽपि युक्तिवादिनो न भवन्ति। कथम्? यद्यात्मनः आनन्दरूपं स्वसंवेद्यं च; तदा संसारावस्थायामपि तत् वेद्यं प्रसक्तम्। ततश्च मोक्षार्थप्रयासो निष्फलः।

ye 'pi ānandarūpamātmanah kaivalyamabhidadhāti te 'pi yuktivādinō na bhavanti. katham? yadyātmanah ānandarūpam svasamvedyam ca; tadā saṁsārāvasthāyāmapi tat vedyam prasaktam. tataśca mokṣārthaprayāso niṣphalah.

Translation: 942

Even those philosophers (the Advaitins) who talk of liberation of the form of Bliss, do not seem to be rational. If you ask me how, we wonder, if the self is of the nature of bliss and at the same time, self-illuminating, then, at the time of bondage also it should be self-illuminating and in that case the very effort for liberation is purposeless.

Text: 943

अथ संसारावस्थायां न वेद्यते अनादिमलावगुण्ठितमात्मनः स्वरूपम्, यथा पटान्तरिते घटे घटबुद्धिर्न भवति, एवं मललिप्ते आत्मनि आत्मबुद्धिर्न भवति;

atha saṁsārāvasthāyām na vedyate anādimalāvaguṇṭhitamātmanah svarūpam, yathā paṭāntarite ghaṭe ghaṭabuddhirna bhavati, evam malalipte ātmani ātmabuddhirna bhavati;

Translation: 943

Clarification:

Well, at the stage of bondage, the nature of the self is not revealed, because, it is covered with dirt from time without a beginning. As a pot is not known, if the pot is covered with a cloth, in the same way, if the self is covered with dirt, the awareness of the self does not arise.

Text: 944

तदेतदयुक्तम्, दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः वैषम्यात्-पटान्तरिते घटे घटबुद्धिर्न भवति पटान्तर्धाने सति इन्द्रियेण साकं सम्बन्धो नास्ति तदभावाद् घटे नेन्द्रियजं विज्ञानं सम्पद्यते। इह तु पुनः मलावगुण्ठनेन कस्य व्यवधानं क्रियते? न वेद्यवेदकयोर्व्यवधानं क्रियते। वेद्यं वेदकं च आत्मस्वरूपमेव-यथा बौद्धानां स्वसंवेद्यं विज्ञानम्, तच्च

विषयसद्भावेऽपि वेद्यते तदभावेऽपि वेद्यते, य(त)थात्मनः स्वसंवेद्यं स्वरूपं मलसद्भावेऽपि वेद्यते तदसद्भावेऽपि वेद्यते, मलस्याऽकिञ्चित्करत्वाद् आत्मनोऽर्थान्तरत्वेनाऽवस्थानात्।

tadetadayuktam, dr̥ṣṭāntadār̥ṣṭāntikayoḥ vaiṣamyāt-paṭāntarite ghaṭe ghaṭabuddhirna bhavati paṭāntardhāne sati indriyeṇa sākāṃ sambandho nāsti tadabhāvād ghaṭe nendriyajam̐ vijñānam̐ sampadyate. iha tu punaḥ malāvaguṇṭhanena kasya vyavadhānam̐ kriyate? na vedyavedakayorvyavadhānam̐ kriyate. vedyam̐ vedakam̐ ca ātmasvarūpameva-yathā bauddhānam̐ svasam̐vedyam̐ vijñānam, tacca viśayasadbhāve'pi vedyate tadabhāve'pi vedyate, ya(ta)thā-tmanaḥ svasam̐vedyam̐ svarūpam̐ malasadbhāve'pi vedyate tadasadbhāve'pi vedyate, malasya'kiñcītkaratvād ātmano'rthāntaratvenā'vasthānāt.

Translation: 944

Reply:

This is not proper, because, there is no similarity between example and the thing for which this is an example. When a pot is covered by a cloth, there does not arise the perception of the pot, because the pot is not connected with the sense organ and in the absence of the relationship with the sense organ, the perceptual knowledge of pot does not arise. In the present case, however i.e. in the case of awareness of the self, what is covered by the cover of dirt? Nothing intervenes between the knower and the object of knowledge, because, both, the object of knowledge and the knower, are nothing but the self. According to the Buddhists, as the knowledge is self-illuminated and the awareness of that knowledge, continues with or without the presence of the object of knowledge. In the same way, the nature of the self viz. self awareness exists even when there is presence of dirt or when there is no dirt. The dirt is insignificant to this phenomenon, because the self exists irrespective of all this.

Text: 945

अथ तादात्म्येन स्थितानि मलानि; तदा 'मलानि अपनीयन्ते' किमुक्तं भवति? आत्माऽपनीयते। ततश्च मोक्षाभावप्रसङ्गः।

atha tādātmyena sthitāni malāni; tadā 'malāni apanīyante' kimuktaṁ bhavati? ātmā'panīyate. tataśca mokṣābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 945

If you say, the dirt appears as identical as the self, then, when you say the dirt is being removed, what does it mean? Does it mean the self is removed? This will lead to the absence of liberation.

[७. मीमांसकमतेनापि आत्मानुमानस्यासम्भवित्वप्रकटनम्।]

[7. *mīmāṃsaka matenāpi ātmānumānasyā sambhavitvaprakāṣaṇam.*]

Text: 946

तथा मीमांसकमतेनापि आत्मानुमानं न प्रवर्तते, प्रमाणान्तरानवधारितार्थविषय-
त्वाभ्युपगमात् प्रमाणानाम्। नियतविषयाणि हि प्रमाणानि प्रतिपद्यन्ते-प्रत्यक्षवसेये
नानुमानं प्रवर्तते, अनुमानवसेये च प्रत्यक्षं न प्रवर्तते। ततश्च इतरेतरव्यावृत्तिविशेष-
विषयाणि। तदयु(तदु)क्तम्- “विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः” विशेषो नियतप्रमाणग्राह्योऽर्थः, तथाभू-
तेऽर्थेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे अनुमानस्याऽनुगमाभावः। अनुगमः सम्बन्धः, तद्ग्रहणानुपपत्तिः।

*tathā mīmāṃsaka matenāpi ātmānumānaṁ na pravartate, pramāṇāntarānavadhāritārthaviśayāt vābhyupagamāt pramāṇānām. niyata-
viśayāṇi hi pramāṇāni pratipadyante-pratyakṣāvaseye nānumānaṁ pravartate, anumānavaseye ca pratyakṣaṁ na pravartate. tataśca
itaretaravyāvṛttiviśeṣaviśayāṇi. tadayu(tadu)ktam- “viśeṣe 'nugamābhāvaḥ” viśeṣo niyatapramāṇagrāhyo 'rthaḥ, tathābhūte 'rthe 'ngi-
kriyamāṇe anumānasyā 'nugamābhāvaḥ. anugamaḥ sambandhaḥ, tadgrahaṇānupapattiḥ.*

Translation: 946

Similarly, according to the doctrine of Mīmāṃsakas, inference has no scope to establish self, because, according to them, the processes of knowing i.e. the pramāṇas are accepted as operative towards such object which is not known by another process of knowing. They also accept the processes of knowing having one to one relationship, between one kind of process of knowing and its object. If something is determined by perception, inference has no scope to reveal it and when something is concluded by the process of inference, the process of perception has no scope to reveal it. Thus, the objects

are mutually exclusive and they are the objects of specific process of knowing as it has been said, “There is absence of consecutive property with reference to a specific object.” Here, specific means an object which is known by a specific process of knowing and when an object is accepted as of that form, an inference is left with no consecutive scope of operation. The word *anugam* means, relation and such a relation cannot be known.

Text: 947

अर्थे(थ) प्रत्यक्षाद्यवधारितेप्यर्थे अनुमानं प्रवर्तते;

arthe(tha) pratyakṣādyavadhāritepyarthe anumānam pravartate;

Translation: 947

Clarification:

Inference can operate with reference to the object, even if it is determined by the process of perception.

Text: 948

नन्वेवं प्रत्यक्षानुमानसाधारणोऽर्थः प्रसक्तः। साधारणता समानता। “सामान्ये सिद्ध-साध्यता” प्रत्यक्षावगतत्वात् । अनधिगतार्थगन्तुविशेषणं च अपार्थकम्।

nanvevaṁ pratyakṣānumānasādhāraṇo'rthaḥ prasaktaḥ. sādharmaṇatā samānatā. “sāmānye siddhasādhyatā” pratyakṣāvagatatvāt. anadhigatārthagantvīśeṣaṇam ca apārthakam.

Translation: 948

Reply:

If it is so, then, an object becomes that, which is commonly accessed by perception and inference. Commonality means sameness and if there is sameness, there is knowledge of that which is already known, because, it is already known by perception and in that case, the adjective (in the definition of *pramāṇa*) “that which causes the knowledge of a thing which is not already known, becomes empty.”

Text: 949

अथवा, सामान्ये सिद्धे साधनम् इत्यन्योऽर्थः। सामान्ययोः गम्यगमकभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते मीमांसकेन। नच तत् सामान्यं विद्यते, यथा च न विद्यते तथा प्रागेवोदितम्। ततश्च सिद्धस्य साधनम्-विद्यमानस्य साधनम्। नच अग्नित्वमस्ति। तदभावे कस्येदं ज्ञापकम्?

athavā sāmānye siddhe sādhanam ityanyo'rthaḥ. sāmānyayoḥ gamyagamakabhāvo 'bhyupagamyate mīmāṃsakena. naca tat sāmānyam vidyate, yathā ca na vidyate tathā prāgevoditam. tataśca siddhasya sādhanam-vidyamānasya sādhanam. naca agnitvamasti. tadabhāve kasyedaṃ jñāpakam?

Translation: 949

Or, this can be explained in another way, “When the universal is established, the thing is established.” The Mīmāṃsakas accept implication between two universals. That, there is nothing called universal, has already been established by us before. Thus, proving that which is established, means, establishing that which is established. There is nothing called fireness and when there is no fireness, what can be the ground to imply that?

Text: 950

अथवा, सिद्धं साधनं सिद्धसाधनम् इत्यन्योऽर्थः। विद्यमानं साधनम्। नच धूमत्व-सामान्यमस्ति। तच्च(त्व)विद्यमानं सामान्यम्। कथं सामान्यं साधनं भवितुमर्हति?
athavā, siddham sādhanam siddhasādhanam ityanyo'rthaḥ. vidyamānam sādhanam naca dhūmatvasāmānyamasti. tacca(tva)vidyamānam sāmānyam. katham sāmānyam sādhanam bhavitumarhati?

Translation: 950

Or, the expression, “siddha-sādhana” can mean the “ground which is known”. It will imply the ground which exists. But there is nothing called smokeness. Such universal does not exist and therefore how can universal be the ground for inferring something?

Text: 951

अथवा, सिद्धसाधनम्-ज्ञातमनुमानं साधनं भवति, न च धूमत्वं ज्ञातं स्वयमसत्त्वात्, अथवा ग्रहणोपायाभावात् तस्य अनुस्यूतं रूपम्। नच तत् आत्मन्यनुस्यूतम्। नापि एकस्यां व्यक्तौ अपि तु बह्वीषु व्यक्तिषु। नच बह्व्यो व्यक्तस्य उपलभ्यन्ते, अपि तु एकैव धूमव्यक्तिरुपलभ्यते। नच एकस्यां व्यक्तौ अनुगतात्मतया सामान्यसंवित्तिरस्ति। नचाकारान्तरसामान्यम्।

athavā, siddhasādhanam-jñātamanumānam sādhanam bhavati, naca dhūmatvam jñātam svayamasattvāt, athavā grahaṇopāyābhāvāt tasya anusyūtam rūpam. naca tat ātmanyanusyūtam. nāpi

ekasyāṃ vyaktau api tu bahviṣu vyaktiṣu. naca bahvayo vyaktasya upalabhyante, api tu ekaiva dhūmavyaktirupalabhyate. naca ekasyāṃ vyaktau anugatātmatayā sāmānyasamvittirasti. nacākārāntarasāmānyam.

Translation: 951

Or, the word siddha-sādhanā can also be explained as follows: “once the ground is known, it can be the ground for the knowing the object of inference.” Smokeness cannot be said to be known, because, it itself does not exist. Or, there is no method of knowing its common form and there is no common form with reference to its own form. It is also not the case that, it should be only one individual, but it should be in many individuals, but we do not find many individuals, rather we find only one smoke individual. There cannot be the knowledge of universal “as common characteristics” in single individual and there is no other form of universal possible.

0.10 ताथागतसम्मतस्यानुमानस्य निरासः।

[tāthāgatasammatasyānumānasya nirāsaḥ.]

(Refutation of the definition of Inference as accepted by the Buddhists)

Text: 952

तथा, ताथागतानामपि अनुमानं न प्रवर्तते सम्बन्धानवगतेः। तदवगतिश्च—किं सामान्ययोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्, आहोस्वित् सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोः, स्वलक्षणयोर्वा?

tathā, tāthāgatānāmapi anumānaṃ na pravartate sambandhānavagateḥ. tadavagatiśca-kiṃ sāmānyayorḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam, āhosvit sāmānyasvalakṣaṇayorḥ, svalakṣaṇayorvā?

Translation: 952

Similarly, the process of inference as proposed by the Buddhists also cannot operate because, one cannot have the knowledge of invariable concomitance. So far the knowledge of invariable concomitance is concerned, the question arises, is it the conclusive knowledge of relation between two universals? Or, between a universal and a particular? Or, between two particulars?

Text: 953

तद्यदि सामान्ययोः सम्बन्धावधारणं क्रियते; तदयुक्तम्, सामान्यस्याऽसम्भवान्न तयोः सम्बन्धः।

tadyadi sāmānyayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam kriyate; tadayuktam, sāmānyasyā'sambhavānna tayoh sambandhaḥ.

Translation: 953

If you say, the knowledge of relationship between two universals is determined, that will not be proper, because, since the universal is impossible, the question of their relationship does not arise.

Text: 954

नापि सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोः सम्बन्धावधारणं क्रियते, सामान्यस्याऽसत्वात्।

nāpi sāmānyasvalakṣaṇayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam kriyate, sāmānyasyā'satvāt.

Translation: 954

Nor, it is the case that, the knowledge between a universal and a particular is decided, because, the universal itself is non-existent.

Text: 955

अथ स्वलक्षणयोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्; तत्रापि किम् अर्थयोः, ज्ञानयोः, ज्ञानार्थयोर्वा?

atha svalakṣaṇayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam; tatrāpi kim arthayoḥ, jñānayoḥ, jñānārthayorvā?

Translation: 955

If you say, the knowledge of concomitance between two individuals is ascertained, there also the question arises, whether such relation is ascertained between two objects or between two knowledges or between knowledge and object.

Text: 956

तद्यदि अर्थयोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्; तद्ब्रह्मधूमयोर्हेतुफलभावज्ञानं किं सत्तामात्रेण, आहोस्वित् तदाकारयोगित्वेन, तज्जन्यत्वेन वा, सामस्त्येन वा?

tadyadi arthayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam; taddahanadhūmayorhetu-phalabhāvajñānam kim sattāmātreṇa, āhosvit tadākārayogitvena, tajjanyatvena vā, sāmastyena vā?

Translation: 956

If you say, such relationship is known between two objects, there also the question arises, is it the case that the knowledge of ground viz. the smoke, and the knowledge of result viz. the fire, arises by their mere existence, or, because of association of their forms, or, as been produced by that or collectively?

Text: 957

तद्यदि सत्तामात्रेण दहनधूमसंवेदनमपदिश्यते; न केवलं तद्दहनस्य तत् संवेदनम्, त्रैलोक्यस्य तत्संवेदनं प्रसक्तम्, उपकारविनिर्मुक्तस्य सत्ताऽविशेषात्।

tadyadi sattāmātreṇa dahanadhūmasaṃvedanamapadiśyate; na kevalam taddahanasya tat saṃvedanam, trailokyasya tatsaṃvedanam prasaktam, upakāravinirmuktasya sattā'viśeṣāt.

Translation: 957

If you say, by mere existence, the knowledge of fire and smoke is referred to, then, that knowledge cannot said to be that fire rather it will become the knowledge of all the three worlds, because, the existence devoid of any change or effect is common to all of them.

[१. प्रसङ्गात् ज्ञानस्य विषयाकारत्वं विचार्य तत्खण्डनम्।]

[1. prasaṅgāt jñānasya viśayākāratvaṃ vicārya tatkhaṇḍanam.]

Text: 958

अथ तद्दहनाकारयोगित्वेन तस्य संवेदनमभिधीयते; यथा दहनेन स्वनिर्भासमुत्पादितम्। तथा गन्धाकारोपरक्तगन्धादिज्ञानेनापि स्वनिर्भासमुत्पादितम्। ततश्च ज्ञानाकारं तदुत्पद्यते इति युक्तं भवति गन्धाद्याकारम्, ततश्च अनेकाकारयोगित्वे सति प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था न लभ्यते।

atha taddahanākārayogitvena tasya saṃvedanamabhidhīyate; yathā dahanena svanirbhāsamutpāditam. tathā gandhākāroparaktagandhā-dijñānenāpi svanirbhāsamutpāditam. tataśca jñānākāraṃ tadutpadyate iti yuktam bhavati gandhādyākāram, tataśca anekākārayogitve sati pratikarmavyavasthā na labhyate.

Translation: 958

If you say that, its knowledge is referred to as being associated with the form of that fire, then, as by the fire, its own cognition is generated, in the same way, by the knowledge of smell etc.

associated with the form of smell also, its own cognition is generated. Therefore, it is proper to hold that, the form of the knowledge is produced which reflects the form of the smell etc. In this way, there will be association of many forms and as such, one is to one correspondence between knowledge and its object, will become impossible.

Text: 959

अथ गन्धादिज्ञानं न गन्धाद्याकारमर्पयति दहनज्ञाने; तदानीं ज्ञानाकारार्पकत्वमपि न लभ्यते, ज्ञानतादात्म्यव्यवस्थितोऽसौ गन्धाकारः तदनर्पकत्वे ज्ञानाकारोऽपि नार्पितः स्यात्। ततश्च दहनविज्ञानम् अविज्ञानम्। निरवयवं च गन्धादिज्ञानम्, नैकदेशेन आकारार्पकत्वम्।

atha gandhādijñānam na gandhādyākāramarpayati dahanajñāne; tadānīm jñānākārārpakatvamapi na labhyate, jñānatādātmyavyavasthito'sau gandhākārah tadanarpakatve jñānākāro'pi nārpitaḥ syāt. tataśca dahanavijñānam avijñānam. niravayavam ca gandhādijñānam, naikadeśena ākārārpakatvam.

Translation: 959

If you say that, the knowledge of smell etc. does not offer the form of smell etc. in the knowledge of fire, then, you should also accept that a thing does not offer its form to its knowledge and if it does not offer its own form, then, the form of the smell will have to be treated as identical with its knowledge and in that case, it amounts saying that, it does not offer any form to its knowledge also. Thus, knowledge of fire will not be called knowledge. The knowledge of the smell etc. is without any part. Therefore, it cannot also be said that, partially it can offer its form.

Text: 960

अथ निराकारं गन्धादिज्ञानम्; प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था तर्हि न लभ्यते, तस्य दहनज्ञानस्यापि निराकारताऽस्तु।

atha nirākāram gandhādijñānam; pratikarmavyavasthā tarhi na labhyate, tasya dahanajñānasyāpi nirākāratā'stu.

Translation: 960

If you hold that, the knowledge of smell is without a form, then, you cannot explain that, such-and-such knowledge is of such-and-such

object. Not only that, then, one may say, let the knowledge of fire also be treated as knowledge without a form.

Text: 961

किंच, दहनाकारयोगित्वेन यदि दहनसंवेदनम्; तदा पूर्वविज्ञानाकारयोगित्वेन पूर्वविज्ञान-
स्यापि तद्वेदनं प्राप्तम्, तदाकारयोगित्वात् तदुत्पाद्यत्वाच्च।

*kim̐ca, dahanākārayogitvena yadi dahanasamvedanam; tadā pūrva-
vijñānākārayogitvena pūrvavijñānasyāpi tadvedanam prāptam,
tadākārayogitvāt tadutpādyatvācca.*

Translation: 961

Moreover, if you think that, knowledge of fire is associated with the form of fire, then, since it is associated with the form of the previous knowledge, the earlier knowledge should also be knowledge of the fire, because, that is associated with that form and also because, it is produced by that earlier knowledge.

Text: 962

अथ तथा(दा)कारयोगित्वे तदुत्पाद्यत्वे च तस्य तद्वेदनं न भवति;

*atha tathā(dā)kārayogitve tadutpādyatve ca tasya tadvedanam na
bhavati;*

Translation: 962

Clarification:

If, simply because, it is associated with that form and it is produced by that previous knowledge, the previous knowledge cannot be said to be the knowledge of fire.

Text: 963

विषयस्यापि तर्हि तद्वेदनं किम्, इह द्वयस्य विसंवादात्?

viṣayasyāpi tarhi tadvedanam kim, iha dvayasya visamvādāt?

Translation: 963

Reply:

In that case, what will be the knowledge of that object, because, here both become contradictory.

Text: 964

अथ तद्विज्ञानं विदितम् इति कृत्वा न वेद्यते ज्ञानान्तरेण;

atha tadvijñānam veditam iti kṛtvā na vedyate jñānāntareṇa;

Translation: 964

Clarification:

Well, since there is awareness of that knowledge, it cannot be known by another knowledge.

Text: 965

एवं विषयस्यापि तद्वेदनं न प्राप्नोति पुरुषान्तरावधार्यमाणस्य।

*evaṃ viṣayasyaṅpi tadvedanaṃ na prāpnoti puruṣāntarāvadhā-
ryamāṅasya.*

Translation: 965

Reply:

In that case, it cannot be said to be the knowledge of that object, if it is being known by another knower.

Text: 966

अपि च, यदि दहनाकारयोगित्वेन दहनस्य तद्वेदनम्; वस्तुत्वाकारयोगित्वेन नयनादेरपि तत्संवेदनं प्रसक्तम्।

*api ca, yadi dahanākārayogitvena dhanasya tadvedanam; vastu-
tvākārayogitvena nayanāderapi tatsaṃvedanaṃ prasaktam.*

Translation: 966

Moreover, if you say that, since there is association of the form of fire, therefore, this knowledge is the knowledge of fire, on the same analogy, since eyes etc. are associated with the property of being an entity, let that knowledge also be called knowledge of eyes etc.

Text: 967

अथ नयनादेरसाधारणाकारार्पकत्वं न विद्यते; तेन तेषां तत्संवेदनं न भवति, नीलस्य स्वभवनदेशकालस्वभावानर्पकत्वात् स्वकारणकलापोत्पाद्यस्वभावानर्पकत्वाच्च। तदर्पकत्वे च नीलाकारयोगिता स्यात् तत्कारणजन्यत्वञ्च। एककालीनत्वे एककारणजन्यत्वे च हेतुफलभावानुपपत्तिः सहोत्पन्नयोर्गोविषाणयोरिव।

*atha nayanāderasādharaṅākārārpakatvaṃ na vidyate; tena teṣāṃ
tatsaṃvedanaṃ na bhavati, nīlasya svabhavanadeśakālasvabhāvān-
narpakatvāt svakāraṅakalāpotpādyasvabhāvānarpakatvācca. tadar-
pakatve ca nīlākārayogitā syāt tatkāraṅajanyatvaṅca. ekakālīnatve
ekakāraṅajanyatve ca hetuphalabhāvānupapattiḥ sahotpannayorgovi-
ṣāṅayoriva.*

Translation: 967

Well, it is not the case that, eyes etc. offer uncommon form, therefore, it cannot be said that, it is the knowledge of the eyes, because, a blue object does not offer the nature of its born at a particular space and at a particular time and also because, it does not offer the nature of being produced by its own collection of factors and if it is accepted that, it offers, then, it should have association with the blue form and also the state of being produced by its cause and if it becomes contemporary and being produced by the same collection of factors, then, it is difficult to explain cause and effect relationship, like two horns of a cow which have grown simultaneously.

Text: 968

अथ असाधारणाकारतया नोपजायते अपि तु नीलमात्र प्रतिच्छायतयैव उपजायते; यद्येवं नयनादिस्वलक्षणाकारतया उपजायमानं नयनादेः तद्ग्रहणं भवेत्।

atha asādhāraṇākāratayā nopajāyate api tu nīlamātra praticchāyatayaiva upajāyate; yadyevam nayanādisvalakṣaṇākāratayā upajāyamānaṁ nayanādeḥ tadgrahaṇaṁ bhavet.

Translation: 968

If you say that, it is not produced as uncommon cause, but it is produced merely as a copy of the blue object, then, that should be called the knowledge of the eyes etc. because it is produced in the form of the particular viz. eyes etc.

Text: 969

अपि च, दहनाकारता दहनविज्ञानात् किं भिन्ना, अभिन्ना वा?

api ca, dahanākāratā dhanavijñānāt kiṁ bhinnā, abhinnā vā?

Translation: 969

Moreover, is the form of fire different from knowledge of fire or identical?

Text: 970

यदि भिन्ना; सा किं तात्त्विकी, आहोस्विदतात्त्विकी?

yadi bhinnā; sā kiṁ tāttvikī, āhosvidatāttvikī?

Translation: 970

If you say, it is different, then, also the question arises, whether it is real or unreal?

Text: 971

तद्यदि तात्त्विकी; तद्गतिः कथम्? न स्वसंवेद्यत्वेन नापि जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन। स्वसंवेद्या न भवति विज्ञानकार्यं(काय)व्यतिरेकात्। नापि जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन गृह्यते। अर्थो हि आकारमर्पयति न विषयाकारता। तदाकारार्पकत्वे वा प्राप्ता आकारपरम्परा।

tadyadi tāttvikī; tadgatiḥ katham? na svasaṁvedyatvena nāpi janakatvā"kāraṁpakatvena. svasaṁvedyā na bhavati vijñānakārya-(kāya)vyatirekāṭ. nāpi janakatvā"kāraṁpakatvena gr̥hyate. artho hi ākāramarpayati na viṣayākāratā. tadākāraṁpakatve vā prāptā ākāraparamparā.

Translation: 971

If you say, it is real, then, how can it be known? It cannot be known by the process of self-illumination, nor, in the form of offering the form of a producer i.e. a cause. It cannot be said to be known by itself, because it is different from knowledge. Nor can it be said to be known as offering the form of its cause because an object offering its own form and not the form of its being object of knowledge and if you accept that, it offers the form of its being object of knowledge, then, you will have to postulate an infinite chain of forms.

Text: 972

अथ अतात्त्विकी विषयाकारता; सा अतात्त्विकत्वेन असंविदितदेहा कथं प्रतिकर्मनियामिका भवति?

atha atāttvikī viṣayākāratā; sā atāttvikatvena asaṁviditadehā katham pratikarmaniyāmikā bhavati?

Translation: 972

If you say that, the form of being the object of knowledge is unreal, then, being unknown, because of its being unreal, how can it account for one is to one relation between knowledge and its object.

Text: 973

अथ अव्यतिरिक्ताः; सा किं तात्त्विकी, आहोस्विद् अतात्त्विकी?

atha avyatiriktāḥ; sā kiṁ tāttvikī, āhosvid atāttvikī?

Translation: 973

If you say, it is identical, there also the question arises, whether it is real or unreal?

Text: 974

यदि तात्त्विकी; सा किं जडात्मिका; आहोस्वित् चित्स्वभावा?

yadi tāttvikī; sā kiṃ jaḍātmikā; āhosvit citsvabhāvā?

Translation: 974

If you say, it is real, then, the question arises, whether it is animate or inanimate?

Text: 975

तद्यदि जडात्मिका; तदा ज्ञानाऽव्यतिरेकित्वं न सम्भवति चिदचिदोरेकत्वायोगा-
दन्योन्यपरिहारस्थितिधर्मत्वेन।

*tadyadi jaḍātmikā; tadā jñānā'vyatirekitvaṃ na sambhavati cidacido-
dorekatvāyogādanyonyaparihārasthitidharmatvena.*

Translation: 975

If you say, it is inanimate, then, it cannot be said to be not different from knowledge, because, animate and inanimate cannot be identical, since they are found possessing mutually exclusive properties.

Text: 976

अथ चिदात्मिका; तदा परिभाषामात्रं भिद्यते-ज्ञानं विषयाकार इति।

atha cidātmikā; tadā paribhāṣāmātram bhidyate-jñānaṃ viṣayākāra iti.

Translation: 976

If you say, it is animate, then, it differs only in nomenclature i.e. knowledge which has the form of its knowledge.

Text: 977

अथ अतात्त्विकी; तदा ज्ञानस्याप्यतात्त्विकत्वम्। न च ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्ता विषयाकारता
नास्ति, अपि तु ज्ञानस्वरूपमेव विषयाकारतात्मकमपदिश्यते। तच्च नयनार्थालोकसाधारण
उत्पाद्यत्वेन समं संवेदनं प्रसक्तं सर्वकारकाणाम्।

*atha atāttvikī; tadā jñānasyāpyatāttvikatvam. na ca jñānavyati-
riktā viṣayākāratā nāsti, api tu jñānasvarūpameva viṣayākāra-
tātmakamapadiśyate. tacca nayanārthālokasādhāraṇa utpādyatvena
samam samvedanam prasaktam sarvakāraḥkāṇām.*

Translation: 977

If you hold that, it is unreal, then, knowledge also becomes unreal. It is not the case that, the form of being an object of knowledge is different from knowledge; rather, it is referred as identical with the form of being the object of knowledge, which is nothing but nature of knowledge, which amounts to knowledge of all causal factors, because of its being produced, which is common to eyes, object and light.

[२. दृष्टान्तीभूतस्यादर्शस्य मुखरूपतास्वीकारार्थस्य विकल्प्य निरसनम्।]

[2. *dr̥ṣṭāntībhūtasya ādarśasya mukharūpatāsvīkārārthasya vikalpya nirasanam.*]

Text: 978

यदप्युक्तं केनापि-“आदर्शमण्डलं मुखरूपतां स्वीकरोति नच आदर्शरूपतां परित्यजति तथा ज्ञानमपि विषयरूपतां स्वीकुर्वन्न विज्ञानरूपतां त्यजति” तदप्ययुक्तम्, आदर्शमण्डलस्य मुखरूपतास्वीकरणार्थो वक्तव्यः-किं मुखतादात्म्यम्, आहोस्विद् अविरलदेशोत्पादः?

yadapyuktam kenāpi-“ādarśamaṇḍalam mukharūpatām svīkaroti naca ādarśarūpatām parityajati tathā jñānamapi viṣayarūpatām svīkurvanna vijñānarūpatām tyajati” tadapyayuktam, ādarśamaṇḍalasya mukharūpatāsvīkaraṇārtho vaktavyaḥ-kiṁ mukhatādātmyam, āhosvid aviraladeśotpādaḥ?

Translation: 978

You have made the following statement: “the circular mirror reflects the form of the face, but does not give up its being the form of the mirror. In the same way, knowledge, reflects the form of being its content, but does not give up its own form of being knowledge.” This statement is also not proper. You should explain what is the meaning of saying that, the circular mirror receives the form of the face. Does it mean identity with the face or does it mean producing a close place?

Text: 979

तद्यदि तादात्म्यम्, कथं नादर्शरूपतां जहाति? एकं हीदं वस्तु-तत्तादात्म्ये मुखमादर्शो वा।
tadyadi tādātmyam; katham na ādarśarūpatām jahāti? ekam hīdam vastu-tattādātmye mukhamādarśo vā.

Translation: 979

If you say, it is identity, then, how is it that, it does not give up the form of a mirror? The entity called face is a single thing, if it is identical with the face, then, either it is face or mirror.

Text: 980

अथ अविरलदेशोत्पादो मुखस्य स्वीकरणम्; तदानीम् आकारस्यापि स्वीकरणम् अविरलदेशोत्पाद एव प्राप्तः, ततश्च नाकारेण प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्था क्रियते। अनवगतरूपेणैव च स्थितेः। दहनज्ञानं यदि साकारं तथापि दहनग्रहणं न भवति।

atha aviraladeśotpādo mukhasya svīkaraṇam; tadānīm ākārasyaāpi svīkaraṇam aviraladeśotpāda eva prāptaḥ, tataśca nākāreṇa pratikarmavyavasthā kriyate. anavagatarūpeṇaiva ca sthiteḥ. dahanajñānam yadi sākāraṁ tathāpi dahanagrahaṇam na bhavati.

Translation: 980

If you say, it means producing a close place of the face, then, you should accept the production of a close place of the form and in that case again it cannot explain one is to one relationship between knowledge and its object, because it will remain without being known. Even if you accept the knowledge of fire, as having the form, still, you cannot say that, it is the knowledge of fire.

Text: 981

इतोऽपि दहनग्रहणं न भवति। किं तदवगतमनवगतम्, तत्किं ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यं, स्वसंविदितं वा?

ito'pi dahanagrahaṇam na bhavati. kiṁ tadavagatamanavagatam, tatkiṁ jñānāntaravedyam, svasamviditam vā?

Translation: 981

For the following reason also, there cannot be knowledge of fire, because, the following questions arise: Is the knowledge of fire known or unknown or it can be known by knowledge or it can be known by itself?

Text: 982

यदि ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यम्; तदयुक्तम्, न ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यं भवत्पक्षे।

yadi jñānāntaravedyam; tadayuktam, na jñānam jñānāntaravedyam bhavatpakṣe.

Translation: 982

If you say, it can be known by another knowledge, it is not proper, because, according to your view, a knowledge cannot be known by another knowledge.

Text: 983

अथ स्वसंवेद्यम्; तदयुक्तम्, विषयदृष्टान्तबलेन निराकृतं नैयायिकैः।
atha svasamvedyam; tadayuktam, viṣayadr̥ṣṭāntabalena nirākṛtaṁ nīyāyikāiḥ.

Translation: 983

If you say, it is self-illuminating, that also is not proper, because the logicians have already refuted it on the strength of example of content.

Text: 984

अथ अनवगतम्, न तर्हि तद् दहनस्य ग्रहणम्। “अप्रत्यक्षोपलम्भस्य नार्थदृष्टिः प्रसिद्ध्यति” इति न्यायात्।

atha anavagatam, na tarhi tad dahanasya grahaṇam. “apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadr̥ṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati” iti nyāyāt.

Translation: 984

If you say, it is unknown, then, it cannot be said to be knowledge of fire on the basis of the maxim “if knowledge is not known, then, its content is also not known.”

Text: 985

अपि च, यत् तत् दहनग्रहणम्—तत्र किमवभाति—किम् अर्थः, ज्ञानम्, उभयं वा?
api ca, yat tat dahanagrahaṇam-tatra kimavabhāti-kim arthaḥ, jñānam, ubhayaṁ vā?

Translation: 985

Moreover, whatever you consider to be the knowledge of fire, we would like to ask, what does appear there? Is it the object or the knowledge or both?

Text: 986

यदि अर्थः प्रतिभाति; तदयुक्तम्, असंविदितायां संवित्तो तत्संवित्ययोगात्।
yadi arthaḥ pratibhāti; tadayuktam, asaṁviditāyāṁ saṁvitto tatsaṁvityayogāt.

Translation: 986

If you say that, it is the object that appears, that is not proper, because, if the knowledge is not known, its object cannot be known.

Text: 987

अथ ज्ञानम्; [न] तर्हि दहनधूमयोः सम्बन्धोऽवगतः तत्संवित्तिपूर्वकत्वात् सम्बन्धबुद्धेः।
atha jñānam; [na] tarhi dahanadhūmayoḥ sambandho'vagataḥ tatsamvittipūrvakatvāt sambandhabuddheḥ.

Translation: 987

If you say that, it is the knowledge that is known, then, it amounts to saying that, the invariable concomitance between fire and smoke is not known, because, knowledge of that relation has to be preceded by knowledge of the relata.

Text: 988

अथ उभयं प्रतिभाति; तद्युक्तम्, एकोपलम्भस्या(स्य) द्वितीयाकारपरिहारस्थिति-
 धर्मत्वात्। न च दहनज्ञाने ज्ञानार्थकारौ प्रतीयेते अपि तु दहनस्यैव प्रतिभासनात्।
*atha ubhayam pratibhāti; tadayuktam, ekopalambhasyā(sya) dvitīyākāraparihārasthitidharmatvāt. na ca dahanajñāne jñānār-
 thakārau pratīyete api tu dahanasyaiva pratibhāsanāt.*

Translation: 988

If you say that, both appear there, it is improper, because, once one is known, it will lose the property of being present in the other form. It is not the case that, in the knowledge of fire, two forms viz. the form of knowledge and the knowledge of object appear. But, what appears is only fire.

Text: 989

अथ दहनोत्पाद्यत्वेन तद्दहनस्य संवेदनम्; कथं तद्दहनेनोत्पाद्यते? किम्
 अतज्जननस्वभावेन तज्जननस्वभावेन वा?
*atha dahanotpādyatvena taddahanasya saṁvedanam; katham taddahaneṇotpādyate? kim atajjananasvabhāvena tajjananasvabhā-
 vena vā?*

Translation: 989

If you say that, it is the knowledge of fire, because it is produced by fire, then, we would like to know, how it is produced by fire? Is it

produced as having the nature of not producing that, or, as having the nature of producing that?

Text: 990

यद्यतज्जननस्वभावेन; अतज्जननस्वभावः कथमसौ तज्जनयेत्?

yadyatajjananasvabhāvena; atajjananasvabhāvaḥ kathamasau tajjanayet?

Translation: 990

If you say, as having the nature of not producing that, then, if it has the nature of not producing that, then, how can it produce that?

Text: 991

अथ तज्जननस्वभावः; न तर्हि दहनाद् धूमस्योत्पत्तिः, दहनस्य दहनज्ञानोत्पादकस्वभाव्येन धूमोत्पादकत्वायोगात्।

atha tajjananasvabhāvaḥ; na tarhi dahanād dhūmasyotpattiḥ, dahanasya dahanajñānotpādakasvābhāvvyena dhūmotpādakatvāyogāt.

Translation: 991

If you say, it has the nature of producing that, then, you should accept that fire does not produce smoke, because, the fire has the nature of producing its knowledge, it cannot have the nature of producing smoke.

Text: 992

अथ तेनैव स्वभावेन धूममुत्पादयति; प्राप्ता विज्ञानस्यापि धूमरूपता, धूमस्य वा विज्ञानरूपता, अभिन्नात्मोत्पाद्यते, भेदकं च न बीजमस्ति।

atha tenaiva svabhāvena dhūmamutpādayati; prāptā vijñānasyāpi dhūmarūpatā, dhūmasya vā vijñānarūpatā, abhinnātmotpādyate, bhedakaṁ ca na bījamasti.

Translation: 992

If you say that, fire produces smoke, because, it has the nature of producing smoke, then, it amounts to saying that, knowledge is smoke or smoke is knowledge. Both are produced in the identical form and there is no ground left to distinguish them.

Text: 993

अथ स्वभावान्तरेण जनयति; [न] एकस्य स्वभावद्वयाभावात्-स्वभावद्वये च एकतानुपपन्ना। ततश्च दहनेन धूमोत्पादनं क्रियते न तदा स्वज्ञानमुत्पादयति। ज्ञानं विना केन हेतुफलावधारणं क्रियते?

atha svabhāvāntareṇa janayati; [na] ekasya svabhāvadvayābhāvāt-svabhāvadvaye ca ekatānupapannā. tataśca dahanena dhūmot-pādanam kriyate na tadā svajñānamutpādayati. jñānam vinā kena hetuphalāvadhāraṇam kriyate?

Translation: 993

If you say that, it produces by help of some other nature, it cannot be accepted, because, one thing cannot have two natures. And if you accept two natures, you cannot justify it to be one. Therefore, when fire is producing smoke, then, it cannot produce its own knowledge. Without knowledge, how can any one decide what is the cause and what is the effect?

Text: 994

अथ दहनो दहनज्ञानमुत्पादयति; न तर्हि दहनस्य धूमोत्पादकत्वम्, तदभावात् न बाह्यार्थयोर्हेतुफलभाववधारणं दहनादिज्ञानेन शक्यते कर्तुम्।

atha dahano dahanajñānamutpādayati; na tarhi dahanasya dhūmotpādakatvam, tadabhāvāt na bāhyārthayorhetuphalabhāvā-vadhāraṇam dahanādijñānena śakyate kartum.

Translation: 994

If you say, fire produces knowledge of fire, then, it means that, fire does not produce smoke. In the absence of that it is not possible to decide the cause and effect relationship between two external objects by the knowledge of fire etc.

[३. कार्यानुमाननिरासाय दहनधूमयोर्हेतुफलभावानुपपत्तेः पुनरुपक्रमः।]

[3. kāryānumānanirāsāya dahanadhūmayorhetuphalabhāvānupapatteḥ punarupakramah.]

Text: 995

इतोऽपि दहनधूमयोः हेतुफलभावानुपपत्तिः। यथा अविचलितदहनस्वरूपस्य पूर्वापरानेक-कार्याविर्भावकत्वं न प्रतिपद्यते भवद्भिः तथा अनायत्तविकारस्य युगपदुत्पन्नानेक-कार्याविर्भावकत्वमपि न प्रत्येतव्यम्।

ito'pi dahanadhūmayoḥ hetuphalabhāvānupapattiḥ. yathā avicalita-dahanasvarūpasya pūrvāparānekakāryāvīrbhāvakatvaṃ na pratipadyate bhavadbhiḥ tathā anāyattavikārasya yugapadutpannāneka-kāryāvīrbhāvakatvamapi na pratyetyam.

Translation: 995

For the following reason also one cannot explain the cause and effect relationship between fire and smoke. As you do not accept manifestation of many earlier and later effects of fire possessing invariable nature, in the same way, you should not accept a thing which does not undergo any change having the property of manifesting many simultaneous effects.

Text: 996

अथ अभ्युपगम्यते युगपदनेककार्योत्पादकत्वं युगपदनेककार्योत्पादनशक्तियुक्तस्योत्पत्तेः;
atha abhyupagamyate yugapadanekakāryotpādatvam yugapada-
nekakāryotpādanaśaktiyuktasyotpatteḥ;

Translation: 996

Clarification:

Well, we accept simultaneous production of many effects, because, it possesses power or capacity to produce many effects simultaneously.

Text: 997

यद्येवं – क्रमभाव्यनेककार्यविर्भावकत्वस्योत्पत्तेः अयुगपदेकं कार्यं विदध्यात्।
yadyevam - kramabhāvyanekakāryāvīrbhāvakatvasyotpatteḥ ayuga-
padekam kāryam vidadhyāt.

Translation: 997

Reply:

If it is so, then, since it is accepted as having the capacity to manifest many effects in a sequence, then, at a time it will produce only one effect.

Text: 998

विदधात्येव इति चेत्;
vidadhātyeva iti cet;

Translation: 998

Clarification:

If we say, it does produce, then?

Text: 999

इदमापेक्षिकत्वं यत्क्रमभाव्यनेकार्थजनकात्मकं स्वरूपम्। एतदभ्युपगमेऽभ्युपेतहान-
मापद्यते।

*idamāpekṣikatvaṁ yatkrambahāvyanekakāryajanakātmakam svarū-
pam. etadabhyupagame'bhuyupetahānamāpadyate.*

Translation: 999

Reply:

It is a relative phenomenon that, it has the nature of producing many effects in a sequence and if you accept this, it will lead to the fault of giving up a position which was earlier taken.

Text: 1000

अथ अविचलितरूपेण पूर्वापरकार्यं न जन्यते; तदा युगपदपि न कुर्यात् अनायत्तविकारः।
ततश्च न दहनाद् धूमस्योत्पत्तिः।

*atha avicalitarūpeṇa pūrvāparakāryam na janyate; tadā yugapadapi
na kuryāt anāyattavikārah. tataśca na dahanād dhūmasyoṭpattiḥ.*

Translation: 1000

If you say that, it does not produce earlier and later effects, without getting affected by any variation, then, simultaneously also it cannot produce, because, it is not affected by any variation and as a consequence, there will be no smoke from fire.

Text: 1001

अथ एकमेव तेन ज्वलनेन जन्यते;

atha ekameva tena jvalanena janyate;

Translation: 1001

Clarification:

Well, only one effect is generated by fire.

Text: 1002

किं तदेकम्-विज्ञानम्, धूमो वा?

kiṁ tadekam-vijñānam, dhūmo vā?

Translation: 1002

Reply:

What is that one effect? Is it knowledge or smoke?

Text: 1003

तद्यदि विज्ञानमेव जन्त्यते; न तर्हि धूमं दृष्ट्वा अग्निं(ग्निः) प्रतीय[तेऽ]तद्व्यापारलब्ध-
जन्मवत्वात्।

tadyadi vijñānameva janyate; na tarhi dhūmam̐ dṛṣṭvā agnim̐(gnih)
pratīya[te']tadvyāpāralabdhanmavavāt.

Translation: 1003

If you say that, knowledge alone is produced, then, after seeing the smoke, one will not come to know fire, because it will not be produced by its function.

Text: 1004

अथ धूम एव उत्पाद्यते; तदा तद्विज्ञानं विना केन हेतुफलभावोऽवगम्यते?

atha dhūma eva utpādyate; tadā tadvijñānam̐ vinā kena hetupha-
labhāvo'vagamyate?

Translation: 1004

If you say that, only smoke is produced by fire, then, without its knowledge, who will come to know the cause and effect relationship between them?

Text: 1005

इतोऽपि दहनस्य धूमाविर्भावकत्वं न जाघटीति – किं निमित्तभूतेन धूमोत्पादनं क्रियते,
किं वा उपादानभूतेन?

ito'pi dahanasya dhūmāvīrbhāvakatvaṁ na jāghatīti - kiṁ nimitta-
bhūtena dhūmotpādanam̐ kriyate, kiṁ vā upādānabhūtena?

Translation: 1005

For the following reason also, fire cannot be said to be the producer of smoke. Is it the case that fire produces smoke as its auxiliary cause, or, it produces smoke as its material cause?

Text: 1006

तद्यदि निमित्तभूतेनोत्पाद्यते; तदा धूमरूपता न प्राप्नोति उपादानं विना।

tadyadi nimittabhūtenotpādyate; tadā dhūmarūpatā na prāpnoti
upādānam̐ vinā.

Translation: 1006

If you say, as an auxiliary cause it produces smoke, then, the effect called smoke, because, it has come into being without its material cause.

Text: 1007

अथ उपादानभूतेनोत्पादनं क्रियते; ननु असमानजातीयं कथमुपादानकारणं भवेत्? अभ्युपगमे वा देहेन्द्रियसङ्घातादेव गर्भादौ विज्ञानं भविष्यति अलं परलोकविज्ञानकल्पनया।
atha upādānabhūtenotpādanam kriyate; nanu asamānajātīyam kathamupādānakāraṇam bhavet? abhyupagame vā dehendriya-saṅghātādeva garbhādau vijñānam bhaviṣyati alaṁ paralokavijñā-nakalpanayā.

Translation: 1007

Again if you say that, it produces smoke as its material cause, then, the question arises, how can an entity belonging to a different class be the material cause of an entity belonging to a different class? If in spite of that you accept it, then, there will be knowledge in the womb of mother from the collection of factors such as body, sense organ etc.etc. and in that case, what is the need of postulating knowledge of world hereafter?

Text: 1008

अथ समानजातीयेन विज्ञानेन विना न विज्ञानस्य उद्गतिः इति चेत्;
atha samānajātīyena vijñānena vinā na vijñānasya udgatiḥ iti cet;

Translation: 1008

Clarification:

Well, knowledge cannot arise without the knowledge belonging to the same class.

Text: 1009

एवं तर्हि धूमस्यापि असमानजातीयात् दहनात् कथमुत्पत्तिः?
evaṁ tarhi dhūmasyāpi asamānajātīyāt dahanāt kathamutpattiḥ?

Translation: 1009

Reply:

In that case, how can smoke be produced from fire, which does not belong to the class of smoke?

Text: 1010

अथ रूपरूपतया वह्नेः समानजातीयत्वम्;
atha rūparūpatayā vahneḥ samānajātīyatvam;

Translation: 1010

Clarification:

Well, fire can be treated as belonging to the same class i.e. of the class of smoke as possessing a form.

Text: 1011

एवं देहादेरपि समानजातीयत्वं स्वलक्षणरूपतया। इदमेव चेतसि समारोप्य उक्तम्-“शरीरादेव इति बृहस्पतिः।”

evam dehāderapi samānajātīyatvaṁ svalakṣaṇarūpatayā. idameva cetasi samāropya uktam-“śarīrādeva iti bṛhaspatiḥ.”

Translation: 1011

Reply:

Then, factors like body etc. can also be treated as belonging to the same class i.e. the class of knowledge as having the form of a particular. Having kept this very idea in mind, it has been said, “From the body alone (knowledge arises), says Bṛhaspati”.

Text: 1012

अथ ज्ञानरूपतया न समानजातीयत्वं देहस्य; दहनस्यापि धूमरूपतयाऽसमानजातीयत्वम्। नियतकारणजन्याकारतया नियतदेशकालस्वभावतया च सर्वे भावाः अन्योन्यव्यावृत्ततनवः। न च तेषाम् अन्योन्याकारानुगमोऽस्ति, नाप्येकजात्यनुगमः। तदुक्तम्-

सर्वे भावाः स्वभावेन स्वस्वभावव्यवस्थितेः।

स्वभावपरभावाभ्यां यस्माद् व्यावृत्तिभागिनः॥

atha jñānarūpatayā na samānajātīyatvaṁ dehasya; dahanasyāpi dhūmarūpatayā'asamānajātīyatvam. niyatakāraṇajanyākāratayā niyatadeśakālasvabhāvatayā ca sarve bhāvāḥ anyonyavyāvṛttatana-vaḥ. na ca teṣām anyonyākārānugamo'sti, nāpyekajātyanugamaḥ. taduktam-

sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ,

svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāṁ yasmād vyāvṛttibhāgināḥ.

Translation: 1012

If you say that, body cannot be treated as belonging to the same class as knowledge, then, fire also cannot be treated as belonging to the same class as smoke. All positive entities are distinct from one another, as possessing the form produced by specific cause and

as having the nature of being in a particular place and particular time. There is no common form by which they can be connected with one another. Nor there is any universal property by which they can form the class. This is what has been said in the following statement, “All positive entities are existent in their own form by nature, because, they are distinguished on the basis of their own nature and from the nature of others.”

Text: 1013

ततश्च भिन्नजातीयात् सर्वं जायमानं दृष्टम्, न समानजातीयाद्भवत् किञ्चिद् दृष्टपूर्वम्। एवञ्च भिन्नजातीयं देहादिकं गर्भादौ विज्ञानमुत्पादयिष्यति। ततश्च न परलोकः प्रसिद्ध्यति।

tataśca bhinnajātīyāt sarvaṃ jāyamānaṃ dr̥ṣṭam, na samānajātīyādbhavat kiñcid dr̥ṣṭapūrvam. evaṅca bhinnajātīyaṃ dehādikaṃ garbhādaḥ vijñānamutpādayiṣyati. tataśca na paralokaḥ prasiddhyati.

Translation: 1013

Therefore, everything is seen as being produced from something belonging to different class. Nothing has been seen before which is produced from something belonging to the same class. Thus, the factors like body etc. would produce knowledge in the womb of the mother and therefore, the world “after this world” i.e. re-birth cannot be established.

Text: 1014

अथ समानजातीयं विज्ञानं विना विज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते;

atha samānajātīyaṃ vijñānaṃ vinā vijñānaṃ notpadyate;

Translation: 1014

Objection:

Well, no knowledge can be produced without the knowledge belonging to the same class.

Text: 1015

तदा न कस्यचिदुत्पत्तिः स्यात्, समानजातीयकारणासम्भवात्। ततश्च कार्यानुमानं हीयते।

tadā na kasyacidutpattiḥ syāt, samānajātīyakāraṇāsambhavāt. tataśca kāryānumānaṃ hīyate.

Translation: 1015

Reply:

In that case, nothing can be produced, because, there is no cause which belongs to the same class. This leads to the conclusion that, there cannot be inference of any effect (on the basis of the cause).

Text: 1016

इतोऽपि दहनधूमयोः हेतुफलभावावधारणं कर्तुं नैव शक्यते—किम् एकेन ज्ञानेन दहनधूमयोर्हेतुफलभावावधारणं क्रियते, आहोस्विद् प्रतिनियतेन ज्ञानेन?

ito'pi dahanadhūmayoḥ hetuphalabhāvāvdhāraṇam kartuṁ naiva śakya-te-kim ekena jñānena dahanadhūmayorhetuphalabhāvāvdhāraṇam kriyate, āhosvid pratiniyatena jñānena?

Translation: 1016

For the following reason also, it is not at all possible to decide the cause and effect relationship between fire and smoke, because, here the question arises, is it the fact that the cause and effect relationship is decided between fire and smoke on the basis of one knowledge, or, on the basis of each knowledge i.e. knowledge of smoke and knowledge of fire?

Text: 1017

तद्यदि एकं ज्ञानम् उभयावगाहकं गीयते; तदा ज्ञानस्य अक्षणिकत्वमापद्यते धर्महेतोर्वा।
tadyadi ekaṁ jñānam ubhayāvagāhakaṁ gīyate; tadā jñānasya akṣaṇikatvamāpadyate dharmahetorvā.

Translation: 1017

If you say, by one knowledge which is the knowledge of both fire and smoke, then, the knowledge cannot be said to be momentary or the cause of the smoke cannot be said to be momentary.

Text: 1018

अथ प्रतिनियतेन ज्ञानेन पूर्वापरावधारणं क्रियते; तदयुक्तम्, धूमावगाहकेन विज्ञानेन तत्सत्तामात्रं प्रद्योत्यते। तत्स्वरूपमात्रपर्यवसायिना तत्स्वरूपास्तित्वं विधीयते तदुक्तम्—“सामान्ये सिद्धसाध्यता” सामान्ये धूमास्तित्वमात्रे धूमज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमस्ति।

atha pratiniyatena jñānena pūrvāparāvdhāraṇam kriyate; tadayuktam, dhūmāvagāhakena vijñānena tatsattāmātram pradyotyate. tatsvarūpamātraparyavasāyinā tatsvarūpāstitvam vidhīyate tadu-

ktam- “sāmānye siddhasādhyatā”. sāmānye dhūmāstitvamātre dhūmajñānasya prāmānyamasti.

Translation: 1018

If you say that, by each knowledge the precedence of the cause and the following of the effect thereafter is decided, that will not be proper, because knowledge of smoke reveals mere existence of smoke. That which concludes in mere exhibiting its form enjoins the existence of that form. As it has been made in the following statement, for an “entity in general” there is existence of its form. It means, in smoke in general i.e. in mere existence of smoke, the knowledge of smoke can be treated as true.

Text: 1019

“विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः।” विशेषे भेदे दहनेन सह पूर्वापरविकल्पो(ल्पे) अनुगमाभावः व्यापाराभावः। न शक्नोति धूमज्ञानमवगन्तुम्- ‘किमेतद् धूमस्वरूपं दहनात् पूर्वं सह पश्चाद्वा जातम्?’ धूमज्ञानस्य दहनात्मा पिशाचतुल्यतया व्यवस्थितः – यथा धूमज्ञानं पिशाचादिस्वरूपं न विषययति तेन सह पूर्वापरसहभावं न शक्नोति स्थापयितुं धूमस्य; दहनस्यापि धूमज्ञानेन स्वरूपं नावसितम्, तेन सह पूर्वापरसहभावेन धूमज्ञानं धूमस्वरूपं नावगन्तुं शक्नोति।

“*viśeṣe ’nugamābhāvaḥ*”. *viśeṣe bhede dahanena saha pūrvāparavikalpo(lope) anugamābhāvaḥ vyāpārābhāvaḥ. na śaknoti dhūmajñānava-
gantum- ‘kimetad dhūmasvarūpaṁ dahanāt pūrvaṁ saha paścādvā
jātam?’ dhūmajñānasya dahanātmā piśācatulyatayā vyavasthitah-
yathā dhūmajñānaṁ piśācādisvarūpaṁ na viśayayati tena saha pūrvāparasahabhāvaṁ na śaknoti sthāpayitum dhūmasya; dahanasyāpi
dhūmajñānena svarūpaṁ nāvasitam, tena saha pūrvāparasahabhā-
vena dhūmajñānaṁ dhūmasvarūpaṁ nāvagantum śaknoti.*

Translation: 1019

There is other statement, “in the particular form of an entity, there is no common characteristic.” It means in each distinct particular, there is no common characteristic which can invite the preceding and the following with the fire i.e. there is no function here. It cannot create awareness of knowledge of smoke viz. “whether the nature of the smoke is produced before fire or along with fire or

after fire?" If the knowledge of smoke is treated as knowledge of fire, it will be similar to existence of a ghost. In other words, as the knowledge of smoke cannot reveal the form of a ghost in it, and cannot establish co-existence of the smoke with fire, in the same way, the knowledge of fire, cannot be treated as knowledge of smoke, because, the knowledge of smoke cannot cause the knowledge of the nature of smoke either preceded by fire or coming into being in a sequence.

Text: 1020

अथ यद्यपि धूमज्ञानं दहनस्य स्वरूपं न विषययति तथापि स्वज्ञानेन दहनस्वरूपं विषयी-
क्रियते, पिशाचादेस्तु स्वरूपं न केनाप्यवसितम्, तेन सह पूर्वापरभावो नावगम्यते धूमस्य;
atha yadyapi dhūmajñānaṁ dahanasya svarūpaṁ na viṣayayati
tathāpi svajñānena dahanasvarūpaṁ viṣayīkriyate, piśācādestu
svarūpaṁ na kenāpyavasitam, tena saha pūrvāparabhāvo nāvaga-
myate dhūmasya;

Translation: 1020

Clarification:

Well, although the knowledge of smoke does not contain the nature of fire, still by its own knowledge, it does take the form of fire as its content. The form of ghost however, is not known to anybody. Therefore, no one understands the sequence of smoke with the ghost.

Text: 1021

तदेतदयुक्तम्, दहनज्ञानेनापि दहनास्तित्वमात्रमवसितम्, न तु धूमेन सह पूर्वापर-
सहविकल्पः। सती सत्ता दहनज्ञानेन प्रद्योत्यते। सा तु धूमात् किम् - पूर्वं सह
पश्चाद्वा चिरोत्पन्ना प्रत्ययोत्पन्ना अनुत्पन्ना वा? नायं दहनज्ञानव्यापारस्य विषयः अपि
तु तत्सत्तामात्रप्रतिबद्धं तदस्तित्वं विदधाति। पिशाचोऽपि स्वज्ञानेनावगतः।

tadetadayuktam, dahanajñānenāpi dahanāstitvamātramavasitam,
na tu dhūmena saha pūrvāparasahavikalpaḥ. satī sattā dahana-
jñānena pradyotyate. sā tu dhūmāt kim - pūrvam saha paścādvā
cirotpannā pratyayotpannā anutpannā vā? nāyaṁ dahanajñāna-
vyāpārasya viṣayaḥ api tu tatsattāmātrapratibaddham tadastitvam
vidadhāti. piśāco'pi svajñānenāvagataḥ.

Translation: 1021

Reply:

This is not proper. By the knowledge of fire also mere existence of fire is known and not its sequence with the smoke. If there is existence (of fire) the knowledge of fire simply reveals it. Whether, that existence of fire is before smoke or after smoke or produced at a later time, or produced by knowledge, or not produced at all, is not the subject matter of the function of knowledge of fire. The knowledge of fire simply enjoins the existence, which is invariably related to the mere existence of fire. Even the ghost is understood from the knowledge of ghost.

Text: 1022

कथं?

katham?

Translation: 1022

Objection:

How do you say so?

Text: 1023

ज्ञायते, सोऽपि स्वज्ञानावगाहितदेहोऽस्तु – यदि नाम तेन सह धूमज्ञानं पूर्वापरसहभावं न शक्नोति प्रकाशयितुं धूमस्य।

jñāyate, so'pi svajñānāvagāhitadeho'stu - yadi nāma tena saha dhūmajñānaṁ pūrvāparasahabhāvaṁ na śaknoti prakāśayitum dhūmasya.

Translation: 1023

Reply:

Because, it is known and so let that ghost also exist, whose existence depends upon its knowledge itself, even if, it is not capable of revealing the sequential existence of smoke.

Text: 1024

इतोऽपि दहनधूमयोर्हेतुफलभावावधारणं न शक्यते कर्तुम्। धूमज्ञानसत्ताकाले धूमसत्ता न विद्यते ज्वलनज्ञानसत्ताकाले ज्वलनसत्ता न विद्यते। न(ना)विद्यमानस्या(स्य) ग्रहणं नाम, अन्यथाग्राहि(थाऽग्राह्य)केशोण्डुकस्यापि ग्रहणं स्यात्।

ito'pi dahanadhūmayorhetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇam na śakyate kartum dhūmajñānasattākāle dhūmasattā na vidyate jvalanajñānasattākāle jvalanasattā na vidyate. na(nā)vidyamānasyā(sya) grahaṇam nāma, anyathāgrāhi(thā'grāhya)keśoṇḍukasyāpi grahaṇam syāt.

Translation: 1024

For the following reason also, it is not possible to decide the cause and effect relationship between fire and smoke. When the knowledge of smoke exists the smoke does not exist and when the knowledge of fire exists, fire does not exist. But that which does not exist cannot be known. Otherwise, there should be knowledge of thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a person who comes into the shade from the sun.

Text: 1025

अथ केशोण्डुकस्य सर्वदा सत्ता न विद्यते- न ज्ञानकाले नापि पूर्वं, दहनादेस्तु पूर्वं सत्ता विद्यते।

atha keśoṇḍukasya sarvadā sattā na vidyate- na jñānakāle nāpi pūrvam, dahanādestu pūrvam sattā vidyate.

Translation: 1025

Clarification:

Well, if you say that, thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a person who comes into the shade from the sun, do not exist always neither at the time of knowledge nor before that. On the other hand, fires etc. do exist before.

Text: 1026

यदि नाम 'ज्ञानकाले नापि पूर्वं तु विद्यते' इति; सुव्याहृतमेतत्! गृहीतिकाले नास्ति गृहीतेस्तु पूर्वमस्ति, गृहीतिमन्तरेण सुस्थितानि वस्तूनि!

yadi nāma 'jñānakāle nāpi pūrvam tu vidyate' iti; suvyāhṛtametat! gṛhītikāle nāsti gṛhīteṣtu pūrvamasti, gṛhītimantareṇa susthītāni vastūni!

Translation: 1026

Reply:

It is a good clarification viz. that, it does not exist at the time of knowledge, but it does exist before knowledge. It means, at the time

of knowledge it is not there, but before knowledge it is there, and so things can exist independent of their knowledge.

Text: 1027

अथ ज्ञानजनकत्वेन पूर्वं विद्यते;

atha jñānajanakatvena pūrvam vidyate;

Translation: 1027

Clarification:

Well, it exists before as a producer of knowledge.

Text: 1028

तज्जनकत्वं केनाऽवगम्यते, विज्ञानस्य स्वतनुद्योतकत्वेन पर्यवसितेः? ततश्च पिशाचकल्पौ दहनधूमाकारौ, तयोर्हेतुफलभावावधारणाय न प्रत्यक्षम्।

tajjanakatvaṃ kenā'vagamyate, vijñānasya svatanudyotakatvena paryavasiteḥ? tataśca piśācakaḥkalpau dahanadhūmākārau, tayorhetu-phalabhāvāvadhāraṇāya na pratyakṣam.

Translation: 1028

Reply:

Who has known that, it is the producer of knowledge, because, knowledge terminates in revealing its own form? Therefore, the forms of fire and smoke are like ghosts and therefore there is no need of perception in order to know the cause and effect relationship between them.

Text: 1029

अथ ज्ञानावलीढतदाकारान्यथानुपपत्त्या तयोः स्वरूपव्यवस्था क्रियते;

atha jñānāvalīḍhatadākāraṇyathānupapattiyā tayoh svarūpavyavasthā kriyate;

Translation: 1029

Clarification:

Well, in order to satisfactorily explain the forms which appear in the knowledge, we require to assign forms to them.

Text: 1030

तदयुक्तम्, आकारो हि प्रागेवापोदितः, न च आकारार्थयोः प्रतिबन्धोऽवधारितः, तदनवधारणे कथम् आकारोऽर्थं गमयति? एवं तावदर्थजन्यत्वं न शक्यते ज्ञानस्याव-

धारयितुम्। नाप्यर्थस्य अर्थजन्यत्वम्। एवं हेतुफलभावानवधारणात् कथं धूमं दृष्ट्वा अनुमिनोति अग्निम्।

tadayuktam, ākāro hi prāgevāpoditah, na ca ākārārthayoḥ pratibandho'vadhāritah, tadanavadhāraṇe katham ākāro'rtham gamayati? evaṁ tāvadarthajanyatvam na śakyate jñānasyāvadhārayitum. nāpyarthasya arthajanyatvam. evaṁ hetuphalabhāvānavadhāraṇāt katham dhūmam dṛṣṭvā anuminoṭi agnim.

Translation: 1030

Reply:

This is not proper. We have already rejected before “form”. It has not been decided, the invariable relationship between the form and the thing of which this is the form, and if it is not decided, then, how can a form cause the knowledge of a thing? Thus, it is not possible to decide whether knowledge is produced by a thing, neither is it decided whether a thing is produced by another thing? Therefore, since there is no knowledge of cause and effect relationship, how can one infer fire by seeing smoke?

[४. विकल्प्य विषयासम्भवदर्शनेनानुमानस्य निरासः।]

4. *vikalpya viṣayāsambhavadarśanenānumānasya nirāsaḥ]*

Text: 1031

अपि च, अनुमानिकं ज्ञानं किंविषयं – किं अग्न्यादिस्वलक्षणविषयम्, आहोस्विद् वस्तुसू- (भू)तसामान्यविषय[म्], [अवस्तुभूतसामान्यविषयं वा], विकल्पविषयं, स्वांशविषयं, निर्विषयं वा?

api ca, ānumānikam jñānam kiṁviṣayam - kiṁ agnyādisvalakṣaṇa-viṣayam, āhosvid vastusū(bhū)tasāmānyaviṣaya[m], [avastubhūtasāmānyaviṣayam vā], vikalpaviṣayam, svāmśaviṣayam, nirviṣayam vā?

Translation: 1031

Moreover, what could be the object of inferential knowledge? Will that object be a particular like fire etc. or any real entity called universal? (or an unreal entity called universal) or some imaginary object or a part of own form or is inferential knowledge without a content?

Text: 1032

तद्यदि स्वलक्षणविषयम्; तदा प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदो न प्राप्नोति, स्वलक्षणविषयत्वेन स्पष्टाकारतानुमानज्ञानस्यापि प्रसज्यते, 'अस्पष्टाभम्' च भवद्भिः प्रतिपद्यते न त्वन्यैः।

tadyadi svalakṣaṇaviṣayam; tadā pratyakṣānumānayorbhedo na prāpnoti, svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvena spaṣṭākāratānumānājñānasyāpi prasajyate, 'aspaṣṭābham' ca bhavadbhiḥ pratipadyate na tvanyaiḥ.

Translation: 1032

If you say that, content is a particular, then, there is no difference between perception and inference. Since, particular will be the object of an inferential knowledge, an inferential knowledge will also be called knowledge in which the form of its content is very clear. If you say, such a clarity is an appearance, then, such a view is held only by you.

Text: 1033

अन्ये तु वदन्ति - “स्वलक्षणमेव स्पष्टाकारम्।” यदि नाम प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यं स्वलक्षणं विस्पष्ट-मनुमानग्राह्यम् अविस्पष्टम्, स्वलक्षणस्यैवायं भेदः। एकोऽग्निः प्रत्यक्षजननयोग्यः अन्योऽग्निः अनुमानजननयोग्यः। प्रत्यक्षजननयोग्येऽग्नौ आनुमानिकं ज्ञानं यदि भवति - भवति प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदः कदाचित्, यावता आनुमानिकज्ञानजननयोग्योऽग्निः अन्य एव।

anye tu vadanti - “svalakṣaṇameva spaṣṭākāram”. yadi nāma pratyakṣagrāhyam svalakṣaṇam vispaṣṭam anumānagrāhyam avispaṣṭam, svalakṣaṇasyaivāyam bhedaḥ. eko'gniḥ pratyakṣajanānayogyah anyo'gniḥ anumānajanānayogyah. pratyakṣajanānayogye'gnau ānumānikam jñānam yadi bhavati - bhavati pratyakṣānumānayorbhedah kadācit, yāvata ānumānikajñānajanānayogyo'gniḥ anya eva.

Translation: 1033

Others (Buddhists) however hold the view that, a particular alone has a clear form. If the particular which is fit to be known by perception, has clear form and the particular which is fit to be known by inference has unclear form, then, this difference is of particular only. One fire is fit to generate the perceptual knowledge and another fire is fit to generate the inferential knowledge. If we accept that, with reference to the fire which is fit to generate perceptual knowledge, there arises the inferential knowledge, then,

somehow we can make a distinction between perception and inference. By that, we can show that the fire which is fit to generate inferential knowledge is indeed distinct.

Text: 1034

अथ स्वलक्षणविषयसाम्याद् अभेदपरिकल्पना प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः;

atha svalakṣaṇaviṣayasāmyād abhedaparikalpanā pratyakṣānumānayoḥ;

Translation: 1034

Clarification:

Well, because of the similarity in the particular which is the content of the knowledge, perception and inference are postulated as one and the same.

Text: 1035

यद्येवम् – गन्धरसादिज्ञानानां स्वलक्षणविषयसाम्यात् सर्वेषामभेदः प्राप्नोति – सर्वं गन्ध-
ज्ञानं रसज्ञानं वा वक्तव्यम्।

*yadyevam - gandharasādijñānānām svalakṣaṇaviṣayasāmyāt sarve-
ṣāmabhedah prāpnoti - sarvaṁ gandhajñānaṁ rasajñānaṁ vā vaktavyam.*

Translation: 1035

Reply:

If it is so, then, in the case of knowledges of smell, taste etc. since there is similarity in the particular, which is the content of the knowledge, all knowledges will have to be treated as identical i.e. all knowledges will be either knowledges of smell or knowledges of taste.

Text: 1036

अथ स्वलक्षणविषयत्वे सत्यपि अवान्तरभेदविवक्षया गन्धादिज्ञानमपदिश्यते;

atha svalakṣaṇaviṣayatve satyapi avāntarabhedavivakṣayā gandhādijñānamapadiśyate;

Translation: 1036

Clarification:

Well, although these knowledges have particular as their content, still, keeping in mind other differences, those knowledges are referred to as knowledge of smell, etc.

Text: 1037

यद्येवम् – सत्यपि अग्निविषयत्वे प्रत्यक्षानुमानज्ञानयोः अवान्तरभेदविवक्षया प्रत्यक्षानुमानज्ञानव्यपदेशः।

yadyevam - satyapi agniviṣayatve pratyakṣānumānajñānayoḥ avāntarabhedavivakṣayā pratyakṣānumānajñānavyapadeśaḥ.

Translation: 1037

Reply:

If you say so, then, in spite of fire being the content of perceptual and inferential knowledges, keeping in view other differences, they are said to be perceptual and inferential knowledges.

Text: 1038

अथ करणभेदेन गन्धादिज्ञानानि भिद्यन्ते;

atha karaṇabhedena gandhādiññānāni bhidyante;

Translation: 1038

Clarification:

Well, the knowledges of smell etc. are distinguished on the basis of the difference of the processes through which the knowledges are produced.

Text: 1039

तदा प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः करणभेदोपपत्तेः भेदोऽस्तु। एवं च यदुक्तम्-“स्वलक्षणविषयानुमानं भवति” तन्मूढोक्तम्, अग्निप्रपञ्चस्य प्रतिभासनात्।

tadā pratyakṣānumānayoḥ karaṇabhedopapatteḥ bhedo'stu. evaṁ ca yaduktam-“svalakṣaṇaviṣayānumānam bhavati” tanmūḍhoktam, agniprapañcasya pratibhāsanāt.

Translation: 1039

Reply:

In that case, since the difference in processes of perceptual knowledges and inferential knowledges is justified, let there be difference between the two. Thus, your statement “inference operates with reference to the object viz. particular” is a foolish statement, because in that knowledge only, a series of fire particulars appears.

Text: 1040

अथ वस्तुभूतसामान्यविषयम्; न, तदभावाद् विज्ञानजनकत्वासम्भवाच्च। न च जनकत्वमन्तरेण विषयार्थ उपलभ्यते।

atha vastubhūtasāmānyaviṣayam; na, tadabhāvād vijñānajanakavāsambhavācca. na ca janakatvamantareṇa viṣayārtha upalabhyate.

Translation: 1040

If you say that, the object of inferential knowledge is a real universal, it will not be correct, because, there is nothing called universal and therefore it cannot generate any knowledge. Unless, an entity generates knowledge it cannot be said to be object of this knowledge.

Text: 1041

अथ अवस्तुभूतसामान्यविषयम्। तदुक्तम् - “वैकल्पिकं सामान्यं बुद्ध्युपदर्शितरूपम्”; एतदपि न युक्तम्, अविद्यमानं सामान्यं कथं बुद्धेर्विषयभावं प्रतिपद्यते? किम् - सत्तामात्रेण, सहोत्पादेन वा, जनकत्वाऽऽकारार्पकत्वेन वा? सर्वस्यासम्भवे विषयार्थो भणनीयः। यदि च जनकत्वाद्यभावेऽपि बुद्धौ प्रतिभाति सामान्यम्; तदा रूपादेरपि जनकत्वं न कल्पनीयम् - रूपं विज्ञानमकुर्वत् प्रत्यक्षं स्यात्। यदपि “दृश्यविकल्प्यावथविकीकृत्य तदध्यवसायेन प्रवर्तते” इत्युक्तम्। दृश्यं बाह्यं रूपादिस्वलक्षणम्, विकल्पः(प्यः) बुद्धिसमारोपिताकारः। किं पुनरनयोः एकीकरणम्? किम्-अभेदेन उत्पादनम्, किं वा अभेदेन अवधारणम्, आहोस्वित् सङ्घटना क्रियते?

atha avastubhūtasāmānyaviṣayam. taduktam - “vaikalpikaṁ sāmānyam buddhyupadarśitarūpam”; etadapi na yuktam, avidyamānaṁ sāmānyam katham buddherviṣayabhāvaṁ pratipadyate? kim - sattāmātreṇa, sahotpādena vā, janakatvā”kārārpakatvena vā? sarvasyāsambhave viṣayārtho bhaṇanīyaḥ. yadi ca janakatvādyabhāve’pi buddhau pratibhāti sāmānyam; tadā rūpāderapi janakatvaṁ na kalpanīyam - rūpaṁ vijñānamakurvāt pratyakṣaṁ syāt. yadapi “dṛśyavikalpyāvarthāvekīkṛtya tadadhyavasāyena pravartate” ityuktam. dṛśyaṁ bāhyaṁ rūpādisvalakṣaṇam, vikalpaḥ(pyāḥ) buddhisamāropitākāraḥ. kiṁ punaranayoḥ ekīkaraṇam? kim-abhedena utpādanam, kiṁ vā abhedena avadhāraṇam, āhosvit saṅghaṭṭanā kriyate?

Translation: 1041

If you say, the unreal universal is the content of the inferential cognition, as expressed in your statement, “the imagined universal

is presented by the mind,” that also is not proper, because, if the universal does not exist, how can it become the content of knowledge? Will it become content of knowledge, by mere existence or being produced together or by offering a form which can cause the knowledge? All of this is impossible and therefore you should state, what will be the object of inferential knowledge. If you say, even if it does not generate the knowledge, the universal can appear in the knowledge, then, you should also not postulate that, color etc. produce knowledge and in that case color will become object of perception, even if it does not cause that knowledge. You had said, “by uniting both, the visible as well as imagined objects, it works with the help of a definite knowledge of that. Here, visible is external particular viz. color etc. and imagined is the form super-imposed by the mind. So, what will be the meaning of their unification? Does it mean producing as identical, or, does it mean knowing as identical, or, does it mean it is constructed?

Text: 1042

तद्यदि अभेदेन उत्पादनम्; सदसतोरभेदेन उत्पादनं हतत्रंपादृते नान्यो वक्तुमर्हति।
अभेदेनोत्पादने च भावस्याभावप्रसङ्गः, सामान्यस्य वा वस्तुत्वं प्राप्नोति, तद्वस्तुत्वे
स्वलक्षणविषयमनुमानम्। प्रत्यक्षाऽनुमानयोर्भेदबीजमन्वेष्टव्यम्।

*tadyadi abhedena utpādanam; sadasatorabhedena utpādanam
hatatrampādṛte nānyo vaktumarhati. abhedenotpādane ca bhāvasyā-
bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ, sāmānyasya vā vastutvaṁ prāpnoti, tadvastutve
svalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānam. pratyakṣā’numānayorbhedabījama-
nveṣṭavyam.*

Translation: 1042

If you say, it means producing as identical, then, no one other than a shameless person is capable of saying that, there is a production as identical of real and unreal entities and if there is a production as identical, there will be an absence of a positive entity or universal will become real and if universal becomes real, particular will become the object of inferential knowledge and as such one will have to find out the ground to distinguish perception from inference.

Text: 1043

अथ एकीकरणम् – एकत्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वं दृश्यविकल्पयोः; तदुक्तं(तदयुक्तम्), किम् एक एव आकारः प्रतिभाति, आहोस्विद् आकारद्वयम्?

atha ekīkaraṇam - ekatvena pratīyamānatvaṁ drśyavikalpyayoḥ; taduktam(tadayuktam), kim eka eva ākāraḥ pratibhāti, āhosvid ākāradvayam?

Translation: 1043

If you say, unification means knowing visible and imagined as one that will be improper. In that case, does it mean only one form appears in the knowledge or two forms?

Text: 1044

तद्यदि एक एव आकारः प्रतिभाति; तत्किं दृश्याकारः, आहोस्विद् विकल्पाकारः?
tadyadi eka eva ākāraḥ pratibhāti; tatkiṁ drśyākāraḥ, āhosvid vikalpākāraḥ?

Translation: 1044

If you say, only one form appears in the knowledge, is that the visible form or the imagined form?

Text: 1045

तद्यदि दृश्याकारः प्रतिभाति; तदा स्वलक्षणविषयमेव अनुमानं प्रसज्यते।
tadyadi drśyākāraḥ pratibhāti; tadā svalakṣaṇaviṣayameva anumānam prasajyate.

Translation: 1045

If it is the visible form, that appears in the knowledge, then, the content of inferential knowledge becomes nothing but a particular.

Text: 1046

अथ विकल्पाकारः प्रतिभाति; तस्य सर्वोपाख्यारहितत्वेन प्रतिभासाविषयत्वाद्वाप्येतद् वक्तव्यम्– स्वलक्षणमेषकाराव्यतिरिक्ताव्यतिरिक्तो वा?

atha vikalpākāraḥ pratibhāti; tasya sarvopākhyārahitatvena pratibhāsāviṣayatvādvāpyetad vaktavyam- svalakṣaṇameṣakāravyatiriktāvvyatirikto vā?

Translation: 1046

If you say, imagined form appears in knowledge, then, since it is not possible for the object to appear in the inferential knowledge

devoid of all attributes, you should say this particular (..the text is broken) whether different from the form or identical with the form?

Text: 1047

यद्यव्यतिरिक्तः; तदा स्वलक्षणविषयमनुमानं प्राप्तम्। समारोपितं च सामान्यं प्रतीयते इति न वक्तव्यम्। तात्त्विकं च सामान्यं प्रसज्यते।[दृश्या]तात्त्विकत्वप्रसङ्गो वा।

yadyavyatiriktah; tadā svalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānaṁ prāptam. samāropitam ca sāmānyam pratīyate iti na vaktavyam. tāttvikam ca sāmānyam prasajyate.[dṛśyā]tāttvikatvaprasaṅgo vā.

Translation: 1047

If it is identical, then, the object of an inferential knowledge becomes the particular and then, you should not say that in that knowledge, a super-imposed universal appears. In that case the universal will become real.... (the text is broken or there will be contingency of its becoming visible)

Text: 1048

अथ व्यतिरिक्तो विकल्पाकारः; तर्हि न वक्तव्यम् – तदारोपद्वारेण प्रतीयते स्वलक्षण-विकल्पाकारान्तरितत्वात्।

atha vyatirikto vikalpākārah; tarhi na vaktavyam - tadāropadvāreṇa pratīyate svalakṣaṇavikalpākārāntaritatvāt.

Translation: 1048

If you say that, the form of imagined content is different, then, you should not say that, it appears in the knowledge as super-imposed, because, it will be either of the form of particular, or, of the form of imagined content.

Text: 1049

अथ घटना क्रियते स्वलक्षणेन सामान्यस्य; तदसत्, सदसतोर्घटनाऽयोगात्। सतोर्घटना दृष्टा यथा चक्षुर्घटयोः।

atha ghaṭanā kriyate svalakṣaṇena sāmānyasya; tadasat, sadasatorghaṭanā'yogāt. satorghaṭanā dṛṣṭā yathā cakṣurghaṭayoh.

Translation: 1049

If you say that, universal is constructed by the particular, that is not true. No construction is possible with real and unreal. A structure of two reals is seen as in the case of eyes and pot.

Text: 1050

अथ सामान्यस्वलक्षणाकारद्वयं प्रतीयते; एवं तर्हि अन्योन्यविलक्षणौ सामान्य-स्वलक्षणाकारौ प्रतीयेते। ततश्च न वक्तव्यम् - “दृश्यविकल्पा(ल्प्या)वर्थावेकी- कृत्य तदध्यवसायेन प्रवर्तते” इति। यदि च विविक्तमाकारद्वयं प्रतिभाति; तदा स्वलक्षण-विषयमनुमानं प्रसक्तम्। तद्विषयत्वे मानयोर्भेदकारणं वक्तव्यम्। सर्वोपाख्याविनिर्मुक्तस्य च सामान्यस्य प्रतीयमानत्वं नोपपद्यते।

atha sāmānyasvalakṣaṇākāradvayaṃ pratīyate; evaṃ tarhi anyo-nyavilakṣaṇau sāmānyasvalakṣaṇākārau pratīyete. tataśca na vaktavyam - “drīśyavikalpā(lpyā)varthāvekīkṛtya tadadhyavasāyena pravartate” iti. yadi ca viviktamākāradvayaṃ pratibhāti; tadā svalakṣaṇaviśayamanumānaṃ prasaktam. tadviśayatve mānayor-bhedakāraṇaṃ vaktavyam. sarvopākhyāvinirmuktasya ca sāmānya-sya pratīyamānatvaṃ nopapadyate.

Translation: 1050

If you say, two forms viz. the form of universal and form of particular appear in knowledge, then, the two forms of universal and particular will appear as mutually distinct and then, you should not say “it operates by uniting visible and imagined entities through a definite knowledge.” If two forms appear in the knowledge distinctly, then again, there arises the contingency of accepting inferential knowledge as having particular as its content and if that becomes the content, you should state the reason to distinguish perception from inference. It is impossible to explain that universal which is devoid of all attributes appears in the knowledge.

Text: 1051

अन्यच्च, धूमोत्पादिते अग्निविज्ञाने अनग्निव्यवच्छेदरूपं सामान्यं प्रतिभातीति व्यपदिश्यते, अजलव्यवच्छेदेन प्रतिभातीति किं नाभ्युपगम्यते? नाऽजलव्यवच्छेदेन जन्यते, नापि अनग्निव्यवच्छेदेन, तदनुत्पत्तौ प्रतिकर्मनियमानुपपत्तिः।

anyacca, dhūmotpādite agniviññāne anagnivyavacchedarūpaṃ sāmānyam pratibhātīti vyapadiśyate, ajalavyavacchedena pratibhātīti kiṃ nābhyupagamyate? nā’jalavyavacchedena janyate, nāpi anagnivyavacchedena, tadanutpattau pratikarmanīyamānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 1051

Moreover, in the knowledge of fire, produced by the smoke, it is said that, universal in the form of difference from that which is not fire appears. If you accept this, why don't you accept that the universal appears in the form of being different from that which is not water? So, you will have to accept that, such knowledge is not produced either in the form of being different from non-water, nor in the form of being different from non-fire and when such knowledge cannot be recognized, it is difficult to explain to one is to one relationship between knowledge and its content.

Text: 1052

अथ निर्विषयम् आनुमानिकं ज्ञानम्; तदयुक्तम्, स्वांशविषयत्वात्। नहि भवतां पक्षे निरालम्बनं किञ्चिद् विज्ञानमस्ति, आत्मावगाहकत्वेनोत्पत्तेः। यदि च निरालम्बनं ज्ञानम्; क्व प्रवर्तेत निवर्तेत वा पुरुषः? अगतिः स्यात्।

*atha nirviṣayam ānumānikam jñānam; tadayuktam, svānśa-
viṣayatvāt. nahi bhavatām pakṣe nirālabhanam kiñcid vijñāna-
masti, ātmāvagāhakatvenotpatteḥ. yadi ca nirālabhanam jñānam;
kva pravarteta nivarteta vā puruṣaḥ? agatiḥ syāt.*

Translation: 1052

If you say that, inferential knowledge is without content, it is not proper, because, it accepts its own form as its content. According to your doctrine, there is no knowledge which is without a content, because contentfulness of the knowledge can be explained by accepting the knowledge itself as its content and if you accept knowledge without a content, then, where will the person who has such knowledge will be induced and from where will he withdraw? The person will become motionless.

Text: 1053

अथ दहनेन तदुत्पादितम् इति कृत्वा दहनान्तिकमुपसर्पति; एवं धूमज्ञानोत्पादेऽपि यायात्।
*atha dahanena tadutpāditam iti kṛtvā dahanāntikamupasarpati;
evam dhūmajñānotpāde'pi yāyāt.*

Translation: 1053

If you say, since the knowledge is produced by fire, the person will go to collect fire, then, the person should also go to collect smoke, because smoke has also produced the knowledge of fire.

Text: 1054

अथ स्वांशविषयमनुमानम्; तदा प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्भेदानुपपत्तिः, प्रतीयमानज्ञानस्य स्वलक्षणात्मकत्वात्।

atha svāṁśaviṣayamanumānam; tadā pratyakṣānumānāyorbhedānupapattiḥ, pratīyamānajñānasya svalakṣaṇātmakatvāt.

Translation: 1054

If you say, its own part can be the content of inferential knowledge, then, one cannot explain difference between perception and inference, because, the knowledge is the content, is nothing more than a particular.

[५. ज्ञानयोः हेतुफलभावावधारणस्याशक्यत्वप्रतिपादनम्।]

[5. jñānayoḥ hetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇasyāśakyatvapratipādanam.]

Text: 1055

अथ ज्ञानयोः हेतुफलभावावधारणं क्रियते;

atha jñānayoḥ hetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇam kriyate;

Translation: 1055

Clarification:

Well, we come to know the cause and effect relationship between two knowledges.

Text: 1056

तदप्ययुक्तम्, ज्ञानयोरपि हेतुफलभावावधारणं न शक्यते कर्तुम् – कार्यज्ञानं हि स्वसंवि-
त्पर्यवसितं न ज्ञानान्तरमात्मसात्करोति। तदकरणे 'केन निव(र्व)र्तितं मम स्वरूपम्'
इत्येतत् कथं वेत्ति, तद्विज्ञानस्य पिशाचतुल्यत्वात्? तत्र(न्न) ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तराद् भिद्यते।
तदभेदे कथं हेतुफलभावः, स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात्?

tadapyayuktam, jñānayorapi hetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇam na śakyate kartum - kāryajñānam hi svasaṁvitpariyavasitam na jñānāntaramātmāsātkaroti. tadakaraṇe 'kena niva(rva)rtitam mama svarūpam' ityetat katham vetti, tadbhinnaajñānasya piśācatulyatvāt? tatra(nna)

jñānam jñānāntarād bhidyate. tadabhede katham hetuphalabhāvaḥ, svātmani kriyāvirodhāt?

Translation: 1056

Reply:

That is also not correct. It is not possible to know the cause and effect relationship between two knowledges, because, knowledge in the form of an effect amounts to self-illumination and hence cannot make another knowledge of its own type and once that does not happen, how will he know who has created this form? Because, that so called another knowledge, will be similar to a ghost. Therefore, one knowledge does not differ from another knowledge and if they are not different, how can they be treated as cause and effect? The same cannot be the cause and the same cannot be the effect and therefore, there will be contradiction in the causal function.

[६. प्रसङ्गाद् विज्ञाननयादिकृतावयविनिराकरणस्य प्रतिवादः।]

[6. prasaṅgād vijñānanayādikṛtāvayavinirākaraṇasya prativādaḥ.]

Text: 1057

यापि युक्तिरपदिष्टा - विज्ञानमात्रस्थितावयविनिराकरणपरा वृत्त्यनुपपत्त्यादिरूपा - “न किल अवयवी एकदेशेन वर्तते, नापि सर्वात्मना। एकदेशवृत्त्यभ्युपगमे हि अवयविनो भेदप्रसङ्गः। अथ सर्वात्मना वर्तते; तर्हि अन्यत्रावृत्तिप्रसङ्गः” इत्यादिका; सापि न युक्तियुक्ता। कथम्? किम् एकदेशशब्देन अवयवी अभिधीयते, अवयवो वा?

yāpi yuktirapadiṣṭā - vijñānamātrasthitāvayavinirākaraṇaparā vṛtṭyanupapatyādirūpā - “na kila avayavī ekadeśena vartate, nāpi sarvātmanā. ekadeśavṛtyabhyupagame hi avayavino bhedaprasaṅgaḥ. atha sarvātmanā vartate; tarhi anyatrāvṛtṭiprasaṅgaḥ” ityādikā; sāpi na yuktīyuktā. katham? kim ekadeśaśabdena avayavī abhidhīyate, avayavo vā?

Translation: 1057

You had floated the following argument to deny the concept of “whole”: Since, knowledge is the only reality, there is nothing called “whole”, because its existence cannot be justified. Your statement goes like this: “the whole cannot exist partially, nor in full, because, if one accepts that it exists partially, there will be difference in the

whole. And if it is accepted as existing totally, then, it cannot exist elsewhere." But such an argument is not proper. Because, we would like to know what do you mean by partially? Do you mean the whole by the word ekadeśa or part?

Text: 1058

यदि अवयव्यभिधीयते; तदा एकदेशेनैव सर्वत्र वर्तत इति ब्रूमः, स्वकारणान्नियमितस्य तथाभूतस्योत्पत्तेः।

yadi avayavyabhīdhīyate; tadā ekadeśenaiva sarvatra vartata iti brūmaḥ, svakāraṇānniyamitasya tathābhūtasyoṭpatteḥ.

Translation: 1058

If you say, whole is expressed by that word, then, we can say a whole exists only in a part of a place everywhere, because, it is produced like that determined by its own cause.

Text: 1059

अथ अवयवोऽभिधीयते तदेकदेशशब्देन; तदा न एकदेशेन अवयवी वर्तते, अवयव[व]स्य अवयवे वृत्त्ययोगात्। भवतु वा, अवयवेषु वृत्तेरभावोऽवयविनः, तथापि असत्त्वं न सिद्ध्यति, तद्देहोपलम्भस्य तदस्तित्वविधानपरत्वात्। यथा 'अनुदकः कमण्डलुः' इत्युक्ते सति उदककमण्डलुसम्बन्धाभावः प्रतीयते, न तु कमण्डलोरभावः, तदुदकस्य वा।

atha avayavo'bhīdhīyate tadekadeśaśabdena; tadā na ekadeśena avayavī vartate, avaya[va]sya avayave vṛtṭiyayogāt. bhavatu vā, avayaveṣu vṛtterabhāvo'avayavināḥ, tathāpi asatvaṁ na siddhyati, taddehopalambhasya tadastitvavidhānaparatvāt. yathā 'anudakaḥ kamaṇḍaluḥ' ityukte sati udakakamaṇḍalusambandhābhāvaḥ pratīyate, na tu kamaṇḍalorabhāvaḥ, tadudakasya vā.

Translation: 1059

If you say that, part is meant by the word ekadeśa, then, in one part, the whole does not exist, because a part cannot exist in a part or let there be absence of the whole in the parts still, it is not proved that, the whole does not exist. Because, when we say that the body is found, it means, it exists. As when someone says, this jar does not have water, what is understood is, the absence of relation between water and the jar. But, not absence of either jar or of water.

[७. प्रसङ्गादनुपलब्धिपदार्थस्य विचारः।]

[7. prasaṅgādanupalabdhīpadārthasya vicārah.]

Text: 1060

अथ अवयविन उपलब्धिरेव नास्ति;

atha avayavina upalabdhireva nāsti;

Translation: 1060

Clarification:

But there is no knowledge of the whole.

Text: 1061

सा किं दृश्यानुपलब्धिः, आहोस्विद् अदृश्यानुपलब्धिः?

sā kiṁ drśyānupalabdhīḥ, āhosvid adrśyānupalabdhīḥ?

Translation: 1061

Reply:

When you say there is no knowledge, does it mean there is no knowledge of something which is fit to be perceived or there is no knowledge of something which is not fit to be perceived?

Text: 1062

यदि दृश्यानुपलब्धिः; सा नोपपद्यते। दृश्यशब्देन किमपदिश्यते? उपलब्धिलक्षण-
प्राप्तोऽर्थोऽभिधीयते। उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तिश्च प्रत्ययान्तरसाकल्यं स्वभावविशेषश्च।
एतच्चेद् विद्यते; कथमनुपलम्भः? उपलब्धिकारकसाकल्ये सति उपलब्ध्या भवितव्यम्,
नानुपलब्ध्या, तत्स्वभावनिबन्धनत्वात्तदुपलब्धेः। उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य यदि अनुप-
लम्भः, अनुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य तर्हि उपलम्भः स्यात्, अनिष्टं चैतत्।

*yadi drśyānupalabdhīḥ; sā nopapadyate. drśyaśabdena kima-
padiśyate? upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto'rtho'bhidhīyate. upalabdhilakṣa-
ṇaprāptiśca pratyayāntarasākalyaṁ svabhāvaviśeṣaśca. etaced
vidyate; kathamanupalambhaḥ? upalabdhikāraśakālye sati upala-
bdhyā bhavitavyam, nānupalabdhīyā, tatsvabhāvanibandhanatvāttad-
upalabdhēḥ. upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya yadi anupalambhaḥ, anu-
palabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya tarhi upalambhaḥ syāt, aniṣṭaṁ caitat.*

Translation: 1062

If you say, there is no knowledge of something which is fit to be perceived, then, it is not correct, because by the word that which

is fit to be perceived, what do you mean? You will have to accept that, “a thing, had it been there, it would have been perceived.” Had the knowledge of the thing, had it been there, it would have been known, refers to collection of factors such as other knowledge, etc. and a particular nature of a thing. If you say, this is there, how can it be said that it is not known? If there is collection of factors which contribute to knowledge of the thing, there has to be knowledge of that thing and there cannot be absence of knowledge of that thing, because the knowledge of the thing depends upon that nature. If it is accepted that, there is absence of knowledge of that which possesses the property of its being known, then, there should be knowledge of that which possesses the factors which will cause the absence of knowledge and this is of course, not desirable.

Text: 1063

यदि च घटविविक्तभूतलोपलम्भ एव घटस्यानुपलम्भः; तदा भूतलस्याप्युपलम्भो न भवेत्,
तस्याप्युपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तत्वात्।

*yadi ca ghaṭaviviktabhūtalopalambha eva ghaṭasyānupalambhaḥ;
tadā bhūtalasyāpyupalambho na bhavet, tasyāpyupalabdhillakṣaṇa-
prāptatvāt.*

Translation: 1063

If by the absence of knowledge of a pot, you mean knowledge of the ground without pot, then, there cannot be knowledge of ground also, because, that also is something in the presence of which it is known.

Text: 1064

अथ उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तमुपलभ्यते भूतलम्;
atha upalabdhillakṣaṇaprāptamupalabhyate bhūtalam;

Translation: 1064

Clarification:

Well, the ground is known because, it is something which is confirmed by perception.

Text: 1065

घटस्यापि उपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः।
ghaṭasyāpi upalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 1065

Reply:

Then, the pot (in the absence of pot) also should be known.

Text: 1066

अथ भूतलज्ञाने घटस्वरूपं नावभाति, तेन तस्यानुपलम्भः, घटाभावव्यवहारः क्रियते; तदयुक्तम्; घटावष्टब्धेऽपि भूतले भूतलज्ञाने घटो नावभाति, तत्रापि घटाभाव-व्यवहारप्रसक्तिः। तथा ज्ञानस्यापि उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य संवेदनं न भवेत्। ततश्च सर्वस्यासंवेदने नानुपलब्धिः, उपलब्धेरेव यतोऽनुपलब्धिः।

*atha bhūtalajñāne ghaṭasvarūpaṁ nāvabhāti, tena tasyānupa-
lambhaḥ, ghaṭābhāvavyavahāraḥ kriyate; tadayuktam; ghaṭāvaṣṭa-
bdhe'pi bhūtale bhūtalajñāne ghaṭo nāvabhāti, tatrāpi ghaṭābhā-
vavyavahāraprasaktiḥ. tathā jñānasyāpi upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya
saṁvedanaṁ na bhavet. tataśca sarvasyāsāṁvedane nānupa-
labdhiḥ, upalabdhereva yato'nupalabdhiḥ.*

Translation: 1066

If you say, in the knowledge of ground the nature of pot does not appear, therefore, that is not known, but only reference to pot is made. Even then, it will not be proper, because, even when the pot is associated with the ground, in the knowledge of ground, the pot does not appear. But there also, there will arise the contingency of referring to absence of pot. Similarly, there will be no awareness of knowledge which satisfies the character of something in the presence of which it is fit to be known. Thereby, since everything will become unknown there will be only absence of knowledge, because, knowledge itself will become non-knowledge.

Text: 1067

यदि च भूतलाद्युपलब्धिरेव घटानुपलब्धिः; पिशाचादेरपि सैवाऽनुपलब्धिस्तु।
*yadi ca bhūtalādyupalabdhireva ghaṭānupalabdhiḥ; piśācāderapi sai-
vā'nupalabdhirastu.*

Translation: 1067

If you say, the knowledge of ground itself is the absence of knowledge of pot, then, let the same absence of knowledge of pot be of the ghost also.

Text: 1068

भवतु, को दोषः?

bhavatu, ko doṣaḥ?

Translation: 1068

Clarification:

Let it be so, what is the harm?

Text: 1069

पिशाचाभावविनिश्चयः स्यात्।

piśācābhāvaviniścayaḥ syāt.

Translation: 1069

Reply:

In that case, there will be definite knowledge of absence of ghost (which is not desirable, since there is nothing called ghost.)

Text: 1070

अथ न भवति पिशाचाभावविनिश्चयः; कुम्भाभावविनिश्चयाभावप्रसङ्गः स्यात्।

atha na bhavati piśācābhāvaviniścayaḥ; kumbhābhāvaviniścayābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ syāt.

Translation: 1070

If you say, there will be no definite knowledge called absence of ghost, then, there will be absence of definite knowledge of absence of pot.

Text: 1071

अथ निरालम्बनज्ञानं दृश्यस्याऽनुपलब्धिः; नहि भवतां पक्षे निरालम्बनज्ञानमस्ति स्वांशपर्यवसितत्वात्।

atha nirālambanajñānaṁ drśyasyā'nupalabdhiḥ; nahi bhavatāṃ pakṣe nirālambanajñānamasti svāṁśaparyavasitatvāt.

Translation: 1071

If you say, knowledge without content, is the absence of knowledge of something which is visible, it cannot be so because according to your doctrine, there is no knowledge without a content, since, every knowledge accepts its own part as its content.

Text: 1072

अथ अदृश्यानुपलम्भः अवयव्यनुपलम्भः; सोऽपि तत्सत्तां न व्यावर्त्तयति, यथा उपलभ्यमानत्वं वस्तुस्वरूपम्, तथा अनुपलभ्यमानत्वमपि वस्तुस्वरूपमेव। यथा कार्यस्य स्वकारणाजनकत्वं वस्तुस्वरूपं तथा अनुपलभ्यमानत्वमपि वस्तुस्वरूपमेव। नहि स्वकारणाजनकत्वे वस्तुस्वरूपमतिवर्त्तते। तथा अवयव्यपि कार्याजनकत्वेऽपि न स्वरूपं हास्यति, स्वहेतोरेव कार्याजनकात्मकस्योत्पत्तेः।

atha adrśyānupalambhaḥ avayavyanupalambhaḥ; so'pi tatsattām na vyāvarttayati, yathā upalabhyamānatvaṁ vastusvarūpam, tathā anupalabhyamānatvamapi vastusvarūpameva. yathā kāryasya svakāraṇājanakatvaṁ vastusvarūpaṁ tathā anupalabhyamānatvamapi vastusvarūpameva. nahi svakāraṇājanakatve vastusvarūpamativarttate. tathā avayavyapi kāryājanakatve 'pi na svarūpaṁ hāsyati, svahetoreva kāryājanakātmakasyotpatteh.

Translation: 1072

If you say, non-knowledge of something which is invisible means, absence of knowledge of the whole that too does not exclude its existence, as the state of being known, is the nature of the thing, similarly, the state of not being known, is also the nature of the thing. As the state of being the producer of its own cause, is the nature of an effect, in the same way, the state of not being known, also is the nature of a thing. It is not the case that, if something is not the producer of its own cause, it loses its being nature of a thing. In the same way, even if the whole does not produce the effect, it does not lose its form, because, it comes into being from its own cause which is of the nature of producing the effect.

[८. अवयविनिराकरणे प्रयुक्तस्य रक्ताक्तत्वप्रसञ्जनरूपस्य साधनस्य निरासः।]

[8. avayavinirākaṛaṇe prayuktasya raktāraktatvaprasañjanarūpasya sādhanasya nirāsaḥ.]

Text: 1073

यदपि साधनमन्यदुपदिष्टम् - रक्ताक्तप्रसङ्गरूपम्; तदप्यसत्, रक्ता नाम का अवयविनः? किं नीलगुणात्मकत्वम्, आहोस्वित् नीलगुणाधिकरणत्वम्, नीलगुणाधिकरणद्रव्यसंयोगित्वं वा, तदविरलदेशोत्पादो वा?

yadapi sādhanamanyadupadiṣṭam - raktāraktaprasaṅgarūpam; tadapyasat, raktatā nāma kā avayavinah? kiṁ nīlaguṇātmakatvam,

āhosvit nīlaguṇādhikaraṇatvam, nīlaguṇādhikaraṇadravyasaṁyogitvam vā, tadaviraladeśotpādo vā?

Translation: 1073

You narrated some other causal factor viz. the contingency of a whole becoming red and non-red simultaneously. That is not proper. We would like to know, what do you mean by redness of a whole? Does it mean the state of being of the nature of a blue or the state of being the locus of the blue color or the state of being connected with the substance which is the locus of the quality called blue or the production in the particular space without any gap?

Text: 1074

यदि तावन्नीलगुणात्मकत्वं रक्तता; तदयुक्तम्, स्फटिकपटादेरनीलात्मकत्वात्।
*yadi tāvannīlaguṇātmakatvaṁ raktatā; tadayuktam, sphaṭikapataḍ-
deranīlātmakatvāt.*

Translation: 1074

If you say that, redness means being of the nature of the quality of blue, that will not be proper, because, crystal, cloth etc. are not of the nature of blue quality.

Text: 1075

अथ नीलगुणाधिकरणत्वं रक्तता; साप्यनुपपन्ना, स्फटिकपटादेरवदारूपयोगित्वात्।
*atha nīlaguṇādhikaraṇatvaṁ raktatā; sāpyanupapannā, sphaṭika-
paṭāderavadātarūpayogitvāt.*

Translation: 1075

If you say, that redness means being the locus of the quality called blue, that also is not proper, because, crystal, cloth etc. are associated with spotless color.

Text: 1076

अथ नीलगुणाधिकरणद्रव्यसंयोगित्वं रक्तता; सा स्वयमनभ्युपगता कथमवयविनं व्याव-
र्त्तयति?

*atha nīlaguṇādhikaraṇadravyasaṁyogitvaṁ raktatā; sā svayamana-
bhyupagatā kathamavayavinam vyāvarttayati?*

Translation: 1076

If you say that, redness means being connected with the substance which is the locus of blue color, how can that be accepted, because,

when you yourself have not accepted it, how will exclude the whole?

Text: 1077

अथ परेण इष्टा;

atha pareṇa iṣṭā;

Translation: 1077

Clarification:

Well, it is desired by others.

Text: 1078

यथेष्टा तथाऽविरोधित्वेनाऽभ्युपगता, नहि संयोगावयविनोर्विरोधोऽभ्युपगम्यते परेण यथाकृतकत्वाऽनित्यत्वयोः, साऽविरुद्धा कथमवयविनं विपर्यासयति? 'रक्तताधिकरणश्च, नास्ति च' इत्यसङ्गतम्। यथा—नास्ति शब्दः कृतकत्वात्—तादृगेतत्।

yathēṣṭā tathā'virodhitvenā'bhyupagatā, nahi saṁyogāvayavinorvirodho'bhyupagamyate pareṇa yathākṛtakatvā'nityatvayoḥ, sā'viruddhā kathamavayavinam viparyāsayati? 'raktatādhikaraṇaśca, nāstī ca' ityasaṅgatam. yathā-nāsti śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt-tādṛgetat.

Translation: 1078

Reply:

Yes, it is desired by others, but it is accepted as not being contradicted. It is not the case that, others accept contradiction, between contact and the whole, as between the state of not being produced and the state of not being eternal. And thus, without being contradicted how can it exclude the whole? To say that, something is locus of red color, and at the same time saying that it does not exist, are not compatible. Like the statement “there is no sound, because it is produced.”

Text: 1079

अथ रक्तता नास्ति घटस्य; तथापि असत्त्वं न सिद्ध्यति। रक्तताभावे तु अभावः कथं भवेत्? तदभावे विज्ञानाभावप्रसङ्गः।

atha raktatā nāstī ghaṭasya; tathāpi asatvaṁ na siddhyati. raktatābhāve tu abhāvaḥ katham bhavet? tadabhāve vijñānābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 1079

If you say that, there is no red color in the pot, still, it does not prove that, the pot does not exist. If there is red color, how can there be absence of pot? And in spite of that, if you say there is absence, it will lead to the contingency of absence of knowledge.

Text: 1080

अथ एकस्य विरुद्धावेतौ रक्तताऽरक्तताकारौ;
atha ekasya viruddhāvetau raktatā'raktatākārau;

Translation: 1080

Clarification:

Well, it is contradictory to say that, one thing is red and at the same time not red.

Text: 1081

केनेष्टौ विरुद्धतया? नीलद्रव्यसंयोगो हि रक्तता, तदभावोऽरक्तता, तौ च अर्थान्तरभूतौ। न च तयोर्भेदे अवयविनो भेद उपपद्यते, ताभ्यां तस्य भिन्नत्वात्। न च अन्यस्य भेदे अन्यस्य भेद उपपद्यते, विज्ञानभेदप्रसङ्गात्।

keneṣṭau viruddhatayā? nīladravysamyogo hi raktatā, tadabhāvo'raktatā, tau ca arthāntarabhūtau. na ca tayorbhede avayavino bheda upapadyate, tābhyām tasya bhinnatvāt. na ca anyasya bhede anyasya bheda upapadyate, vijñānabhedaprasaṅgāt.

Translation: 1081

Reply:

Who wants them to be contradictory? Being red means contact with the blue substance and absence of that is not being red. These two are two different things. Simply because these two are different, you cannot say that the whole is different, because the whole is different from both. It is not true that, if X is different from Y, X is different from Z. If it is accepted, then, there will be difference in knowledge.

Text: 1082

यदि च रक्तारक्तभेदेन अवयवी भिद्यते तदा अवयविद्वयं स्यात्, नाऽसत्त्वम्, विज्ञानाऽव्यतिरेकित्वं वा।

yadi ca raktāraktabhedena avayavī bhidyate tadā avayavidvayam syāt, nā'satvam, vijñānā'vyatirekitvam vā.

Translation: 1082

If you say that, a whole is differentiated on the basis of its being red and non-red, then, you should accept there are two wholes, you should not say there is no whole or it is not different from knowledge itself.

Text: 1083

अथ अविरलदेशोत्पादो रक्तता नीलद्रव्यपटयोः; तथापि असत्त्वं न सिद्ध्यति, संस्कृतानां सत्त्वाभ्युपगमात्।

atha aviraladeśotpādo raktatā nīladravypaṭayoh; tathāpi asatvaṁ na siddhyati, saṁskṛtānām sattvābhyupagamāt.

Translation: 1083

If you say, the redness of a blue substance and a cloth means production in a place without any gap, even then, it does not prove that it does not exist, because you accept existence of things which undergo some change.

[९. अवयविनिराकरणे प्रयुक्तस्यावृतानावृतत्वप्रसङ्गस्य खण्डनम्।]

[9. avayavinirākaraṇe prayuktasyāvṛtānāvṛtatvaprasaṅgasya khaṇḍanam.]

Text: 1084

यच्चान्यत् साधनमुक्तम् - आवृताऽनावृतप्रसङ्गरूपम् - “एकस्मिन्नवयवे आवृते आवृतः, अनावृते अनावृतः”; तदेतदयुक्तम्। तद्यदि अवयवावरणे अवयवी आवृतोऽनावृतो वाऽभ्युपगम्यते परैः, तदवयवानामतीन्द्रियत्वेऽपि हि उपलम्भाभ्युपगमात्। न च अवयवानामावृतत्वेऽनावृतत्वे वा अवयव्यावृतोऽनावृतो वा। अपि तु यदा वस्त्राद्यावरणेन देवदत्तेन्द्रियघटसम्बन्धविघातः क्रियते तदा 'आवृतः' इत्यपदिश्यते। यस्य तु वस्त्रादिनाऽऽवरणेन देवदत्तेन्द्रिय-घटसम्बन्धविघातो न क्रियते, तदपेक्षया अनावृतव्यपदेशः। यथा भवत्पक्षे स्वकारणानुत्पादकत्वेन अजनकत्वमभिधीयते, न च स्वरूपभेदमासादयति।

yaccānyat sādhanamuktam - āvṛtā'nāvṛtaprasaṅgarūpam - “ekasminnavayave āvṛte āvṛtaḥ, anāvṛte anāvṛtaḥ”; tadetadayuktam. tadyadi avayavāvaraṇe avayavī āvṛto'nāvṛto vā'bhyupagamyaṭe paraiḥ, tadavayavānāmatīndriyatve'pi hi upalambhābhyupagamāt. na ca avayavānāmāvṛtatve'nāvṛtatve vā avayavyāvṛto'nāvṛto vā. api tu yadā vastrādyāvāraṇena devadattendriyaghaṭasambandhavighātaḥ kriyate tadā 'āvṛtaḥ' ityapadiśyate. yasya tu vastrā-

dinā”varaṇena devadattendriya-ghaṭasambandhavighāto na kriyate, tadapekṣayā anāvṛtavypadeśaḥ. yathā bhavatpakṣe svakāraṇānu-tpādakatvena ajanakatvamabhidhīyate, na ca svarūpabhedamāsā-dayati.

Translation: 1084

You had also mentioned another factor viz. the contingency of being covered and not covered. Your statement was, “When one part is covered, the whole is covered and when it is not covered, the whole is not covered.” This statement is illogical, because, if a whole is covered when a part is covered, and a whole is not covered, when the part is not covered. If this thesis is accepted by the opponents, then, even if their parts are beyond the range of sense organs, you will have to accept the knowledge of that whole. It is not the case that the whole is covered, when parts are covered and whole is not covered, when the parts are not covered. Rather, when by a cover viz. cloth, the relationship of pot and the sense organ viz. the eyes of Devadatta is obstructed at that time we say that, the whole is covered. But, for someone whose connection of the eyes of the Devadatta with the pot, is not obstructed by a cover viz. a cloth, with reference to such person, it is said that, the whole is not covered. As according to your doctrine, you consider something as non-cause, if it does not produce something which is a cause. This does not lead to difference in the form.

[१०. अवयविनिराकरणप्रयुक्तस्य चलाचलत्वकृतस्य अवयविभेदप्रसङ्गस्य प्रत्यादेशः।]

[10. avayavinirākaraṇaprayuktasya calācalatvakṛtasya avayavi-bhedaprasaṅgasya pratyādeśaḥ.]

Text: 1085

यदपि अपरमभिहितम् – चलाचलत्वसाधनम् - “अवयवे चलति चलत्यवयवी, अवयवान्तरे चाऽचलति न चलति – ततश्चलाचलत्वे अवयविनो भेदप्रसङ्गः”; तदेतदयुक्तम्, चलनस्य स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्। तदभावे कथं तेन अवयवी भिद्यते?

yadapi aparamabhihitam - calācalatvasādhanam - “avayave calati calatyavayavī, avayavāntare cā’calati na calati - tataścalācalatve avayavino bhedaprasaṅgaḥ”; tadetadayuktam, calanasya svayama-nabhyupagamāt. tadabhāve katham tena avayavī bhidyate?

Translation: 1085

You had also made a reference to another factor viz. moving and non-moving. You had said, “When the parts move, the whole moves and if another part does not move, the whole does not move. And therefore, if a whole is accepted as non-moving, then, there will be difference in the whole.” This is also not proper, because, you yourself have not accepted movement. And in the absence of the movement, how can the whole be different?

Text: 1086

अथ चलनं विद्यते; तर्हि इदं वक्तव्यम्—स्वविषयलक्षणम्, चलनरूपार्थस्य उत्पत्तेः।
atha calanam vidyate; tarhi idam vaktavyam-svaviṣayalakṣaṇam,
calanarūpārthasya utpatteḥ.

Translation: 1086

If you say, the movement is there, then, you should be able to define the object of that movement, because the entity viz. the movement is produced.

Text: 1087

अथ परेणैष्टं चलनम् इति कृत्वा व्यपदिश्यते;
atha pareṇeṣṭam calanam iti kṛtvā vyapadiśyate;

Translation: 1087

Clarification:

Well, in whatever movement is desired by the opponent, you may call the same as movement.

Text: 1088

सत्यम्, इष्टं परेण। न तु अवयवे चलति अवयविनश्चलनमिष्टम्, ततो भिन्नत्वात्।
 नाप्यवयवान्तरस्याचलने अवयविनोऽचलनमिष्यते, तस्यान्यत्वात्। अपि तु चलनयुक्तः
 चलतीति व्यपदिश्यते। चलनविकलो निष्कम्प इत्यभिधीयते।

satyam, iṣṭam pareṇa. na tu avayave calati avayavinaścalanam-i-
ṣṭam, tato bhinnatvāt. nāpyavayavāntarasyācalane avayavino'ca-
nalamiṣyate, tasyānyatvāt. api tu calanayuktaḥ calatīti vyapadi-
śyate. calanavikalo niṣkampa ityabhidhīyate.

Translation: 1088

Reply:

It is true, it is desirable to the opponent. But, it is not desirable to

them that, if you say part moves, the whole will move. Therefore, it is different from that. It is also not the case that, if the another part does not move, the whole does not move, because, that is different. Rather, that is said to move which is associated with the movement. And that which is devoid of movement is called motionless.

Text: 1089

अथ तदेव द्रव्यमुपजातक्रियं चलति अनुपजातक्रियं च न चलति;

atha tadeva dravyamupajātakriyam calati anupajātakriyam ca na calati;

Translation: 1089

Clarification:

Well, the same substance, when activity is produced in it, moves and when activity is not produced in it, it does not move.

Text: 1090

सत्यम्, तदेव चलति, तदेव न चलति।

satyam, tadeva calati, tadeva na calati.

Translation: 1090

Reply:

What you say is true. It is the same whole, that moves, and the same whole that does not move.

Text: 1091

नत्व(न्व)वयविनो भेदः प्रसज्यते;

natva(nva)vayavino bhedaḥ prasajyate;

Translation: 1091

Objection:

Well, then, in that there will difference in the whole.

Text: 1092

न प्रसङ्गः, चलनस्य ततोऽन्यथा (न्यत्वात्)। चलाचलव्यपदेशश्च अन्योपाधिकृतः। यथा भवत्पक्षे ज्ञानं कार्यं कारणं च व्यपदिश्यते – स्वकायपेक्षया कारणम्, स्वकारणापेक्षया कार्यम्, न च तस्य भेदोऽस्ति, तथा अवयवचलाचलत्वेन न भेदो दृश्यते।

na prasāṅgaḥ, calanasya tato'nyathā (nyatvāt). calācalavyapadeśāśca anyopādhikṛtaḥ. yathā bhavatpakṣe jñānaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ ca vyapadiśyate - svakāryāpekṣayā kāraṇam, svakāraṇāpekṣayā

kāryam, na ca tasya bhedo'sti, tathā avayavicalācalatvena na bhedo drśyate.

Translation: 1092

Reply:

No, there will no such contingency, because, action is different from that. The reference to moving and non-moving is made on the basis of another factor. As according to your doctrine, knowledge is said to be an effect and also a cause- with reference to its own effect, it is a cause, with reference to its own cause, it is called an effect and still there is no difference. In the same way, due to the movement and non-movement of the whole, there will be no difference of the whole.

[११. अवयविनिराकरणे प्रयुक्तस्य 'सर्वावयवग्रहणेन' इत्यादि विकल्पजालस्य निरासः।]
[11. *avayavinirākaraṇe prayuktasya 'sarvāvayavagrahaṇena' ityādi vikalpajālasya nirāsaḥ.*]

Text: 1093

यदप्युक्तम् – किं सर्वावयवग्रहणेन अवयवी गृह्यते, किं वा कतिपयावयवग्रहणेन गृह्यते? यदि च सर्वावयवग्रहणेन गृह्यते; तदा मध्यभागपरभागाऽग्रहणे अवयव्यग्रहणप्रसङ्गः। अथ कतिपयाऽवयवग्रहणे अवयविग्रहणमभ्युपगम्यते; तदा करांङ्घ्रिग्रहणे अवयवविग्रहणं स्यात्। अथ अवयवग्रहणमन्तरेण अवयविग्रहणम्; तदा सर्वदा ग्रहणं स्यात्। तदेतत् सर्वमयुक्तम्, न सर्वावयवग्रहणपूर्वकमवयविग्रहणम्, नापि कतिपयावयवग्रहणपूर्वकमवयविनो ग्रहणम्, अपि तु तद्देहेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षालोकादिसाकल्ये सति उपलम्भः। अन्यथा हि अवयवग्रहणपूर्वके ग्रहणेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने अवयव्यादेरनुपलम्भः स्यात्।

yadapyuktam - kiṃ sarvāvayavagrahaṇena avayavī grhyate, kiṃ vā katipayāvayavagrahaṇena grhyate? yadi ca sarvāvayavagrahaṇena grhyate; tadā madhyabhāgaparabhāgā'grahaṇe avayavyagrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ. atha katipayā'vayavagrahaṇe avayavigrahaṇamabhyupagamyate; tadā karāṅghrigrahaṇe avayavavigrahaṇam syāt. atha avayavagrahaṇamantareṇa avayavigrahaṇam; tadā sarvadā grahaṇam syāt. tadetat sarvamayuktam, na sarvāvayavagrahaṇapūrvakamavayavigrahaṇam, nāpi katipayāvayavagrahaṇapūrvakamavayavino grahaṇam, api tu taddehendriyasannikarṣālokādisākalye sati upalambhaḥ. anyathā hi avayavagrahaṇapūrvake grahaṇe'bhyupagamyamāne avayavyāderanupalambhaḥ syāt.

Translation: 1093

You had also said, “Is it the fact that when all the parts are drawn, the whole is drawn? Or when some of the parts are drawn, the whole is drawn? If you say, when all the parts are drawn, the whole is drawn, then, when some one will draw the middle part, or the end part, the whole will not be drawn. And if you say, when some parts are drawn, then, the whole is drawn, then, if someone touches hand and feet, it will mean that, he is touching the whole body. If you say that, without drawing the whole, or touching the parts, there will be touching of the whole, then, there should be always touching of the whole.” All this is illogical. It is not the case that, to know the whole, it is necessary to know all parts of the whole. It is also not the case that, knowing of the whole, is preceded by knowing of some of the parts of the whole. Rather, when the whole is connected with the sense organ, body etc. and when there is sufficient light, there will be knowledge of the whole. If this is not accepted, and if it is accepted that, knowledge of the whole is preceded by knowledge of whole. Otherwise, if it is accepted that, knowledge of the whole is preceded by the knowledge of parts, there will be no knowledge of the whole.

[१२. अवयविनिराकरणपरायाः 'यत्र भिन्ने न तद्बुद्धिः' इत्यादि युक्तेः खण्डनम्।]

[12. *avayavinirākaraṇaparāyāḥ* 'yatra bhinne na tadbuddhiḥ' ityādi yukteḥ khaṇḍanam.]

Text: 1094

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम्—अवयविनिराकरणपरं साधनम्—“यत्र भिन्ने न तद्बुद्धिर्धिया च न सा। तद् घटं तु संवृतिसत् परमार्थसदन्यथा” तत्र यदि अवरुग्णे घटे घटबुद्धिर्न भवति घटस्याऽपरमार्थसत्त्वम्; नीलेऽपि प्रत्यस्तमिते नीलबुद्धिर्न भवति नीलस्याऽस्तमितत्वात् तदा नीलमपि अपरमार्थसत् प्राप्तम्।

yadapyanyaduktam - avayavinirākaraṇaparam̄ sādhanam - “yatra bhinne na tadbuddhirdhīyā ca na sā. tad ghaṭam tu samvṛ-tisat paramārthasadanyathā” tatra yadi avarugṇe ghaṭe ghaṭa-buddhirna bhavati ghaṭasyā'paramārthasattvam; nīle'pi pratya-stamite nīlabuddhirna bhavati nīlasyā'stamitatvāt tadā nīlamapi aparamārthasat prāptam.

Translation: 1094

You had also given another ground, to refute the existence of the whole viz. “When, there is difference in the whole, there cannot be knowledge of the whole. Nor can that knowledge be decided. The knowledge of pot that arises is not true, because, the ultimate reality is otherwise.” There, if the pot is covered, the knowledge of the pot does not arise and the pot is not considered to be the ultimate reality. If you say this, then, when the blue color is erased, there does not arise the knowledge of blue color and so, because the blue is not there, you should accept that the blue color is unreal.

Text: 1095

तथा, विज्ञानमस्तमुपगतं न वेद्यते तदप्यपरमार्थसत् प्राप्नोति।

tathā, vijñānamastamupagatam na vedyate tadapyaparamārthasat prāpnoti.

Translation: 1095

Clarification:

Similarly, when knowledge vanishes, it is not known and therefore on the same logic, you should say that knowledge also is unreal.

Text: 1096

अथ प्राक्तने विज्ञाने नीलान्तरे प्रत्यस्तमिते ज्ञानान्तरं वेद्यते नीलान्तरं च, न तु घटेऽवरुणे घटान्तरं वेद्यते; तत् किम् – उत्पन्नं न वेद्यते, आहोस्विदनुत्पन्नम्?

atha prāktane vijñāne nīlāntare pratyastamite jñānāntaram vedyate nīlāntaram ca, na tu ghaṭe'avaruṇe ghaṭāntaram vedyate; tat kim - utpannam na vedyate, āhosvidanutpannam?

Translation: 1096

Reply:

Well, in the earlier knowledge, another blue color is destroyed and so in the subsequent knowledge, there is awareness of knowledge as well as another blue color. But when the pot is broken, another pot is not known. Do you want to say that, it is produced and not known, or, it is not produced at all?

Text: 1097

तद्यदि उत्पन्नं न गृह्यते; तत्रापि हि विज्ञानोत्पादनसमर्थमुत्पन्नं न गृह्यते, तद्विपरीतं वा?

tadyadi utpannam na grhyate; tatrāpi hi vijñānotpādanasamarthamutpannam na grhyete, tadviparītam vā?

Translation: 1097

If you say that, it is produced, but not known, there also the question arises, that something which is capable of producing the knowledge, is produced, but not known, or, does it mean opposite of that?

Text: 1098

तद्यदि विज्ञानोत्पादनसमर्थमुत्पन्नं न गृह्यते; तदयुक्तम्, यदि विज्ञानोत्पादनसमर्थमुत्पन्नं घटजातम्, तदवश्यं गृह्यते अन्यथा नीलस्याप्यग्रहणं स्यात्।

tadyadi vijñānotpādanasamarthamutpannam na grhyate; tadayuktam, yadi vijñānotpādanasamarthamutpannam ghaṭajātam, tadvaśyam grhyate anyathā nīlasyāpyagrahaṇam syāt.

Translation: 1098

If you say that, something which is capable of producing knowledge, is produced, but not known, that will not be proper, because, if pots are produced and are capable of producing the knowledge of the pot, then, it must be known. Otherwise, even that cannot be knowledge of blue color.

Text: 1099

अथ विज्ञानजनकोत्पन्नस्याग्रहणम्; तदा नीलस्याप्यनया वृत्त्याऽग्रहणे तस्याप्यपरमार्थसत्त्वं स्यात्।

atha vijñānajanakotpannasasyāgrahaṇam; tadā nīlasyāpyanayā vṛtyā-grahaṇe tasyāpyaparamārthasattvam syāt.

Translation: 1099

If you say that, something is produced and it causes the knowledge, and still it is not known, then, by the same process, when blue color is also not known, the blue color should also be accepted as unreal.

Text: 1100

अथ अनुत्पन्नघटजातं न वेद्यते तेन तस्य अपरमार्थसत्त्वम्; नील-ज्ञाने अपि अनुत्पन्ने न वेद्य(द्ये)ते तयोरपि अपरमार्थसत्त्वमापद्यते।

atha anutpannaghaṭajātam na vedyate tena tasya aparamārthasattvam; nīla-jñāne api anutpanne na vedya(dye)te tayorapi aparamārthasattvamāpadyate.

Translation: 1100

If you say that, pots which are not produced are not known, and therefore, a pot is unreal, then, when the knowledge of blue color arises, it is not known, the knowledge of blue color should be declared as unreal.

Text: 1101

अथ अवरुग्णे घटे घटान्तरं न प्रादुर्भवति विज्ञानजनकं कपालावस्थायाम्;
atha avarugṇe ghaṭe ghaṭāntaram na prādurbhavati vijñānajanakam kapālāvasthāyām;

Translation: 1101

Clarification:

Well, when a pot is broken, another pot does not emerge which can generate the knowledge of pot and what continues there, is the parts of the pot.

Text: 1102

यद्येवं निर्विकल्पके रूपज्ञाने नष्टे नान्यन्निरविकल्पकं रूपज्ञानं जायते सविकल्पकाव-
 स्थायाम्। तथा, स्थूले नीले नष्टे नान्यत् स्थूलं नीलान्तरं भवति सूक्ष्मनीलोत्पादकाले।
*yadyevam nirvikalpake rūpañjāne naṣṭe nānyannirvikalpakam rūpa-
 jñānam jāyate savikalpakāvasthāyām. tathā, sthūle nīle naṣṭe nānyat
 sthūlam nīlāntaram bhavati sūkṣmanīlotpādakāle.*

Translation: 1102

Reply:

If it is so, when an indeterminate knowledge of color, is destroyed, no other indeterminate knowledge of color emerges during the state of determinate knowledge. In the same way, when a gross blue color is destroyed, no other gross blue color emerges during the time of production of minute blue color.

Text: 1103

अथ तत्र नीलरूपताऽनुगता ज्ञानरूपता वाऽनुगता;
atha tatra nīlarūpatā'nugatā jñānarūpatā vā'nugatā;

Translation: 1103

Clarification:

Well, there the blue color continues in the subsequent moments and also the form of the knowledge in the subsequent knowledges.

Text: 1104

यद्येवम् इहापि कपालघटयोः स्वलक्षणरूपताऽनुगता।

yadyevam ihāpi kapālaghaṭayoh svalakṣaṇarūpatā'nugatā.

Translation: 1104

Reply:

If it is so, here also, the parts of the pot and the pot continue in the form of particulars.

Text: 1105

यदप्युक्तम्- “धिया च न सा – धिया बुद्ध्या विवेच्यमाने न सा घटबुद्धिर्भवति नीलबुद्धिस्तु भवति”; तदेतद्युक्तम्, किंभूतया बुद्ध्या विवेच्यते – किं निरालम्बनया, आहोस्वित् सालम्बनया?

yadapyuktam- “dhiyā ca na sā - dhiyā buddhyā vivecyamāne na sā ghaṭabuddhirbhavati nīlabuddhistu bhavati”; tadetadayuktam, kiṁbhūtayā buddhyā vivecyate - kiṁ nirālanbanayā, āhosvit sālambanayā?

Translation: 1105

You have said the following, “The knowledge of the pot, is also not established i.e. when one examines critically, that knowledge is not of pot, but it is knowledge of blue color.” This is also not proper, because, there the question arises, by which thought do you examine this? Is it thought without content, or, thought with content?

Text: 1106

तद्यदि निरालम्बनया विवेच्यते; तदा विवेचनीयार्थो वक्तव्यः। यदि च निरालम्बनया विवेच्यमानस्य असत्त्वम्; तदाऽनया रीत्या नीलादेरप्यसत्त्वमापनीपद्यते। न च निरालम्बनमतिरस्ति।

tadyadi nirālanbanayā vivecyate; tadā vivecanīyārtho vaktavyaḥ. yadi ca nirālanbanayā vivecyamānasya asattvam; tadā'nayā rītyā nīlāderapyasattvamāpanīpadyate. na ca nirālanbanamatirasti.

Translation: 1106

If you say, it is examined by a thought without content, then, you should spell out what is the object of critical examination? If you examine it by a thought without a content, then, content does not

exist and by this logic, there will be absence of blue color also. As a matter of fact, there cannot be a thought without a content.

Text: 1107

अथ सालम्बनया घटो विवेच्यते; सा किमात्मालम्बना, आहोस्वित् स्वकायव्यतिरि-
क्तालम्बना?

*atha sālambanayā ghaṭo vivecyate; sā kimātmālabhanā, āhosvit
svakāyavyatiriktālabhanā?*

Translation: 1107

If you say that, pot is examined by the knowledge of thought, having a content, there also the question arises, what is the content there? Is it the thought itself, or, something other than its own form?

Text: 1108

तद्यदि स्वकायालम्बना सती घटस्य विवेचिका; तदा विवेचनीयार्थो वक्तव्यः। यदि नाम
स्वकायमात्रावभासा समुत्पन्ना; घटस्याऽसत्त्वे किमायातम्?

*tadyadi svakāyālabhanā satī ghaṭasya vivecīkā; tadā vivecanīyārtho
vaktavyaḥ. yadi nāma svakāyamātrāvabhāsā samutpannā; ghaṭa-
syā'satve kimāyātam?*

Translation: 1108

If you say, the thought having thought itself as its content, examines pot, then, you should know, what is that which is being examined? If the thought is produced, which reveals its own form i.e. mere thought, then, what happened that the pot does not appear in that thought?

Text: 1109

अथ तस्यां बुद्धौ घटो [ना]वभाति तेन तस्याऽसत्त्वम्; अनया भङ्ग्या नीलादेरपि
असत्त्वमापद्यते।

*atha tasyām buddhau ghaṭo [nā]vabhāti tena tasyā'sattvam; anayā
bhaṅgyā nīlāderapi asattvamāpadyate.*

Translation: 1109

If you say that, because, in that knowledge or thought the pot does not appear, and therefore, there is no existence of pot, then, by this argument, there will arise the contingency of denying the existence of blue color etc.

Text: 1110

अथ स्वकायव्यतिरिक्तार्थालम्बनया घटो विवेच्यते; किं [घटालम्बनया] घटो विवेच्यते, घटव्यतिरिक्तार्थालम्बनया वा?

atha svakāyavyatiriktārthālambanayā ghaṭo vivecyate; kiṃ [ghaṭālambanayā] ghaṭo vivecyate, ghaṭavyatiriktārthālambanayā vā?

Translation: 1110

If you say that, the pot is being examined by the thought in which the content is different from the thought then, we would like to know whether the pot is the content of the thought, and therefore, it is being examined, or, (the pot is being examined) by the thought in which the content is different from the pot?

Text: 1111

तद्यदि घटालम्बनया विवेच्यते, तत्रापि विवेचनार्थो वक्तव्यः। तथा किं क्रियते—किं घटस्याऽऽसत्त्वं प्रद्योत्यते, आहोस्वित् सत्त्वम्, उभयं वा, न किञ्चिद्वा?

tadyadi ghaṭālambanayā vivecyate, tatrāpi vivecanārtho vaktavyaḥ. tayā kiṃ kriyate—kiṃ ghaṭasyā'sattvaṃ pradyotyate, āhosvit sattvam, ubhayaṃ vā, na kiñcidvā?

Translation: 1111

If you say that, by the thought, the pot having its content, the pot is being examined, there, we would like to know, what could be the meaning of “the act of examining”, i.e. what is going to be done by that act of examining i.e. the act of thinking? Is the non-existence of the pot going to be indicated, or, existence, or, both, or, neither?

Text: 1112

तद्यदि असत्त्वम्; तदयुक्तम्, नहि अन्यविषया सती एतस्य प्रबोधिका भवितुमर्हति अतिप्रसङ्गात्, न जातु रूपविषयविज्ञान(नं) रसस्थापनाय अलम्।

tadyadi asatvam; tadayuktam, nahi anyaviṣayā satī etasya prabodhikā bhavitumarhati atiprasaṅgāt, na jātu rūpaviṣayavijñāna(naṃ) rasasthāpanāya alam.

Translation: 1112

If you say, non-existence is going to be indicated, that will not be proper, because, if the content of the thought is something else, it cannot reveal that, because, otherwise it will lead to unwanted

contingency. It is not the case that, the knowledge of color is capable of establishing the existence of taste.

Text: 1113

अथ सत्त्वं प्रद्योत्यते; तथापि सत्त्वम्। स(सं)वृत्तिसत्त्वे वा नीलादेरपि संवृत्तिसत्त्वप्रसङ्गः।
atha sattvaṃ pradyotyate; tathāpi sattvam. sa(saṃ)vṛttisattve vā nīlāderapi saṃvṛttisattvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 1113

If you say, then, existence is being revealed or indicated, still there will be existence and if that is treated as unreal, there will arise the contingency of blue color becoming unreal i.e. not having real existence.

Text: 1114

अथ उभयं प्रतिभाति; न, तदभावस्य अविषयत्वात्। यथा विज्ञानस्य विषयतां न याति तथा प्रागेव प्रपञ्चितम्। किंच, उभयं प्रद्योतयन्त्या भावोऽपि प्रद्योतितस्तया। तत्प्रद्योतने च कथं घटस्य संवृत्तिसत्त्वम्?

atha ubhayaṃ pratibhāti; na, tadabhāvasya aviṣayatvāt. yathā vijñānasya viṣayatāṃ na yāti tathā prāgeva prapañcitam. kiñca, ubhayaṃ pradyotayantyā bhāvo'pi pradyotitastayā. tatpradyotane ca katham ghaṭasya saṃvṛttisattvam?

Translation: 1114

If you say that, both appear, that is also not correct, because the absence of the pot is not the content in the thought, as this absence cannot be the object of the knowledge, has already been discussed before. Moreover, by thought revealing both, the positive entity is also revealed and if that is revealed, how can pot be called unreal?

Text: 1115

अथ न किञ्चिदपि प्रद्योत्यते तया; कथं तर्हि घटविषया सा अपदिश्यते?

atha na kiñcidapi pradyotyate tayā; katham tarhi ghaṭaviṣayā sā apadiśyate?

Translation: 1115

If you say that, neither of the two is revealed by that knowledge of thought, then, how do you call that knowledge as knowledge of pot?

Text: 1116

अथ घटभिन्नार्थविषया सा; तत्र वर्तमाना न कुम्भस्य अस्तित्वविधायिका, न व्यावर्त्तिका।
atha ghaṭabhinnārthaviṣayā sā; tatra vartamānā na kumbhasya
astitvavidhāyikā, na vyāvarttikā.

Translation: 1116

If you say that, something other than the pot is the content of that knowledge, then, that thought at that time can neither enjoin the existence of pot nor can it exclude pot.

Text: 1117

अथ तस्यां बुद्धौ कुम्भो न प्रतिभाति तेन तस्य संवृतिसत्त्वम्;
atha tasyām buddhau kumbho na pratibhāti tena tasya samvṛti-
sattvam;

Translation: 1117

Clarification:

Well, in that knowledge, since pot does not appear, therefore, that pot is called unreal.

Text: 1118

यद्येवम्—बुद्धिविषयोऽपि बुद्ध्यन्तरे न प्रतिभाति, तस्याप्यायातं संवृतिसत्त्वम्। सर्वज्ञानानि
 च इतरेतरज्ञाने न प्रतिभान्ति – सर्वेषां संवृतिसत्त्वं प्राप्तम्। न चैतदभ्युपगम्यते।
yadyevam-buddhiviṣayo'pi buddhyantare na pratibhāti, tasyāpyā-
yātam samvṛtisattvam. sarvajñānāni ca itaretarajñāne na pratibhā-
nti - sarveṣāṃ samvṛtisattvaṃ prāptam. na caitadabhyupagamyate.

Translation: 1118

Reply:

If it is so, then, since that which appears in one knowledge does not appear in another knowledge and so that also should be declared as unreal. Similarly, all knowledges do not appear in other knowledges and therefore, all knowledges should be declared as unreal. But, as a matter of fact, this is not acceptable to you.

[१३. विज्ञानवादिना साधितस्य बाह्यार्थविलोपस्य निरासः।]

[13. vijñānavādinā sādhitasya bāhyārthavilopasya nirāsaḥ.]

Text: 1119

यदप्यन्यत्साधनमपदिष्टं बाह्यार्थापह्वे - “न किल विज्ञानमसंविदितम् अर्थस्य वेदनम्।
 यद्यविदितमर्थवेदनं तदाऽजातेऽपि ज्ञानेऽर्थो वेद्यः स्यात्, सन्तानान्तरज्ञाने च जाते

देवदत्तवेद्यः सोऽर्थः स्यात्, न चैतदुपपद्यते। तथा स्वसन्ततिपतिते परोक्षज्ञाने जातेऽर्थो न वेद्यः स्यात्। अथ ज्ञानान्तरविदितमर्थस्य वेदनम्; तदपि ज्ञानान्तरविदितम् इत्यायातमान्ध्यं जगतः। अथ स्वसंविदितं तदर्थस्य वेदनम्; ततश्च सहोपलम्भाद् एकोपलम्भतो वा बाह्यार्थविलोपः प्राप्तः।” तदेतदयुक्तम्।

yadapyanyatsādhanamapadiṣṭāṁ bāhyārthāpahnave - “na kila vijñānamasamviditam arthasya vedanam. yadyaviditamarthavedanam tadā’jāte’pi jñāne’rtho vedyah syāt, santānāntarajñāne ca jāte devadattavedyah so’rthah syāt, na caitadupapadyate. tathā svasantatipatite parokṣajñāne jāte’rtho na vedyah syāt. atha jñānāntaraviditamarthasya vedanam; tadapi jñānāntaraviditam ityāyātamāndhyam jagataḥ. atha svasamviditam tadarthasya vedanam; tataśca sahopalambhād ekopalambhato vā bāhyārthavilopah prāptah”. tadetadayuktam.

Translation: 1119

You had also stated another ground to deny the existence of external object viz. “knowledge does not mean sensation of a thing which is not known. Had it been the case that there is sensation of even a thing which is not known, a thing would have been known in a knowledge, even if that knowledge has not yet come into being. When another knowledge series has arisen, that object can be known by Devadatta. But this is not proper. Similarly, when non-perceptual knowledge has arisen in its own knowledge series, the object will remain unknown.

If someone says that, sensation of a thing means the perception of something known by another knowledge, then, that knowledge also is known by another knowledge and in this way the entire universe will become blind. If you say that, sensation of a thing means being known by itself, then, either because of the simultaneous knowledge or because of knowledge, the external world will vanish.” But this is not proper.

Text: 1120

यत्तावदुक्तम्-‘ज्ञानान्तरविदितं यदि ज्ञानम् अर्थस्य वेदनं तदा अनिष्ठा प्राप्नोति’। एतदनभ्युपगमेनैव पर्युदस्तम्। अपि तु अविदितमेव ज्ञानम् अर्थस्य वेदनम्।

yattāvaduktam- 'jñānāntaraviditam̐ yadi jñānam arthasya vedanam̐ tadā aniṣṭhā prāpnoti'. etadanabhyupagamenaiṣa paryudastam. api tu aviditameva jñānam arthasya vedanam.

Translation: 1120

You had also said “if the knowledge of a thing is that, which is known by another knowledge, then, it will lead to unsteadiness.” But since such a theory is not acceptable, it is automatically refuted. Rather, a knowledge which is not known, is the knowledge of a thing.

Text: 1121

ननु अजातेऽपि ज्ञाने अर्थो वेद्यः स्यात्;
nanu ajāte'pi jñāne artho vedyah̐ syāt;

Translation: 1121

Clarification:

Well, if when knowledge has not come into being, an object will be known.

Text: 1122

न वेद्यः, वेदनस्याभावाद् अर्थो न वेद्यते, न तु वेदनवेदनस्याभावादर्थो न वेद्यते।
*na vedyah̐, vedanasyābhāvād artho na vedyate, na tu vedanaveda-
nasyābhāvādartho na vedyate.*

Translation: 1122

Reply:

It cannot be known, since there will be no knowledge, the object cannot be known. It is not the case that in the absence of knowledge of knowledge, an object is not known.

Text: 1123

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम्— 'सन्तानान्तरजाते न ज्ञाने सोऽर्थो वेद्यः स्यात्'; तदप्ययुक्तम्, देवदत्त-
सन्ततिपतिते जाते देवदत्तस्य सोऽर्थोऽपरोक्षः, न तु सन्तानान्तरपतिते ज्ञाने, अन्यथा हि
सन्तानान्तरपतितं विज्ञानं स्वसंविदितरूपं जातम्। तस्मिन् जाते सोऽर्थो देवदत्तस्याऽपरोक्षः
स्यात्।

yadapyanyaduktam- 'santānāntarajāte na jñāne so'rtho vedyah̐ syāt'; tadapyayuktam, devadattasantatipatite jāte devadattasya so'rtho 'parokṣah̐, na tu santānāntarapatite jñāne, anyathā hi santā-

nāntarapatitam vijñānam svasamviditarūpam jātam. tasmin jāte so'rtho devadattasyā'parokṣaḥ syāt.

Translation: 1123

You had also said, “when knowledge is produced in another knowledge series, that object is known.” But, this is also not proper, because, if the knowledge comes into being in the series of Devadatta, that object becomes invisible to Devadatta. But not in the knowledge which is included in another knowledge series, otherwise, a knowledge falling in another knowledge series, will become of the form of being known by itself and when in such a form it is born, that object will become invisible to Devadatta.

Text: 1124

अपि च, रूपज्ञानं किं रूपगृहीत्यात्मकम्, आहोस्विद् अगृहीत्यात्मकम्?

api ca, rūpajñānam kiṁ rūpagrḥītyātmakam, āhosvid agrḥītyātmakam?

Translation: 1124

Moreover, is it the case that knowledge of color is of the nature of sensation of color, or, of the nature of non-sensation.

Text: 1125

तद्यदि रूपगृहीत्यात्मकम्; तदा गृहीतमेव रूपं ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यं भवतु स्वसंवेद्यं वा, न ज्ञानग्रहणपुरस्सरमर्थस्य ग्रहणम्।

tadyadi rūpagrḥītyātmakam; tadā grḥītameva rūpam jñānam jñānāntaravedyam bhavatu svasamvedyam vā, na jñānagrahaṇapurassaramarthasya grahaṇam.

Translation: 1125

If you say, it is of the nature of sensation of color, then, let the color which is known to be the knowledge, to be known by another knowledge, or, to be known by itself? It is not the case that, before the object is known, the knowledge of the object is known.

Text: 1126

अथ रूपगृहीतिस्वभावकं न भवति रूपज्ञानम्; एवं तर्हि स्वसंवेद्यं भवतु व्यतिरिक्त-संवेदकसंवेद्यं वा भवतु अवेद्यं वा, न रूपस्य प्रत्यक्षता, यथा रसज्ञानस्वसंवेद्यत्वेऽपि

न रूपस्य प्रत्यक्षता तद्वत् रूपज्ञानसद्भावेऽपि न रूपस्य प्रत्यक्षता रूपगृहीतिस्वभावतया अनुपपत्तेः।

atha rūpaḡr̥hītisvabhāvakaṁ na bhavati rūpajñānam; evaṁ tarhi svasaṁvedyaṁ bhavatu vyatiriktasaṁvedakasaṁvedyaṁ vā bhavatu avedyaṁ vā, na rūpasya pratyakṣatā, yathā rasaññānasvasaṁvedyatve'pi na rūpasya pratyakṣatā tadvat rūpajñānasadbhāve'pi na rūpasya pratyakṣatā rūpaḡr̥hītisvabhāvatayā anupapatteḥ.

Translation: 1126

If you say that, knowledge of color cannot be of the nature of sensation of color, then, let that be known by itself, or, let that be revealed by another revealer, or, let that not be known at all. The color cannot be perceived. As even if the knowledge of taste is revealed by itself, color is not revealed by that knowledge, in the same way, it is knowledge of color, there cannot be perception of color because, it cannot be said to be of the nature of sensation of color.

[१४. बाह्यार्थविलोपायोपयुक्तस्य सहोपलम्भसाधनस्य विकल्प्य दूषणम्।]

[14. *bāhyārthavilopāyopayuktasya sahopalambhasāadhanasya vikalpya dūṣaṇam.*]

Text: 1127

यदप्युक्तम्—'स्वसंवेद्यत्वे सहोपलम्भाद् विज्ञानार्थयोरैक्यम्' – एतदप्यपनीतं द्रष्टव्यम्; स्वसंवेद्यत्वाऽसंभवादेव। न च सहोपलम्भादर्थस्याऽभावः सिद्ध्यति अव्यतिरेको वा।

*yadapyuktam—'svasaṁvedyatve sahopalambhād vijñānārthayorai-kyam' - etadapyapanītaṁ draṣṭavyam; svasaṁvedyatvā'sambhāvā-
deva. na ca sahopalambhādarthasyā'bhāvaḥ siddhyati avyatiireko vā.*

Translation: 1127

You had also said, "if it is movable by itself, because they will appear together, there will be identity with knowledge and its content." This is also as good as refuted, because, it is impossible to justify that, it is revealed by itself. It is not the case that because, they appear together there will be absence of content or there will be identity between the two.

Text: 1128

सहोपलम्भो हि ज्ञानैकधर्मः, अर्थैकधर्मः, उभयधर्मो वा?

*sahopalambho hi jñānaikadharmah, arthaikadharmah, ubhayadharma-
rmo vā?*

Translation: 1128

We would like to ask, whether, knowing together is the property of knowledge alone, or, of the object of the knowledge alone, or of the property of the both?

Text: 1129

तद्यदि ज्ञानैकधर्मः; तदा सहशब्दार्थो नोपपद्यते। ज्ञानैकधर्मत्वे च ज्ञानस्यैवास्तित्वस्थापकं नार्थस्य व्यतिरेकाभावावेदकं सहोपलम्भसाधनम् अतद्धर्मत्वात्।

tadyadi jñānaikadharmah; tadā sahaśabdārtho nopapadyate. jñānaikadharmatve ca jñānasyaivāstitvsthāpakam nārthasya vyatirekābhāvāvedakam sahopalambhasādhanam ataddharmatvāt.

Translation: 1129

If you say that, it is the property of knowledge alone, then, you cannot justify the meaning of the word “together”. If it is the property of knowledge alone, then, it will not be the revealer of the absence of difference of the object, because, the factor of causing the perception together cannot be the property of that.

Text: 1130

अथ अर्थैकधर्मः सहोपलम्भः; अत्रापि सहशब्दार्थो वक्तव्यः। अर्थैकधर्मत्वे वा अर्थस्यैव सत्तां व्यवस्थापयति, ततश्च विपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धः।

atha arthaikadharmah sahopalambhah; atrāpi sahaśabdārtho vaktavyah. arthaikadharmatve vā arthasyaiva sattām vyavasthāpayati, tataśca viparītasādhanaḍ viruddhah.

Translation: 1130

If you say, it is the property of object alone and that is the meaning of knowing together, then, here also you should also spell the meaning of the word “together”, or, else if it is the property of knowledge alone, then, it establish the existence of object only and consequently it will establish contrary to what you intend to establish.

Text: 1131

अथ उभयधर्मः; कथमुभयधर्मत्वे अन्यतरलोपः? अन्यतरलोपश्चेत्; नोभयधर्मता उपपद्यते। 'उभयधर्मता च अन्यतरलोपश्च' इति व्याहतमपदिश्यते। उभयधर्मत्वे च 'अर्थस्यैव विलोपो न ज्ञानस्य' इत्यत्र नियामकं वक्तव्यम्। तच्च नास्ति। न च उपलम्भोऽन्यतरसद्भावं व्यावर्तयति, सद्भावेऽपि दृष्टत्वात् यथा ज्ञाने।

atha ubhayadharmah; kathamubhayadharmatve anyataralopah? anyataralopaścet; nobhayadharmatā upapadyate. 'ubhayadharmatā ca anyataralopaśca' iti vyāhatamapadiśyate. ubhayadharmatve ca 'arthasyaiva vilopo na jñānasya' ityatra niyāmakam vaktavyam. tacca nāsti. na ca upalambho'nyatarasadbhāvaṁ vyāvartayati, sadbhāve'pi dr̥ṣṭatvāt yathā jñāne.

Translation: 1131

If you say that, it is the property of both, then, if it is the property of both, then, how one of the two has disappeared? If one of the two has disappeared, then, it cannot be maintained that, it is the property of both. It is indeed a contrary statement, if you say, "it exists in both and there is absence of one." If it is a property of both, in spite of that, there is absence of the object and not of knowledge. For such a statement, you should give explanatory ground and there is no such controlling factor. Knowledge of a thing does not exclude the existence of one of the two, because, even if it is there, it is experienced by us as in the case of knowledge.

Text: 1132

अपि च कस्यात्र पक्षीकरणम् – किं विज्ञानस्य, उत अर्थस्य?

api ca kasyātra pakṣīkaraṇam - kiṁ vijñānasya, uta arthasya?

Translation: 1132

Moreover, what is the subject of this inference? Is it the knowledge, or, the content of the knowledge?

Text: 1133

तद्यदि ज्ञानं पक्षयसि; तस्य किं साध्यते – अभावः अव्यतिरेको वा?

tadyadi jñānam pakṣayasi; tasya kiṁ sādhyate-abhāvaḥ avyatiireko vā?

Translation: 1133

If you are making knowledge of content as the subject, then, what is being inferred in that? Is it the absence, or, absence of difference?

Text: 1134

तद्यदि अभावः; स किं ज्ञानस्य, उत अर्थस्येति?

tadyadi abhāvah; sa kiṃ jñānasya, uta arthasyeti?

Translation: 1134

If absence is being inferred, there also we would like to know, is the absence of knowledge, or, the absence of content of knowledge?

Text: 1135

यदि ज्ञानस्य तदा अभ्युपेतहानम्, हेतोश्च पक्षधर्मता न लभ्यते।

yadi jñānasya tadā abhyupetahānam, hetośca pakṣadharmatā na labhyate.

Translation: 1135

If you say, it is the absence of knowledge, then, you are giving up something which you have already accepted. Moreover, you cannot demonstrate that, the ground for the inference exists in the subject.

Text: 1136

अथ अर्थस्य; तदा असम्बद्धत्वम् – ज्ञानं पक्षयसि अर्थो नास्तीति व्याहृतमपदिश्यते, सहोपलम्भस्य च व्यधिकरणत्वम्।

atha arthasya; tadā asambaddhatvam - jñānaṃ pakṣayasi artho nāstīti vyāhatamapadiśyate, sahopalambhasya ca vyadhikaraṇatvam.

Translation: 1136

If you say, it is the absence of content of knowledge which is being inferred, then, it is a very irrelevant statement. On one hand, you are making knowledge as the subject, and on the other, you say there is no content of knowledge and so it is self-contradictory. It will mean that, the knowledge of the two exists in two different loci.

Text: 1137

अथ अव्यतिरेकः साध्यते; स किं ज्ञानस्य, आहोस्विद् अर्थस्य?

atha avyatiirekaḥ sādhyate; sa kiṃ jñānasya, āhosvid arthasya?

Translation: 1137

If you say that, the absence of difference is being established by inference, there also question arises, is it of the knowledge, or, of the object of knowledge?

Text: 1138

तद्यदि अर्थस्य; तदाऽसम्बद्धाभिधातृत्वम् – ज्ञानं पक्षयसि, अर्थस्य चाऽव्यतिरेकप्रतिपादनं करोसि इति व्याहृतमपदिश्यते, अर्थाव्यतिरेको हि अर्थधर्मः।

tadyadi arthasya; tadā'sambaddhābhidhātṛtvam - jñānaṁ pakṣayasi, arthasya cā'vyatirekapratipādanaṁ karosi iti vyāhatamapadiśyate, arthāvyatireko hi arthadharmah.

Translation: 1138

If you say, it is the object of knowledge, then, again it is irrelevant statement, because, on one hand you are making knowledge as the subject, and on the other hand you are attempting to explain the identity of the object of knowledge. This is self-contradictory, because, the property of object cannot be different from the object.

Text: 1139

अथ ज्ञानस्यैव अव्यतिरेकप्रतिपादनं क्रियते; तत्किं स्वस्मात्स्वरूपादव्यतिरिक्तम्, आहोस्वित् पररूपादव्यतिरिक्तम्?

atha jñānasyaiva avyatirekapratipādanaṁ kriyate; tatkiṁ svasmāt svarūpādavyatiriktam, āhosvit pararūpādavyatiriktam?

Translation: 1139

If you say that, you are explaining the non-difference of the knowledge itself, there also the question arises, is it the case that, it is not different from its own nature? Or, it is not different from other's nature?

Text: 1140

तद्यदि स्वस्मात् स्वरूपादव्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानम्; तदा अविवादेन सम्बोधयितव्याः।

tadyadi svasmāt svarūpādavyatiriktam jñānam; tadā avivādena sambodhayitavyāḥ.

Translation: 1140

If you say, the knowledge is not different from its own nature, then, there is no difference of opinion whatsoever.

Text: 1141

अथ परस्मादव्यतिरेकप्रतिपादनं क्रियते; स परात्मा तात्त्विकः, अतात्त्विको वा?

atha parasmādavyatirekapratipādanaṁ kriyate; sa parātmā tāttvikah, atāttvikō vā?

Translation: 1141

If you say that, it is being explained as not different from other's nature, there also question arises whether the others nature is real or unreal?

Text: 1142

तद्यदि अतात्त्विकः; ततोऽव्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानमपि अतात्त्विकं भवेत्।
tadyadi atāttvikah; tato'vyatiriktam jñānamapi atāttvikam bhavet.

Translation: 1142

If you say, it is unreal, then, the knowledge also will be unreal because, it is identical with that.

Text: 1143

अथ तात्त्विकः; सोप्यवधारितदेहो वा, अनवधारितदेहो वा?
atha tāttvikah; sopyavadhāritadeho vā, anavadhāritadeho vā?

Translation: 1143

If you say, it is real, then, there also question arises, whether its own form is determined, or, its form is not determined.

Text: 1144

तद्यदि अवधारितदेहः; स किं भिन्नाकारतया अवगतः, अभिन्नाकारतया वा?
tadyadi avadhāritadehaḥ; sa kiṁ bhinnākāratayā avagataḥ, abhinnākāratayā vā?

Translation: 1144

If you say, its form is determined, there also the question arises, whether it is known as having different form, or, as having identical form.

Text: 1145

यदि भिन्नाकारतया अवधारितः; तदा भिन्नाकारावगाहकविज्ञानदूषितपक्षत्वेन सहोपलम्भ-
हेतोरसिद्धता कालात्ययापदिष्टता वा।

*yadi bhinnākāratayā avadhāritaḥ; tadā bhinnākārāvagāhakavijñāna-
dūṣitapakṣatvena sahopalambhahetorasiddhatā kālātyayāpadiṣṭatā vā.*

Translation: 1145

If you say, its form is determined having different form, then, the subject of the inference becomes defective as knowledge in which

different form is the object and as such the ground viz. "knowing together" remains unestablished, or, suffering from the defect of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*.

Text: 1146

अथ अभिन्नस्वभावतयाऽवधारितः; न तर्हि परात्मा, 'परात्मा च अभिन्नस्वभावतया अवधारितः' इति च व्याघातः। किंच, अभिन्नस्वभावतया यदि प्रागेवाऽवगाहितः; तदा किं तत्र सहोपलम्भसाधनेन प्रयोजनम्? निष्पादितक्रिये कर्मणि साधनं सा(ध?)नन्यायमतिपतति।

atha abhinnasvabhāvatayā'vadhāritaḥ; na tarhi parātmā, 'parātmā ca abhinnasvabhāvatayā'vadhāritaḥ' iti ca vyāghātaḥ. kimca, abhinnasvabhāvatayā yadi prāgevā'vagāhitaḥ; tadā kim tatra sahopalambhasādhanena prayojanam? niṣpāditakriye karmaṇi sādhanam sā(dha?)nanyāyamati patati.

Translation: 1146

If you say, it is determined as having identical nature, then, this cannot be said to be of the form of others nature. It is a contradictory statement to say that it is of others nature and at the same time it is determined as having nature having the nature identical with the nature of its own. Moreover, if you say that it is already known as having identical nature then, what is the need of establishing "knowing together"? Because, when an act has already terminated in generating an activity, the means of that activity is left with no scope, for a cause and effect relationship.

Text: 1147

अथ अनवधारितदेहः; स परात्माऽस्तीति कथं जानीषे? न च अवधारितानवधारिताकारयोः एकत्वं बहुविदो वदन्ति। अनवधारिताकारैकत्वे च ज्ञानस्याप्यसंवेदनं प्रसक्तम्।

atha anavadhāritadehaḥ; sa parātmā'stīti katham jānīṣe? na ca avadhāritānavadhāritākārayoḥ ekatvam bahuvīdo vadanti alavadhāritākāraikatve ca jñānasyāpyasamvedanam prasaktam.

Translation: 1147

If you say, it is not determined, then, the question arises how do you know that, it has other's nature? Learned people do not say that, there is identity between a known and unknown forms. If it is

identified with the form which is not determined, then, it will lead to lack of awareness of knowledge.

Text: 1148

अपि च सहोपलम्भः किं ज्ञानयोः, उत अर्थयोः, ज्ञानार्थयोः वा?

api ca sahopalambhaḥ kiṁ jñānayoḥ, uta arthayoḥ, jñānārthayoḥ vā?

Translation: 1148

Moreover, by knowing both what do you mean? Is it knowing two knowledges? Or, knowing two objects, or, knowing knowledge and object?

Text: 1149

तद्यदि ज्ञानयोः सहोपलम्भः; तदा न द्वितीयस्याभावोऽव्यतिरेको वा सिद्ध्यति, असिद्धश्च हेतुः, दृष्टान्तश्च साधनविकलः – द्विचन्द्रज्ञाने[न] ज्ञानयोः सहोपलम्भोस्ति।

tadyadi jñānayoḥ sahopalambhaḥ; tadā na dvitīyasyaābhāvo'vyatireko vā siddhyati, asiddhaśca hetuḥ, dr̥ṣṭāntaśca sādhanavikalah - dvicandrajñāne[na] jñānayoḥ sahopalambhosti.

Translation: 1149

If you say, knowing together two knowledges, then, it does not establish as the absence of the second, or, the non-difference. Thus the ground for the inference is not established and the example is devoid of the ground. It is not the case that in the erroneous knowledge of two moons there is awareness of two knowledges.

Text: 1150

अथ अर्थयोः; तदाऽसिद्धो हेतुः, न चान्यतरार्थलोपः। लोपे वा अन्यतरसिद्धौ बाह्यार्थ-व्यवस्थितिः।

atha arthayoḥ; tadā'siddho hetuḥ, na cānyatarārthaloṣaḥ. lope vā anyatarasiddhau bāhyārthavyavasthitih.

Translation: 1150

If you say, it is knowing two objects, then, also the ground is not established. Neither of the two objects can be elided and if it is elided, then, one of the two will be established and in that case, it will prove that there are objects outside.

Text: 1151

अथ ज्ञानार्थयोः सहोपलम्भः; तथापि हेतोरसिद्धता, दृष्टान्तश्च साधनविकलः।

atha jñānārthayoḥ sahopalambhaḥ; tathāpi hetorasiddhatā, dṛṣṭāntaśca sādhanavikalah.

Translation: 1151

If you say, it is knowing together knowledge and object, even then, the ground is not established and there is no example to establish it.

Text: 1152

अथ सहोपलम्भादित्यस्यायमर्थः – एकोपलम्भात्। एकोपलम्भेन ज्ञानार्थयोरेकता उप-पाद्यते।

atha sahopalambhādityasyāyamārthaḥ - ekopalambhāt. ekopalambhena jñānārthayorekatā upapādyate.

Translation: 1152

Clarification:

Well, by the term “knowing together” we mean the following: It means because, there is one knowledge, we can justify the identity between knowledge and its object.

Text: 1153

ननु एकोपलम्भादित्यस्य कोऽर्थः – किं ज्ञानार्थयोः एक एवोपलम्भः, उत एकस्यै-वोपलम्भः, आहोस्विदेकेनैव उपलम्भ इति।

nanu ekopalambhādityasya ko'rthaḥ - kiṁ jñānārthayoḥ eka eva upalambhaḥ, uta ekasyaivopalambhaḥ, āhosvidekenaiva upalambha iti.

Translation: 1153

Reply

Well, we would like to know, what do you mean by, “Because it is one knowledge”? Does it mean that there is one knowledge of knowledge and its object?, or, does it mean knowledge of only one, or, does it mean knowledge by only one?

Text: 1154

तद्यदि ज्ञानार्थयोः एक एव उपलम्भ इति; न तर्हि अर्थाभावसिद्धिः। संवेद्यमानत्वेन विज्ञानसत्तावद् अर्थसत्ताऽपि सुस्थिता। असिद्धोप्ययं हेतुः नीलादावनेकोपलम्भसम्भवात्। अनैकान्तिकोप्ययं हेतुः यस्मादनेकनीललोहिताद्याकाराणामेकोपलम्भेऽपि नान्यतम-व्यावृत्तिः अभेदो वा दृष्टः।

tadyadi jñānārthayoḥ eka eva upalambha iti; na tarhi arthābhāvasiddhiḥ. saṁvedyamānatvena vijñānasattāvad arthasattā'pi susthitā. asiddhopyayam hetuḥ nīlādāvanekopalambhasambhavāt. anaikāntikopyayam hetuḥ yasmādanekanūlalohitādyākārāṇāmekopalambhe'pi nānyatamavyāvṛttiḥ abhedo vā dṛṣṭaḥ.

Translation: 1154

If you say, only one knowledge of knowledge and the subject, then, it will not establish that, there is no object. As, because of awareness, the existence of knowledge is established, in the same way, knowledge of object will be established. Moreover, this ground of inference is unknown because, it is possible to have knowledges of a blue color. This ground is also suffering from another defect called “inconsistency” because, in spite of a single knowledge of many forms such as blue, red etc., there is neither exclusion of any of them, or, identity.

Text: 1155

अथ एकस्यैव उपलम्भः एकोपलम्भः; तदेकं किं विज्ञानात्मकम्, आहोस्विद् ज्ञानात्मकम्?
atha ekasyaiva upalambhaḥ ekopalambhaḥ; tadekaṁ kiṁ vijñānātmakam, āhosvid jñānātmakam?

Translation: 1155

If you say, knowledge of only one is what is meant by one knowledge, there we would like to know, whether that knowledge is of the nature of vijñāna, or, of the nature of knowledge?

Text: 1156

तद्यदि विज्ञानात्मकम्; तदसत्, नील-मणि-कुम्भादेर्विज्ञानोत्पादकत्वेन स्वरूपमवधार्यते न तु विज्ञानात्मतया, यस्माद् 'अनेन उत्पादितं विज्ञानम्' 'अत्र ममोत्पन्नम्' इत्येवं प्रवदन्ति सन्तः न तु 'इदमेव ज्ञानम्' इत्येवं वक्तारो भवन्ति। यथा हि वस्तुत्वेन प्रतीयमानं नील-जलादिकम् एकोपलम्भानुरोधेन नावस्तुत्वेन प्रतिपद्यते तथा अविज्ञानात्मकतया अध्यवसीयमानं न विज्ञानात्मतया व्यवस्थापयितुं पार्यते, अन्यथा वस्तुत्वहानिप्रसंगात्,
tadyadi vijñānātmakam; tadasat, nīla-maṇi-kumbhādervijñānotpāda-katvena svarūpamavadhāryate na tu vijñānātmatayā, yasmād 'anena utpāditaṁ vijñānam' 'atra mamotpannam' ityevaṁ pravadanti santāḥ na tu 'idameva jñānam' ityevaṁ vaktāro bhavanti. yathā hi vastutvena pratīyamānaṁ nīlajalādikam ekopa-

*lambhānurodhena nāvastutvena pratipadyate tathā avijñānātma-
katayā adhyavasīyamānaṃ na vijñānātmatayā vyavasthāpayitum
pāryate, anyathā vastutvahānīprasaṅgāt,*

Translation: 1156

If you say, it is of the nature of vijñāna, then, it is not true, because, its nature is decided on the basis of blue color, gem, pot etc., being its producer and not as vijñāna. Since, this vijñāna is produced by this, this is produced here for me. This is how people describe. They do not say, this is the knowledge as blue color, water etc., is known as an entity and in terms of a single knowledge, they are not considered to be a non-entity, similarly, when something is decided as non-knowledge it is not possible to establish it as the nature of knowledge, otherwise, it will lead to absence of all entities.

Text: 1157

अथ(था)विज्ञानात्मतया तदेकमवधार्यते तदेष्टसिद्धेरसिद्धिः, सिद्धसाध्यता च स्यात्।
*atha(thā)vijñānātmatayā tadekamavadhāryate tadeṣṭasiddhera-
siddhiḥ, siddhasādhyatā ca syāt.*

Translation: 1157

If you say that, something is decided as of the nature of other than vijñāna, then, there will be non-establishment of what is intended to be established and also establishing something which is already established.

Text: 1158

अथ एकैवोपलम्भः; सोप्यनुपपन्न एव, जलचन्द्राकदिः बहिभिरुपलभ्यमानत्वात्।
*atha ekenāvopalambhah; sopyanupapanna eva, jalacandrārkaḍeḥ
bahibhirupalabhyamānatvāt.*

Translation: 1158

If you say that, knowledge by only one, that is also not proper, because, water, moon, sun, etc., are seen by many.

[१५. अवयविनिराकरणद्वारा स्थापितस्य क्षणिकत्वस्योत्थापनम्।]

[15. avayavinirākaraṇadvārā sthāpitasya kṣaṇikatvasyotthāpanam]

Text: 1159

यदप्युक्तम् - “अवयविनिराकरणे क्षणिकत्वम् - यदि हि किल अक्षणिको भवति भावः तदा भवति अवयवाऽवयविभावः, तदभावे तत्त्व(तस्याऽ)भावात्। अथ कथं तस्याभावः?

स्थायिनोऽर्थक्रियाऽकरणात्। तदेव कथम्? कथ्यते – किं येन स्वभावेन आद्यामर्थक्रियां करोति किं तेनैव स्वभावेन उत्तरोत्तराण्यपि कार्याणि करोति, अथ समासादितस्वभावान्तरः करोति? यदि तेनैव करोति; तदा एककालयोगित्वं सर्वकार्याणां प्रसज्यते, क्रमकरणं हीयते तस्य। न ह्येकस्वभावायत्तो वस्तूनां कालविकल्पो नाम। विकल्पे वा एकस्वभावायत्तामतिक्रामन्ति। अथ स्वभावान्तरापत्तौ जनयति; स्वभावान्तरापत्तिश्च पूर्वाकारपरिहारान्तर्रीयकरूपा। तदपरित्यागे न आकारान्तरानुप्रेवेशोऽस्ति, आकारयोः एकत्वायोगात्। अथ पूर्वाकारपरिहारः; तदा एतदेव क्षणिकत्वं यत् पूर्वापरकार्यकारणम्।”

तदेतदयुक्तम्। यदि क्रमेण कार्यं न करोति युगपदपि कथं करोति? एकं नीलस्वल-क्षणमनेकं विज्ञाननीलादिकं कार्यं करोति इति वः सिद्धान्तः। तदनेकं कार्यं किम- (किमेके)नाकारेण करोति, आकारभेदेन वा?

yadapyuktam - “avayavinirākaraṇe kṣaṇikatvam - yadi hi kila akṣaṇiko bhavati bhāvah tadā bhavati avayava’vayavibhāvah, tadabhāve tatsva(tasyā’)bhāvāt. atha katham tasyābhāvah? sthāyino’rthakriyā’karaṇāt. tadeva katham? kathyate - kim yena svabhāvena ādyāmarthakriyām karoti kim tenaiva svabhāvena uttarottarāṅyapi kāryāṅi karoti, atha samāsāditasvabhāvāntarāḥ karoti? yadi tenaiva karoti; tadā ekakālayogitvam sarvakāryā-ṅām prasajyate, kramakaraṇam hīyate tasya. na hyekasvabhāvāyatto vastūnāṅi kālavikalpo nāma. vikalpe vā ekasvabhāvāyattatāmatikrāmanti. atha svabhāvāntarāpattau janayati; svabhāvāntarāpattiśca pūrvākāraparihāranāntarīyakarūpā. tadaparityāge na ākāranāntarānupreśo’sti, ākārayoḥ ekatvāyogāt. atha pūrvākāraparihārah; tadā etadeva kṣaṇikatvam yat pūrvāparakāryakāraṇam.”

tadetadayuktam. yadi krameṇa kāryam na karoti yugapadapi katham karoti? ekaṁ nīlasvalakṣaṇamanekaṁ vijñānanīlādikaṁ kāryam karoti iti vaḥ siddhāntaḥ. tadanekaṁ kāryam kima(kime-ke)nākāreṇa karoti, ākārabhedena vā?

Translation: 1159

You have also said the following: In the context of refuting the concept of whole, you had raised the matter of momentariness.- If a positive entity is taken as momentary, then, the part and whole relationship will become possible, because, in the absence of that, there will be absence of that. If you ask how will there be absence of that? The answer will be “because that which is durable will not be

involved in bringing about the result. If you ask how is that? Here is the answer: Is it the case that, a thing performs its first result having a particular nature by the same nature, does it also produce the subsequent effects also? If you say that, by acquiring another nature, it produces the effect, then, let it do so by that nature, in that case, all effects will start occurring at one and the same time and it will lose its nature of producing an effect in a sequence. It is not the case that, things entertain sequence of time being controlled by one nature. Considering that, it does, it will cross the limit of its own nature. If you say, it is involved in the production of another nature, and assuming another nature will be of the form of being so, without giving up its earlier form and if does not give up its earlier form, there is no question of another form entering into it, because, two forms cannot be said to be one. If you say that, it will give up its earlier form, then, that itself is momentariness, which is the cause of earlier and later effect.”

But, this is not proper. If something does not produce effect in a sequence, how will it do so simultaneously? According to your doctrine, one blue particular produces many cognitions of blue. There the question can be asked, whether that produces the effect, by the same form, or, by different form?

Text: 1160

तद् यद्येकेन करोति; तदाऽऽयातासर्वकार्याणामेकाकाररूपता एकत्वम्, एकस्य चानेकत्व-
मापद्यते।

*tad yadyekena karoti; tadā”yātāsarvakāryāṅāmekākārarūpatā eka-
tvam, ekasya cānekatvamāpadyate.*

Translation: 1160

If you say that, it produces by one form, then, oneness will mean, all effects have been only one form and this will mean, as if, one has become many.

Text: 1161

अथ आकारभेदेनानेकार्थं जनयति; आकारभेदात् तदेकत्वं व्यावर्त्तते, यद्द्व्यावृत्तौ
नैकमनेकं कार्यं करोति।

atha ākārabhedanānekakāryam janayati; ākārabhedāt tadekatvam vyāvarttate, yadvyāvṛttau naikamanekam kāryam karoti.

Translation: 1161

If you say that, it produces effect, by different forms, then, since there will be difference in forms, oneness will be excluded. Once that is excluded, it means that, one cannot produce many effects.

Text: 1162

अथ इत्थंभूतं स्वहेतुभ्यस्तदुद्गतं यदनेकयुगपत्कार्यकरणात्मकम्;
*atha itthambhūtam svahetubhyastadudgatam yadanekayugapatkā-
ryakaraṇātmakam;*

Translation: 1162

Clarification:

Well, what we consider to be of the nature of producing many effects simultaneously, is that which emerges from its own cause, in this form.

Text: 1163

यद्येवं ममापि क्रमभाव्यनेककार्यकरणात्मकं समुद्भूतं स्वहेतुभ्यः।
*yadyevam mamāpi kramabhāvyanekakāryakaraṇātmakam samud-
bhūtam svahetubhyah.*

Translation: 1163

Reply:

If it is so, then, according to me also, something can emerge from its own cause, which may be of the nature of producing many effects in a sequence.

[१६. क्षणिकत्वस्थापनाय प्रयुक्तस्य विनाशहेत्वभावस्य विनाशं विकल्प्य दूषणम्।]
*[16. kṣaṇikatvasthanāyāya prayuktasya vināśahetvabhāvasya vināśam
vikalpya dūṣaṇam.]*

Text: 1164

यदप्यन्यदुक्तम् - “विनाशहेत्वभावात् क्षीणको भावः” तदनुपपन्नम्; कथम्? ते इदं प्रष्टव्याः
-विनाशोस्ति वा, न वा?

*yadapyanyaduktam-“vināśahetvabhāvāt kṣīṇako bhāvaḥ” tadanupa-
pannam; katham? te idam praṣṭavyāḥ -vināśosti vā, na vā?*

Translation: 1164

You had also said the following: “Since, there is no cause of destruction, a positive entity is momentary.” But it is not proper. If they ask how?, they should be asked this: whether there is something called destruction, or, not?

Text: 1165

तद्यदि नास्ति; कस्य सहेतुकत्वं निर्हेतुकत्वं वा विचारयन्ति मनीषिणः। नहि वन्ध्यासुत-
स्याभावे सहेतुकत्वं निर्हेतुकत्वं वा विचारयन्ति सन्तः।

tadyadi nāsti; kasya sahetukatvaṃ nirhetukatvaṃ vā vicārayanti manīṣiṇaḥ. nahi vandhyāsutasyābhāve sahetukatvaṃ nirhetukatvaṃ vā vicārayanti santah.

Translation: 1165

If they say, there is no destruction, then, what is being discussed as having cause and not having cause by the learned men? If there is absence of son of a barren lady, wise men never discuss about its having a cause, or, not having a cause.

Text: 1166

अथ विद्यते विनाशः; स वस्तुस्वभावानुबन्धी वा, विच्छिन्नोत्पन्नो वा?

atha vidyate vināśaḥ; sa vastusvabhāvānubandhī vā, vicchinnotpanno vā?

Translation: 1166

If you say, there is destruction, then, the question arises whether it is associated with nature of reality, or, is it produced without any association with reality?

Text: 1167

तद्यदि वस्तुस्वभावानुबन्धी; न तर्हि निर्हेतुकत्वम्, वस्तुनो वा निर्हेतुकत्वप्रसंगः, सत्स्व-
भावानुबन्धित्वव्यतिरेकप्रसङ्गो वा।

tadyadi vastusvabhāvānubandhī; na tarhi nirhetukatvam, vastuno vā nirhetukatvaprasaṅgaḥ, satsvabhāvānubandhitvavyatirekaprasaṅgo vā.

Translation: 1167

If you say, it is associated with nature of reality, then, it cannot be said to be without cause. Otherwise, all entities will become without cause, or, all entities will be devoid of association with their own form.

Text: 1168

अथ व्यतिरिक्तः; तस्य निर्हेतुकत्वे कोपपत्तिः? सहेतुकत्वे नियतदेशकालयोगित्वेनो-
पलब्धिः।

*atha vyatiriktaḥ; tasya nirhetukatve kopapattiḥ? sahetukatve niyata-
deśakālayogitvenopalabdhiḥ.*

Translation: 1168

If you say, it is different, then, what is the justification for calling it without a cause? And if you say, it has cause, then, there will be its knowledge as being associated with a particular place and particular time.

Text: 1169

यदि नाम निर्हेतुको विनाशः वस्तूनां क्षणिकत्वे किमायातम्, वस्तुभ्योऽर्थान्तरत्वात्?
yadi nāma nirhetuko vināśaḥ vastūnāṃ kṣaṇikatve kimāyātam, vastubhyo'rthāntaratvāt?

Translation: 1169

If you say, destruction is without any cause, then, what is the harm, if things are taken as momentary because, it will be a different entity from the real entities?

[१७. क्षणिकत्वोपयोगिनः विनाशनिर्हेतुकत्वस्य विकल्पप्रपञ्चकेन प्रतिवदनम्।]

*[17. kṣaṇikatvopayogināḥ vināśanirhetukatvasya vikalpaprapañca-
kena prativadanaṃ.]*

Text: 1170

अथ निर्हेतुकत्वे वस्तूत्पत्त्यनन्तरमात्मानं समासादयति विनाशः;

atha nirhetukatve vastūtpattyanantaramātmānaṃ samāsādayati vināśaḥ;

Translation: 1170

Clarification:

Well, if destruction is treated as having no cause, then, destruction will come into being after the production of a thing.

Text: 1171

तदयुक्तम्। अत्र पञ्च पक्षा भवन्ति – वस्तूत्पत्तेः पूर्वम्, सह वा, अनन्तरं वा, कालान्तरे वा भवनम्, न वा भवनम्?

tadayuktam. atra pañca pakṣā bhavanti - vastūtpatteḥ pūrvam, saha vā, anantaram vā, kālāntare vā bhavanam, na vā bhavanam?

Translation: 1171

Reply:

That is not proper. Here five alternatives are possible. Is it prior to the production of a thing, or, together, or, after, or, coming into being at another time, or, not coming into being?

Text: 1172

तद्यदि पूर्वभवनम्; तदा भावोद्भवानुपपत्तिः।

tadyadi pūrvabhavanam; tadā bhāvodbhavānupapattiḥ.

Translation: 1172

If you say, coming into being before, then, you cannot explain production of any positive entity.

Text: 1173

अथ सह; तदा भावानुपलम्भप्रसङ्गः। तत्सद्भावोपलम्भे वा सततोपलम्भप्रसङ्गः, अभाव-
स्याऽकिञ्चित्करत्वात्। तथाऽनन्तरभूतेऽपि विनाशे सततोपलम्भप्रसङ्ग एव।

atha saha; tadā bhāvānupalambhaprasaṅgaḥ. tatsadbhāvopalambhe vā satatopalambhaprasaṅgaḥ, abhāvasyā'kiñcītkaratvāt. tathā'nantarabhūte'pi vināśe satatopalambhaprasaṅga eva.

Translation: 1173

If you say together, then, there will arise the contingency of not knowing a positive entity and if its existence is known, then, there will arise the contingency of knowing always, because, absence is an insignificant entity. Similarly, even if the destruction occurs later, it will keep on being known always.

Text: 1174

अथ कालान्तरे भवनम्; न तर्हि क्षणिकत्वं वस्तूनां विनाशस्य निर्हेतुकत्वे सत्यपि।

atha kālāntare bhavanam; na tarhi kṣaṇikatvaṁ vastūnāṁ vināśasya nirhetukatve satyapi.

Translation: 1174

If you say, its coming into being at a different time, then, you cannot hold that things are momentary, even if destruction is treated as without a cause.

Text: 1175

अथ नैव भवनं विनाशस्य; तदा सर्वभावानां नित्यत्वमापद्यते, विनाशस्याऽसंभवात्।
atha naiva bhavanam vināśasya; tadā sarvabhāvānām nityatva-
māpadyate, vināśasyā'sambhavāt.

Translation: 1175

If you say that, destruction does not occur at all, then, it will mean that, all positive entities are eternal, because, destruction is not possible.

Text: 1176

अथ सहेतुके विनाशे नावश्यंभावो विनाशस्य, वस्त्रे रागवत् कारणव्यापारपराधीनवृत्तित्वात्, तदभावे तस्याभावः कथं भवेत्?
atha sahetuke vināśe nāvāśyamābhāvo vināśasya, vastre rāgavat
kāraṇavyāpāraparādhiṇavṛttitvāt, tadabhāve tasyābhāvaḥ katham
bhavet?

Translation: 1176

Clarification:

Well, if destruction is treated as having a cause, then, there can be no definite occurrence of destruction. Like the color in the cloth, it is dependent on the function of its cause and if that is not there, how can there be absence of that?

Text: 1177

तदयुक्तम्, स्वहेतोरेव ध्रुवभाविविनाशार्हस्योत्पत्तेः। भवतु वाऽभावास्यानुद्गमः न कश्चि-
द्विरोधः। न तु निर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गो गुणानां विनाशानुत्पत्तेः; नेदमस्मद्विरोधेषु राजते, मोक्षपरि-
क्लृप्त्यकरणात्।

tadayuktam, svahetoreva dhruvabhāvīvināśārhasyotpatteḥ. bhavatu
vā'bhāvāsyānudgamah na kaścidvirodhaḥ. na tu nirmokṣaprasaṅgo
guṇānām vināśānutpatteḥ; nedamasmadvirodheṣu rājate, mokṣapa-
rikḷṛptyakaraṇāt.

Translation: 1177

Reply:

It is not correct. A thing which is sure to be destroyed is produced from its own cause, or, let there be no emergence of absence. There is no conflict in it. It will also not lead to absence of freedom from

bondage, since there will be no destruction of the attributes. This does not stand in opposition to our view, because we do not accept the idea of salvation.

Text: 1178

अथ कृतकस्य नित्यत्वं प्राप्नोति विनाशासंभवे सति;

atha kṛtakasya nityatvaṁ prāpnoti vināśāsambhave sati;

Translation: 1178

Objection:

Well, if there is no destruction, then, a thing which is produced will become eternal.

Text: 1179

सावधिका सत्ता अनित्या, निरवधिका तु नित्या, तत्कथं कृतकस्य नित्यत्वं विनाशासंभवे सति? भवतु वा नित्यत्वम्, न दोषोऽस्ति।

sāvadhikā sattā anityā, niravadhikā tu nityā, tatkatham kṛtakasya nityatvaṁ vināśāsambhave sati? bhavatu vā nityatvam, na doṣo'sti.

Translation: 1179

Reply:

The existence which has a starting point is non-eternal and that which has no beginning is eternal and therefore, how can there be eternity of something which is produced in the absence of destruction? Or, let that be eternal. It does not do harm to our doctrine.

[१८. प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यत्वेन उपपादितस्य क्षणिकत्वस्य खण्डनम्।]

[18. *pratyakṣagrāhyatvena upapāditasya kṣaṇikatvasya khaṇḍanam.*]

Text: 1180

यदप्यपदिष्टम् - “प्रत्यक्षेण क्षणिकत्वं वस्तूनां विषयीक्रियते, अतीतानागतकालविकला वस्तुसत्ता वर्तमानकालालिङ्गिता प्रत्यक्षेण आत्मसात्क्रियते” - तदेतदयुक्तम्, अतीतानागतवर्तमानकालानां किं प्रतीयमानादव्यतिरेकित्वम्, व्यतिरेकित्वं वा?

yadapyapadiṣṭam - “pratyakṣeṇa kṣaṇikatvaṁ vastūnāṁ viṣayīkriyate, atītānāgatakālavikalā vastusattā vartamānakālālīṅgitā pratyakṣeṇa ātmasātkriyate” - tadetadayuktam, atītānāgatavartamānakālānāṁ kiṁ pratīyamānādavyatirekitvam, vyatirekitvaṁ vā?

Translation: 1180

You had also said, “momentariness of things becomes object of perception, the existence of a thing devoid of past and future time and being associated with only present time, can be the object of perception.” This is also not proper, we would like to know whether, the times such as past, future and present are not different from what is being known are different?

Text: 1181

तद्यदि अव्यतिरेकित्वम्; तदा कालत्रयानुमतं वस्तूपलब्धम्।

tadyadi avyatiirekitvam; tadā kālatrayānumatam vastūpalabdham.

Translation: 1181

If you say, they are not different, then, we know a thing with reference to all the three times.

Text: 1182

अथ व्यतिरेकित्वम्; वस्त्ववगमे न अतीतानागतवर्तमानकालावगतिरस्ति। वस्तुमात्रोप-
लब्धेस्तदस्तित्वं सिद्धम्, तदभावश्च निष्प्रमाणकः।

*atha vyatiirekitvam; vastvavagame na atītānāgatavartamānakālāvagati-
rasti. vastumātropalabdhestadastitvam siddham, tadabhāvaśca niṣpra-
māṇakaḥ.*

Translation: 1182

If you say, they are different, then, for the knowledge of them, there is no knowledge of past, future and the present. By knowing mere thing, its existence is established and also its absence without any proof.

Text: 1183

अथ स एव भावोऽभावः; भावोऽन्यस्तर्हि वक्तव्यः, अभावस्य सर्वोपाख्याविनिवृत्ति-
लक्षणत्वात्।

atha sa eva bhāvo'bhāvaḥ; bhāvo'nyastarhi vaktavyaḥ, abhāvasya sarvopākhyāvinivṛttilakṣaṇatvāt.

Translation: 1183

If you say, the same is positive entity is absence, then, you should spell out the positive entity as different, because an absence is of the nature of that which is free from all attributes.

Text: 1184

अथ कालान्तरे तस्य अन्योऽभावः; तस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् सत्ताखण्डनं प्रति।

*atha kālāntare tasya anyo'bhāvaḥ; tasyākincitkaratvāt sattākha-
ṇḍanam prati.*

Translation: 1184

If you say that, at other time, there will be absence, different from that, then, it is insignificant in the context of refuting its existence.

Text: 1185

अथापरकार्याकर्तृत्वं कालान्तरे तदभावः; तदयुक्तम्, सर्वापरकार्यकर्तृत्वमेकस्य प्रत्यक्षात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन च पूर्वोदितानुभवावेदिता सत्ता आत्मसात्क्रियते सैव सत्ता प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन आत्मसात्क्रियते।

*athāparakāryākartṛtvam kālāntare tadabhāvaḥ; tadayuktam, sarvā-
parakāryakartṛtvamekasya pratyakṣāt pratyabhijñānena ca pūrvo-
ditānubhavāveditā sattā ātmasātkriyate saiva sattā pratyabhi-
jñānena ātmasātkriyate.*

Translation: 1185

If you say, the state of not producing another effect, is the absence of that at some other time, it will not be proper, because, it is known by perception and also by recollection that, one thing produces all other effects and so it takes existence which is revealed by earlier experience as its object and the same existence becomes the object of recollection.

Text: 1186

कथं पुनर्वेत्सीति चेत्;

katham punarvetsīti cet;

Translation: 1186

Objection:

How do you know it?

Text: 1187

प्रत्यभिज्ञानादेव जानीमः। सैव सत्ता प्रतिभाति। आद्यानुभवेपि सा सत्ता प्रतिभाति। कुतोऽवगता? एवं ज्ञानयोरपि हेतुफलभावधारणं न शक्यते कर्तुम्, तदभावान्न कार्यानुमानम्।

pratyabhijñānādeva jānīmaḥ. saiva sattā pratibhāti. ādyānubhavepi sā sattā pratibhāti. kuto'vagatā? evaṁ jñānāyorapi hetuphalabhā-vāvadhāraṇaṁ na śakyate kartum, tadabhāvāna kāryānumānam.

Translation: 1187

Reply:

We know it because of recollection only. The same existence appears in the first experience also, the first existence also appears. Where-from can that existence be known? In the same way, it is not possible to know the cause and effect relationship between two knowledges and since it is not there, there cannot be inference of an effect.

[१९. बौद्धसंमतस्य स्वभावानुमानस्य निरासः।]

[19. bauddhasammatasya svabhāvanumānasya nirāsaḥ.]

Text: 1188

तथा स्वभावानुमानस्यापि न सम्बन्धावधारणमुपपद्यते, तदभावात्। भिन्नयोः सम्बन्ध-
(द्ध)योः सम्बन्धो दृष्टः, नह्येकस्य सम्बन्ध उपपद्येते।

tathā svabhāvanumānasyāpi na sambandhāvadhāraṇamupapadyate, tadabhāvāt. bhinnayoḥ sambandha(ddha)yoḥ sambandho dṛṣṭaḥ, nahyekasya sambandha upapadyete.

Translation: 1188

Similarly, it is not possible to know the relationship of invariable concomitance in the case of inference of one's nature, because, such a relation does not exist. Relation can exist between two different things, if the thing is only one, there can be no relation.

Text: 1189

किंच, कृतकत्वेन अनित्यत्वानुमानं क्रियते – किमवगतेन, अवनगतेन वा?

kiñca, kṛtakatvena anityatvanumānaṁ kriyate - kimavagatena, avanagatena vā?

Translation: 1189

Moreover, you are going to infer non-eternity on the basis of something being produced. There the question arises whether that state of being produced should be known, or, unknown.

Text: 1190

तद्यदि अनवगतेन; तत्कथं स्वयमनु(मनव)गतं साधनं भवितुमर्हति?

tadyadi anavagatena; tatkatham svayamanu(manava)gatam sādhanam bhavitumarhati?

Translation: 1190

If you say, it is unknown, then, how can that which is not known, be called a ground to infer something on the basis of that.

Text: 1191

अथावगतेन; तस्यां कृतकत्वावगतौ अनित्यत्वं प्रतिभाति वा, न वा?

athāvagatena; tasyām kṛtakatvāvagatau anityatvam pratibhāti vā, na vā?

Translation: 1191

If you say that, by a known ground that can be known then, we would like to know whether in the knowledge of the state of being produced non-eternity appears, or, not?

Text: 1192

यदि न प्रतिभाति; कथं प्रतिभासमानाऽप्रतिभासमानयोस्तादात्म्यम्?

yadi na pratibhāti; katham pratibhāsamānā'apratibhāsamānayostādātmyam?

Translation: 1192

If you say, it does not appear then, how can there be identity between that which appears and that which does not appear?

Text: 1193

अथ प्रतिभाति; किमनुमानेन? निष्पादितक्रिये कर्मणि साधनानर्थक्यम्। अन्यथा हि कृतकत्वप्रतिपत्तावपि अनुमानमुपादेयं स्यात्।

atha pratibhāti; kimanumānena? niṣpāditakriye karmaṇi sādhanānarthakyam. anyathā hi kṛtakatvapratipattāvapi anumānamupādeyam syāt.

Translation: 1193

If you say, it appears, then, what is the need of inference? With reference to an act which has already produced the effect, a means is of no use. Otherwise, even after the knowledge of the state of being produced one will have to say that the inference can operate.

Text: 1194

अथ कृतकत्वं प्रतिपन्नमिति कृत्वा नानुमानमुपादीयते;

atha kṛtakatvaṃ pratipannamiti kṛtvā nānumānamupādīyate;

Translation: 1194

Clarification:

Well, because the state of being produced becomes known, therefore, inference does not operate.

Text: 1195

तत्स्वभावानुबन्ध्यनित्यत्वमप्यवगतम्, किमनुमानेन? अवगते चानित्यत्वे यत्साधनमुपादीयते तत्कदाचिदनित्यताप्रतिपत्यर्थम्, कदाचिच्च नित्यतासमारोपव्यवच्छेदार्थम्, कदाचित्त्व(त्त्व)नित्यताव्यवहारार्थम्?

tatsvabhāvānubandhyanītyatvamapyavagatam, kīmanumānena? avagate cānītyatve yatsādhanamupādīyate tat kadācidanīyatā-pratīpatyartham, kadācicca nīyatāsamāropavyavacche- dārtham, kadācitva(ttva)nīyatāvvyavahārārtham?

Translation: 1195

Reply:

In that case, then, non-eternity which follows from that nature is also known, so, what is the need of inference? Even after the knowledge of non-eternity, if a means is employed, will it be for the knowledge of non-eternity sometimes, or, for excluding super-imposition of eternity sometimes, or, for referring to non-eternity sometimes?

Text: 1196

तद्यदि अनित्यताप्रतिपत्यर्थम्; सा ज्ञातैव, व्यर्थः प्रयासः।

tadyadi anītyatāpratīpatyartham; sā jñātāiva, vyarthaḥ prayāsaḥ.

Translation: 1196

If you say, for the knowledge of non-eternity, then, it is already known and hence taking effort in that direction is futile.

Text: 1197

अथ समारोपव्यवच्छेदार्थम्; समारोपव्यवच्छेदः अनित्यत्वादव्यतिरिक्तः, व्यतिरिक्तो वा?

atha samāropavyavacchedārtham; samāropavyavacchedaḥ anītyatvādavyatiriktaḥ, vyatirikto vā?

Translation: 1197

If you say, for the sake of excluding the super-imposition, there the question arises, whether the exclusion of super-imposition, is identical with the non-eternity, or, different?

Text: 1198

तद्यद्यव्यतिरिक्तः; असावपि अनित्यत्वावगमेनैवावगतत्वान्न साधनान्तरमपेक्षते।
tadyadyavyatiriktaḥ; asāvapi anityatvāvagamenaivāvagatatvānna sādhanāntaramapekṣate.

Translation: 1198

If you say, it is identical, then, that also is known by knowing the non-eternity and then also, it does not require any other means to know it.

Text: 1199

अथ व्यतिरिक्तः; स किं वस्तुभूतः, अवस्तुभूतो वा?
atha vyatiriktaḥ; sa kiṁ vastubhūtaḥ, avastubhūto vā?

Translation: 1199

If you say, it is different, we would like to know, whether it is real, or, unreal.

Text: 1200

तद्यदि वस्तुभूतः तेन सह शब्दगतकृतकत्वस्य तादात्म्यानुपपत्तिः। तादात्म्ये वा तदवगमेनैवावगमात् नानुमानमपेक्षते।
tadyadi vastubhūtaḥ tena saha śabdagatakṛtakatvasya tādātmyānupapattiḥ. tādātmye vā tadavagamenaivāvagamāt nānumānamapekṣate.

Translation: 1200

If you say, it is real, then, with that there cannot be identity of the state of being produced which exists in the sound, and if there is identity, then, it is known that by itself and obviously, it does not require inference again to know it.

Text: 1201

अथ अवस्तुभूतः; स किं क्रियते, ज्ञाप्यते वा?
atha avastubhūtaḥ; sa kiṁ kriyate, jñāpyate vā?

Translation: 1201

If you say, it is unreal, then, what happens to it?

Text: 1201a

तद्यदि क्रियते; तदयुक्तम्, सर्वोपाख्याविनिर्मुक्तस्य करणायोगात्, करणे वा वस्तुत्वप्रसङ्गः।
tadyadi kriyate; tadayuktam, sarvopākhyāvinirmuktasya karaṇāyogāt, karaṇe vā vastutvaprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: 1201a

If you say, it does something, that will not be proper, because, if something is devoid of all characterizations it cannot do anything and if it does, it becomes real.

Text: 1202

अथ ज्ञाप्यते; तेन सह कृतकत्वस्य सम्बन्धव्यतिरेकात्, अव्यतिरेके वा तस्य वस्तुत्वं कृतकत्वासत्त्वं वा।

atha jñāpyate; tena saha kṛtakatvasya sambandhavyatirekāṭ, avyatiरेके vā tasya vastutvaṃ kṛtakatvāsattvaṃ vā.

Translation: 1202

If you say, it is known, then, it does not have relationship with the state of being produced, or, if you say that the relationship continues, then, the question arises whether it is real, or, a product, or, non-existent.

Text: 1203

अथ अनित्यताव्यवहारः क्रियते – यो हि कृतकत्वं जानन्नपि अनित्यताव्यवहारं न करोति स हि अत्र व्यवहार्यते;

atha anityatāvvyavahāraḥ kriyate - yo hi kṛtakatvaṃ jānannapi anityatāvvyavahāraṃ na karoti sa hi atra vyavahāryate;

Translation: 1203

Clarification:

Well, we refer to it as non-eternal and one, even after knowing it is non-eternal, it does not refer to it as non-eternal, and that is what is referred to here.

Text: 1204

सोऽपि व्यवहारः अनित्यत्वादव्यतिरिक्तः, व्यतिरिक्तो वा?

so 'pi vyavahāraḥ anityatvādavyatiriktah, vyatirikto vā?

Translation: 1204

Reply:

Even that reference we would like to know, whether not different from that which is non-eternal, or, different from that?

Text: 1205

यद्यव्यतिरिक्तः; असावपि प्रतिपन्न एवानुमानिकः।

yadyavyatiriktaḥ; asāvapi pratipanna evānumānikah.

Translation: 1205

If you say, it is not different, then, that too is to be accepted as inferential.

Text: 1206

अथ व्यतिरिक्तः; स किं कृतकत्वेन उत्पाद्यते, ज्ञाप्यते वा?

atha vyatiriktaḥ; sa kiṃ kṛtakatvena utpādyate, jñāpyate vā?

Translation: 1206

If you say, it is different, then, the question arises whether it is produced because it is non-eternal, or, is it made known?

Text: 1207

यदि उत्पाद्यते; तदा न शब्दोत्पादकहेतूनामनुमानत्वम्।

yadi utpādyate; tadā na śabdotpādakahetūnāmanumānatvam.

Translation: 1207

If you say, it is produced, then, the grounds which produce sound need not be inferential.

Text: 1208

अथ ज्ञाप्यते; तेन साकं सम्बन्धोऽभिधेयः। न तादात्म्यलक्षणः, ज्ञाप्याद् भिन्नत्वात्।

atha jñāpyate; tena sākam sambandho'bhidheyah. na tādātmya-lakṣaṇah, jñāpyād bhinnatvāt.

Translation: 1208

And if you say, it is made known, then, you should state the relationship with that. That relationship cannot be identity because, it is different from that which makes it known.

Text: 1209

अथ तदुत्पत्तिलक्षणः सोप्यनुपपन्न एव – किं व्यवहारेणोत्पाद्यते घटः, घटेन वोत्पाद्यते व्यवहारः?

atha tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ; sopyanupapanna eva - kiṃ vyavahāreṇotpādyate ghaṭaḥ, ghaṭena votpādyate vyavahārah?

Translation: 1209

If you say, the relationship is of the nature of cause-and-effect, that too is not proper because, there also the question arises, is it the case that a pot is produced by mere linguistic reference to it, or, the linguistic reference is produced by pot?

Text: 1210

न तावद् व्यवहारेण उत्पाद्यते घटः; आदौ घटसत्ता तदनु व्यवहारः।

na tāvad vyavahāreṇa utpādyate ghaṭaḥ; ādau ghaṭasattā tadanu vyavahārah.

Translation: 1210

It cannot be the case that a pot is produced by mere linguistic reference, because, the first the pot should have existence and thereafter it can be referred to by language.

Text: 1211

अथ घटेनोत्पाद्यते व्यवहारः; तदा कारणानुमानम्, न स्वभावानुमानम्। तच्च स्वयमेव पर्युदस्तम्।

atha ghaṭenotpādyate vyavahārah; tadā kāraṇānumānam, na svabhāvānumānam. tacca svayameva paryudastam.

Translation: 1211

If you say, the linguistic behavior is produced by pot, then, it should infer its cause and one need not infer its nature and that has been refuted by you, yourself.

0.11 षड्विधार्थापत्तिप्रामाण्यस्य निरासः

[ṣaḍvidhārthāpattiprāmāṇyasya nirāsaḥ.]

(Refutation of the Authenticity of six types of Presumptions)

Text: 1212

एवमर्थापत्यादीनामप्यप्रामाण्यम्। किं पुनः अर्थापत्यादेः स्वरूपम्? कथं वा प्रामाण्यम्? तत्र दर्शनार्थापत्तेस्तावत् स्वरूपं व्युत्पाद्यते – रूपदर्शनान्यथानुपपत्त्या चक्षुः-प्रतिपत्तिः। तथा, अनुमानपूर्विकानुमानादग्नित्वप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या अग्निव्यक्तिप्रतिपत्तिः। अभाव-पूर्विका अर्थापत्तिः – जीवति देवदत्तः गेहे नास्ति – गेहाभावान्यथानुपपत्त्या बहिर्भावप्रतिपत्तिः। तथा, आगमपूर्विका अर्थापत्तिः – शब्दार्थप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या शब्दार्थसम्बन्ध-

नित्यताप्रतिपत्तिः। तथा अर्थापत्तिपूर्विका अर्थापत्तिः – शब्दार्थसम्बन्धनित्यताप्रतिपत्तिः। तथा, उपमानपूर्विका अर्थापत्तिः – गवयपिण्डग्रहणान्तरं गेहावस्थितगोपिण्डे गोगवय-सादृश्यावच्छिन्ने प्रतिपत्तिरूपमानात् पिण्डावच्छिन्ने वा सादृश्ये, तस्य पिण्डस्य वाहदोह-प्रसवसामर्थ्यम् अर्थापत्या प्रत्येति। एषा षट् प्रकाराऽर्थापत्तिः।

evamarthāpatyādīnāmapyaprāmāṇyam. kim punaḥ arthāpattiyādeḥ svarūpam? katham vā prāmāṇyam? tatra darśanārthāpattestāvata svarūpam vyutpādyate - rūpadarśanānyathānupapatyā cakṣuḥ- pratipattiḥ. tathā, anumānapūrvikā anumānādagnitvapratipattiyanyathānupapatyā agnivyaktipratipattiḥ. abhāvapūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - jīvati devadattaḥ gehe nāsti - gehābhāvānyathānupapatyā bahirbhāvapratipattiḥ. tathā, āgamapūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - śabdārthapratipatyanyathānupapatyā śabdārthasambandhanityatāpratipattiḥ. tathā arthāpattipūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - śabdārthasambandhanityatāpratipattiḥ. tathā, upamānapūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - gavayapīṇḍagrahaṇāntaram gehāvasthitagopiṇḍe gogavayasādrśyāvachchinne pratipattirupamānāt piṇḍāvachchinne vā sādrśye, tasya piṇḍasya vāhadohaprasava-sāmarthyam arthāpatyā pratyeti. eṣā ṣaṭ prakārā'rthāpattiḥ.

Translation: 1212

In the same way, there is no authenticity of the processes of knowing viz. presumption and the like. What is the nature of presumption? How can it be called a valid means of knowing? There the nature of presumption called darśanārthāpatti – Since without eyes perception of color is not possible, therefore, one has to presume eyes. Similarly, some presumption is preceded by inference, for instance, since without fire, it is not possible to know fire through inference and therefore, one has to presume the fire in the visual. There can be a presumption preceded by absence, for instance, if it is a case that Devadatta is alive and he is not found at home. Without his existence outside the house, since his absence in the house cannot be justified and therefore, there is presumption of his existence outside. Similarly, there will be presumption preceded by a sentence. Unless it is presumed that the relationship between word and meaning is eternal, the knowledge from the meaning from the word cannot be explained and therefore, there is a presumption

that the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal. In the same way, there will be presumption preceded by presumption. As in the case of presumption of eternity of relationship between word and meaning, in the same way, there is presumption preceded by analogy. For instance, after the knowledge of a goyal individual, there arises the knowledge of similarity of the goyal in the cow individual, existing at home and this happens because of analogy, or, one comes to know by presumption the capacity of carrying, or, milking, or, giving birth to calf in the similarity qualified by the individual. These are, thus, six types of presumptions.

Text: 1213

इयं चानुपपन्ना। यदुक्तम् - 'रूपदर्शनान्यथानुपपत्त्या चक्षुरिन्द्रियं प्रतीयते'। तदयुक्तम्। चक्षुरिन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकसम्बन्धावधारणमन्तरेण अन्यकारणपरिहारेण नियतकारण-प्रतिपत्तिः अर्थापत्याऽनुपपन्ना-चक्षुरादिकरणस्य पिशाचादितुल्यत्वात् न तदवगतिः, अवगतौ वा अर्थापत्यनुपपत्तिः।

iyam cānupapannā. yaduktam- 'rūpadarśanānyathānupapatyā cakṣurindriyam pratīyate'. tadayuktam. cakṣurindriyānvayavyatirekasa-mbandhāvadhāraṇamantareṇa anyakāraṇaparihāreṇa niyatakāraṇa-pratipattiḥ arthāpatyā'nupapannācakṣurādikaraṇasya piśācādityatvāt na tadavagatiḥ, avagatau vā arthāpatyanupapattiḥ.

Translation: 1213

This is not proper. You said eyes are known because without eyes the perception of color cannot be explained. This is not proper, because, instead of ascertaining the relationship by the method of positive and negative concomitance with the sense organ viz. the eyes, it is not proper to ascertain the invariable cause through presumption by excluding other causes. The instrument viz. the sense organs of eyes is similar to ghost and hence, that cannot be known and if it is known, the presumption becomes futile.

Text: 1214

यदप्युक्तम् - 'अन्यथोपपद्यते' इति। अत्र काऽनुमा? अथवा रूपादिज्ञानस्यैव धर्मित्वं करणपूर्वकमिति साध्यो धर्मः कार्यत्वात् रथादिवत्। एवं सर्वार्थापत्तिविषयत्वेन प्रयोगव्युत्पादनं कार्यम्। प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकत्वाच्च अर्थापत्तेः तदभावे तदभावात्।

*yadapyuktam - 'anyathopapadyate' iti. atra kā'numā? athavā rūpādi-
jñānasyaiva dharmitvaṃ karaṇapūrvakamiti sādhyo dharmah kārya-
tvāt rathādivat. evaṃ sarvārthāpattiviśayatvena prayogavyutpāda-
naṃ kāryam. pratyakṣapūrvakatvācca arthāpatteḥ tadabhāve tada-
bhāvāt.*

Translation: 1214

You have said, “without that something cannot be explained.” What is the inference here? Or, the knowledge of color etc. itself is treated as the locus; what is to be inferred is the property “which is preceded by an instrument”; because, it is an effect; like a chariot etc. In this way, you should explain the form of inference in the case of all presumptions. Since a presumption is preceded by perception and since there is no perception accepted as a valid means of knowing there is nothing called presumption.

0.12 उपमानप्रामाण्यस्य निरासः।

[*upamānaprāmāṇyasya nirāsaḥ.*]

(Refutation of the Validity of Analogy)

Text: 1215

तथा, उपमानमपि सम्भवति काननगतगवयपिण्डदर्शनानन्तरं गेहावस्थितगोपिण्डे गवय-
सादृश्यावच्छेदेन यद्विज्ञानं तदुपमानफलम्। गोपिण्डावच्छिन्ने सादृश्ये वा यद्विज्ञानं तद्वा
उपमानफलं गवयपिण्डज्ञानमुत्पादनम्। तदेतदयुक्तम्, प्रत्यक्षमूलमुपमानम्, तदपगमे
तस्याप्यपगमात्।

*tathā, upamānamapi sambhavati kānanagatagavayapiṇḍadarśanāna-
ntaraṃ gehāvasthitagopiṇḍe gavayasādṛśyāvachchedena yadvijñānaṃ
tadupamānaphalam. gopiṇḍāvachchinne sādṛśye vā yadvijñānaṃ
tadvā upamānaphalaṃ gavayapiṇḍajñānamutpādanam. tadetada-
yuktam, pratyakṣamūlamupamānam, tadapagame tasyāpyapagamāt.*

Translation: 1215

In the same way, analogy is also not possible as a valid means of knowing. After seeing the animal called goyal, in the forest you see similarity of the goyal in the cow individual at home. This knowledge is the result of the process of analogy, or, the knowledge of similarity qualified by the cow individual may the result of analogy, it produces the knowledge of the individual called goyal,

but this is not proper, because, analogy is preceded by perception, and when perception is refuted the analogy is also refuted.

Text: 1216

अथ किमिदं गोगवयसादृश्यं यद् गोपिण्डग्रहणकाले नावगतम् उपमानादवगम्यते? किम् अवयवानां संस्थानम्, किं वा विषाणाद्यवयवा वा, सामान्यं वा, अथ धर्मान्तरम्?

*atha kimidaṁ gogavayasādrśyaṁ yad gopiṇḍagrahaṇakāle nāvaga-
gatam upamānādavagamyate? kim avayavānāṁ saṁsthānam, kiṁ
vā viṣāṇādyavayavā vā, sāmānyaṁ vā, atha dharmāntaram?*

Translation: 1216

Well, what is this similarity between the cow and goyal? Is it that which is not known at the time of knowing the cow individual but known by analogy? Does it mean the structure of parts, or, the parts such as horns etc., or, a universal, or, any other property?

Text: 1217

तद्यदि अवयवानां संस्थानं सादृश्यम्; तदुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तं वा, न वा?

*tadyadi avayavānāṁ saṁsthānaṁ sādṛśyam; tadupalabdhilakṣaṇa-
prāptaṁ vā, na vā?*

Translation: 1217

If you hold that, the structure of parts is similarity, there also one may ask, whether it is verified by knowledge, or, not?

Text: 1218

तद्यदि उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तम्; अवगतं तर्हि। अवगतपूर्वं यद् भवति गवयपिण्डदर्शनानन्तरं तत् स्मरणान्नातिरिच्यते।

*tadyadi upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam; avagataṁ tarhi. avagatapūrvam
yad bhavati gavayapiṇḍadarśanānantaram tat smaraṇānnātiricyate.*

Translation: 1218

If you say, it is verified by knowledge, then, you have already known it and whatever is already known, after the knowledge of the goyal individual it will not be different from mere remembrance.

Text: 1219

अथ उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तमपि नोपलभ्यते; तदा गवयपिण्डेऽपि तस्य ग्रहणं नास्ति। तदग्रहणे पिण्डमात्रग्रहणे सति भवति 'मदीया गौः अनेन सदृशी' इति, तदास्व(श्व)विषयमपि स्यात् 'मदीयोऽनेन सदृशः' इति।

atha upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptamapi nopalabhyate; tadā gavayapiṇḍe 'pi tasya grahaṇam nāsti. tadagrahaṇe piṇḍamātragrahaṇe sati bhavati 'madīyā gauḥ anena sadṛśī' iti, tadāsva(śva)viṣayamapi syāt 'madīyo'nena sadṛśaḥ' iti.

Translation: 1219

If you say that, even if it is verified by knowledge, it is not known, then, it cannot be known even in the goyal individual, and if that is not known, by knowing mere individual, if you say, there arises the knowledge “my cow is similar to this goyal”. If it is so, then, this can be also said to be knowledge of horse, “my horse is similar to this.”

Text: 1220

अथ अनुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तम्; तर्हि तस्य क्वचिदपि ग्रहणम्, ततश्च महिष्यादिदर्शनेऽपि 'मदीया गौरनेन सदृशी, अश्वो वा मदीयोऽनेन सदृशः' इत्यु[प]प्लवः स्यात्।
atha anupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam; tarhi tasya kvacidapi grahaṇam, tataśca mahiṣyādīdarśane'pi 'madīyā gauranena sadṛśī, aśvo vā madīyo'nena sadṛśaḥ' ityu[pa]plavaḥ syāt.

Translation: 1220

If you say, it is not verified by knowledge, then, hardly it can be known and in that case, after seeing buffalo etc. one will say, “my cow is similar to this”, or, “my horse is similar to this” leading into confusion.

Text: 1221

अथ विषाणाद्यवयवाः सादृश्यशब्दवाच्याः; ते च अवगता एव तेषु यद्भवति उत्तरकालं विज्ञानं तत् स्मृतिरूपतामतिपतति।
atha viṣāṇādyavayavāḥ sādṛśyaśabdavācyāḥ; te ca avagatā eva teṣu yadbhavati uttarakālam vijñānam tat smṛtirūpatāmatipatati.

Translation: 1221

If you say, the parts viz. horns etc. are the meaning of the word similarity, then, they are also known and at a later time, when one will come to know them, then, that will not be different from remembrance.

Text: 1222

अथ गोगवयसामान्यं सादृश्यशब्दवाच्यम्; तच्चानुपपन्नम्, यथा च न सम्भवति तथा प्रागेव आवेदितम्। भवतु नाम, किं तदुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तं वा – पूर्ववद्विभज्य दूषणं वक्तव्यम्।

atha gogavayasāmānyam sādṛśyaśabdavācyaṃ; taccānupapannam, yathā ca na sambhavati tathā prāgeva āveditam. bhavatu nāma, kiṃ tadupalabdhillakṣaṇaprāptam vā - pūrvavadvibhajya dūṣaṇam vaktavyam.

Translation: 1222

If you say, universal such as cowness, or, goyalness is the meaning of the word similarity, that will not be proper. Why it will not be proper, has already been explained before, or, let it be as you want. Even then, you should. Answer the objections as raised above viz. whether “that is verified by knowledge, or, not”.

Text: 1223

अथ धर्मान्तरम्; तदपि ऐन्द्रियकम्, अतीन्द्रियं वा?

atha dharmāntaram; tadapi aindriyakam, atīndriyam vā?

Translation: 1223

If you say, similarity is some kind of other property, there also one may ask whether that property can be known by senses, or, is it beyond the range of senses.

Text: 1224

तद्यदि ऐन्द्रियकम्; तदा तस्य पूर्वोपलम्भे सति उत्तरकालभावि यत् तस्य विज्ञानं न तत् स्मरणाकारतां परित्यजति।

tadyadi aindriyakam; tadā tasya pūrvopalambhe sati uttarakālabhāvi yat tasya vijñānam na tat smaraṇākāratām parityajati.

Translation: 1224

If you say, it can be known by senses, then, when it will be known before, its knowledge through analogy later, will not be different from remembrance.

Text: 1225

अथ तदुपलब्धिलक्षण[म]प्राप्तम्; न तर्हि तस्य क्वचिदपि ग्रहणम्। तदग्रहणे न गवयदर्शने सति 'मदीया गौरनेन सदृशी' त्यादिज्ञानेन शक्यते भवितुम्। भवने वा गवय(या)दर्शनेऽपि स्यात्।

atha tadupalabdhilakṣaṇa[ma]prāptam; na tarhi tasya kvacidapi grahaṇam. tadagrahaṇe na gavayadarśane sati 'madīyā gauranena sadṛśi'tyādiñānena śakyate bhavitum. bhavane vā gavaya(yā)darśane'pi syāt.

Translation: 1225

If you say, it is not verified by knowledge, then, it cannot be known at all and once it is not known, there cannot arise the knowledge after seeing the goyal “my cow is similar to this” and if you say that, there will arise such knowledge, then, such knowledge can arise without seeing the goyal.

[१. नैयायिकसम्मतस्य उपमानस्वरूपस्य खण्डनम्।]

[1. naiyāyikasammataṣya upamānasvarūpasya khaṇḍanam.]

Text: 1226

अन्ये तु अन्यथा उपमानं व्याचक्षते विपश्चितः - “गोगवयसादृश्यं स्वज्ञानविशिष्टमुपमानम्। संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिः उपमानफलम्।” एतच्चाऽसमीचीनम्। प्रागेव वनेचरवचनाद-वगतं गोसदृशो गवय इति। कोऽर्थः? गोसदृशस्य गवय इति नाम। एवं च सर्वमेव संज्ञासंज्ञि-सम्बन्धावधारणं कृतम्, नोपमानं कल्पनीयम्।

*anye tu anyathā upamānaṁ vyācakṣate vipaścitaḥ - “gogavayaśā-
dṛśyaṁ svajñānaviśiṣṭamupamānam. sañjñāsañjñīsambandhapra-
tipattiḥ upamānaphalam.” etaccā'samīcīnam. prāgeva vanecaravaca-
nādavagataṁ gosadṛśo gavaya iti. ko'rthaḥ? gosadṛśasya gavaya
iti nāma. evaṁ ca sarvameva sañjñāsañjñīsambandhāvadhāraṇaṁ
kṛtam, nopamānaṁ kalpanīyam.*

Translation: 1226

Other scholars (i.e. Naiyāyikas)-explain analogy in a different way. “The similarity between a cow and a goyal qualified by its own knowledge, is the process of analogy and the result of this process, is the knowledge of the relationship of word and its meaning.” This is not proper. This has been known before from the statement of the forester viz. “goyal is similar to cow.” What does it mean? You will say, that which possesses similarity with the cow, is known by the name goyal. If it is so then, the relationship between word and its meaning is fully decided and therefore, there is no need of postulating another process of knowing called analogy.

Text: 1227

अथ सम्प्लवन्यायेन कल्प्यते; भवतु, तथापि संज्ञी विद्यते संज्ञा तु न विद्यते। क्वोपमानं परिकल्प्येत?

atha samplavanyāyena kalpyate; bhavatu, tathāpi saṁjñā vidyate saṁjñā tu na vidyate. kvopamānam parikalpyeta?

Translation: 1227

If you say, it is postulated on the basis of the maxim called samplavanyāya, let it be so, still the meaning, or, referent is there, but the word is not there and so where is the necessity of postulating analogy?

[२. संज्ञाप्रतिपत्तिविषयकमतद्वयस्य निरासः।]

[2. saṁjñāpratipattiviṣayakamatadvayasya nirāsaḥ.]

Text: 1228

एके वदन्ति - “स्वयमुच्चार्य संज्ञा प्रत्येति।” तदयुक्तं, संज्ञाकाले सादृश्यज्ञानस्य अनवस्थितेः।

eke vadanti - “svayamuccārya saṁjñā pratyeti.” tadayuktam, saṁjñākāle sādṛśyajñānasya anavasthiteḥ.

Translation: 1228

Some scholars say, “after uttering by himself one comes to know the name of the object.” This is not proper, because, at the time of the word, the knowledge of similarity does not exist.

Text: 1229

अन्ये तु - “बुद्ध्युपस्थापिता संज्ञा प्रत्येति” एवमामनन्ति। तदयुक्तम्। अविद्यमानस्य विषयार्थता न लभ्यते - 'न सत्तामात्रेण जनकत्वेन वा' इत्यादिना प्रागेव उपपादितम्।

anye tu - “buddhyupasthāpitā saṁjñā pratyeti” evamāmananti. tadayuktam. avidyamānasya viṣayārthatā na labhyate - ‘na sattāmātreṇa janakatvena vā’ ityādinā prāgeva upapāditam.

Translation: 1229

Still others hold that, “one comes to know the name presented by ones intellect.” That is also not correct, because, that which does not exist cannot be the object of knowledge. We have already discussed before “nor by mere existence, nor by the role of producing its knowledge, can its existence be accepted.”

Text: 1230

प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकं च उपमानमुद्गीयते। तदभावे तत्कथं भवेदव्यभिचारः येन विज्ञानोत्पादकत्वेन उपमानता, तच्चाव्यभिचारित्वं न शक्यं(क्य)विज्ञानमिति पूर्वमेवावेदितम्।

pratyakṣapūrvakam ca upamānamudgīyate. tadabhāve tatkatham bhavedavyabhicārah yena vijñānotpādakatvena upamānatā, taccāvyabhicāritvam na śakyam(kya)vijñānamiti pūrvamevāveditam.

Translation: 1230

Analogy is said to be preceded by perception and when perception is itself not there, how will it not lead to lack of inconsistency, because of which there will be production of knowledge and thereby the need for postulating an analogy. The fact that such absence of inconsistency cannot be known has already been discussed before.

0.13 अभावप्रमाणस्य निरासः।

[abhāvapramāṇasya nirāsaḥ.]

(Refutation of the Pramāṇa called Absence)

Text: 1231

अपरे तु अभावाख्यं प्रमाणं सदुपलम्भकप्रमाणपञ्चकव्यावृत्तिरूपं व्याहरन्ति अभावविषयम्। तत्किमवगतमनवगतं वा?

apare tu abhāvākhyaṁ pramāṇam sadupalambhakapramāṇapañcakavyāvṛtṭirūpaṁ vyāharanti abhāvaviṣayam. tatkimavagatamanavagatam vā?

Translation: 1231

Other thinkers (the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas) talk of an independent process of knowing called absence which is distinct from all the processes of knowing which reveal positive entities in order to reveal a negative entity. There one may ask, does it cause knowledge after it is known, or, without being known?

Text: 1232

यदि अवगतम्; तत् केनावगतम् – किं मेयव्यावृत्त्या, मानव्यावृत्त्या वा, सदुपलम्भकेन वा? *yadi avagatam; tatkenāvagatam - kiṁ meyavyāvṛtyā, mānavyāvṛtyā vā, sadupalambhakena vā?*

Translation: 1232

If you say, it is known, then, one would like to know, how is it known? Is it known by excluding object of knowledge, or, is it known excluding knowledge, or, is it known by that which reveals positive entity?

Text: 1233

तद्यदि मेयव्यावृत्त्या; तद्गतिः कथम्? अथ मानव्यावृत्त्या; तदा इतरेतराश्रयत्वं दुरुत्तरमापद्यते।

tadyadi meyavyāvṛtyā; tadgatiḥ katham? atha mānavyāvṛtyā; tadā itaretarāśrayatvaṁ duruttaramāpadyate.

Translation: 1233

If it is known by excluding object of knowledge, then, how can it be called knowledge? And if you say it is known by excluding the knowledge, then, it will result into mutual dependency which cannot be answered satisfactorily.

Text: 1234

अथ समानव्यावृत्त्या अवधार्यते; सैव ज्ञातुमारब्धा - कथं ज्ञापिका भवति? न च एका ज्ञाप्या अन्या ज्ञापिका भवति सदुपलम्भकप्रमाणमात्रापगमस्य ज्ञापकत्वेनेष्टत्वाद् अनिष्टादोषप्रसङ्गाच्च-सापि ज्ञापिका कथं ज्ञाता इत्यादिना।

atha samānavyāvṛtṭyā avadhāryate; saiva jñātumārabdhā - katham jñāpikā bhavati? na ca ekā jñāpyā anyā jñāpikā bhavati sadupalambhakapramāṇamātrāpagamasya jñāpakatveneṣṭatvād aniṣṭhādoṣaprasaṅgācca-sāpi jñāpikā katham jñātā ityādinā.

Translation: 1234

If you say that, it is decided by excluding the common ones, then, in fact that is what we have started to know, then, how can it cause the knowledge? It is not the case that, one is known and the other causes the knowledge. When no verifying knowledge of a positive entity is desired to be the producer of knowledge and when it does not lead to a contingency which is not desired and which does not contribute to any defect, how that which is the producer of knowledge be the object of knowledge?

Text: 1235

अथ सदुपलम्भकेन अवगम्यते; हीयते तर्हि अभावाख्यं प्रमाणम्, मेयाभावावगमेऽपि तदेवाऽस्तु।

atha sadupalambhakena avagamyate; hīyate tarhi abhāvākhyam pramāṇam, meyābhāvāvagame'pi tadevā'stu.

Translation: 1235

If you say, it is known by the verifying knowledge of existence of positive entity, then, the process of knowing called absence should be dropped and even in the case of knowing the absence of object of knowledge, the same process of knowing the positive entity be accepted.

Text: 1236

अथ अनवगतमेव मेयाभावेऽनुगमं करोति; यद्येवं देवदत्तस्य देशान्तरे विनाशे जाते देवदत्तोपलम्भकप्रमाणपञ्चकव्यावृत्तौ देवदत्ताभावनिश्चयः स्यात्, न तु भवति प्रभुसमानस्यापि।

atha anavagatameva meyābhāve'nugamam karoti; yadyevam devadattasya deśāntare vināśe jāte devadattopalambhakapramāṇapañcakavyāvṛttau devadattābhāvaniścayaḥ syāt, na tu bhavati prabhusamānasyāpi.

Translation: 1236

If you say that, even without being known, the process of knowing called absence will cause the knowledge of absence of object, then, when Devadatta has died at another place, then, there will be determination of the absence of Devadatta only after the application of the five processes of knowing Devadatta, such as perception etc. Even that process of knowing which is like the monster cannot cause such determination.

Text: 1237

अथ वस्तुभूतनिमित्तान्तरवैकल्ये सति न भवति; तदेवास्तु तन्नान्तरीयत्वात् तद्गतेः।

atha vastubhūtanimit्तान्तरavaikalye sati na bhavati; tadevāstu tannāntarīyatvāt tadgateḥ.

Translation: 1237

If you say that, in the absence of another real factor, such confirmation does not arise. Then, let that alone be accepted because, without that, such knowledge is not possible.

Text: 1238

अभावस्य च प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणग्राह्यतां प्रतिपादयन्ति नैयायिकाः। सम्बन्धश्च विषयविषयि-
भावलक्षणः विशेषणविशेष्यभावलक्षणो वा।

*abhāvasya ca pratyakṣapramāṇagrāhyatām pratipādayanti nīyā-
yikāḥ. sambandhaśca viśayaviśayibhāvalakṣaṇaḥ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-
bhāvalakṣaṇo vā.*

Translation: 1238

The Indian logicians explain that, absence can be known by perception. The relation is accepted of the form of “container-and-content”, or, of the nature of “qualifier-and-qualificand”.

0.14 सम्भवैतिह्यप्रमाणयोर्निरासः।

[*sambhavaitihyapramāṇayornirāsaḥ.*]

(Refutation of the Pramāṇas called Inclusion and Popular Belief)

Text: 1239

सम्भवस्य अनुमानेऽन्तरीभावसम्बन्धैकनिमित्तमर्दने(?) सति अर्थान्तरे प्रतिपत्तिरनु-
मानम्॥

*sambhavasya anumāne’ntarībhāvasambandhaikanimittamardane(?)
sati arthāntare pratipattiranumānam.*

Translation: 1239

The process of knowing (as accepted by the Paurāṇikas) called Sambhava is to be included in inference. It follows the process of inference where knowledge of one leads to the knowledge of another.

Text: 1240

ऐतिह्यस्य चागमे अन्तर्भावः। तस्य च प्रामाण्यं न सम्भवति, नानुमानान्तर्गतस्य नापि
स्वतन्त्रस्य।

*aitihyasya cāgame antarbhāvaḥ. tasya ca prāmāṇyam na sambha-
vati, nānumānāntargatasya nāpi svatantrasya.*

Translation: 1240

The process of knowing (as accepted by the Paurānikas) called Aitihya is included in śabdapramāṇa. That cannot be a valid source of knowledge. Neither as a constituent part of an inference nor independently.

0.15 शब्दप्रामाण्यस्य निरासः।

[śabdaprāmāṇyasya nirāsaḥ.]

(Refutation of the Validity of Verbal Testimony)

[१. वाचकत्वेन शब्दप्रामाण्यं स्वीकुर्वतां मतस्योद्धलनम्।]

[1. vācakatvena śabdaprāmāṇyam svīkurvatāṁ matasyodhvalanam.]

Text: 1241

एके वदन्ति - “वाचकत्वेन गोशब्दस्य प्रामाण्यम्।” तच्चासमीचीनम्, शब्दार्थगो(योः) सम्बन्धव्यतिरेकात्। न तावत्तादात्म्यलक्षणः, तयोरकारभेदात्। नापि तदुत्पत्तिलक्षणः; अर्थापायेपि शब्दोदयदर्शनात्।

eke vadanti - “vācakatvena gośabdasya prāmāṇyam.” taccāsamīcīnam, śabdārthago(yoḥ) sambandhavyatirekāṭ. na tāvattādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ, tayorākārabhedāt. nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ; arthāpāyepi śabdodayadarśanāt.

Translation: 1241

Some scholars hold the following view: -

“The word cow is dependable because, it expresses its meaning”. But this is not proper, because, there is no relationship between word and its meaning. Such relation cannot be of the nature of identity because, the form of word and form of meaning are different. Nor such a relation can be of the nature of cause and effect, because, even if the meaning, or, referent is destroyed, there is application of word to refer to that.

Text: 1242

नापि सामयिकः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः; शब्दार्थव्यक्तीनामानन्त्याद् अभिन्नैकनिमित्तस्य चाऽसम्भवात्। न च सङ्केतितशब्दस्य अर्थप्रतिपत्तिकाले अवस्थानं विद्यते। नचार्थप्रत्या-यकः(क)शब्दस्य सङ्केतोऽवगतः, समयकरणकाले तदभावात्। न च स्वकार्यसम्बन्धमन्तरेण पूर्वशब्दसम्बन्धं स्वासारूप्याद्(?) वाचकम् अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

nāpi sāmāyikāḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ; śabdārthavyaktīnāmānāntyād abhinnaikanimittasya cā'sambhavāt. na ca saṅketitaśabdasya arthapratipattikāle avasthānam vidyate. nacārthapratyāyakaḥ(ka)-śabdasya saṅketo'vagataḥ, samāyakaraṇakāle tadabhāvāt. na ca svakāryasambandhamantareṇa pūrvaśabdāsambandham svāsārūpyād(?) vācakam atiprasaṅgāt.

Translation: 1242

Nor can there be the relation between word and its meaning called “conventional” because, there are endless number of words and endless number of meanings and there is no single identical ground. It is also not the case that the expressive word continues to exist at the time of the knowledge of its meaning. It is also not the case that convention, or, primary relationship of a word which expresses a meaning is known, because, at the time of expressing the relationship, it is not there. It is not the case that, without the relationship with its own effect the relation with the earlier word becomes expressive of the meaning on account of similarity because, it will lead to unwanted consequences.

Text: 1243

नापि स्व(स्वा)भाविकः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः; तद्गत्यभावात् न प्रत्यक्षेण नापि अनुमानेन।
nāpi sva(svā)bhāvikaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ; tadgatyabhāvāt na pratyakṣeṇa nāpi anumānena.

Translation: 1243

It is also not true to say that, there is a natural relationship between word and its meaning, because, its knowledge is not possible, either by perception, or, by inference.

Text: 1244

अथ अर्थापत्याऽनुमीयते; साप्यनुपपन्ना, प्रत्यक्षादिपूर्विका हि अर्थापत्तिः, प्रत्यक्षाद्यभावे तस्याप्य(तस्या अप्य)भावः। न सा अनुमानाद् भिद्यते अर्थापत्तिः। न च अनुमानग्राह्यः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धो भवद्भिः प्रतिपाद्यते। नच तदनुमानमस्ति। न च नित्यसम्बन्धस्य विज्ञानगमक(०नजनक)त्वमिहोपपद्यते उक्तन्यायात्।

atha arthāpatyā'numīyate; sāpyanupapannā, pratyakṣādīpūrvikā hi arthāpattiḥ, pratyakṣādyabhāve tasyāpya(tasyā apya)bhāvaḥ.

na sā anumānād bhidyate arthāpattiḥ. na ca anumānagrāhyah śabdārthayoḥ sambandho bhavadbhiḥ pratipādyate. naca tadanu- mānamasti. na ca nityasambandhasya vijñānagamaka(Onajanaka)- tvamihopapadyate uktanyāyāt.

Translation: 1244

If you say, it can be inferred by the process called presumption, it will not be correct, because, a presumption is preceded by perception and when perception is not there as reality, there will be nothing called presumption. Moreover, what is called presumption is not different from inference. Moreover, the relationship between word and meaning is not accepted by you as something which can be known by inference. There is no inference also to that effect. It is also not possible to hold that there is eternal relationship between word and meaning which can cause the knowledge of verbal understanding on the same ground.

Text: 1245

एवं च सति सम्बन्धमन्तरेण पदानां वाचकत्वं न युज्यते। तदवाचकत्वे च तत्पूर्वक- वाक्यस्यापि वाचकत्वं न लभ्यते।

evam ca sati sambandhamantareṇa padānām vācakatvaṁ na yujyate. tadavācakatve ca tatpūrvakavākyaśyāpi vācakatvaṁ na labhyate.

Translation: 1245

When such is the situation, without the relationship it is not proper to say that, words expresses meanings and when words do not express meanings, it is obvious that the sentence also cannot express meaning, because, to express meaning a sentence has to be preceded by expressive words.

Text: 1246

अथ कथं न लभ्यते?

atha katham na labhyate?

Translation: 1246

Objection:

How do you say that, words and sentences do not express any meaning?

Text: 1247

प्रसिद्धपदपदार्थसम्बन्धपूर्वकं हि वाक्यं वाचकत्वेन गीयते। तदप्रसिद्धौ वाक्यस्यापि वाचकत्वं न सङ्गच्छते। एवं चाऽवाचकत्वे वेदवाक्यानां कथं प्रामाण्यम्?

prasiddhapadapadārthasambandhapūrvakam hi vākyaṁ vācakatvena gīyate. tadaprasiddhau vākyaśyāpi vācakatvaṁ na saṅgacchate. evaṁ cā'vācakatve vedavākyaṅnām katham prāmāṅyam?

Translation: 1247

Reply:

A sentence is said to express its meaning if it is preceded by the knowledge of relationship between word and meaning. When that itself is not known, it cannot be held that sentence expresses meaning. Thus, when sentence does not express meaning, how can the sentences of the Vedas be taken as authoritative?

Text: 1248

अथ अप्रसिद्धपदपदार्थपूर्वकमपि वाक्यं वाचकत्वेनोद्गीयते; तदा सर्वप्रमातृणां वेदोपलम्भे सति वेदार्थप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्। किञ्च, अदृष्टविषये वेदवाक्यानां प्रामाण्यं कथं वेत्सि?

atha aprasiddhapadapadārthapūrvakamapi vākyaṁ vācakatvenodgīyate; tadā sarvapramātrīṅnām vedopalambhe sati vedārthapratipattiḥ syāt. kiñca, adṛṣṭaviṣaye vedavākyaṅnām prāmāṅyaṁ katham vetsyi?

Translation: 1248

If you say that, even if the knowledge of relationship between word and its meaning is not known, a sentence can be said to be expressive of meaning, then, after all knowers acquire the knowledge of the Veda there will be the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda. Moreover, how are you going to know that Vedic sentences are authoritative with regard to an object which is beyond the range of sense organ?

Text: 1249

वेदैकदेशत्वेन इति चेत्; न, अर्थवदेववाक्येन न व्य(अर्थवादवाक्येन व्य)भिचारात्-
“ग्रावाणः प्लवन्ते, आदित्यो वैष्णव इति चतुःषष्टिवर्णानालोड्य प्रजापतिः पपौ”
इत्यादिना।

vedaikadeśatvena iti cet; na, arthavadevavākyena na vya(arthavādavakyena vya)bhicārāt - "grāvāṇaḥ plavante ādityo vaiṣṇava iti catuḥṣaṣṭivarṇānalodya prajāpatih papau" ityādinā.

Translation: 1249

If you say, because they are part of the Veda, it will not be proper, because, it will not be consistent with the narrative sentences such as "the stones are floating, the Sun is Vaishnava, and therefore, the Creator protected after having considered sixty-four letters."

[२. आप्तोक्तत्वेन शब्दं प्रमाणीकुर्वतां मतस्य निरासः।]

[2. āptoktatvena śabdāṁ pramāṇīkūrvatāṁ matasya nirāsaḥ.]

Text: 1250

अन्ये तु आप्तोक्तत्वेन प्रामाण्यमुशन्ति। आप्तः साक्षात्कृतधर्मणः। तैर्यदुक्तं सममाप्तं तत्किलाविसंवादकम्। "क्षीणदोषोऽनृतं वाक्यं न ब्रूयाद् हेत्वसम्भवात्।"

anye tu āptoktatvena prāmāṇyamuśanti. āptaḥ sāksātkṛtadharmṇaḥ. tairyaduktam samamāptaṁ tatkilāvisamvādakam. "kṣīṇa-doṣo'nṛtaṁ vākyaṁ na brūyād hetvasambhavāt."

Translation: 1250

Other philosophers think that, a sentence is authoritative when it is uttered by a reliable person. Reliable persons are those who have realized the reality. Whatever they have said does not betray the fact "a person who has no defect should not tell a lie because there is no reason to do that."

Text: 1251

तदेतदयुक्तम्, आप्तस्य अत्यन्ताऽप्रत्यक्षतया तदायत्तताया अनधिगतेः। वीतरागज्ञापकं च अनुमानं न विद्यते तस्य अप्रमाणत्वात्।

tadetadayuktam, āptasya atyantā'pratyakṣatayā tadāyattatāyā anadhigateḥ. vītarāgajñāpakam ca anumānaṁ na vidyate tasya apramāṇatvāt.

Translation: 1251

All this is not proper, because, that is absolutely not visible and so a reliable person cannot grasp the range of that. There is no inference to reveal that the person is devoid of attachment etc. because, an inference is not a valid source of knowledge.

Text: 1252

भवतु वा आप्तोक्तत्वम्; प्रामाण्ये किमायातम्? किं सत्तामात्रेण प्रामाण्य(म्), विज्ञान-जनकत्वेन वा?

bhavatu vā aptoktatvam; prāmāṅye kimāyātam? kiṁ sattāmātreṇa prāmāṅya(m), vijñānajanakatvena vā?

Translation: 1252

Or, if you so wish, let the Vedic sentences be accepted as uttered by reliable person. But what is obtained when they are treated as authoritative? Are those Vedic sentences authoritative by their mere existence, or, through generating knowledge?

Text: 1253

यदि सत्तामात्रेण; तदयुक्तम्; अकारकस्य प्रामाण्यायोगात्।

yadi sattāmātreṇa; tadayuktam; akāraḥasya prāmāṅyāyogāt.

Translation: 1253

If you say, by mere existence, it will not be proper. If something is not involved in function i.e. if it is not an instrumental case, it cannot be said to be the process of knowing.

Text: 1254

अथ विज्ञानजनकत्वेन प्रामाण्यम्; तत्किम् एकलस्य, सहकारिकारणोपचरितस्य वा?

atha vijñānajanakatvena prāmāṅyam; tatkim ekalasya, sahakārikāraṇopacaritasya vā?

Translation: 1254

If you say, they are authoritative through generating knowledge, then, we would like to know whether they themselves alone, or, through association of auxiliary cause, they are authoritative.

Text: 1255

तद्यदि एकलस्य; तदयुक्तम्; स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्, क्रमयौगपद्यासम्भवाच्च।

tadyadi ekalasya; tadayuktam; svayamanabhyupagamāt, kramayau-gapadyāsambhavācca.

Translation: 1255

If you say, they themselves, then, it will not be proper, because, you yourself have not accepted such a position and also because nothing like sequence, or, simultaneity will be possible.

Text: 1256

अथ सहकारिक(का)रणोपचरितेन जन्यते; यद्येवं तदा सहकारिकारणं दुष्टमप्यभ्येति, तदनुरोधेन विपरीतमपि ज्ञानं जनयति आप्तोक्तत्वे सत्यपि। यथा अभिनवकम्बलसम्बन्धिनं माणवकं दृष्ट्वा प्रवक्ता वाक्यमुच्चारयति - नवकम्बलकोऽयं माणवकः इति; श्रोता तु अधर्ममनःक्षोभादिना निमित्तेन नवत्वसंख्यायुक्तकम्बलसम्बन्धिनं प्रतिपद्यते। तथा प्रतारणबुद्ध्या नवत्वसंख्यायुक्तकम्बलसम्बन्धी माणवक इत्युक्ते अवदातकर्मानुरोधेन प्रतिपत्ता अभिनवकम्बलसम्बन्धिनं प्रत्येति, तथा वेदवाक्यानामपि अवदातेतरकर्मानुवेधेन विपरीतार्थावबोधोत्पादकत्वमुपपद्यते। तथा, भूतोपघातचेतोविक(का)रमनःक्षोभादिना वा निमित्तेन।

atha sahakārika(kā)raṇopacaritena janyate; yadyevam tadā saha-kārikāraṇam duṣṭamapyabhyeti, tadanurodhena viparītamapi jñānam janayati āptoktatve satyapi. yathā abhinavakambala-sambandhinam māṇavakam dṛṣṭvā pravaktā vākyamuccārayati - navakambalako'yaṁ māṇavakaḥ iti; śrotā tu adharmamanahkṣobhādīnā nimittena navatvasamkhyāyuktakambalasambandhinam pratipadyate. tathā pratāraṇabuddhyā navatvasamkhyāyuktakambala-sambandhī māṇavaka ityukte avadātakarmānurodhena pratipattā abhinavakambalasambandhinam pratyeti, tathā vedavākyaṅānamapi avadātetarakarmānuvedhena viparītārthāvabodhotpādakatvamupapadyate. tathā, bhūtopaghātacetovika(kā)ramanahkṣobhādīnā vā nimittena.

Translation: 1256

If you say, authoritativeness is produced in association with the auxiliary cause, then, it is possible that the auxiliary cause is faulty and accordingly a Vedic sentence may generate false cognition also in spite of the fact that it is uttered by a reliable person. As after seeing a boy associated with a new blanket, the speaker says “this boy has new blanket” but the listener of that sentence understands that the boy has got association with nine blankets because of the ground such as lack of righteousness and disturbance of mind etc. Similarly, when someone utters that this boy is associated with nine blankets, in order to abuse him the listener of the sentence understands the same boy having association with new blanket, in accordance with the good work performed by that boy (the word

'nava' in Sanskrit can be understood in two senses, (1) nine and (2) new). In the same way, it is possible to demonstrate that the Vedic sentences also can generate false cognition in accordance with works other than good deeds. Similarly, such situation can arise because of some other ground such as change in the mental state due to physical factor, hesitation of mind and the like.

[३. अपौरुषेयत्वेन वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं स्वीकुर्वतां मतस्य व्युदासः।]

[3. *apauruṣeyatvena vedasya prāmāṇyam svīkurvatām matasya vyudāsaḥ.*]

Text: 1257

अन्ये तु कुमतिमतानुसारिणो वदन्ति - वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमन्यथा-अपौरुषेयत्वेन। पुरुषा हि रागादिविपरीतचेतसो विपरीतमुपपादयन्ति, न च वेदविधातृसम्भवोऽस्ति। तदुक्तम्-नित्यो वेदः अस्मर्यमाणकर्तृ[क]त्वात् व्योमादिवत्। वेदवेधसोऽपगमे तदायत्ता दोषा व्यपगता भवन्ति। ते हि विधातृसत्तानुवर्तिनः तदव(प)गमे कथमवतिष्ठेरन्। तेषामपाये कथमप्रमाणमाशङ्क्यते वेदः। यदुक्तम्-

दोषाः सन्ति न सन्तीति पौरुषेयेषु युज्यते।

वेदे कर्तुरभावात्तु दोषाशङ्कव नास्ति नः॥ (तत्त्वसङ्ग्रहः, कारिका २८९५)

चोदनाजनिता बुद्धिः प्रमाणं दोषवर्जितैः।

कारणैर्जन्यमानत्वात् लिङ्गामोक्ताक्षबुद्धिवत्॥ (श्लोकवा.सू.२.श्लो.१८४)

नच चोदनाजनितं विज्ञानं सन्दिग्धम्, किंस्वित् इत्यनेनाकारेणानुपजायमानत्वात् । नचेदं भ्रान्तं देशान्तरादावबाध्यमानत्वात्। यत् देशान्तरादौ बाध्यते तत् मिथ्या, यथा मरीचिनिचये अम्बुज्ञानम्, कालान्तरे च बाधा यथा आरक्तपटे हाटकविज्ञानमित्येवमादि, नचेदं भ्रान्तं तथा, तस्मादवितथम्।

anye tu kumatimatānusārīṇo vadanti - vedasya prāmāṇyamanyathā-apauruṣeyatvena. puruṣā hi rāgādiviparītacetaso viparītamupapādayanti, na ca vedavidhātṛsaṁbhavo'sti. taduktamnityo vedāḥ asmaryamāṇakartṛ[ka]tvāt vyomādivat. vedavedhaso'pagame tadāyattā doṣā vyapagatā bhavanti. te hi vidhātṛsattānuvartinaḥ tadava-(pa)game kathamavatiṣṭheran. teṣāmapāye kathamapramāṇamāśa-ṅkyate vedāḥ. yaduktam-

doṣāḥ santi na santīti pauruṣeyeṣu yujyate,

vede karturabhāvāttu doṣāśaṅkaiva nāsti naḥ.

(*Tattvasam.kā.2895*)

*codanājanitā buddhiḥ pramāṇaṁ doṣavarjitaiḥ,
kāraṇairjanyamānatvāt liṅgāptoktākṣabuddhivat.*

(Ślokavā.sū.2.ślo.184)

*naca codanājanitaṁ vijñānaṁ sandigdham, kiṁsvit ityanenākāreṇā-
nupajāyamānatvāt. nacedaṁ bhrāntaṁ deśāntarādāvabādhyamāna-
tvāt. yat deśāntarādau bādhyate tat mithyā, yathā marīcinicaye
ambujñānam, kālāntare ca bādḥā yathā āraktapaṭe hāṭaka-
vijñānamityevamādi, nacedaṁ bhrāntaṁ tathā, tasmādavitattham.*

Translation: 1257

Other philosophers who are the followers of those who are not that intelligent say “Veda is authoritative because, it is not composed by any human being. Human beings are indeed affected by adverse states of mind such as attachment etc. and hence they narrate some thing contrary to facts. They also say that, there is no possibility of anybody creating the Veda. They extend the following inference in support of that: Veda is eternal. Because, no one remembers author of it. Like entities such as sky etc. If we say that, there is no creator of the Vedas, all the defects of the Creator will be removed from the Vedas, because, the defects of the Creator are transferred to the sentences and when the Creator is removed how can the defects be there? And when there are no defects how can they say that the Vedas are un-authoritative?

It is also supported by the following statement. It may be proper to think that, there are defects and there are no defects in the context of sentences uttered by human beings. Since there is no creator of the Vedas, there is no possibility of doubting any defect in the Vedas. This is what our position is. “The knowledge which is generated by a Vedic injunction is authoritative. Because, it is produced by the factors which are free from defects. Like the knowledge of the ground, knowledge of the sentence uttered by a reliable person and perceptual knowledge. It is not the case that, the knowledge produced by Vedic injunction is doubtful because, it is not produced by any non-cause such as “something”.

Nor it is erroneous because, it is not going to be falsified in another place. That which is falsified in another place is false, for example, the knowledge of water in mirage. There can be contradiction in another time for example, after seeing a red cloth when there arises the knowledge of gold (i.e. when one has seen several times gold wrapped in a red cloth sometimes when he sees something wrapped in a red cloth he concludes that there is gold, but it may be the case that something else other than gold was wrapped in the red cloth and hence it resulted in an erroneous cognition). This knowledge arising from the Vedic sentence is not erroneous like that, therefore, it is not false.”

Text: 1258

यत्तावदुक्तम्- 'नित्यो वेदः कर्त्रस्मरणात्'; तदयुक्तम्, कूपारामादिभिरनैकान्तिकत्वात्। तेषां हि कर्त्ता न स्मर्यते अथ च अनित्यत्वम्।

yattāvaduktam- 'nityo vedaḥ kartrasmaraṇāt'; tadayuktam, kūpārāmā-dibhīranaikāntikatvāt. teṣāṃ hi karttā na smaryate atha ca anityatvam.

Translation: 1258

You said, “Veda is eternal because, its author is not remembered”. This is not correct, because this ground is not consistent, since one may also say that a particular well, or, a particular garden is also eternal because their creators are not remembered. This will happen when their creators are not remembered. But as a matter of fact, they are not eternal.

Text: 1259

अथ देशकालोच्छेदात् तत्र कर्तुरस्मरणम्; एवं तर्हि अविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरं नाम निग्रहस्थानम्।

atha deśakālocchedāt tatra karturasmaraṇam; evaṃ tarhi aviśeṣābhīhite 'rthe viśeṣamicchato hetvantaraṃ nāma nigrahassthānam.

Translation: 1259

If you say that, the same space and time are not there and therefore, the authors are not remembered, then, this argument will lead you to a point of defeat known as “another ground” when someone uses a general ground with an intention to refer to a specific ground.

Text: 1260

अथवा सत्यपि विशेषणोपादाने हेतोः विपक्षगमनं न निवारयितुं पार्यते, यथा कृतकत्वविशेषणोपादानेऽपि न प्रमेयत्वस्य व्यावृत्तिरस्ति।

athavā satyapi viśeṣaṇopādāne hetoḥ vipakṣagamanam na nivārayitum pāryate, yathā kṛtakatvaviśeṣaṇopādāne'pi na prameyatasya vyāvṛttirasti.

Translation: 1260

Or, even if specific qualifier is added, still no one can stop occurrence of the ground in a locus which is not the subject of the inference i.e. the locus were the existence of the absence of probandum is confirmed. For example, even if the qualification “the state of being produced” is added no one can exclude the state of being object of a true cognition being there.

Text: 1261

अथ कृतकत्वं; तदेव गमकं व्यावृत्तत्वात्। न ह्येकस्य व्यावृत्तौ अन्यस्य व्यावृत्तिरस्ति, अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

atha kṛtakatvam; tadeva gamakam vyāvṛttatvāt. na hyekasya vyāvṛtttau anyasya vyāvṛttirasti atiprasaṅgāt.

Translation: 1261

If you say, it is the state of being produced, then, that itself is the ground which is excluded from all the rest. It is not the case that, when one is excluded, other gets also excluded, because, it will lead to over-application of the statement.

Text: 1262

किञ्च, साध्यविरुद्धे हेतोः(तौ) किं विशेषणोपादानम् तद्विपरीते वा?

kiñca, sādhyaviruddhe hetoḥ(tau) kim viśeṣaṇopādanam tadviparīte vā?

Translation: 1262

Moreover, what qualification can be added to a ground which establishes just opposite of what is intended to be established, or, do you want to say that, the qualification is to be added what is opposite of it.

Text: 1263

तद्यदि विरुद्धे; तदाऽनर्थकं विशेषणोपादनम्।

tadyadi viruddhe; tadā'narthakam viśeṣaṇopādanam.

Translation: 1263

If it is in the ground which establishes what is opposite of what is to be established, then, the adding of the qualification is meaningless.

Text: 1264

अथ अविरुद्धेऽप्येवमेव – नहि विशेषणेन विरुद्धस्वभावता, व्यावर्तते, यथा कृतकत्व-विशेषणोपादानेऽपि न चाक्षुषत्वस्य शब्दे वृत्तिलाभः। तथा देशकु(का)लोच्छेदाभाव-विशेषणोपादानेऽपि अस्मर्यमाणकर्तृ(क)त्वस्य न विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिरस्ति।

atha aviruddhe'pyevameva - nahi viśeṣaṇena viruddhasvabhāvata, vyāvartate, yathā kṛtakatvaviśeṣaṇopādāne'pi na cākṣuṣatvasya śabde kṛttilābhaḥ. tathā deśaku(kā)locchedābhāvaviśeṣaṇopādāne'pi asmāryamaṇakartṛ(ka)tvasya na vipakṣād vyāvṛttirasti.

Translation: 1264

Again, if it is added to that which is not contradictory, the same will be the consequence, because, just by adding a qualification the nature of being contradictory cannot be removed. For example, even if we add the qualification “the state of being produced” the state of being perceived by eyes cannot occur in sound. Similarly, even if you say we add a qualification viz. “absence of destruction of space and time, the state of not remembering the creator cannot be excluded from the locus where the existence of absence of probandum is confirmed.

Text: 1265

असिद्धोप्ययं हेतुः यस्मात्स्मरन्ति एव कर्तारं काणादाः। तथा लौकिका अपि बहुलं वक्तारो भवन्ति – 'ब्रह्मणा वेदाः प्रणीताः' इति।

asiddhopyayam hetuḥ yasmātsmaranti eva kartāraṁ kāṇādāḥ. tathā laukikā api bahulaṁ vaktāro bhavanti - 'brahmaṇā vedāḥ praṇītāḥ' iti.

Translation: 1265

This ground is also not an established ground, because, the followers of the school of Kaṇāda do remember the creator of the Veda.

Similarly, we also find many ordinary people saying that the Vedas are created by the Brahman.

Text: 1266

अपि च किमशेषजनस्मरणनिवृत्तिरिह हेतुत्वेन विवक्षिता, आहोस्वित् कतिपयपुरुष-
स्मरणविनिवृत्तिः?

*api ca kimaśeṣajanasmarāṇanivṛttiriha hetutvena vivakṣitā, āhosvit
katipayapurūṣasmarāṇavinivṛtṭiḥ?*

Translation: 1266

Moreover, do you want to say that, your ground is destruction of remembrance of all people, or, the destruction of remembrance of a few people?

Text: 1267

तद्यदि सकलजनस्मरणविनिवृत्तिः; तदाऽसिद्धा, अवधारयितुमशक्यत्वाच्च अर्वाग्भाग-
विद्धिः। अवधारणे वा त एव सर्वज्ञाः स्युः अर्वाग्भागविदो न भवेयुः।

*tadyadi sakalajanasmarāṇavinivṛtṭiḥ; tadā'siddhā, avadhārayitum
maśakyatvācca arvāgbhāgavidbhiḥ. avadhāraṇe vā ta eva sarvajñāḥ
syuḥ arvāgbhāgavidō na bhaveyuḥ.*

Translation: 1267

If you say that, destruction of remembrance of all people is a ground, then, such a ground is not established, because, it can never be known by those who know the later part and if you say that, it can be known, then, they will become all-knowing and not those who know the earlier part.

Text: 1268

अथ कतिपयपुरुषापेक्षया; तदानैकान्तिको हेतुः, विद्यमानकर्तृकेष्वपि कर्ता न स्मर्यते
कैश्चित्।

*atha katipayapurūṣāpekṣayā; tadānaikāntiko hetuḥ, vidyamāna-
kartṛkeṣvapi kartā na smaryate kaiścit.*

Translation: 1268

If you say that, in comparison to some people it can be known, then, such a ground will suffer from the defect of inconsistency because, sometimes even if there is creator, the creator is not remembered.

Text: 1269

अन्यच्च, कतिपयैः पुरुषैर्न स्मर्यते – अर्थादापद्यते – पुरुषान्तरस्मर्यमाणकर्तृको वेदः विशेषप्रतिषेधस्य शेषाभ्यनुज्ञा विषयत्वात्। न च पुरुषजन्यत्वेन वेदस्याऽप्रामाण्यम्, अपि तु पुरुषदोषोत्पाद्यत्वेन। अतः स एव अपनेयः न पुरुषव्यापारः।

anyacca, katipayaiḥ puruṣairna smaryate - arthādāpadyate - puruṣāntarasmāryamāṇakartṛko vedah viśeṣapratīśedhasya śeṣābhyanujñā viśayatvāt. na ca puruṣajanyatvena vedasyā'prāmāṇyam, api tu puruṣadoṣotpādyatvena. ataḥ sa eva apaneyah na puruṣavyāpārah.

Translation: 1269

Not only that, if you say, some people do not remember the creators of the Veda, it implies that the Veda is created by some other people. This is in tune with the maxim that when a particular is negated the remaining members become known. It is not the case that, Veda is not authoritative because, it is produced by a human being, but it is so because, it is produced by the defects in the human being and therefore, that defect is to be excluded and not the function of creation by human being.

Text: 1270

अथ पुरुषस्य दोषाधिकरणत्वे तज्जन्यत्वे दोषजन्यत्वमप्याशङ्क्यत इति चेत्;

atha puruṣasya doṣādhikaraṇatve tajjanyatve doṣajanyatvamapyāśaṅkyata iti cet;

Translation: 1270

Clarification:

Well, if a human being is accepted as locus of defects and if such a human being is accepted as producer of Veda, then, obviously one can doubt that the Veda is produced by the defects of a human being.

Text: 1271

यद्येवम् इन्द्रियाणामपि दोषाधिकरणत्वेन तदुत्पादितविज्ञानानामप्रामाण्यं समाशङ्क्यत इति सर्वत्र प्रामाण्यानास्वा(श्वा)सः स्यात्। न च अस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वेन वेदशब्दाना-मपौरुषेयत्वसंसिद्धिः, अन्यथापि अस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वमुपपद्यते – केनापि विदग्धमतिना वेदसन्दोहमुत्पाद्य आत्मा अपह्रूयते – 'नाहं वेदानां विधाता' इति।

yadyevam indriyāṇāmapi doṣādhikaraṇatvena tadutpāditavijñānānānāmaprāmāṇyam samāśaṅkyata iti sarvatra prāmāṇyānāsvā(śvā)-

*saḥ syāt. na ca asmaryamāṇakarṭṛkatvena vedaśabdānāmapauruṣe-
yatvasaṁsiddhiḥ, anyathāpyasmaryamāṇakarṭṛkatvamupapadyate -
kenāpi vidagdhamatinā vedasandohamutpādya ātmā apahnūyate -
'nāham vedānām vidhātā' iti.*

Translation: 1271

Reply:

If it is so, then, since the sense organs also are locus of defects the knowledges produced by them should also be undependable. When such a doubt is possible, it implies that there is no authoritativeness, or, dependability in anything. No one can establish that, the words of the Veda are not uttered by an agent. Simply because, such agent is not remembered, because, the fact that the agent is not remembered can be explained in some other way also. Suppose, some person having great genius has indeed composed the Veda but he can conceal his own agency by saying that “I have not created the Vedas”.

Text: 1272

भवतु वा अपौरुषेयो वेदः; प्रामाण्ये किमायातम्?

bhavatu vā apauruṣeyo vedah; prāmāṇye kimāyātam?

Translation: 1272

Or, if you so wish, let the Veda be authorless. How to establish its authoritativeness?

Text: 1273

अथ पुरुषव्यावृत्त्या तद्दोषव्यावृत्तिनिबन्धनं प्रामाण्यम्; तद्व्यावृत्त्या तद्गुणव्यावृत्ति-
निबन्धनमप्रामाण्यं किन्नेष्यते?

*atha puruṣavyāvṛtṭyā taddoṣavyāvṛtṭinibandhanam prāmāṇyam;
tadvyāvṛtṭyā tadguṇavyāvṛtṭinibandhanamaprāmāṇyam kinneṣyate?*

Translation: 1273

If you say that, by excluding an author, there will be exclusion of defects existing in that author and on the basis of that there will an authoritativeness in the Veda, then, by excluding the author there will be exclusion of his qualities and on the basis of that why don't you welcome in-authoritativeness of the Vedas?

Text: 1274

अथ पुरुषगतगुणदोषव्यावृत्तौ निसर्गगुणानुवेधेन प्रामाण्यमिष्यते; पुरुषगुणदोषव्यावृत्तौ निसर्गदोषानुवेधेनाप्रामाण्यं किन्न गीयते?

atha puruṣagatagunaḍoṣavyāvṛttau nisargagunaṅānuvedhena prāmāṅyamiṣyate; puruṣagunaḍoṣavyāvṛttau nisargadoṣānuvedhenāprāmāṅyam kinna gīyate?

Translation: 1274

If you say that, by excluding good qualities and defects of the author on the basis of the natural qualities, the authoritativeness of the Veda is desired, then, by excluding the virtues and defects of the author on the basis of the natural defects, why don't you say that the Vedas are not authoritative?

Text: 1275

अपि च यथा अपौरुषेयत्वे सत्यपि रागादिदोषसम्बन्धिता उपलभ्यते, तथा वेदेऽपि भविष्यति।

api ca yathā apauruṣeyatve satyapi rāgādidoṣasambandhitā upalabhyate, tathā vede'pi bhaviṣyati.

Translation: 1275

Moreover, in spite of the fact that, some thing is without an author, one can find relationship with defects such as attachment. In the same way this will happen with regard to the Veda also.

Text: 1276

किञ्च, अपौरुषेयत्वेन कर्त्तृदोषापगमः कृतः, श्रोतृदोषास्तु केनापनीयन्ते। तथा हि - अर्थप्रतिपत्तौ तानपेक्ष्य विपरीतां प्रतिपत्तिमभिनिर्वर्तयिष्यति। ततश्च नित्यानामपि कर्त्तृकर्मणां दुष्टसहकारिकारणानुवेधेन विपर्ययादिज्ञानहेतुत्वमुपपद्यते न वाक्यानां प्रमाणप्रतिलम्भः।

kiñca, apauruṣeyatvena kartṛdoṣāpagamaḥ kṛtaḥ, śrotṛdoṣāstu kenāpanīyante. tathā hi - arthapratipattau tānapekṣya viparītāṁ pratipattimabhinirvartayīṣyati. tataśca nityānāmapi kartṛkarmaṅnām duṣṭasahakārikāraṅānuvedhena viparyayādijñānahetutvamupapadyate na vākyaṅnām pramāṅnapratilambhaḥ.

Translation: 1276

Moreover, by removing the authorship of the Veda you could remove the defects of the author. But how are you going to remove the

defects of the listener to explain while the understanding of the Veda, a listener will acquire the knowledge of its opposite meaning on the basis of its own defects. Thus, even the eternal actions and agents will become the cause of erroneous knowledge on the basis of defective auxiliary cause and thereby the Vedic sentences will not get authoritativeness.

Text: 1277

यदप्युक्तम् - 'देशान्तरादावबाध्यमानत्वात् प्रमाणं चोदनाजनिता बुद्धिः' - तदयुक्तम्, स्मृतेर्बाधारहितत्वेऽपि अप्रमाणत्वात्।

yadapyuktam - 'deśāntarādāvabādhyamānatvāt pramāṇam codanājānitā buddhiḥ' - tadayuktam, smṛterbādhārahitatve 'pi apramāṇatvāt.

Translation: 1277

You said, "The knowledge generated by Vedic injunction is authoritative because, they are not contradicted in another place." This is not proper, because, a remembrance is never authoritative even if it is not contradicted.

Text: 1278

किञ्च, बाधाशब्देन विपरीतविज्ञानमपदिश्यते, तच्च नोत्पद्यते - किं चोदनाजनित-विज्ञानस्य यथार्थत्वेन उत तदुत्पादककारणवैकल्येन इति सन्दिह्यते।

kiñca, bādhasabdēna viparītavijñānamapadiśyate, tacca notpadyate - kiṁ codanājānitavijñānasya yathārthatvena uta tadutpādakakāraṇavaikalyena iti sandihyate.

Translation: 1278

Moreover, do you want to say that, by the word the contradiction what is understood is an erroneous cognition? That does not arise, is it because the knowledge produced by a Vedic injunction is true, or, because there are defects in the cause which generate that? Such a doubt is created.

Text: 1279

अपि च, बाधारहितत्वेऽप्यप्रामाण्यं दृष्टं - बाधकविज्ञानोत्पत्तेः पूर्वम्। बाधाप्युपजायमाना कालविकल्पेन उपजायते-क्वचिदर्थमासेन क्वचिन्मासव्यवधानेन क्वचिच्च अब्दद्वयत्रय-व्यवधानेन, अन्यत्र तु कारकवैकल्यान्नैव सम्पत्स्यते। नचैतावता प्रमाणं चोदनाजनिता बुद्धिः।

*api ca, bādhārahitatve'pyaprāmāṇyaṃ dr̥ṣṭaṃ - bādhakavijñānot-
patteḥ pūrvam. bādhāpyupajāyamānā kālavikalpena upajāyate-
kvacidardhamāsenā kvacinmāsavyavadhānena kvacicca abdadvaya-
trayavyavadhānena, anyatra tu kārakavaikalpānnaiva sampatsyate.
nacaitāvatā pramāṇaṃ codanājanitā buddhiḥ.*

Translation: 1279

Moreover, it is our experience that, something is not authoritative even if it is not contradictory before the arising of the contradicting knowledge. Even contradiction is seen to arise with variation in time, sometimes, in half a month, in some case after a gap of a month, in some other case after a gap of two, or, three years, in still some other cases it does not arise at all because of lack of necessary factors. Therefore, on the basis of simply this, that the knowledge that arises from Vedic injunction is authoritative.

Text: 1280

किञ्च, बाधारहितत्वमपि किम्-अशेषपुरुषापेक्षया, कतिपयपुरुषापेक्षया वा?
*kiñca, bādhārahitatvamapi kim-aśeṣapuruṣāpekṣayā, katipayapuru-
ṣāpekṣayā vā?*

Translation: 1280

Moreover, is the lack of contradiction in comparison to all human beings, or, in comparison to only a few?

Text: 1281

यद्यशेषपुरुषापेक्षया; तदवगन्तुं न शक्यते, परचित्तवृत्तीनां दुस्त्वयत्वात्।
*yadyaśeṣapuruṣāpekṣayā; tadavagantum na śakyate, paracitta-
vṛttīnāṃ duranvayatvāt.*

Translation: 1281

If you say, it is in comparison to all human beings, then, it can never be known, because, it is difficult to relate the functions of everybody's mind, or, intellect.

Text: 1282

अथ कतिपयपुरुषापेक्षया बाधारहितत्वम्; तदाऽनैकान्तिको हेतुः - यथा असत्योदके जातोदकबुद्धिः तस्माद्देशात् देशान्तरं यदा प्रयाति तत्रैव दशार्धतामुपयाति, नच तस्य बाधकं विज्ञानमुत्पन्नम्। किमेतावता तत् प्रमाणं भवतु?

atha katipayapurūṣāpekṣayā bādhārahitatvam; tadā 'naikāntiko hetuḥ - yathā asatyodake jātodakabuddhiḥ tasmāddeśāt deśāntaraṁ yadā prayāti tatraiva daśārdhatāmupayāti, naca tasya bādhakam vijñānamutpannam. kimetāvātā tat pramāṇam bhavatu?

Translation: 1282

If you say, contradiction is with reference to a few, then, the ground becomes inconsistent. For instance, when one acquires knowledge of water where there is no water, and when he goes to another place from that place, and suppose he dies there, no contradictory knowledge arose in him. Is it enough to claim that knowledge is a true knowledge?

Text: 1283

अथवा चोदनाजनितविज्ञानस्य निर्विषयत्वमेव भ्रान्तत्वं, चोदनाजनितविज्ञानसमानकाली-
नकर्तव्यतारूपार्थस्याऽसम्भवात्। सम्भवे वा चोदनावचसो वैकल्यं, वितानक्रियाविलोपः।
athavā codanājanitavijñānasya nirviṣayatvameva bhrāntatvam, codanājanitavijñānasamānakālīnakarttavyatārūpārthasyā'sambhavāt. sambhave vā codanāvachaso vaikalyam, vitānakriyāvilopah.

Translation: 1283

Or, let us say the knowledge generated by a Vedic injunction has no content and that itself is, its becoming false because, it is not possible to show something worth doing at the time when the knowledge is caused by the Vedic injunction and if you say it is possible, then, the Vedic injunction will become defective and the spreading Vedic ritual activities will disappear.

Text: 1284

अथ न विद्यते कर्तव्यतारूपोऽर्थः; कथं चोदनावचनोद्भूतं विज्ञानं न मिथ्या? अन्यथा
केशोण्डुकसंविदो मिथ्यात्वं न भवेत्।
*atha na vidyate kartavyatārūpo'rthah; katham codanāvachanodbhū-
tan vijñānam na mithyā? anyathā keśoṇḍukasamvīdo mithyātvaṁ
na bhavet.*

Translation: 1284

If you say, there is nothing which is understood as to be performed (from the Vedic injunction) then, how is it that the knowledge

arising from the Vedic injunction is not false? If it is not false, then, the knowledge of thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a person who comes into the shade from the sun cannot be false?

Text: 1285

अथ तस्या[ः] प्रतीयमानार्थाऽसम्भवेन मिथ्यात्वम्; तदिहापि तदेवास्तु।

atha tasyā[h] pratīyamānārthā'sambhavena mithyātvam; tadihāpi tadevāstu.

Translation: 1285

If you say, since there is impossibility of the content in that knowledge, that knowledge is false. The same logic is applicable in the present case also.

Text: 1286

अथ चोदनाजनितविज्ञानार्थस्य पुनः सद्भावो भवति तेन तस्य यथार्थत्वम्। न तु केशोण्डुकविज्ञानस्य कदाचिदपि सद्भावोऽस्ति।

atha codanājanitavijñānārthasya punaḥ sadbhāvo bhavati tena tasya yathārthatvam. na tu keśoṇḍukavijñānasya kadācidapi sadbhāvo'sti.

Translation: 1286

Clarification:

Well, since the object of the knowledge arising from a Vedic injunction emerges again and therefore, that knowledge is considered to be true. But in the case of knowledge of thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a person who comes into the shade from the sun, never that content of that knowledge is found to exist (therefore, the knowledge arising from the Vedic injunction is found to be true.)

Text: 1287

सोऽयं विषभक्षणेन परं प्रत्याययति तपस्वी। चोदनार्थस्य पश्चाद्भवनं तद्विज्ञानानुपयोगि, तस्मिन् काले ज्ञानस्य अस्तमितत्वात्, विज्ञानकाले च अर्थस्य(स्या)सम्भवात्।

so'yaṁ viṣabhakṣaṇena paraṁ pratyāyayati tapasvī. codanārthasya paścādbhavanam tadvijñānānupayogi, tasmīn kāle jñānasya astamitatvāt, vijñānakāle ca arthasya(syā)sambhavāt.

Translation: 1287

Reply:

It is something like a saint causing the experience to another person (the effect of poison) by consuming poison. If the object of the knowledge arising from the Vedic sentence occurs later, it is of no use to that knowledge, because, when that object will come into being at the time that knowledge will no longer be there and when there is knowledge, there is no possibility of its object being there.

Text: 1288

अथवा, इयमेव बाधा यदुत असम्भाव्यमानार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वं यथा तन्तु-तुरि-कारकोपनिपाते सति वस्त्रादिकार्यमुपजायमानं दृष्टम्। पुनः पटार्थिने उपदेशो दीयते- 'तन्तूनामुपादानं कुरुष्व' इति। न त्वेवं सप्ततन्त्ववदातकर्मणोः साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धावधारणम्, नापूर्वम्, येनात्र उपदेशस्य साफल्यं भवति। एवं तावदुक्तेन न्यायेन शब्दानां वाचकत्वेन प्रामाण्यं न युज्यते।

athavā, iyameva bādā yaduta asaṁbhāvyaṁnārthasya pratipā-dakatvaṁ yathā tantu-turi-kāra- kopanipāte sati vastrādikāryamupa-jāyamānaṁ dr̥ṣṭam. punaḥ paṭārthine upadeśo dīyate - 'tantūnāmu-pādānaṁ kuruṣva' iti. na tvevaṁ sapṭatantvavadātakarmaṇoḥ sādhyasādhanasambandhāvadhāraṇam, nāpūrvam, yenaṭra upadeśasya sāphalyaṁ bhavati. evaṁ tāvadukena nyāyena śabdānāṁ vācakatvena prāmāṇyaṁ na yujyate.

Translation: 1288

Or, this may be the meaning of contradiction that explanation of that thing which is not going to come. For example, when there are factors like threads, weaver's shaft, and other factors, one finds that the effect viz. the cloth comes into being. Thereafter, again when some one is in need of cloth, he says go and fetch threads. It is not the case that the relation of cause-and-effect is determined between seven threads and the action of their fetching. Neither there is something called apurva by which one can say that the instruction has become fruitful. In this way, as per the above mentioned logic it is not proper to hold that, words are dependable since they express their meanings.

[४. विवक्षासूचकत्वेन शब्दप्रामाण्यं स्वीकुर्वतां मतस्य खण्डनम्।]

[4. vivakṣāsūcakatvena śabdaprāmāṇyam svīkūrvatām matasya khaṇḍanam.]

Text: 1289

अथ विवक्षासूचकत्वेन लिङ्गभूतस्य प्रामाण्यम्। तदुक्तम्- “विवक्षाप्रभवा हि शब्दाः तामेव संसूचयेयुः” इति।

atha vivakṣāsūcakatvena liṅgabhūtasya prāmāṇyam. taduktam- “vivakṣāprabhavā hi śabdāḥ tāmeva saṁsūcayeyuḥ” iti.

Translation: 1289

Clarification:

Well, a sentence becomes authoritative because they become the ground to indicate the intention of the speaker. “As it has been said words emerge out of intention of the speaker and therefore, they point towards those intended meanings.”

Text: 1290

तदेतदयुक्तम्, यथा हेतुफलभावो नास्ति सौगते मते तथा प्रागेव प्रपञ्चितम्।

tadetadayuktam, yathā hetuphalabhāvo nāsti saugate mate tathā prāgeva prapañcitam.

Translation: 1290

Reply:

This is not proper. That it has no cause-and-effect relationship according to the Buddhist philosophy, has already been explained before.

[५. साधुपदादर्थप्रतिपत्तिं वर्णयतां वैयाकरणानां मतस्य निरासः।]

[5. sādhipadaādarthapratipattiṁ varṇayatāṁ vaiyākaraṇānām matasya nirāsaḥ.]

Text: 1291

अन्ये तु साधुपदशब्दादर्थप्रतिपत्तिं वर्णयन्ति। साधुत्वं च लक्षणयोगित्वेन। लक्षणं च सूत्राण्येव, लक्ष्यं गौरित्यादिपदम्।

anye tu sādhipadaśabdādarthapratipattiṁ varṇayanti. sādhitvaṁ ca lakṣaṇayogitvena. lakṣaṇam ca sūtrāṇyeva, lakṣyam gaurityādi-padam.

Translation: 1291

Other philosophers say that, an understanding of the meaning arises from a sentence containing grammatically correct words. Grammaticality is to be tested in terms of the rules of grammar. The word lakṣaṇa stands for grammatical rules and lakṣya refers to the word cow etc.

Text: 1292

अथ किमिदं नाम यल्लक्षणेन परमर्षिगदितेन सूत्रकलापेन लक्ष्यते? किं गकारादयो वर्णाः, वर्णेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं वा पदं स्फोटरूपम्?

atha kimidaṁ nāma yallakṣaṇena paramarṣigaditena sūtrakalāpena lakṣyate? kiṁ gākārādayo varṇāḥ, varṇebhyo 'rthāntaram vā padaṁ sphoṭarūpam?

Translation: 1292

Objection:

Well, what is that which is described by a set of rules uttered by the great sage? Is it the case that the phonemes such as 'g' etc. are described, or, something different from the phonemes viz. word called sphota is described?

Text: 1293

तद्यदि वर्णाः; ते किं नित्याः सन्तः

tadyadi varṇāḥ; te kiṁ nityāḥ santāḥ

Translation: 1293

Reply: If you say, phonemes are described, are they called a word since they are permanent, or, since they are produced?

Text: 1294

पदसंज्ञा भवन्ति, उत उपजननधर्मकाः? तद्यदि नित्याः कूटस्थाः सन्तो वर्णाः पदसंज्ञा भवन्ति; तत्र किं व्यस्ताः, समुदिता वा?

padasañjñā bhavanti, uta upajanana dharmakāḥ? tadyadi nityāḥ kūṭasthāḥ santo varṇāḥ padasamjñā bhavanti; tatra kiṁ vyastāḥ, samuditā vā?

Translation: 1294

If you say that, they are permanent, the phonemes become words, I would like to know, whether individually they are called so, or, collectively?

Text: 1295

तद्यदि व्यस्ताः; सनातना एते पदसंज्ञा भवन्ति, तदा गवर्णेनैव केवलेन गोऽर्थप्रतिपादनं क्रियते, ओकारेण वा अर्थप्रतिपादनं क्रियते। ततश्च पूर्वापरवर्णोच्चारणार्थक्यम्। न चात्रैकस्मिन् वर्णे विभक्त्यन्तता अस्ति, अपि तु वर्णकदम्बके विभक्त्युत्पादाभ्युपगमात्।
tadyadi vyastāḥ; sanātanā ete padasamjñā bhavanti, tadā gavarṇe-naiva kevalena go'rthapratipādanam kriyate, okāreṇa vā artha-pratipādanam kriyate. tataśca pūrvāparavarṇocchāraṇānarthakyam. na cātraikasmin varṇe vibhaktyantatā asti, api tu varṇakadambake vibhaktyutpādābhyupagamāt.

Translation: 1295

If you say, collectively, then, the question arises whether being permanent they become word, or, whether by mere the phoneme 'g' the meaning of cow is conveyed, or, by the phoneme 'o' the meaning is conveyed? If it is so, then, the utterance of the phonemes before and after becomes purposeless. It is also not the case that individual phonemes end in case terminations because case suffixes are added only after the group of phonemes i.e. a word.

Text: 1296

अथ समुदितानां पदसंज्ञा। तदयु(दु)क्तम् - “बहूनां संघातशब्दवाच्यत्वम्, न ह्येकस्मिन् संघातशब्दप्रयोगोऽस्ति, अपि तु गकारौकारविसर्जनीयेषु समुदायशब्दः प्रयुज्यते।” तदयुक्तम्, वर्णानां नानाता विद्यते। वर्णो हि अवर्णात् वर्णात्मतया व्यावर्त्तते वर्णान्तरात्तु कथं व्यावर्त्तते? किं वर्णाकारतया अवर्णात्मतया वा?

atha samuditānām padasamjñā. tadayu(du)ktam-“bahūnām saṅghā-taśabdavācyaṭvam, na hyekasmin saṅghātaśabdaprayogo'sti, api tu gākārauḥkāravisarjanīyeṣu samudāyaśabdaḥ prayujyate.” tadayuktam, varṇānām nānātā vidyate. varṇo hi avarṇāt varṇātmatayā vyāvarttate varṇāntarāttu katham vyāvarttate? kim varṇākāratayā avarṇātmatayā vā?

Translation: 1296

If you say that, the collection of phonemes will be called a word, that will also not be proper, because, when there are many phonemes it should be called mere a collection of phonemes. The word collection is not used with reference to one. But the word collection can be

used only to collection of phonemes in the sequence of 'g + o + visarga'. It is also not proper. The plurality of the phonemes exists. One phoneme can be distinguished from something which is not a phoneme, but how it can be distinguished from other phoneme? Is it going to be distinguished in the form of a phoneme, or, in the form of something which is not a phoneme?

Text: 1297

तद्यदि वर्णाकारतया व्यावर्त्तते; तदाऽन्येषां वर्णरूपता न प्राप्नोति नीरतीरादेरिव।
tadyadi varṇākāratayā vyāvarttate; tadā'nyeṣāṃ varṇarūpatā na prāpnoti nīratīrāderiva.

Translation: 1297

If you say, it is distinguished in the form of a phoneme it will mean that other phonemes are not phonemes. Like water and bank of the river.

Text: 1298

अथ अवर्णात्मतया व्यावर्त्तते; तदा(ऽ)वर्णात्मता व्यावर्त्तते उक्तानामिव ततश्चैक एव वर्णात्मा जगति सञ्जातः। तस्य गोऽर्थवाचकत्वं न युज्यते सुप् विभक्त्यनुपपत्तेः।
atha avarṇātmatayā vyāvarttate; tadā(ṣ)varṇātmata vyāvarttate uktānāmiva tataścaika eva varṇātmā jagati sañjātaḥ. tasya go'rthavācakatvaṃ na yujyate sup vibhaktyanupapatteḥ.

Translation: 1298

If you say that, they are distinguished as something other than phoneme, then, what has been distinguished is the state of not being a phoneme as stated above. Thereby, one will have to accept that there is only one phoneme in this world. But that cannot be accepted as expressive of the meaning cow, because after that no case suffix can be added.

Text: 1299

नापि वर्णानां नित्यत्वप्रत्यायकं प्रमाणमस्ति, एवं प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यप्रतिपादनात्। तीव्रमन्दात्मतया गवर्णस्य नानात्वोपलब्धेः गकारोऽपि भेदवान् न गकारे(रै)कत्वम्।
nāpi varṇānāṃ nityatvapratyāyakaṃ pramāṇamasti, evaṃ pratya-kṣādīnāmaprāmāṇyapratipādanāt. tīvramandātmatayā gavarṇasya nānātvopalabdheḥ gākāro'pi bhedavān na gākāre(rai)katvam.

Translation: 1299

Moreover, there is no proof which can cause the knowledge of eternity of phonemes. It has already been explained that proofs like perception etc. are all not dependable. Moreover, we experience sometimes the 'g' sound as sharp and sometimes as soft and therefore one will have to posit many 'g' sounds and therefore, it is not true that the phoneme 'g' is only one.

Text: 1300

अथ व्यञ्जकवशेन तीव्रमन्दादिबुद्धेरुत्पत्तिः। न गवर्णस्य भेदोऽस्ति; तदयुक्तम्, गवर्ण एव प्रतीयते तीव्रमन्दाद्यात्मतया न व्यञ्जकानि गवर्णबुद्धिर्वा।

atha vyañjakavaśena tīvramandādibuddherutpattiḥ. na gavarṇasya bhedo'sti; tadayuktam, gavarṇa eva pratīyate tīvramandādyātmatayā na vyañjakāni gavarṇabuddhirvā.

Translation: 1300

If you say, the perception of softness, sharpness arises due to some other revealing factor and there is no difference in the phoneme called 'g', it will not be proper, because, what is realized is only the phoneme as soft and sharp and neither the revealing factors nor the knowledge of the sound 'g'.

Text: 1301

यदि व्यञ्जकभेदेन तीव्रमन्दादिभेदपरिकल्पितः क्रियते गवर्णात्मा तु न भिद्यते; तदा गकारादिविभागोऽपि व्यञ्जकभेदनिबन्धनोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, वर्णात्मा त्वेक एव। ततश्च गवार्थप्रतिपत्तिर्न प्राप्नोति एकस्मिन् वर्णे सुप् विभक्त्यनुपपत्तेः।

yadi vyañjakabhedenā tīvramandādibhedaparikṛptiḥ kriyate gavarṇātmā tu na bhidyate; tadā gakarādivibhāgo'pi vyañjakabhedanibandhanābhyupagantavyaḥ, varṇātmā tveka eva. tataśca gavārthapratipattirna prāpnoti ekasmin varṇe sup vibhaktyanupapatteḥ.

Translation: 1301

If you say that, due to the revealing factors, there arises the difference viz. sharp and soft but the phoneme 'g' is not changed, then, the different phonemes like 'g' etc. should also be accepted due to the difference in the revealing factor. The form of phoneme being only one. That will again result in the contingency of not

going the knowledge of meaning of cow, because, to one phoneme it is not possible to add case-suffixes.

Text: 1302

किञ्च, भिन्नाकारतया प्रतीयमानस्य यद्येकत्वमभ्युपगम्यते; नानेकं जगत् स्यात्, अभिन्नात्मके च जगति मानमेयव्यवस्थैव हीयते। न च नित्यस्य अनुपजातविकारस्य विज्ञानोदयदानसामर्थ्यमस्ति।

kiñca, bhinnākāratayā pratīyamānasya yadyekatvamabhyupagamyate; nānekam jagat syāt, abhinnātmake ca jagati mānameyavyavasthaiva hīyate. na ca nityasya anupajātavikārasya vijñānodayadānasāmarthyamasti.

Translation: 1302

Moreover, if you say that, even if they appear in different form, they are treated as one, then, the whole world should be only one and as a consequence of it there will no provision for any distinction between *pramāṇa* (process of knowing) and *prameya* (object of knowledge) because, the entire world will be converted into one entity. An entity which is eternal and which has not undergone any change, has no capacity to generate its knowledge.

Text: 1303

अथ क्रियते; किमनुपजातातिशयेन वा, अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन वा, व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन वा?

atha kriyate; kimanupajātātīśayena vā, avyatiriktōpajātātīśayena vā, vyatiriktōpajātātīśayena vā?

Translation: 1303

If you hold that, it produces in spite of that knowledge, we would like to know whether it produces without any excellence emerging in it, or, due to emerging of excellence, not different from it, or, due to emergence of excellence different from it.

Text: 1304

तद्यदि अनुपजातातिशयेन क्रियते; तदा सर्वदा कुर्यात् एकस्मिन् वा काले कुर्यात् तद्देहमात्रानुबन्धेना(न) कालविलम्बनायोगात्।

tadyadi anupajātātīśayena kriyate; tadā sarvadā kuryāt ekasmin vā kāle kuryāt taddehamātrānubandhenā(na) kālavilambanāyogāt.

Translation: 1304

If you say, it produces without any excellence emerging in it, then, it should always keep on producing, or, it can produce only once because, in that form there is no possibility of delay in time.

Text: 1305

अथ अव्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन क्रियते; तथापि सनातना वर्णाः, अव्यतिरिक्तातिशय-
करणपक्षे स एवोपजायते, फलानिष्पत्तिकरणस्वरूपाऽनतिवृत्तेः।

atha avyatiiriktōpajātātīśayena kriyate; tathāpi sanātanā varṇāḥ, avyatiiriktātīśayakaraṇapakṣe sa evopajāyate, phalāniṣpattikaraṇa-svarūpā'nativṛtṭeḥ.

Translation: 1305

If you say that, it produces due to emerging of excellence not different from it, still, the phonemes will remain eternal and in the view that there is excellence not different from itself, the same will come into being because it will not be free from its form of not producing the result.

Text: 1306

अथ व्यतिरिक्तोपजातातिशयेन क्रियते; तस्यातिशयः कथम्? यो यस्य केनापि सम्बन्धेन
न सं(०न्धेन सं) बन्ध्यते स तस्यातिशयः।

atha vyatiiriktōpajātātīśayena kriyate; tasyātīśayaḥ katham? yo yasya kenāpi sambandhena na saṁ(0ndhena saṁ) bandhyate sa tasyātīśayaḥ.

Translation: 1306

If you say, it produces due to emerging of excellence different from itself, then, how can it be called excellence of that? Because, an excellence has to be that which is related to that by some relation.

Text: 1307

यदि च अन्तर्हितवर्णस्मरणविशिष्टोऽन्त्यो वर्णः पदम्; तस्यापि स्मरणकाले तिरोहित-
त्वादवाचकत्वम् - “तस्य व्यञ्जकानां क्षणिकत्वात् क्षणोपलब्धिः” इति वचनात्।

*yadi cāntarhitavarṇasmarāṇaviśiṣṭo'ntyō varṇaḥ padam; tasyāpi smaraṇakāle tirohitatvādavācakatvam-“tasya vyañjakānām kṣaṇi-
katvāt kṣaṇopalabdhīḥ” iti vacanāt.*

Translation: 1307

If you say that, the last phoneme in the sequence qualified by the remembrance of the phonemes which have disappeared, is what is called a word, then, that also will become inexpressive of meaning because, that also will disappear at the time of remembrance. There is a statement to the effect viz. "since the revealing phonemes are momentary in nature, only momentary phoneme can be known."

Text: 1308

यदि वर्णा व्यञ्जकैर्व्यज्यन्ते तदा समानदेशावस्थितं समानेन्द्रियग्राह्याणां प्रतिनियत-
व्यञ्जकत्वेनेष्टम् एकान्तर्गतोदककनकादीनां वदन्ति वैशेषिकाः।

*yadi varṇā vyañjakairvyajyante tadā samānadeśāvasthitam samā-
nendriyagrāhyāṇām pratiniyatavyañjakatveneṣṭam ekāntargato-
dakakanakādīnām vadanti vaiśeṣikāḥ.(?)*

Translation: 1308

If you say that, the phonemes are revealed by revealing factors then, (.....the text is not clear).

Text: 1309

अथ अनित्या वर्णाः पदसंज्ञा भवन्तीति चेत्; तत्रापि किं व्यस्ताः, समस्ता वा?

*atha anityā varṇāḥ padasamjñā bhavantīti cet; tatrāpi kiṁ vyastāḥ,
samastā vā?*

Translation: 1309

If you say that, non-eternal phonemes are called a morpheme, there also we would like to know whether individually they are called so, or, in a collection.

Text: 1310

तद्यदि व्यस्ताः; तदा गकारौकारविसर्जनीयान्यतमे वर्णे न विभक्त्युत्पादोऽस्ति, उत्पादे वा
एको वर्णः वाचकः स्यात्-वर्णान्तरोच्चारणानर्थक्यम्।

*tadyadi vyastāḥ; tadā gākāraukāravisarjanīyānyatame varṇe na
vibhaktiyutpādo'sti, utpāde vā eko varṇaḥ vācakaḥ syāt-varṇāntaro-
ccāraṇānarthakyaṁ.*

Translation: 1310

If you say, individually they are called morpheme, then, no case suffix is found added, or, can be added after any one phoneme viz.

either 'g', or, 'au', or, 'visarga'. And if you say that, in spite of that it can be added, then, you will have to accept that a single phoneme will become the expressive of a meaning and not only that, the utterance of other phonemes will become redundant.

Text: 1311

अथ वर्णसमुदायः पदम्; प्रतिक्षणध्वंसिनां समुदायार्थो वक्तव्यः, बहूनामवस्थितरूपाणां समुदायो लोके दृष्टः, न च वर्णानां भूयस्त्वमस्ति उक्तान्न्यायात्। किञ्च अन्त्यवर्णग्रहणानन्तरं पूर्ववर्णस्मरणम्, पूर्ववर्णस्मरणानन्तरम् अन्त्यवर्णे ज्ञानम्, ततश्चास्य अर्थप्रतिपत्तिकाले पदं [न] विद्यते तेनाऽपदिकाऽर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्।

atha varṇasamudāyaḥ padam; pratikṣaṇadhvaṁsinām samudāyārtho vaktavyaḥ, bahūnāmavasthitarūpāṇāṁ samudāyo loke dr̥ṣṭaḥ, na ca varṇānām bhūyastvamasti uktānnyāyāt. kiñca antyavarṇagrahaṇānantaraṁ pūrvavarṇasmarāṇam, pūrvavarṇasmarāṇānantaram antyavarṇe jñānam, tataścāsyā arthapratipattikāle padam [na] vidyate tenā'padikā'rthapratipattiḥ syāt.

Translation: 1311

If you say that, collection of phonemes, is a morpheme, then, you should tell us what is the meaning of collection when every moment the phonemes gets destroyed. In the world of our experience we find a collection of many things which continue to exist. On the basis of the above maxim, we cannot say that there are many phonemes. Moreover, after the hearing of the last phoneme, there will be remembrance of the earlier phonemes and after the remembrance of earlier phonemes, there will be the knowledge of the last phoneme. And thus, at the time of the meaning, no morpheme will be available and therefore, such a knowledge of meaning will become something which is not caused by any morpheme.

Text: 1312

न च कार्यरूपता वर्णानां विद्यते। सती सत्ता संवेद्यते। विज्ञानोत्पत्तेः पूर्वं वेद्यस्य सत्ता, पश्चाद्विज्ञानम्। तद्वेद्यं किम्-अधुनोत्पन्नं विषयतां याति, चिरोत्पन्नम्, अनुत्पन्नं वा? नालमालोचयितुं ज्ञानम्, तत्स्वरूपमात्रास्तित्वविधायकत्वेन तदुत्पत्तेः।

na ca kāryarūpatā varṇānām vidyate. satī sattā samvedyate. vijñānotpatteḥ pūrvam vedyasya sattā, paścādvijñānam. tadvedyam

kim-adhunotpannamḥ viṣayatām yāti, cirotpannam, anutpannamḥ vā? nālamālocayitum jñānam, tatsvarūpamātrāstitvavidhāyakatvena tadutpatteḥ.

Translation: 1312

It is also not the case that, the phonemes are produced. Only that existence can be crossed which exists, before the knowledge arises that which is to be known has to exist. And later that can be known. There the question arises, what is that which is known? Is it the case that what is produced just now, becomes the object of that knowledge, or, that which was already produced becomes the object of knowledge, or, that which is not produced becomes the object of knowledge? We cannot discuss about the knowledge because, it arises as merely a pointer to show the existence of that form.

Text: 1313

न च तत्कारणं विद्यते।

na ca tatkāraṇam vidyate.

Translation: 1313

We do not see any cause of its production either.

Text: 1314

ननु प्रयत्नादिकं विद्यते;

nanu prayatnādikam vidyate;

Translation: 1314

Clarification:

Well there are efforts to produce.

Text: 1315

तद्युक्तम्, तेषां प्रयत्नादीनां स्वरूपं कथं गृह्यते—किं सत्तामात्रेण, कारकत्वेन वा?

tadayuktam, teṣāṃ prayatnādīnāṃ svarūpaṃ katham grhyate—kiṃ sattāmātreṇa, kāraakatvena vā?

Translation: 1315

Reply:

That is not proper. How do you come to know the nature of those efforts? Do you know only by mere existence, or, because they take part in producing an effect.

Text: 1316

तद्यदि सत्तामात्रेण; तदा जनकं रूपं न स्यात्।

tadyadi sattāmātreṇa; tadā janakaṁ rūpaṁ na syāt.

Translation: 1316

If you say, by mere existence, then, that cannot be taken as a cause.

Text: 1317

अथ कारकत्वेन गृह्यते; किम् आत्मजनकत्वेन, आहोस्विद् अन्यजनकत्वेन?

atha kārakatvena gr̥hyate; kim ātmajanakatvena, āhosvid anyajanakatvena?

Translation: 1317

If you say, as a producer of an effect, there we would like to know, whether it produces its own form, or, does it produce something other than itself.

Text: 1318

तद्यदि आत्मजनकत्वेन गृह्यते; तदात्मा तेनोत्पाद्यते न वर्णः।

tadyadi ātmajanakatvena gr̥hyate; tadātmā tenotpādyate na varṇaḥ.

Translation: 1318

If you say, it is known as it produces itself, then, it means that, the same is produced by that and not the phoneme.

Text: 1319

अथ अन्यजनकत्वेन अवधार्यते; तदा अन्यस्य सत्ता सिद्धा। तर्ह्या(नह्या)क्षिप्तान्यसद्भाव एव सद्भावोऽस्याध्यवसीयते, ततः तत्समानकालीनत्वेन हेतुफलभावाऽसिद्धिः।

atha anyajanakatvena avadhāryate; tadā anyasya sattā siddhā. tarhyā(nahyā)kṣiptānyasadbhāva eva sadbhāvo'syādhyavasīyate, tataḥ tatsamānakālīnatvena hetuphalabhāvā'siddhiḥ.

Translation: 1319

If you say that, it is known as it produces something, then, it will establish existence of something else. In that case, then, one will come to know that, it exists only after one knows that something else exists and in that case, both will be of the same time, and hence the cause-and-effect relationship between them cannot be established.

Text: 1320

किञ्च, पूर्वापरभावेन हेतुफलभावः, किं वा पूर्वापरग्रहणेन?

kiñca, pūrvāparabhāvena hetuphalabhāvaḥ, kiṃ vā pūrvāparagrahaṇena?

Translation: 1320

Moreover, should we decide cause and effect relationship on the basis of a sequence of prior and later, or, on the basis of knowledge of prior and later.

Text: 1321

तद्यदि पूर्वापरभावेन हेतुफलभावः; तदा ज्ञानं विना 'अस्ति' कथं ज्ञायते? ज्ञानाभावे-
नाऽज्ञाने किं पूर्वोत्पन्नौ सहोत्पन्नौ वा?

tadyadi pūrvāparabhāvena hetuphalabhāvaḥ; tadā jñānaṃ vinā 'asti' katham jñāyate? jñānābhāvenā'jñāne kiṃ pūrvotpannau sahotpannau vā?

Translation: 1321

If you say, the basis of prior and later is cause and relationship, then, without knowledge, how can you say that it exists? Well, the knowledge does not arise, when there is absence of knowledge, how to say that they are produced before, or, they are produced together.

Text: 1322

अथ पूर्वापरग्रहणेन हेतुफलभावव्यवस्था इति; तदयुक्तम्, अनियतं ग्रहणं दृष्टम्-कार्यं
दृष्ट्वा कारणं गृह्णाति, कारणं दृष्ट्वा कार्यं गृह्णाति, उभयं च युगपद् गृह्णाति। एवं
च स्थिते न हेतुफलभावविनिश्चयोऽस्ति। तदभावान्नाऽनित्या वर्णाः पदं भवितुमर्हति।
atha pūrvāparagrahaṇena hetuphalabhāvavyavasthā iti; tadayuktam, aniyataṃ grahaṇaṃ dr̥ṣṭam-kāryaṃ dr̥ṣṭvā kāraṇaṃ gr̥hṇāti, kāraṇaṃ dr̥ṣṭvā kāryaṃ gr̥hṇāti, ubhayaṃ ca yugapat gr̥hṇāti. evaṃ ca sthite na hetuphalabhāvaviniścayo'sti. tadabhāvānnā'nityā varṇāḥ padaṃ bhavitumarhati.

Translation: 1322

If you say that, with knowledge of prior and later, the cause and effect relationship can be decided, that is also not proper, because we do not see consistent knowledge about it. Sometimes after seeing

the effect one comes to know the cause, sometimes having seen the cause, one comes to know the effect and sometimes both are known as cause and effect. When such is the case, one cannot decide cause and effect relationship. And when there is no cause and effect relationship, we cannot hold that the non-eternal phonemes can be called a morpheme.

Text: 1323

अथ वर्णेभ्योऽर्थान्तरभूतं पदं वर्णव्यङ्ग्यस्फोटरूपमभ्युपगम्यते।

atha varṇebhyo'rthāntarabhūtaṁ padaṁ varṇavyaṅgyasphoṭarūpamabhyupagamyate.

Translation: 1323

Well, a morpheme distinct from the phonemes of the nature of a concept, suggested by the phonemes, is accepted.

Text: 1324

वर्णानां किल अर्थप्रत्यायकत्वं व्यस्तसमस्तानां सम्भवति, अस्ति च सा अर्थप्रतिपत्तिः तेन अर्थान्तरभूतं वर्णेभ्यः पदं विद्मः। अभिन्नाकारा च प्रतिपत्तिर्वर्णेष्वनुपपन्ना तेन वर्णेभ्यो भिन्नम् अभिन्नाकारं पदमध्यवसीयते।

varṇānām kila arthapratyāyakatvaṁ vyastasamastānām sambhavati, asti ca sā arthapratipattiḥ tena arthāntarabhūtaṁ varṇebhyaḥ padaṁ vidmaḥ. abhinnākārā ca pratipattirvarṇeṣvanupapannā tena varṇebhyo bhinnam abhinnākāraṁ padamadyavasīyate.

Translation: 1324

The phonemes independently, or, in a collection convey meanings and we do have understanding of such meaning and therefore, we understand a morpheme as distinct from the phonemes. It is not proper to say that, there arises the knowledge of identity with the phonemes and therefore, in a morpheme having an identical form but different from phonemes is accepted.

Text: 1325

यत्तावदुक्तम् - “अर्थप्रतिपत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या पदमवगम्यते” तदयुक्तम्, अर्थापत्तेः प्रामाण्यमेव नास्ति। यथा च न विद्यते तथा प्रागेव प्रपञ्चितम्।

yattāvaduktam - “arthapratipatyanyathānupapatyā padamavagamyate” tadayuktam, arthāpatteḥ prāmāṅyameva nāsti. yathā ca na vidyate tathā prāgeva prapañcitam.

Translation: 1325

“You had said a morpheme is accepted because without that the knowledge of meaning cannot be explained”. But this is not proper, because, we had already shown that pre-supposition is not a valid means of knowing. How it cannot be accepted as the valid means of knowing, has already been discussed before.

Text: 1326

न च पदेन सह प्रतिबद्धा अर्थप्रतिपत्तिः अवगतपूर्वा येन अन्यकारणपरिहारेण पदं बोधयति। प्रत्यक्षं च प्रमाणमेव न भवति। कथं तत् पदप्रतिपादनाय अलम्? न च नित्यस्य विज्ञानाद्यर्थक्रियाकरणसामर्थ्यमस्ति। एवं लक्ष्यभूतं पदं न विद्यते। तदभावाच्चिर्विषयं पारमार्थ(मर्ष) लक्षणमिति।

na ca padena saha pratibaddhā arthapratipattiḥ avagatapūrvā yena anyakāraṇaparihāreṇa padam̐ bodhayati. pratyakṣam̐ ca pramāṇameva na bhavati. katham̐ tat padapratipādanāya alam? na ca nityasya vijñānādyarthakriyākaraṇasāmarthyamasti. evam̐ lakṣyabhūtam̐ padam̐ na vidyate. tadabhāvānnirviṣayam̐ pāramārtham̐(marṣam̐) lakṣaṇamiti.

Translation: 1326

It is not our experience that, the knowledge of meaning arises invariably in association with a morpheme. Had it been so, we could have said that, since there is no other factor responsible for such an understanding, it is the morpheme that causes the knowledge of the meaning. Perception cannot be the valid means in this respect because, it is not a valid means at all. Then how is it capable of causing the knowledge of a morpheme? It is not the case that, a permanent entity has the capacity to generate any function such as cognition etc. Thus, there is nothing called a morpheme which needs to be defined and when that is not there its definition is not left with any object.

Text: 1327

अपि च, यानि लक्षणपराणि सूत्राणि तेषां लक्षणं विद्यते, न वा? यदि विद्यते; तत्रापि अन्यद् अत्रापि इत्यनिष्ठायां च न किञ्चित् पदं ज्ञानं(तं) स्यात्।

api ca, yāni lakṣaṇaparāṇi sūtrāṇi teṣāṃ lakṣaṇaṃ vidyate, na vā? yadi vidyate; atrāpi anyad atrāpi ityanīṣṭhāyāṃ ca na kiñcit padaṃ jñānam(tam) syāt.

Translation: 1327

Moreover, what you consider to be the definition-rules, whether there is any definition of them, or, not? If you say, there is, then, there also should be definition of that and in this way, it will lead to endless regress and as a consequence, no pada, or, morpheme can ever be known.

Text: 1328

अथ न विद्यते; किमेवं तर्हि तेषां साधुत्वं न विद्यते?

atha na vidyate; kimevaṃ tarhi teṣāṃ sādhutvaṃ na vidyate?

Translation: 1328

If you say, there are no definitions, or, rules, then, does it mean that they are not grammatically correct?

Text: 1329

अथ लक्षणाभावेऽपि तेषां साधुत्वं विद्यते; एवं गावी-गोणी-गोपुत्तलिकेत्येवमादीनामपि अपभ्रंसा(शा)नां लक्षणाभावेऽपि साधुत्वं भविष्यति।

atha lakṣaṇābhāve'pi teṣāṃ sādhutvaṃ vidyate; evaṃ gāvī-goṇī-goputtaliketyevamādīnāmapi apabhraṃsā(śā)nāṃ lakṣaṇābhāve'pi sādhutvaṃ bhaviṣyati.

Translation: 1329

If you say that, even if there are no rules of grammar and still they are grammatically correct, then, the ordinary dialectical forms such as gāvī, goṇī, goputtalika and the like which are known as apabhraṃśa words should also be declared as grammatically correct in the absence of any rules for them.

Text: 1330

अथ लक्षणाभावान्न गाव्यादीनां साधुत्वम्; तदा सूत्रपदानामपि तदभावादेव असाधुत्वम्।

atha lakṣaṇābhāvānna gāvyaādīnāṃ sādhutvam; tadā sūtrapadānāmapi tadabhāvādeva asādhutvam.

Translation: 1330

If you say, the words like gavi etc. are not accepted as standard grammatical forms, because, there are no grammatical rules to

explain them, then, the words of the rules of Pāṇini should also be declared as ungrammatical because, there are no rules for them.

Text: 1331

अपि च, यदि नाम लक्षणविकलता शब्दस्य; तदा किं भवति? किमुच्चारयितुर्मुखभङ्गः सम्पद्यते, शब्दस्य वा अवाचकत्वम्, अर्थस्य वा रूपविपर्यासो जायते, किं वा अपशब्द-प्रतिपादितार्थस्य अर्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वं हीयते, अपशब्दोच्चारणे सति अमङ्गलोदयो वा भवति? *api ca, yadi nāma lakṣaṇavikalatā śabdasya; tadā kiṃ bhavati? kimuccārayiturmukhabhaṅgaḥ sampadyate, śabdasya vā avācakatvam, arthasya vā rūpaviparyāso jāyate, kiṃ vā apaśabda-pratipāditārthasya arthakriyākartṛtvaṃ hīyate, apaśabdoccāraṇe sati amaṅgalodayo vā bhavati?*

Translation: 1331

Moreover, if you say, a word does not have any rule to explain it, what happens? Does the vocal cavity of the speaker break, or, the word becomes inexpressive, or, meaning gets distorted, or, the meaning obtained from an ungrammatical word does not cause its function, or, is it the case that, if someone utters ungrammatical word, something inauspicious takes place?

Text: 1332

तद्यदि तावत् प्रवक्तृमुखभङ्गो भवति गावीशब्दोच्चारणे सति; तदैते बहुलं गावीशब्दोच्चारणं कुर्वाणाः समुपलभ्यन्ते प्रवक्तारः, न च तेषां मुखभङ्गः समुपलभ्यते।

tadyadi tāvat pravakṭṛmukhabhaṅgo bhavati gāvīśabdoccāraṇe sati; tadaite bahulaṃ gāvīśabdoccāraṇaṃ kurvāṇāḥ samupalabhyante pravaktārah, na ca teṣāṃ mukhabhaṅgaḥ samupalabhyate.

Translation: 1332

If you say, the vocal cavity of the speaker breaks, when he utters the word gāvī, in the sense of cow, it is not true because, innumerable speakers are found uttering the word gāvī, but nobody's vocal cavity is seen to have broken.

Text: 1333

अथ गावीशब्दस्य वाचकत्वं नोपपद्यते; तदयुक्तम्, गावीशब्देन बहुलं व्याहरन्ति प्रमातारः। *atha gāvīśabdasya vācakatvaṃ nopapadyate; tadayuktam, gāvīśabdena bahulaṃ vyāharanti pramātārah.*

Translation: 1333

If you say that, the word *gāvī* is not expressive of its meaning, which is not proper, because, innumerable knowers use the word *gāvī*.

Text: 1334

अथ गोऽर्थप्रतिपित्सूनां गावीशब्दश्रवणानन्तरं गोशब्दे स्मृतिरुपजायते स च गवाद्यर्थवाचक इति चेत्;

atha go'rthapratipitsūnāṃ gāvīśabdaśravaṇānantaraṃ gośabde smṛtirupajāyate sa ca gavādyarthavācaka iti cet;

Translation: 1334

Clarification:

Well, those who want to know the meaning 'cow', remember the word 'go' after hearing the word *gāvī*, because, it is the word 'go' which is expressive of the word 'cow'.

Text: 1335

तदयुक्तम्, म्लेच्छादीनां साधुशब्दपरिज्ञानाभावात् कथं तद्विषया स्मृतिः? तदभावे न गोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्।

tadayuktam, mlecchādīnāṃ sādhuśabdaparijñānābhāvāt katham tadvishaya smṛtiḥ? tadabhāve na go'rthapratipattiḥ syāt.

Translation: 1335

Reply:

It is not proper. The tribals do not have the knowledge of standard grammatical form and so how can they remember the word 'go' and in absence of remembrance, they should not have the knowledge of cow from the word *gāvī* (which is contrary to the fact)

Text: 1336

अथ अर्थस्य रूपविपर्यासो भवति; तदयुक्तम्, न गावीशब्देन अभिधीयमानस्य गोरूपता व्यावर्तमाना दृष्टा।

atha arthasya rūpaviparyāso bhavati; tadayuktam, na gāvīśabdena abhidhīyamānasya gorūpatā vyāvarttamānā dṛṣṭā.

Translation: 1336

If you say that, the meaning gets distorted, that is also not proper. Nobody has seen that what is expressed by the word '*gāvī*', is not a cow.

Text: 1337

अथ अर्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वं हीयते; तदयुक्तम्, गावीशब्देन अभिधीयमानस्य वाहदोहप्रसव-
सामर्थ्यं नातिवर्तते गोपिण्डस्य।

*atha arthakriyākartṛtvam hīyate; tadayuktam, gāvīśabdena abhidhī-
yamānasya vāhadohaprasavasāmarthyam nātivartate gopiṇḍasya.*

Translation: 1337

If you say, it does not cause the function viz activities related to the cow, it will not be proper, because, whatever is conveyed by the word 'gāvī', is the animal called cow, which is not devoid of capacity of carrying load, milking and giving birth to a calf.

Text: 1338

अथ गावीशब्दोच्चारणदमङ्गलोदयो भवति, न तु वाचकत्वं निराक्रियते असाधुशब्दस्य।
तदुक्तम्-

अपशब्दोऽनुमानेन वाचकः कैश्चिदिष्यते।

वाचकत्वाद्विशेषेऽपि नियमः पुण्यपापयोः॥

*atha gāvīśabdoccāraṇādamaṅgalodayo bhavati, na tu vācakatvaṁ
nirākriyate asādhuśabdasya. taduktam-*

apaśabdo 'numānena vācakaḥ kaiścidiṣyate,

vācakatvā 'viśeṣe 'pi niyamah puṇyapāpayoḥ.

Translation: 1338

If you think that by uttering the word 'gāvī' something inauspicious is going to take place, and you are not denying the fact that an ungrammatical non-standard form also expresses its meaning as it is supported by the following statement, "Some thinkers conclude by inference that, a non-standard ungrammatical word also expresses its meaning, although there is no difference so far as its expressive character is concerned, a grammatical form leads to something auspicious that is meritorious and an ungrammatical form leads to something inauspicious, or, demeritorious."

Text: 1339

तदयुक्तम्, तेन सह प्रतिबन्धाभावात्। न चापोस्तित्वग्राहकं(?) प्रमाणमस्ति। अन्यथैव
काले च न म्लेच्चि[त]व्यमिति नियमोऽभ्युपगम्यते। न च शुद्धम्, अन्यत्र पण्डितानामपि
व्यवहारोदयदानदर्शनात्।

*tadayuktam, tena saha pratibandhābhāvāt. na cāpostitvagrā-
hakaṁ(?) pramāṇamasti. anyathaiva kāle ca na mlecci[ta]vyamiti
niyamo'bhyupagamya. na ca śuddham, anyatra paṇḍitānāmapī
vyavahārodayadānadarśanāt.*

Translation: 1339

That is also not proper, because, there is no invariable relationship with merit and demerit. There is no proof to support it. At times, the injunction, “One should not use dialectical and non-standard form” is interpreted differently. It is not correct, because, even the learned people are seen to entertain such usage.

0.16 ग्रन्थोपसंहारः

Granthopasamhārah

(Conclusion)

Text: 1340

तदेवमुपप्लुतेश्वेव तत्त्वेषु अविचारितरमणीयाः सर्वे व्यवहारा घटन्त इति।

ये याता नहि गोचरं सुरगुरोः बुद्धेर्विकल्पा दृढाः,
प्राप्यन्ते ननु तेऽपि यत्र विमले पाखण्डदर्पच्छिदि।
भट्टश्रीजयराशिदेवगुरुभिः सृष्टो महार्तोदयः-
तत्त्वोपप्लवसिंह एष इति यः ख्यातिं परां यास्यति॥
पाखण्डखण्डनाभिज्ञा ज्ञानोदधिविवर्द्धिताः।
जयराशेर्जयन्तीह विकल्पा वादिजिष्णवः॥

संवत् १३४९ मार्ग० वदि ११ शनौ धवलकक्के महं० नरपालेन तत्त्वोपप्लवग्रन्थपुस्तिका लेखीति। भद्रम्॥

*tadevamupapluteṣveva tattveṣu
avicāritaramaṇyāḥ sarve vyavahārā ghaṭanta iti.
ye yātā nahi gocaraṁ suraguroḥ buddhervikalpā dr̥dhāḥ,
prāpyante nanu te'pi yatra vimale pākhaṇḍadarpacchidi
bhaṭṭaśrījayarāśidevagurubhiḥ sṛṣṭo mahārtodayaḥ-
tattvopaplavasimha eṣa iti yaḥ khyātim parāṁ yāsyati.
pākhaṇḍakhaṇḍanābhijñā jñānodadhivivarddhitāḥ
jayarāśerjayantīha vikalpā vādijiṣṇavaḥ.*

*saṁvat1349 mārگا0 vadi 11 śanau dhavalakakke maham0
narapālena tattvopaplavagrāthapustikā lekhīti. bhādrām.*

Translation: 1340

In this way, when all that you consider to be real, cannot be proved to be real, it is nice to say that, all our behaviors with the world are going smoothly only until we do not reflect on them critically. Even those doubts or critical questions which could not become the object of knowledge of even Bṛhaspati, the preceptor of the Gods, have been raised by the teachers viz. Shri Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, for the sake of removing the pride of the fools. This text called Tattvopaplavasīmha composed by them has a great future and it is going to be very famous. These doubts, or, critical questions of Jayarāśi which know how to refute the stubborn and which will expand the ocean of knowledge are indeed capable of winning over the arguments of the opponents. The manuscript of this book called Tattvopaplavasīmha was written by Narapal in the place called Dhavalkkaka on Saturday the 11th day of the Kṛṣṇapakṣa in the month called Mārgaśīrṣa in the Samvat 1349.



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